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ABSTRACT
Introduction
New Zealand (NZ) ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 2002, committing to prudent greenhouse 
gas (GHG) emission reductions. In an effort to promote public sector carbon management, in 
2004, Clark’s Labour-led Government funded local government membership in ICLEI’s 
Communities for Climate Protection - NZ (CCP-NZ) programme. In 2007, the same 
Government, in tandem with efforts to price carbon and develop an Emissions Trading 
Scheme, through the Carbon Neutral Public Service (CNPS) programme, sought to move the 
core public sector towards carbon neutrality (Clark, 2007c). In 2008, the NZ government 
changed from a Labour-led to a National-led Government, and this resulted in a shift in its 
carbon emission mitigation strategy, including the termination of the CNPS and the CCP-NZ 
programmes. 
Purpose
The research has two central objectives:  First, to determine why NZ’s newly  elected National 
-led Government cancelled the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programmes; and, second, to 
determine whether despite the discontinuation of these two programmes and in the absence of 
Government support, will NZ government organizations continue to strive for carbon 
emission reductions and neutrality.
Approach
This empirical research is investigative and probing, and comprises a series of semi-
structured interviews with senior managers responsible for the delivery of the CNPS and the 
CCP-NZ programmes within their respective organization. The architects of each programme 
(e.g. the NZ Prime Minister and CEO of ICLEI/ Director of ICLEI Oceania) are also 
investigated in order to glean insight into the rationale for the ultimate termination of these 
two programmes. Fieldwork is informed by publicly available information that  provides 
insight into Government’s rationale for creating and  discontinuing the CNPS and the CCP-
NZ programmes. 
Narrative analysis and termination theory serve as the primary methodological tools for this 
study, providing insight into meaning, interpretation and individual experience as it relates to 
the dismantling of the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programmes.
Findings
This study finds that though economic constraints and programmatic inefficiencies may have 
played a contributing role, political ideology is the primary  rationale for the termination of 
the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programmes.
With the ideological shift  towards strong neoliberal market environmentalism, Government 
support for initiatives like the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programmes has declined markedly, 
with the desire to demonstrate leadership in this area in complete retreat. Ultimately, 
notwithstanding the desire of some government organizations to continue with programme 
objectives, albeit with less priority, NZ public sector organisational resolve towards these 
goals has weakened.
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CHAPTER 1 - INTRODUCTION
1.1.  INTRODUCTION
1.1.1.  Introduction to the Thesis
Climate change is one of the most important and difficult challenges facing modern society. 
Given that  warming is attributed to, in large part, anthropogenic greenhouse gas (GHG) 
emission increases (IPCC, 2007c), communities from around the globe are mobilising to 
reduce their atmospheric GHG contribution, some with the goal of achieving carbon 
neutrality.  
New Zealand (NZ) ratified the Kyoto Protocol in 2002, committing to prudent GHG emission 
reductions. In an effort to promote public sector carbon management, in 2004, Clark’s 
Labour-led Government funded local government membership in ICLEI’s Communities for 
Climate Protection - NZ (CCP-NZ) programme. In 2007 the same Government, in tandem 
with efforts to price carbon and develop an Emissions Trading Scheme, through the Carbon 
Neutral Public Service (CNPS) programme, sought to move the core public sector towards 
carbon neutrality (Clark, 2007c). While the core public sector accounts for only 2% of NZ’s 
total GHG emissions (NZ Govt., 2007b),1 the aim of the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programmes 
was to elevate NZ’s international profile as a leader on sustainability in general and climate 
change and carbon neutrality in particular. In late 2008 the NZ government shifted from a 
Labour-led to a National-led Government, and this resulted in a change to its carbon agenda, 
including the abandonment of the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programmes. 
NZ Government response to climate change in general remains controversial and highly 
politicised.  As part  of a Royal Society of New Zealand Marsden-funded research programme 
into Carbon Neutrality: Fact or Fiction, this empirical study examines the processes of 
conception, outworking and termination of the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programmes in order 
to discover the beliefs, values, commitments and narratives at play  in government 
organizations which were keen (and to varying degrees mandated) to act on climate change 
and carbon mitigation.
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1 For clarity, the core public sector/service refers to the 34 departments (government agencies) that were mandated to participate in the CNPS programme, 
but does not include the broader state sector (e.g. Crown entities, schools, district health boards) (NZ Govt., 2007b). This is discussed further in Chapter 3.
1.1.2.  Chapter Purpose and Outline
The purpose of the Introduction chapter is to provide an account of the motivations for 
research and a concise depiction of the study’s research objectives. Moreover, by discussing 
the study’s importance and presenting its contribution to scholarly debate, in addition to 
qualifying the study’s limitations and key  assumptions, this chapter provides grounding for 
the subsequent chapters.
This chapter is divided into seven sections, (1.1) Introduction; (1.2) Motivations for PhD 
Research; (1.3) Research Objectives; (4) Importance of the Study; (1.5) Contributions to 
Knowledge; (1.6) Limitations and Key Assumptions; and, (1.7) Thesis Outline.  Building off 
the first section, which provides an introduction to the thesis itself, section 1.2 discusses the 
motivations for PhD study  in general. Section 1.3 presents the research objectives and 
explains the context within which they will be explored. Sections 1.4 and 1.5 highlight the 
practical and empirical importance of the study, while section 1.6 explains the study’s 
limiting factors and key assumptions. And, section 1.7 concludes the chapter by providing a 
structural outline of the entire thesis.
1.2.  MOTIVATIONS FOR PhD RESEARCH
My research philosophy is driven by a keen sense of curiosity  and a desire to continuously 
learn, with specific reference to the social-economic-environmental nexus and the solutions 
to solving the complex problems that exist within this space. The research programme 
Carbon Neutrality - Fact or Fiction? led by Professors Markus Milne and Amanda Ball, 
Department of Accounting and Information Systems, University  of Canterbury, provided me 
with an opportunity to expand my studies  and explore a field that is growing in global 
importance. 
While my previous research experience addressed climate science and policy, as well as 
organizational strategies for climate mitigation, it nevertheless lacked an in-depth 
consideration for organizational decision dynamics: how do organizations come to 
understand climate change - what are their cognitions? How do organizations decide how 
best to act on climate mitigation - how do they decide their commitments and actions? As a 
result, in addition to being an interesting line of inquiry, Carbon Neutrality - Fact or Fiction? 
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also serves a pragmatic function. Participation in this research programme would ultimately 
allow me to become a better researcher and a more well-rounded academic.
Why this research programme specifically? Simply  stated, as the literature has shown, while 
organizations are beginning to engage in climate mitigation activities, little scholarly work 
has attempted to flesh-out the motives that drive or resist action (Okereke, 2007). 
Additionally, insight gleaned from the work that does explore this dynamic (e.g. Okereke, 
2007; Kolk & Pinkse, 2004) tends to focus on analysis of websites, reports and 
questionnaires, rather than the narratives at play within organizations. 
Carbon Neutrality - Fact or Fiction? thus provided me with an opportunity to contribute to 
the scholarly  debate on climate change mitigation in general, and importantly, contribute to 
the vastly under-researched literature on public sector organizational carbon management and 
carbon neutrality. Moreover, by  approaching this study through in-depth longitudinal case 
studies, employing termination theory as the theoretical lens, and using narrative analysis to 
extract the experiences of those involved in the carbon management (and neutral) strategies, 
this study  provides an inside view of the state of public sector organizational buy-in for 
carbon mitigation in NZ under a National-led Government.
1.3.  RESEARCH OBJECTIVES
In November 2008, NZ underwent a shift in leadership, from a Labour-led to a National-led 
Government.  Following, two key programmes supported by Labour and intended to lead NZ 
government organizations towards carbon emission reductions and carbon neutrality were 
discontinued.  This study thus has two primary research objectives:
First, to determine why NZ’s newly elected National-led Government 
cancelled the Carbon Neutral Public Service programme and halted funding 
and therefore ended the Communities for Climate Protection programme; 
And second, to determine whether despite the discontinuation of these two 
programmes, NZ government organizations will continue to strive for 
carbon emission reductions and carbon neutrality.
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These research objectives are explored through four stages of programme evolution:2
Inception: Why were the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programmes created?
• Why did the organizations join the respective programmes?
• How did the organizations make sense of the climate change discourse? 
• What were the organizations’ drivers and motivations for action on 
              carbon mitigation? 
• What were the organizations’ expectations and goals?
Application: How effective were the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programmes?
• How did expectations and goals compare to the actual experience?
• How economic, efficient and effective (operationally) were the 
respective   programmes at achieving the intended goals?
Termination: Why were the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programmes 
terminated?
• How were programme economics, efficiency  and effectiveness 
evaluated? 
• Does government no longer believe in the need to manage carbon?
• Did termination meet resistance from programme supporters?
Next Steps: Will future iterations of the CNPS and the CCP-NZ 
programmes be created?
• What will the organizations do next - has the ethos of these programmes 
become business as usual?
• Will the organizations continue with or without the assistance and 
leadership of Government?
According to termination theory, programme termination typically has three rationales: 
economic constraints, programmatic inefficiencies and/ or political ideology (deLeon, 
1982a).  This research explores whether NZ Government’s cancelling of the CNPS and the 
CCP-NZ programmes aligns with deLeon’s rationales for programme termination. And, if so, 
which one, or combination?
In order to resolve the latter and inform the former research objective, NZ government 
organizations are explored to determine their cognitions, commitments and actions towards 
carbon emission reductions and achieving carbon neutrality. Cognitions, commitments and 
actions were chosen as the focal points of this research because they intrinsically represent an 
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2 These themes are the foundation for the semi-structured interview questions, and reflect the study’s theoretical framework, termination theory, discussed 
in Chapter 4.
organization’s direction, or path, towards carbon emission reductions and achieving carbon 
neutrality – cognitions tend to lead to commitments, which often result in actions. 
1.4.  IMPORTANCE OF THE STUDY
Climate change presents society with an unprecedented challenge as in order to stabilise 
atmospheric GHG concentrations and avert run away climate change, most of the developed 
world will have to cut emissions by 80-90% by 2050 (IPCC, 2007d; Stern, 2008b).  Indeed, 
given the seriousness of climate change, communities from around the globe are mobilising 
to reduce their atmospheric GHG contribution, some with the goal of achieving carbon 
neutrality.  
As a result of the urgency, both political and environmental, associated with the climate 
change problem, it  is critical to investigate how NZ government organizations are making 
sense of the climate change discourse, and to flesh-out the drivers and motivations for and 
ultimate actions on achieving carbon reductions and in some case carbon neutrality. Whether 
the discontinuation of the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programmes affects the respective 
organizations’ resolve for achieving carbon emission reductions and carbon neutrality is also 
informative. This study therefore provides Government with insight into the degree to which 
it can expect public sector organizations to engage climate and carbon mitigation efforts 
without Government support.
An understanding of the above issues can in turn provide Government policy makers with 
insight into how best to weave climate and carbon management policies with other national 
strategic policies such as agriculture and energy, two sectors which were responsible for 46% 
and 44%, respectively, of domestic greenhouse gas emissions in 2009 (NZ Govt., 2011c).
Additionally, because of the wicked nature of the climate change problem,3  and the 
complexity of policy solutions (e.g. Verweij et al., 2006), it is important to understand 
Government’s rationale for terminating two programmes designed specifically to help NZ 
government organizations mitigate against climate change.  This in turn provides insight into 
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3 See Rittel & Webber (1973) for an early discussion on the concept of wicked problems.
how NZ’s National-led Government intends to meet its international obligations under the 
Kyoto Protocol and manage its domestic carbon footprint in general.
Finally, NZ’s Government is not alone in its need to balance the economy, society, politics 
and the environment. And while NZ’s contribution to global GHG emissions is low, at about 
0.2%, and though the core public sector accounts for only 2% of NZ’s total GHG emissions 
(NZ Govt., 2007b), NZ has the 11th highest emissions per capita, and is among the developed 
countries with the highest increase in emissions from 1990 levels (NZ Govt., 2009c). Insight 
gained from this study could therefore have significant implications for global public sector 
involvement in climate change and carbon abatement.
1.5.  CONTRIBUTIONS TO KNOWLEDGE
There is a dearth of academic study  examining how government organizations come to 
understand the climate change discourse.  And, as identified by Ball et al. (2009b), Brody et 
al. (2010) and Milne & Grubnic (2011), there is also limited academic discussion concerning 
why and how government organizations contribute to climate change mitigation, and the 
efficacy surrounding their actions to achieve carbon neutrality (e.g. Ball & Grubnic, 2007; 
Ball et al. 2009b). 
Governments from around the world (e.g. UK, Germany, Norway, New Zealand) have 
recently  instituted public sector carbon management initiatives designed to lead by example 
in this area (NZ Government 2007b). This research goes beyond existing academic research 
to provide a critical analysis of how the NZ Government perceives, rationalizes and acts on 
climate change and carbon mitigation. Moreover, while there is a growing body of literature 
that explores NZ’s place in global climate policy  (e.g. Chapman, 2006; Chapman & Boston, 
2007), there remains a significant lack of empirical work focusing on how NZ public sector 
organizations address climate change. This study, through case-based narratives, therefore 
contributes to the understanding of how NZ government organizations makes sense of the 
climate change discourse, and documents their cognitions, commitments and actions towards 
achieving carbon emission reductions and carbon neutrality. And further, in exploring the role 
of political interference, this research sheds light on the resolve of NZ government 
organizations’ towards carbon mitigation.
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This research also contributes to political theory literature by applying deLeon’s rationales 
for programme termination to the contemporary topic of climate change, specifically to two 
of NZ’s key carbon mitigation programmes: the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programmes. This 
will provide insight into the robustness of deLeon’s rationales for programme termination, 
and also an appreciation for the inertia, vested interests and legitimacy  of the respective 
programmes through time.
1.6.  LIMITATIONS AND KEY ASSUMPTIONS
As with any research, an appreciation of the study’s limitations and key assumptions is 
critical to understanding its design, execution and interpretation. Thus the purpose of this 
section is to qualify the thesis. More precisely, here, limitations and key  Assumptions are 
briefly discussed to scope the boundaries of the study and provide insight into the mindset of 
the researcher.4 
Because of the objectives of the research, scope is limited to NZ, specifically to public sector 
organizations involved in the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programmes, respectively. In addition, 
analysis of data collected via interviews and organizational reports will be limited to the 
context of carbon mitigation and climate change, and where relevant sustainability more 
broadly.
Since participation in the CNPS programme was mandated by Government, it can be 
assumed that the 34 core government agencies that took part in the programme may not 
actually have supported the ethos or value of the initiative. However, given the high profile of 
the programme, it can be assumed that at the least the six lead-core agencies did appreciate 
the need to deliver on the programme’s mandate. Also, as a result of the programme’s quick 
design and implementation, it can be assumed that the core agencies did not posses the  in-
house expertise necessary to fulfil programme’s brief. Additionally, it is assumed that the 
lead-core agencies involved in the CNPS initiative are a good representative cross-section of 
core government agencies (NZ Govt., 2007b).
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4 Limitations can also refer to the barriers or elements that limited the scope of the study - things that got in the way.
Councils involved in the CCP-NZ programme, while supported by  Government, were not 
mandated to join the initiative. Therefore, it is assumed that because they chose to participate 
in the programme, they appreciate the ethos and value of the programme, be it from an 
environmental, political, social or economic perspective.  It  is further assumed that councils 
participating in the CCP-NZ programme are among the more proactive NZ councils with 
respect to carbon management and climate control. It is also assumed that the study selection 
representing the CCP-NZ programme member councils is representative of the total 
programme membership. It is also assumed that the total programme membership, though 
more proactive on climate mitigation than the non-programme member councils, is also 
representative of NZ councils in general. 
While some organizations were seeking only  to reduce their GHG emissions, it is assumed 
that organizations aiming for carbon neutrality were not striving for carbon zero (given 
available technology, achieving carbon zero is impractical at  this time). Additionally, it is 
assumed that carbon offsetting was a component of achieving carbon neutrality.
Organizations that consider themselves leaders may be more inclined to participate in 
research studies. Given that the research participants chose to partake in this study 
voluntarily, be it  via interviews or by  providing access to organizational reports, it is therefore 
assumed that there is a risk of self-selection bias.   It  is also assumed that the act of being 
studied in and of itself may influence how the organizations participate. What’s more, by 
targeting top-level management for organizational data, it is assumed that this study limits 
feedback and perspective to top-level discourse.5  
And importantly, while every effort has been made to remain neutral and ensure a reflexive 
approach, it is assumed that the researcher’s history, beliefs and interests have influenced the 
study to some extent.
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5 Though noted later in the thesis, it should also be noted here that while efforts to meet with Dr. Nick Smith (Minister for the Environment and Climate 
Change Issues) were unsuccessful, it can be assumed that the nature or narrative of the interview would likely have mirrored the content of National’s 
media releases vis-a-vis the termination of the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programmes. In other words, it can be assumed that the interview would have been 
censored to reflect party ideology.
1.7.  THESIS OUTLINE
In addition to the Abstract, Acknowledgements, List of Tables, Figures and Articles, the 
thesis is divided into nine chapters, (1) Introduction; (2) Literature Review; (3) Context and 
Background; (4) Theoretical Framework; (5) Methods; (6) Findings I; (7) Findings II; (8) 
Discussion; and, (9) Conclusion. Following the final chapter, References and Appendices are 
included. Structurally, each chapter begins with an introduction and ends with a summary that 
locates the chapter within the research study. The volume between these two sections depends 
on the nature of the chapter itself, with some chapters being significantly larger than others. 
To assist with progression, each chapter builds off the previous chapters and includes 
footnotes at the end of each page.
Chapter 1 begins with a discussion of my motivations for PhD studies, then presents the 
research objectives, highlights the importance of the research, notes the study’s limitations 
and key assumptions, and provides a structural outline of the thesis. Chapter 2 provides a 
grounding in the prior research relevant to the thesis focus. Namely, the chapter presents the 
climate change debate, the basic science of climate change and discusses climate policy, 
specifically as it relates to international, national, local and organizational policy for climate 
mitigation. Chapter 3 discusses the NZ policy context within which the study takes place, and 
provides a detailed overview of the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programmes. In addition, this 
chapter highlights the emission profile, projections and reduction goals of NZ and the 
organizations that were involved in the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programmes.
Chapters 4 and 5 discuss the study’s approach. Specifically, Chapter 4 presents the theoretical 
lens through which the study is explored, highlighting deLeon’s rationales for programme 
termination. Chapter 5 presents the study’s methods, including a discussion on qualitative 
methodology and reflexivity, ethics, and research execution and interpretation. 
Chapters 6 and 7 describe the research findings. More accurately, Chapter 6 breaks-down the 
various themes discovered from the interviews with the senior managers from the case 
studies, and Chapter 7 interprets the themes through the study’s theoretical framework. 
Further to the themes emerging from the case studies, Chapter 6 also presents the findings 
resulting from word count analysis of council reports.
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Chapter 8 provides the analytical finish to the study.  Drawing on all the data amassed 
through the research, this chapter discusses the evolution of the CNPS and the CCP-NZ 
programmes in order to glean insight into the National-led Government’s rationale for 
programme termination, and to understand public sector organizational resolve towards 
carbon mitigation. Following, Chapter 9 concludes the thesis by addressing the research 
findings in the context of the study’s two research objectives, highlights the theoretical and 
practical implications of the study’s findings, including contributions to knowledge, and ends 
with a brief discussion on future research directions.
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CHAPTER 2 - LITERATURE REVIEW
2.1.  INTRODUCTION
2.1.1.  The Debate
Climate change is one of the most important and complex challenges facing society  today. 
With the release of the International Panel on Climate Change’s (IPCC) Fourth Assessment 
Report (2007), in combination with such landmark publications as Flannery’s The Weather 
Makers (2005),6  Stern’s The Economics of Climate Change (2006) and Gore’s An 
Inconvenient Truth (2006),7 the notion of climate change has leapt to the forefront of popular 
and public policy  discussion - deservedly garnering the public’s attention (Sonnenfeld, 2008). 
Building on these key  texts, a variety  of publications aimed at the general public continue to 
advocate for (e.g. McKibben's [2010] Eaarth: Making a Life on a Tough New Planet)8  or 
against (e.g. Wishart’s [2009] Air Con: The Seriously  Inconvenient Truth About Global 
Warming) action to mitigate or adapt to climate change, indicating continued interest in 
understanding the science and challenges of anthropogenic climate change.  And this interest 
is echoed in the academic community as well,9  where study into the dynamics and the 
influence of – and solution to - anthropogenic climate change is strong. 
As Pielke et al. (2009) suggest, the human species has an immense capacity to influence 
Earth’s climate system. And, according to Hansen (2005), via the rapid production of GHG 
emissions, the human species has altered the energy balance of the planet.10  Further to this 
point, as Lomborg (2007, p. xi) indicates, “that humanity has caused a substantial rise in 
atmospheric carbon dioxide (CO2) levels over the past centuries, thereby contributing to 
global warming, is beyond debate.” Such assertions leave some in the scientific community 
to conclude “the world’s prolonged streak of exceptionally  good climate has probably come 
to an end” (Weart, 2008, p. 87).
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6 Diamond’s Collapse (2005), though perhaps to a lesser extent, may have also been influential.
7 These texts brought the notion of climate change to the forefront of popular and public policy discussion, much the way Rachel Carson’s Silent Spring 
launched the environmental movement in 1962, and the Brundtland Report, in 1987, launched the idea of sustainable development (climate change, in the 
context of global energy, featured in a chapter of the Report).
8 See also for example, Lovelock (2009); Hansen (2009); Hamilton (2010); Lomborg (2007, 2010); and, Pielke (2010).
9 Strong interest in climate change is also echoed in the grey literature, with several research institutes from round the globe dedicating effort to climate 
change affects and mitigative action. See for example: in the UK the Tyndall Centre, the Climate Research Unit, the Global Climate Network; in Japan the 
Asia Pacific Network; in Canada the Pembina Institute; and, in the US the PEW Centre, the World Resource Institute.  
10  In 1988, Hansen stated to a NASA Congressional Committee that it was 99% certain, anthropogenic forcing of CO2 was responsible for the warming 
tend (Shabecoff, 1988).
Because of increasing temperatures, key elements of Earth’s climate system, such as 
Antarctica and Greenland’s glaciers and the Arctic’s sea ice, may in fact  reach their tipping 
point (or critical threshold) this century, resulting in a situation where by  small perturbations 
can cause disproportionately large reactions (e.g. Lenton, 2008). And worryingly, according 
to Rahmstorf et  al. (2007), new data suggest sea level may be responding more quickly  than 
models indicate. Moreover, Kriegler et al. (2009, p. 5) caution that though scientific 
knowledge concerning tipping points remain poor, and though uncertainty exits with regard 
to the prospect of triggering major climate shifts, this “does not  necessarily imply that such 
events are considered to be remote.”
While the debate continues, strong academic attention has focused on the problem of 
discerning the difference between natural and anthropogenic influences on surface 
temperature (e.g. Lean & Rind, 2008).  Of the natural forcings evaluated, solar forcing has 
received the greatest  attention, and after much study, has been shown to have little influence 
on modern warming (e.g. Solanki et al. 2004; Ammann et al., 2007; Lockwood & Frohlich, 
2007; Lockwood, 2008). In support of this finding, Lockwood (2008) concludes that 75% of 
warming since 1987 can in fact be attributed to anthropogenic factors.  
Gerhard (2004), on the other hand, indicates that arguments supporting human-induced 
climate change fail to appreciate the magnitude of natural elements that drive and maintain 
Earth’s climate.  What’s more, according to Gerhard (2006), there is little evidence to suggest 
that the ‘imperceptible’ rise in temperature (as measured in the lower stratosphere) is 
correlated with the steady  rise in atmospheric CO2 concentration. Sorokhtin et al. (2007) add 
that contemporary  theories of anthropogenic forcing of climate change tend to ignore the 
paleoclimate record, and rely on computer models that overtly assume GHG emissions are 
the primary drivers of climate change.11
Interestingly, there is yet another debate concerning whether global measurements of 
warming are more to do with the urban heat island (UHI) effect (e.g. Arnfield, 2003; Imhoff 
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11  Computer simulation is a key component to climate prediction. Model interpretation, however, is challenging, and the associated uncertainty must be 
considered appropriately (e.g. Parker, 2010). 
et al., 2010),12  a phenomenon first recognized in 1810 (Pearce, 2010a). In this vein, it is 
suggested that instrument proximity to urban centers has influenced data trends, as is evident 
in Jones et al. (2008),13 where it is shown that  in eastern China, between 1951-2004, UHI was 
responsible for 40% of the warming.14  Yet, as Pearce (2010a, p. 64) notes, “most climate 
researchers have felt  safe in ignoring the potential of urban heat islands to confound their 
temperature trends.” 
Ultimately, as Held et al. (2011, p. 4) note, despite climate science being an unpredictable 
science by  nature, “the general public is not used to uncertainty  amongst scientists.” And as a 
result, the authority of climate science has been called into question. As Jasanoff (2010) 
indicates, scientific progress is dependent on transparency  and trust.  For climate science 
these tenets were shaken following the ‘climategate’ scandal at the Climate Research Unit 
(CRU), University  of East Anglia, UK, where 4660 files including emails, documents, raw 
data and code from 1996-2009 were hacked and leaked from the CRU to the public (e.g. 
Adam, 2010a; Webster, 2009; Pearce, 2010a).15  Though the CRU was cleared of any 
misconduct (e.g. Gillis, 2010; McCarthy, 2010; Adam, 2010b), the media coverage fueled the 
resolve of climate skeptics (e.g. Johnson, 2009; Heffernan, 2010; Feldman, 2009).  In the 
end, the content of the leaked files has been shown to not undermine the argument that 
anthropogenic warming is occurring. What remains, however, according to Berkhout (2010), 
is to address the challenge of how to best respond to the climate change dilemma.
In addition to the credibility of climate science, as Doran & Zimmerman (2009) explain, 
efforts to measure and judge the scientific consensus on anthropogenic climate change (e.g. 
Oreskes, 2004; Montford, 2010) have also been openly  criticized (e.g. Walther & Hughes, 
2005; Peiser, 2005; Pielke et al., 2009).16 Developing their own study, using what they argue 
is an unbiased approach, Doran & Zimmerman (2009, p. 23) find, however, that “the debate 
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12  Akbari et al. (2009) find that increasing the worldwide albedo of urban centres can reduce radiative forcing sufficiently enough to offset approximately 
44Gt of CO2 emissions.
13 Earlier, in Jones et al. (1990), the authors find that urban heating is not a significant factor contributing to the observed global warming trend.
14 Chen et al., (2003) find that increasing energy associated with economic growth is driving Shanghai’s UHI.  Chung et al., (2004) show similar results for 
South Korea, arguing that the country’s UHI is more likely the result of intense energy usage and changes in land cover resulting from rapid urbanization 
than increased temperatures associated with climate change. 
15  The scandal spurred skepticism (among some) about IPCC findings in general, i.e. claims that Himalayas could be ice-free by 2035, as discussed in 
WG2-AR4 (e.g. Manning, 2011).
16  The Economist March 20, 2010, Briefing: The science of climate change – The Clouds of Unknowing, provides an interesting discussion on the 
uncertainties of climate science and a look into the appropriateness of the IPCC’s wording within its Assessment Reports.
on the authenticity of global warming and the role played by human activity is largely 
nonexistent among those who understand the nuances and scientific basis of long-term 
climate processes.” 
While academic literature continues to explore both the mechanics of climate change and the 
consensus of its cause, a new scope of scholarly work addressing the media’s coverage of the 
topic has begun to emerge (e.g. Boykoff et al., 2007; Boykoff, 2008; Staudt, 2008). Here, 
Staudt (2008) finds that mainstream media coverage of climate change has moved away  from 
emphasizing the perspective of climate skeptics, and now rarely  questions the scientific 
consensus. In the last  three years, as Eastin et al. (2010) indicate, media coverage of climate 
change has increased radically.17  In the UK, according to Boykoff (2008), much of the media 
coverage tends to target society’s fears, focusing on the doom and gloom.18  And though 
Sampei & Aoyagi-Usui (2009) find that public concern with regard to climate change tends 
to increase in line with media coverage, Anderegg et al. (2010), show that the American 
public continue to express doubt about both human induced warming, and the level of 
scientific consensus.19  Perhaps, as Lookwood (2009) suggests, climate scientists continue to 
face opposition because they challenge the underpinning of Western consumerism and 
political allegiances (see also Malka et al., 2009; Nisbet, 2009). Along this line, as Walther et 
al. (2005) indicate, it is indeed a major achievement of the climate change research 
community that climate change has actually been elevated on the global political agenda.20
2.1.2.  Chapter Purpose and Outline
The purpose of the Literature Review chapter is to provide an overview of the current state of 
academic literature surrounding the thesis topic, and in so doing, recognise where the 
literature lacks in attention.  In this vein, the Literature Review chapter serves to hone the 
context of the thesis and ultimately rationalise the merit  of the research itself, i.e. the 
Literature Review chapter identifies the gap  in the current academic literature that the thesis 
intends to fill.
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17 Bray & Shackley (2004) explore public perception of weather events in relation to their acceptance of anthropogenic climate change.
18 See Hulme (2007) for a discussion on social fear about the future of climate change, discourse on the mastery of nature and the notion that government 
should protect society from fear. 
19 According to Weart (2008), the possibility of greenhouse warming generated enough interest that it was included in an American public opinion poll in 
1981. Interestingly, the poll found that over a third of American adults had heard about the greenhouse effect, and when asked directly, nearly 2/3 indicated 
that the problem was somewhat serious or very serious. Current trends will be discussed later in this chapter. 
20 See Cooper & Pearce (2011) for a local government (English) example of this trend.
This chapter is divided into four primary  sections, (2.1) Introduction; (2.2) Climate Science; 
(2.3) Climate Policy; and, (2.4) Summary  and Locating the Research. Building on the climate 
change debate discussed in the introduction, section 2.2 explores the state of the scientific 
literature in four broad categories: greenhouse gas emissions and temperature; glaciers and 
sea ice; oceans; and, geoengineering. Next, in section 2.3, the state of climate change policy 
is discussed in the context of its impact on the global political agenda, specifically with 
regard to literature on global mitigative efforts to combat the affects of anthropogenic climate 
change.21  This then follows into an exploration of scholarly  attention to organizations and 
their efforts to manage carbon. In the final section, section 2.4, in addition to providing a 
brief summary of the previous three sections, the gap in the literature is recognized, and the 
justification for the subsequent thesis is identified.
2.2.  CLIMATE SCIENCE
2.2.1.  Greenhouse Gas Emissions and Temperature
Interest in the relationship  between atmospheric GHG emissions, namely CO2, and increases 
in global temperature have featured prominently in contemporary scholarship (e.g. Hansen et 
al. 2006; Mann et al., 2009). The notion that GHGs, or heat-absorbing gases, in the 
atmosphere may influence surface temperature is not new (e.g. Fourier, 1827; Tyndall, 1875; 
Arrhenius, 1896), however, nor is the belief that anthropogenic GHGs play a role in 
exacerbating this natural phenomena (e.g. Callendar, 1938). The role of anthropogenic 
climate change, albeit at an intermediate level, even featured in the Club of Rome’s Limits to 
Growth in 1972.22  And, in 1985, at the close of the International Conference on the 
Assessment of the Role of Carbon Dioxide and other Greenhouse Gases in Climate Variation 
and Associated Impacts, held in Villach, Austria, it was declared that, as the result of 
increasing atmospheric CO2, “in the first half of the next century, a rise in global mean 
temperatures could occur which is greater than any in man’s history” (Pearce, 2010a, p. 33).
Since the industrial revolution, anthropogenic CO2, resulting from the burning of fossil fuels, 
has continued to rise, increasing at a rate of approximately 2 parts per million (ppm) per year 
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21 While this chapter (and more broadly this research) focuses on climate change from a mitigative perspective, there is also a growing body of work that 
addresses adaptation, see for example: Urwin & Jordan, 2008; Twomlow et al., 2008. Eriksen et al. (2011, p. 7) provide an interesting discussion about the 
importance of recognizing that not all forms of climate change adaptation are necessarily good or appropriate, and present “four normative principles to 
guide responses to climate change.” This is addressed once again in this chapter in section 2.3.4: Local Government Response.
22 In Limits to Growth climate change featured as a possible scenario for how the planet might evolve as the atmosphere’s ability to absorb CO2 declines 
(Meadows, 1972).
(Hansen et al., 2008), from 280ppm during pre-industrial times to 381ppm in 2006 (Thornes 
& Randalss, 2007).  Study of the paleoclimate record indicates that though concentrations of 
atmospheric CO2 have varied over time (e.g Pagani et al., 2005; Loulergue et al., 2008; Luthi 
et al., 2008), atmospheric CO2 and temperature have been closely  coupled over the past 
800,000 years (Tripati et al., 2009). Similarly, the research shows that temperature increases 
over the past three decades is closely correlated with atmospheric CO2 (e.g. Broecker, 1975; 
Kuo et al., 1990; Hansen, 2006). And, as Esper et al., (2005) suggest, with improved 
techniques for interpreting proxy data and the paleoclimate record, confidence in such claims 
has increased.23  Nonetheless, D’Arrigo et al. (2006) emphasize the importance of caution 
when drawing inferences on correlations from the paleoclimate record, particularly with 
regard to scale. 
This warming is significant. As Hansen et al. (2006) find, global warming of more than 1C, 
relative to 2000, constitutes what they refer to as ‘dangerous’ climate change (see also 
Oppenheimer, 2005; Monastersky, 2009).24  Hansen et al. (2010) add that  global temperature 
over the past decade increased on par with the previous two decades, indicating that 
temperatures are on the rise. Conversely, Solomon et al. (2010) suggest  that global 
temperature has been near flat since the late 1990s. Hansen et al. (2010)’s findings, however, 
are consistent with projections of the IPCC, which suggest that the average surface 
temperature of “Earth is likely to increase by 1.1-6.4°C by the end of the 21st century, 
relative to 1980-1990” (IPCC, 2007).
Models indicate that as the global temperatures continue to rise, the occurrence of extreme 
temperatures will also increase (e.g. Tebaldi et al., 2006; Alexander et al., 2006; Allan & 
Soden, 2008; Brown et al., 2008).25  Sterl et  al. (2008) add that the occurrence of extreme 
temperatures will increase at a rate greater than global mean temperature.26 And, as Meehl & 
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23 See Mann et al., 1998 and Mann et al., 1999 for an early, now controversial (e.g. McIntyre and McKitrick, 2003), temperature reconstruction using proxy 
indicators.
24 Based on the analysis of results from a conceptual model of anthropogenic CO2 emissions (assessing the trade off between delay and action), Vaughan 
et al. (2009) find that immediate mitigative action is necessary if dangerous climate change is to be avoided. 
25 Extreme precipitation is also expected to increase (e.g. Botzen et al., 2010).
26 According to Lomborg (2007), while an increase of 2C for England will likely translate into 2000 more heat deaths, it may also result in 20,000 fewer cold 
deaths.
Tebaldi (2004) indicate, the occurrence and geographic distribution of intense heat waves will 
also grow.27
 
Another interesting dynamic influencing global temperature is the role of air pollution, 
specifically aerosols (Mann et al., 2009; Wild et al., 2007). Ramanathan & Feng (2009) find 
that the dimming effect caused by aerosols may mask as much as 47% (albeit  at uncertainty 
range of 20-80%) of the warming associated with GHGs. Given this phenomena, as efforts 
continue to tackle air pollution, the true impact of global warming may become more 
apparent and more alarming.28
2.2.2.  Glaciers and Sea-ice
Glacier and sea-ice melt have become iconic symbols of climate change, and in line with 
popular interest, academic attention to the affect warming is having on these phenomena is on 
the rise. Because of challenges associated with the accuracy  of instrument data (e.g. Chen et 
al., 2009), the debate surrounding the influence of global warming on Greenland and 
Antarctic ice-sheets has been ripe with controversy for the last two decades. In both 
Greenland and Antarctica the research shows a variation in ice-sheet mass balance. In terms 
of Greenland, the literature suggests that while marginal ice-sheet melt is accelerating, 
interior ice-sheets are thickening (e.g. Johannessen et al., 2005; Zwally  et al., 2005; Chylek et 
al., 2006). And, as Chylek et al. (2004) indicate, Greenland’s ice-sheet summit temperatures 
have actually declined at a rate of 2.2 degrees celsius (C) since 1987. Overall, however, 
Rignot & Kanagaratnam (2006) find that Greenland glacial mass loss has doubled over the 
last decade.
A similar debate persists with regard to Antarctica’s ice-sheet mass balance.  While it  is 
widely  held that Western Antarctica is losing mass (e.g. Thomas et al., 2004; Rignot et al., 
2008; Chen et al., 2009; Hellmer et al., 2012),29 in contrast to previous studies (e.g. Rignot & 
Thomas, 2002; Zwally et al., 2005), Chen et al. (2009) find that East Antarctica is also losing 
mass, particularly  in the coastal regions.  Additionally, Chen et al. (2009) show that, 
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27  For a discussion on how climate change is affecting human health see for example, Patz et al., (2005) and Frumkin et al., (2008); and, how climate 
change is affecting forest fire occurrence and intensity, see for example, Podur & Wotton (2010). 
28 For further discussion on the role of aerosols, global dimming and climate change, see for example, Streets et al., 2006; Menon et al., 2008; Stanhill & 
Cohen, 2009; Badarinath et al., 2010; Kudo et al., 2011.
29 Hellmer et al. (2012) show that increasing sea temperature has a significant influence on Antarctic ice mass loss, particularly in the Weddell Sea.
according to interferometric synthetic aperture radar (InSAR), Antarctic’s rate of ice loss 
accelerated 75% from 1996 to 2006. This is particularly interesting given that Antarctic sea 
ice (different from ice-sheets) increased between 1979 to 2004, in spite of in-situ 
observations indicating warming in both atmosphere and ocean in the same area (Zhang, 
2007). Ultimately, the thinning of both Greenland and Antarctic ice-sheets is more extensive 
and more pronounced than previously believed (Pritchard et al., 2009). 
In terms of melting sea-ice, since the release of the Arctic Climate Impact Assessment Report 
in 2004, the Arctic has received a great deal of academic attention, particularly with regard to 
sea-ice decline.  Arctic sea-ice, according to Lawrence et  al. (2008), has been consistently in 
decline for the past several decades.  Comiso et al. (2008) support this claim, adding that 
according to satellite data, the year 2007 saw an exceptionally  low sea-ice cover.30 
Worryingly, Serreze & Francise (2006) believe that surface air temperatures in the Arctic are 
nearing a critical threshold31  where summer solar radiation absorption is beginning to hinder 
sea-ice growth the following autumn and winter.  This phenomenon also affects the 
surrounding permafrost, which is becoming increasingly vulnerable to increased heat 
accumulation (Lawrence et al, 2008).32
2.2.3.  Oceans
Over the course of the last two decades, as climate change has become an increasingly 
prominent feature in everyday life, multidisciplinary academic attention to its influence on 
the world’s oceans has ballooned (Willis et al., 2010). Much study has explored historical sea 
level trends, employing techniques such as marine sediment oxygen isotope analysis (e.g. 
Berger 2008) to delve millions of years into the past  (e.g. Bintanja et al., 2005); modern 
measures are achieved by, for example, tide-gauge instrumentation (e.g. Church, 2006; 
Merrifield, 2009) and satellite altimeters (e.g. Willis et al., 2010). 
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30 In addition to having a myriad of impacts on the vitality of the Arctic ecosystem, a declining Arctic sea-ice cover also has the potential to affect Canada’s 
sovereign claim to the Arctic Archipelago, and thus its resource wealth (e.g. Birchall, 2006).
31 As mentioned previously, Arctic sea-ice is a key element of Earth’s climate system. When the critical threshold is reached, small perturbations can cause 
disproportionately large reactions – potentially resulting in a trend of rapid ice-melt.
32 For further discussion on permafrost dynamics associated with global warming, see for example, Smith, et al., 2005; Osterkamp, 2005; Bowden, 2010; 
Reyes, et al., 2010; Hollesen et al., 2011.
Contemporary sea level rise has been attributed to warming (e.g. Vermeer & Rahmstorf, 
2009) associated with increased concentrations of atmospheric GHGs, and as Woodworth 
(2006) suggests, the modern rise in sea level is significantly larger than that measured over 
the past several centuries.  As Milne et al. (2009a) explain, the current rise in sea level is 
attributed to two primary factors: land-based glacial melting (predominantly  from Greenland 
and Antarctica) and thermal expansion of seawater.  The relative contribution of these factors 
has generated increasing scientific attention (e.g. Johannessen et al., 2005; Shepherd & 
Wingham, 2007; Pfeffer 2008; Bamber 2009; Berger 2010), with the latest evidence, as 
presented by Vermeer & Rahmstorf (2009), projecting that the thermal share of sea level rise 
will decrease relative to the ice-melt contribution. 
As the research demonstrates, global sea level is accelerating (e.g. Milne, 2009; Willis et al., 
2010), and as Church & White (2006) suggest, if the current rate of acceleration is 
maintained, sea level in 2100 could range from 280 to 310 mm above 1990 levels.  Such 
projections have spurred research into the geo-physical social implication of elevated sea 
levels, for example impacts on regional scales (e.g. Nicholls & Mimur, 1998; Dasgupta 
2009), atoll islands (e.g. Webb & Kench, 2010) and coastal population concentrations (e.g. 
Anthoff et al. 2006; Crowell et al. 2007; McGranahan, 2007). 
Along with sea level, the ocean’s thermohaline circulation (THC) system has also stimulated 
academic interest (Boning et al., 2008; Dickson et al., 2002; Stouffer et al., 2006). Because 
the THC is a mechanism for transferring heat (vertically and horizontally) around the globe, 
it is potentially sensitive to weakening via increased melt water infusion, or fresh water 
forcing (e.g. Dickson et al., 2002). This has generated much debate, with Hakkinen & Rhines 
(2004) and Kerr (2004) suggesting that sub-polar circulation may have weakened in the 
1990s, relative to the late 1970s and 1980s. Though later, Kerr (2006) argues that the THC 
system is not weakening. Jungclaus et al. (2006) contend that under realistic climate 
scenarios, there is no sign that the THC will shutdown this century. 
If a THC shutdown were to occur, based on evidence from the ice ages, a cooling trend may 
result, particularly in the northern hemisphere (Schiermeier, 2006). But, as Vellinga et al. 
(2008) suggest, a shutdown may also reinforce global warming. Ultimately  contention 
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remains (Clark et al., 2002; Stouffer et al., 2006), and as Knutti & Stocker (2002) suggest, 
predicting the future evolution of ocean circulation is complex.  This notion leaves some to 
wonder whether the THC system is the Achilles heel of the climate system (Broecker, 1997).
In the meantime, the rise in ocean temperature is accelerating. Yet the link between hurricane 
activity and increasing surface and sea temperatures remains unclear.  While Emanuel et al. 
(2008) find that the global genesis rate of tropical cyclones is decreasing, the regional genesis 
rate is on the rise.  Saunders & Lea (2008) show similar results, indicating that a 0.5C 
increase in sea surface temperature in the Atlantic, translates into a 40% increase in Atlantic 
hurricane frequency. Knutson et al. (2008), on the other hand, find that warming of the 
Atlantic will result in fewer Atlantic hurricanes, but the most powerful of those that do occur 
will be even stronger. Here, in terms of storm intensity, the literature is more consistent, 
indicating that as surface and sea temperatures continue to rise, so too does the strength of 
hurricanes (e.g. Webster et al., 2005; Curry et al., 2006; Bengtsson et al., 2007; Irish et al., 
2010). 
Another area where academic interest is strong concerns how climate change affects the 
chemistry of the world’s oceans in general. Over the course of the last  200 years, according to 
Zeebe et al. (2008), the oceans have absorbed approximately  40% of anthropogenic CO2 (see 
also Monastersky, 2009). And, as Kerr (2010) explains, the current rate of absorption is 
exceeding the ocean’s ability to flush surface CO2 into the deep sea (where it is incorporated 
into the sediment), rendering seawater more acidic. As Caldeira & Wickett  (2003) point out, 
if current rates of CO2 production continue, the ocean may experience changes in pH greater 
than it has experienced in the past 300 million years. 
Implications of ocean acidification on marine life are not well understood at present (e.g. 
Doney et al., 2009; Talmage & Gobler, 2010). It  is widely held, however, that marine fauna 
will be negatively impacted by a lower ocean pH (Hester et al., 2008; Doney et  al., 2009). 
This is particularly the case for calcareous marine organism (e.g. Gazeau et al., 2007; Fabry 
et al., 2008; Talmage & Gobler, 2010), including coral reef ecosystems (e.g. Hoegh-Guldberg 
et al., 2007; Cantin et al., 2010). Moreover, Stramme et al. (2008) find that as temperatures 
rise, dissolved oceanic oxygen declines. Polovina et al. (2008) support this finding, indicating 
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that as temperatures have increased, global oligotrophic gyres (low-oxygen zones) have been 
expanding. Models predict ocean-oxygen declines of 1 to 7% over the next century (Keeling 
et al., 2010). With this decline, and the expansion of low-oxygen zones, marine ecosystems 
are likely to be negatively affected (Stramme et al., 2008; Keeling et al., 2010).
2.2.4.  Geoengineering
Research in the field of geoengineering, as means to solve global climate change, has become 
mainstream (Maynard, 2009), with investigative efforts coming from such distinguished 
research institutions as, for example, NASA (e.g. Lane et al., 2007), and the United 
Kingdom’s Parliamentary Office of Science and Technology  (e.g. P.O.S.T., 2009) and Royal 
Society (e.g. R.S., 2009; Brumfiel, 2009). At its root, geoengineering involves manipulating 
the natural environment to meet a given end, in the modern instance, to counter the effects of 
global warming.33  Simply put, geoengineering provides, as Barnett (2008) notes, an 
alternative to reducing greenhouse gas emissions. 
In practice, geoengineering techniques are generally  divided into two categories: carbon 
sequestration; and, solar radiation management. An example of carbon sequestration is 
carbon capture and storage (CCS).34 CCS has emerged as a potentially strong solution to the 
global warming dilemma (Spreng et al., 2007), and as a result  has recently  generated much 
academic attention (e.g. Huijits et al., 2007; Spreng et  al., 2007; Kelemen & Matter, 2008; 
Nikulshina & Steinfeld, 2009; Ehlig-Economides, 2010; Bickel & Lane, 2010).  While CO2 
capture is generally  considered for point sources, such as a power generating plant, a parallel 
vein of research explores the feasibility of capturing CO2 from the ambient air (e.g. 
Nikulshina & Steinfeld, 2009). And, though CCS does promise a solution to the Western 
world’s addiction to the burning of fossil fuels, at  present, as Spreng et al. (2007) argue, the 
technology is energy intensive.35 Moreover, Ehlig-Economides (2010) finds that the geologic 
reservoir required to support the storage of CO2 generated by a commercial power plant is 
significant in size, and thus diminishes the utility of CCS as carbon management measure.36
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33 As Keith (2000, p. 245) explains, “the distinction between geoengineering and mitigation is fuzzy,” rendering it controversial as solution to global warming 
(Keith, 2000).
34 The process of CCS involves the capture and subsequent storage of CO2 produced during the combustion of fossil fuels.
35 According to Hamilton (2010), there are currently no coal-fired power plants capturing their carbon.
36 Kelemen & Matter (2008) suggest further research into the viability of periodite carbonization as an affordable, long-term method of CO2 sequestration.
While research into the feasibility  of CCS continues, public acceptance of the technology has 
also been explored.  In a survey of people living near potential storage sites, Huijits et  al. 
(2007) find that attitudes towards CCS, in general, are positive, but attitudes become more 
negative when the storage site becomes proximal to their neighborhood. 
Another example of carbon sequestration is ocean iron fertilization (OIF). Proposed by 
Martin (1990), OIF differs from CCS in that its process and storage medium are facilitated by 
the ocean.37   As Smetacek & Naqvi (2008) explain, OIF can be implemented relatively 
quickly, and can potentially improve zooplankton stocks, which could have the additional 
benefit of boosting whale populations. On the other hand, as the research (e.g Boyd et al., 
2007; Smetacek & Naqvi, 2008) suggests, the caveat associated with OIF is the potential of 
oxygen depletion and algal blooms (e.g. Gilbert et al., 2005), both harmful to marine biota. 
 
The second category of geoengineering, solar radiation management, involves altering, or 
controlling, Earth’s albedo to reduce surface temperatures (e.g. Wigley, 2006; Morton, 2007). 
The two leading approaches that have attracted academic attention are cloud seeding (e.g. 
Bower et al. 2006; Latham et al., 2008; Jones et al. 2009) and aerosol dispersion (e.g. 
Crutzen, 2006; Rasch et al. 2008; Robock et al. 2008), both designed to increase Earth’s 
albedo. In terms of the former, as Latham et al. (2008) explain, seeding maritime clouds with 
seawater particles, thereby increasing cloud reflectivity, can potentially balance the warming 
associated with atmospheric CO2 increases. Jones et al. (2009) find that a warming 
reductions of 0.6K, could defer future global warming by approximately 25 years.  As the 
research demonstrates, however, cloud seeding does run the risk of altering the hydrological 
cycle, and therefore may impact precipitation patterns (e.g. Jones et al. 2009).
Though different in application, stratospheric aerosol dispersion also serves to increase 
planetary  albedo. As Rasch et al. (2008) suggest, the injection of approximately 1.5 Tg of 
sulphur per year in the lower stratosphere could stabilize the doubling of atmospheric CO2. 
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37 OIF involves fertilizing oceanic iron-limited phytoplankton, leading to blooms and subsequent sinking and deep-sea storage of organic matter containing 
atmospheric CO2 (e.g. Zeebe & Archer, 2005; Buesseler, 2008).
Robock et al. (2008) concur, indicating that a continuous injection of sulphur could in fact 
cause global cooling.38 
Notably, Lenton & Vaughan (2009) emphasize the importance of employing geoengineering 
in parallel to CO2 emissions mitigation, rather than as an alternative to it. Building on this 
point, Matthews & Caldeira (2007) explain the harm in becoming dependent on 
geoengineering, indicating that warming could dramatically increase should the 
geoengineering practice fail or stop  unexpectedly.  What’s more, Matthews et al. (2009) add 
that, though geoengineering may  provide a means to control global temperature, be it via 
carbon sequestration or solar radiation management, it fails to address the problem of ocean 
acidification.39  Ultimately, as the research shows, despite its complexity and potential for 
harm, geoengineering remains an intriguing solution to climate change (e.g. Schneider, 2008; 
Victor, 2008; Bickel & Lane, 2010). 
2.3.   CLIMATE POLICY
2.3.1.  International - Kyoto Protocol
The literature on the current international climate change debate is vast (Ward & Boston, 
2007), with much attention focused on the United Nations Framework Convention on 
Climate Change’s (UNFCCC) Kyoto Protocol and the economics of a global climate change 
solution.40  While the Kyoto Protocol has achieved acclaim for its merit as a multilateral 
agreement, according to Ward & Boston (2007), it has also attracted criticism for being 
“economically inefficient, environmentally flawed and politically impractical” (see also 
Barrett, 2005; Danish, 2007).41  To this end, Howarth & Foxall (2010) caution that the Kyoto 
Protocol may only serve a symbolic purpose, and veil the actual environmental impact of 
climate change.42 
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38  In their investigation of the most effective geoengineering options, Lenton & Vaughan (2009) find that stratospheric aerosol injection is among the 
greatest alternatives for returning surface temperatures to pre-industrial levels.
39  Harvey (2008) offers the infusion of limestone powder in the upper strata of the ocean as a potential solution to ocean acidification. The projected 
economic consequences of ocean acidification are also generating academic interest (e.g. Cooley & Doney, 2009).
40 The Kyoto Protocol is an international agreement linked to the UNFCCC. The Protocol was adopted by consensus at COP3 in 1997 and came into force 
in 2005. Under the Protocol, developed nations agree to take on fixed and binding targets for GHG emission reductions, on average 5.2% below 1990 
levels for the first commitment period (CP1), 2008-12. (e.g. Chichilnishy & Sheeran, 2009; Ward & Boston, 2007).
41  As Muhovic-Dorsner (2005) suggests, the design of the Kyoto Protocol is flawed and allows for a number of loopholes, which can challenge policy 
commitment. And, according to Lomborg (2007), Kyoto is “impossibly ambitious.”
42 Lohmann (2005, p. 204) is similarly cynical of the carbon market stemming from the Kyoto Protocol: “that the scale and contradictions of the work needed 
to build the carbon market to which the Kyoto Protocol has committed its ratifiers have been greatly underestimated.” 
This notion was further fueled by the failure of United Nations Climate Change Conference 
in Copenhagen, in December 2009, to “reach an agreement on a new international legal 
architecture for addressing anthropogenic climate change post-2012” (Macintosh, 2010, p. 
2964). While the conference did result in the creation of the Copenhagen Accord, which 
endeavours to hold global average temperature increases at 2C, without an international 
binding legal obligation, resolve remains illusive.43 What's more, while 2C has emerged from 
the political debate as the metric for delineating dangerous anthropogenic warming, 
according to Anderson & Bows (2008), this metric has no scientific basis,44  and thus can 
misguide policy action – as Bode (2006) suggests, the need to reduce atmospheric GHGs 
does not elicit much objection, it  is the concrete targets that tend to spike disagreements. As 
Tol (2007, p. 424) adds, the 2C target is “supported by rather thin arguments, based on 
inadequate methods, sloppy reasoning, and selective citation from a very narrow set of 
studies.” 
Because of UNFCCC’s restrictive definition of climate change, the Kyoto Protocol, and the 
global response in general, is ineffective and as Pielke (2005) suggests, has reached 
‘gridlock.’ Pielke (2005) believes that the UNFCCC should adopt a more comprehensive 
view that  incorporates science, policy and politics, such as that used by  the IPCC. 
Additionally, as Tompkins & Amundsen (2008, p. 1) find, “though the Convention is clearly 
important, … it is not adequate to inspire national action to resolve the problems of climate 
change.”45  Vogler (2010) also notes that the lack of trust  between member states is mounting, 
further challenging the Protocol’s effectiveness. 
Ultimately, as Boston & Kengmana (2007) emphasize, post-2012 policy  discussion must 
address how ambitious global emissions targets must be, and determine how the burden 
should be distributed, between developed and developing nations, as well as within 
developed nations. And, importantly, Okereke & Bulkeley (2007) and Okereke et al. (2009) 
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43 2010‘s COP16 in Cancun, Mexico, was equally anticlimactic, and barely made international news. 2011’s COP17 in Durban, South Africa, also show’s 
little sign of progress, with talks continuing to stall on a resolution to the problem of the world’s biggest emitters not being bound to the treaty - either 
because they refuse to ratify the agreement (e.g. U.S.) or because they were not originally bound (e.g. China, India) (e.g. Eilperin, 2011).
44 Chapman & Boston (2007) indicate that the origin of the 2C target is the EU and a number of other countries, based on available scientific evidences that 
suggest that an increase beyond 2C would be ‘dangerous.’ As noted earlier, Hansen et al. (2006) believe that warming of more than 1C, relative to 2000, is 
‘dangerous.’
45 Tompkins & Amundsen (2008) add that while there remains no agreement with regard to the effectiveness of the Convention, there is in fact no actual 
consensus as to how best judge its effectiveness.
remind the academic community  that the intrinsic, bureaucratic challenges of the global 
governance of climate change must be explored in future negotiations of post-2012 climate 
action, otherwise progress will be further stymied.46
2.3.2.  International - Economics
According to Helm (2003), a part from perhaps population growth (a problem that is certainly 
interrelated with climate change), climate change is the largest economic problem the world 
has ever faced. The economic impacts of climate change and the cost associated with 
abatement have featured prominently in academic literature over the last decade.  Beginning 
with early discussions on sustainable development (e.g. Brundland, 1987; Dyllick & 
Hockerts, 2002; Hopwood et al., 2005; Byrch et al., 2007; Byrch et al., 2009),47 then building 
into the arena of atmosphere commoditization (e.g. Block, 2006; Morss & Hook 2005; 
Muhovic-Dorsner, 2005; Thornes & Randalls, 2007), the literature has, thanks perhaps to the 
release of the Stern Review in 2006, begun to hone in on specific economic dynamics 
associated with climate change. For example, the cost of climate change mitigation to the 
global economy (e.g. Stern, 2008a,b; Hepburn and Stern, 2008; Barker, 2008; Neumeyer, 
2007; Weitzman, 2007; Yohe and Tol, 2007), equity weights across borders (e.g. Bohringer & 
Welsch, 2004; Anthoff and Tol, 2010; Eastin et al., 2010; Leaf et  al., 2003), discounting 
through time (e.g. Kavuncu and Knabb, 2005; Nelson, 2008; Guest, 2010), the marginal 
damage cost of CO2 emissions (e.g. Tol 2005), and emissions trading (e.g. Braun, 2009; Clo, 
2009; Engels, 2009; Lohmann & Sexton, 2010) are topics that have all become commonplace 
in the current academic literature.  
Research into the economics of climate change received a boost of renewed interest 
following the release of the Stern Review in 2006.  As Barker (2008, p. 173) explains, in his 
review, The Economics of Climate Change, Stern pushed the traditional disciplinary 
boundary of economic policy “from a single-disciplinary focus on cost benefit analysis to a 
new inter-disciplinary and multi-disciplinary risk analysis.” Stern (2006) argues for decisive 
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46 Okereke & Dooley (2010) explore the post-2012 climate negotiations with particular attention to the importance of reducing emissions from deforestation 
and forest degradation (REDD). See Backstrand & Lovbrand (2006) for an early discussion on forest carbon sequestration.
47  According to Tregidga & Milne (2006), though sustainable development became mainstream in political and business forums in the 1980s, its history 
goes back further, with its beginning in environmentalism. The notion of sustainable development received another boost of legitimacy following the 
creation of the World Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD) in 1992, which was linked to the Earth Summit of the same year, in Rio de 
Janeiro. Assessing post-Kyoto climate mitigation regimes, Streimikiene & Girdzijauskas (2009) argue that the only way to tackle climate change is via 
sustainable development.
and immediate action on climate change, suggesting that the benefits of near term action 
significantly outweigh the economic costs of inaction. According to Stern (2006), using 
formal economic modeling, the cost of immediate action, to stabilize at 500ppm, and to 
mitigate the ‘worst  impacts’ of climate change, can be approximated to about 1% of global 
gross domestic product (GDP) per year, while the cost of inaction will likely  exceed 5% of 
global GDP into perpetuity. 
Stern’s review, however, has triggered debate among academics (e.g Tol and Yohe, 2006; 
Nordhaus, 2007; Smith, 2010), particularly with regard to the technical aspects of his 
economic analysis.  In fact, Weitzman (2007), for example, suggests that Stern’s haste for 
action is not supported by the majority view of economic analysts.  And, though Tol & Yohe 
(2006) agree that there is an economic case for immediate action, they caution that Stern’s 
‘dubious economics’ may further polarize the debate (see also Neumeyer, 2007; Yohe & Tol, 
2007).48  In Stern (2008b), the author further emphasizes the need for immediate action, 
indicating that the risks are greater now than previously believed.
The importance of equity weights has become prominent as a metric to distinguish the 
relative cost of climate change for a rich developed country versus a poor developing country 
(e.g. Anthoff & Tol, 2010; Anthoff et al., 2009). Often, as Leaf et al. (2003) point out, there is 
a tension between the developed and the developing world when it comes to economic policy 
to mitigate climate change (e.g. Najam, 2003; Patt, 2008); while the developed world 
emphasize a global response, the developing world argue that climate change is the result of 
the developed world’s over consumption.49  And though the principles of the UNFCCC 
(Article 3) do address equity, as Ward & Boston (2007) suggest, how these principles should 
be applied remains an ongoing debate within the international community (e.g. Rajamani, 
2006; Boston & Kengmana, 2007).50 
This tension is further heightened by the notion that while the developed world is indeed 
responsible for the increase in atmospheric GHG emissions (i.e. aggregate emissions since 
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48 For Stern’s response to his critics, see Hepburn & Stern, 2008; Stern, 2008a.
49 According to Hoffman (2010, p. 1), while economic activity may be the driving force behind climate change, “individual beliefs, cultural norms and societal 
institutions guide the development of that activity.”
50  As ISIS (2009, p. 8) indicate: “Kyoto has slowed the reduction of carbon intensity. It has given developing countries the moral right to pollute… this 
arrangement threatens to invert the polluter pays principal into pay the polluter.”
1750), it is the developing world that is most affected by, and least capable to adapt to, the 
impacts of climate change (e.g. Fussel, 2010; Tol et al., 2004; Mendelsohn et al., 2006; 
Srinivasan et al., 2008). Exacerbating the matter further, as Fischer et al. (2005) explain, as a 
result of the developing world’s dependence on agriculture for trade, its economy is acutely 
vulnerable to the variability  of climate change (e.g. Barnett & Adger, 2007).51 Ultimately, as 
Chasek (2007) notes, the developing world continues to seek a solution that recognizes the 
common but differentiated responsibility noted in the UNFCCC (Article 3).
Given the connection between GDP and GHG increases, Eastin et  al. (2010) remind us that 
the developed world’s unsustainable consumptive habits must  be curtailed (see also 
McDonough & Braungart, 2009; Hamilton, 2010).  Along a similar vein, as the developing 
world continues to expand its economy (particularly  India and China), it  is expected that it 
will be responsible for over 90% of global GHG emission growth over the next century 
(Garnaut, 2008; see also Lomborg [2007] for a more general discussion of this issue).52 This 
has triggered further discussion with regard to the notion of contraction and convergence, 
proposed by Meyer (2000), where along with a drastic reduction in global emissions, per 
capita emissions are gradually  equalized across all countries (e.g. Bohringer & Welsch, 2004; 
Bohringer & Helm, 2008).53
Using the principles of sustainomics, Munasinghe (2010) suggests that in tandem with efforts 
to de-link the economy from carbon based technologies (e.g. Leaver & Gillingham, 2010), 
the developed world should provide the developing world with a ‘safety  net’ to help  adapt to 
the impacts of climate change; as Boston & Kengmana (2007) suggest, ‘climate-proofing’ 
development in the low-income countries could cost in the range of US$10 billion – US$40 
billion annually. Moreover, as Karakosta et al. (2010, p. 1546) add, technology transfer from 
the developed to the developing world can act as a catalyst to promote “environmentally 
sound and sustainable practices, institutions and technologies.”54  Likewise, the middle-
income countries (i.e. Brazil, China, India) should learn from the experience of the developed 
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51 For a discussion on how national geo-social security is vulnerable as a result of climate change, see for example Barnett (2003) and Barnett & Adger 
(2007); see also Reuveny (2007) and Warner  (2010) for a discussion on climate induced-migration.
52 According to Ward & Boston (2007), developing countries are now responsible for over 50% of global GHG emissions, and thus the role of developing 
countries to mitigate global GHG emissions is increasing.
53 For an interesting discussion on the values of contraction and convergence versus historical accountability, as a means to allocate emission rights, See 
Starkey (2008).
54 See also GCN (2010), for a closer look at developed-country investment in clean energy technology in the developing world.
world and adopt innovative modern, low-carbon, technologies (e.g. Chasek, 2007). The 
importance of developing and middle-income country involvement in global climate talks is 
further emphasized by the dependance of these countries on black carbon intensive 
technologies. From a mitigation perspective, the reduction of such activities (i.e. improved 
crop management) and technologies (i.e. cleaner fuels, new cooking technologies) offers an 
immediate, albeit short-term, decrease in atmospheric warming (Baron et al., 2010).55
Furthermore, given the current financial crisis, the developed world could bolster its 
economy by investing in its own adaptive capacity (e.g. Aakre & Rubbelke, 2010). As 
Egenhofer (2008, p. 1) suggests, “politicians very  rapidly have discovered climate change as 
the way  to ‘spend themselves’ out of recession.” And, as Huang et al. (2008) find, applying 
the Kuznets Curve hypothesis, GDP growth can occur while GHG emissions decline.56
Another area attracting scholarly  attention concerns discounting, where values are drawn for 
outcomes that are expected in the future (e.g. Ramsey, 1928; Guest, 2010).57   While the 
literature suggests that the economic risks associated with climate change justify immediate 
mitigative action (e.g. Ha-Duong et  al., 1997; Nelson, 2008), it  also warns that action must 
not impede economic growth, because it is economic growth that will assuage the projected 
damage associated with climate change (e.g. Philibert, 1999).  Kavuncu & Knabb (2005) also 
note that it may be several generations before the economic benefits of early action are 
actually experienced. Ultimately, as Nelson (2008, p. 444) indicates: “the problem is that if 
we allow our economies to run along a business-as-usual path, we will bequeath to future 
generations a world whose life-sustaining capacities will be severely compromised.” In 
which case, a dollar in the future could be more valuable than it is today – discounting is 
perhaps only appropriate if future generations are assured to possess greater wealth and 
capacity to cope with the effects of climate change (Chichilnisky & Sheeran, 2009).
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55 According to Baron et al. (2010), within the scientific community, it is accepted that about 40% of current net warming is the result of black carbon.  Black 
carbon has a relatively short residence time in the atmosphere (several weeks), and thus holds large potential for near-term carbon mitigation. Kandlikar et 
al. (2010) caution, however, that black carbon reductions, while important should be employed in conjunction with other CO2 emission reduction efforts.   
56  Huang et al. (2008, p. 239) indicate that: “at the beginning of economic development, environmental quality will deteriorate with economic growth. 
However, after reaching a peak point (turning point), environmental quality may improve with subsequent economic growth.”
57 Hillerbrand & Ghil (2008) draw attention to the moral dilemma of balancing duties to future generations against duties to the current generations. 
Exploring the balance between the cost to reduce carbon dioxide emissions and the avoided 
cost of climate change impacts (e.g. Tol 2002a,b), Tol (2005) finds that the marginal damage 
cost of carbon dioxide emissions vary depending on the study, but  will not likely go beyond 
$50/tC.58  Tol (2005, p. 2072) notes that the studies with the most “pessimistic estimates of 
climate change impacts do not withstand a quality test”.  Tol (2005) concedes that though 
there is a high level of uncertainty, estimates can serve to benchmark costs for emissions 
abatement policies.59 
Internationally, carbon, or emissions trading, both via voluntary and regulated mechanisms, 
has become the preferred path to mitigate GHG emissions, and a growing body of academic 
literature exploring carbon markets and emissions trading has emerged (e.g. Lohmann, 2006; 
Lohmann & Sexton, 2010).60   The global carbon market, specifically  the European Union’s 
(EU) emissions trading scheme, came into law in 2005 when the Kyoto Protocol came into 
force, and has since grown considerably (Chichilnisky & Sheeran, 2009).61 
In 2008 the value of the global carbon market reached 92 billion euros, with a marginal 
increase (despite the marginal increase, the result of the global recession and falling carbon 
price, credits traded rose by  68%) in 2009 to 94 billion euros (Murray, 2010).  According to 
Bloomberg New Energy  Finance, “in spite of the recession and little progress at international 
climate talks, the value of the global carbon market has continued to grow - albeit at a slower 
rate” (Turner, 2011, p. 1). In 2010 the value of global carbon traded increased 5%, with the 
European market accounting for 81% of total trades, and 2011 is projected to increase further 
yet, reaching 107 billion euros, a 15% increase over 2010 (Turner, 2011).62  Chichilnisky  & 
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58 According to Tol (2005, p. 2072), “if we take all studies without discriminating between them, the best guess for the marginal damage costs of carbon 
dioxide emissions is $5/tC, but the mean is $104/ tC. This difference reflects the large uncertainty combined with the notion that negative surprises are 
more likely than positive ones.”
59 See Pearce (2003) for a discussion on how to assess the ‘right’ figure for the social cost of carbon, based on research done in the UK.
60  Carbon tax has emerged as the alternative to carbon trading. Like carbon trading, a tax is a market-based mechanism, but unlike a cap and trade 
system, the tax-based mechanism does not have an emissions cap. Zhang et al. (2011), exploring the effect of a carbon tax on coal emissions in China, 
show that “the use of a carbon tax scheme is one of the most practical policies that can mitigate the challenge of climate change. In the province of British 
Columbia, Canada, revenue from its carbon tax goes back into companies and individuals via reductions in income tax. The tax is currently valued at CAN
$25 / tonne, and will reach CAN$30/ tonne in 2012 (The Economist, 2011). In Australia, starting in 2012, carbon from the country’s 500 largest polluters will 
be taxed at AU$23 / tonne (Milne & Grubnic, 2011).
61 The global carbon market’s roots began to take form in the early 1990s, during a global climate and economics meeting hosted by the OECD in Paris 
France (e.g. Chichilnisky & Heal, 1995; Chichilnisky & Heal, 2000). 
As Chichilnisky & Sheeran (2009, p. 33) indicate: “until the creation of Kyoto’s carbon market, which is still in its infancy, there was little incentive to reduce 
emissions, since no one had to pay for them.” 
62 Optimism surrounding growth of the global carbon market is likely to decrease as countries consider their next steps vis-a-vis phase two of the Kyoto 
Protocol. 
Sheeran (2009) suggest  that the price of carbon on the global market is likely to reach about 
$30 per tonne in the near future, which will generate about $900 billion each year. Randalls 
(2011, p. 127), however, cautions that while the carbon market is focused on the “calculative, 
managerial approach to the environment,” in other words cost effectiveness, it fails to 
adequately address the ethical process that underlies its function as a mitigative tool.
Emissions trading has become a popular means for industrialized countries to mitigate GHG 
emissions, and is seen as a critical component in the global response to climate change (e.g. 
Egenhofer, 2007; Braun, 2009).63   Since the launch of the EU Emissions Trading Scheme in 
2005 - now the largest trading scheme in the world (Engels, 2009), academic attention to 
global emission trading has increased significantly (e.g. Kruger & Pizer, 2004; Engels et al., 
2008; Egenhofer, 2007; Braun, 2009; Clo, 2009; Engels, 2009; Lohmann & Sexton, 2010). 
While emissions trading requires countries and organizations to draw on new skills and 
expertise in order to succeed in the carbon market (e.g. Engels, 2009), the architects of such 
schemes face similar challenges (e.g. Kruger & Pizer, 2004). In exploring the effectiveness of 
the EU’s Emissions Trading Scheme, for example, Clo (2009) finds that because of over-
allocation of allowances, market scarcity  is not ensured, thus rendering the scheme 
ineffective, both economically and environmentally.64  Also, given the differentiated global 
approach to setting a price on GHG emissions, some country’s businesses may face economic 
disadvantage over their competitors (Bartleet  et al., 2010). Exacerbating the challenge 
further, as Lohmann & Sexton (2010) add, all the cap  and trade systems launched to date, in 
an effort  to gain their support, provide the biggest  polluters with large pollution permits, 
resulting in a ‘polluter earns’ system.  Zhang (2004) suggest that carbon/ energy  taxes tend to 
show only  modest results because the sectors where such a tax would be most effective are 
typically exempt on grounds of international competitiveness.65  Ultimately, because the EU 
Emissions Trading Scheme fails to engage communities and residents, as Janner-Klausner 
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63 Dagoumas et al. (2006) emphasize that in order for the Kyoto Protocol to be economically effective, national efforts must extend beyond domestic action, 
otherwise developed countries will experience significant costs.
64 See Engels et al. (2008) for a discussion on the EU Emissions Trading Scheme Phase I (2005-07) and Phase II (2008-12) emission allowances.
65  Based on empirical studies of existing carbon/ energy taxes, Zhang (2004) finds that competitive losses are not significant, and tend to be less than 
commonly perceived. Comparing a relative to an absolute GHG emissions cap, Quirion (2005) finds that, though quantifiably the difference is minor, an 
absolute GHG emissions cap yields greater welfare than a relative GHG emissions cap.
(2007) suggests, politicians may  have missed an important opportunity to ‘transform public 
attitude towards’ climate change and climate change mitigation.
2.3.3.  National/ Domestic
Academic attention to national climate mitigation strategies (e.g. Hennessy et al., 1996; 
Simeonova & Diaz-Bone, 2005; Buhrs & Christoff, 2006; Lorenzoni et al., 2007; Ye et al., 
2007; Chapman, 2008; Hwang, 2010; Holmes, 2010; Howarth & Foxall, 2010) and the role 
of transnational cooperation (e.g. Pattberg & Stripple, 2008) is on the rise. As the literature 
suggests, government’s from around the world are becoming conscious of the necessity to act 
on climate change (e.g. Pinkse & Kolk, 2009) and are beginning to develop long-term 
mitigation strategies (e.g. Bailey, 2007; Boston, 2008); the UK and Scottish Governments, for 
example, have set statutory targets for an 80% reduction in emissions by 2050, relative to 
1990 baseline (Bebbington & Barter, 2011).66 
As Buhrs & Christoff (2006) note, government political ideology  is a key element in the 
determination of a country’s environmental agenda.  Dunlap & McCright (2008) echo this 
notion and suggest that this is particularly apparent in the United States, where the partisan 
gap on climate change is quite distinct; in the US the division between Republican and 
Democratic ideology with regard to climate is explored in the ‘Six Americas’ study  (e.g. 
Leiserowitz et al., 2010; Hamilton, 2010).67  Large political divisions on issues such as 
climate change tend to challenge the formation of a unified and coherent policy  response (e.g. 
Griffiths et al., 2007).
However, even when the notion of climate change and the need for an international response 
is accepted across national political parties, a unified and coherent policy response may 
remain illusive. In NZ, for example, where “government has made many statements that 
indicate a commitment to sustainability and sustainable development” (e.g. Buhrs, 2008, p. 
62),68  the creation of a national climate strategy  is hampered by indecision and the desire to 
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66 Examining geographical variations in market environmentalism, Bailey (2007) indicates that signatories of the Kyoto Protocol have implemented a gamut 
of New Environmental Policy Instruments (NEPI) as part of the global response to climate change. Agnolucci et al. (2008) explore different scenarios 
(higher energy prices, behavior change and energy conservation, and high growth including investment in low-carbon energy) for achieving reduced carbon 
emissions.
67  Referring to the Six America’s study, Hamilton (2010) indicates that those who are convinced that warming is real and a serious threat (Alarmed) are 
primarily Liberals (48% Liberal; 14% Conservative), while those who do not accept that warming is real and remain wholly unconcerned (Dismissive) are 
primarily Conservatives (76% Conservative; 3% Liberal).
68 Additionally, as noted by Buhrs (2008), sustainable development is a cornerstone of NZ’s Resource Management Act 1991.
not get ahead of other countries (e.g. Chapman, 2006) that may perhaps have a greater 
mitigative impact, or more to lose.69  For NZ, like many countries, decarbonizing the 
economy has an array of social and economic implications (e.g. Chapman & Boston, 2007), 
which are potentially outweighed by the insignificance of the country’s overall contribution 
to the accumulation of atmospheric GHG emissions (e.g. Macey, 2007). But for NZ in 
particular, decarbonizing the economy may present unique economic challenges given its 
distinctive national emission profile – 49% of NZ’s national emissions come from 
agriculture, a proportion more akin to developing economies (Renowden, 2007; Ward & 
James, 2007).70  As a result, in terms of post-2012 international climate discussions, NZ is 
emphasizing the importance of recognizing the national circumstances of participant 
countries (Macey, 2007).71 
Another element governments must consider when developing a climate mitigation strategy 
is the public’s perception of risk (e.g. Leiserowitz, 2006; Lorenzoni et al., 2007).  As 
Leiserowitz (2006) suggests, the public’s perception of risk, or lack there of, can influence 
political action. Since perception is largely a function of experiential factors, this has the 
potential to impede mitigative action. This has fundamental implications for the development 
of an international climate mitigation response given that the majority of climate impacts are 
projected to occur not in the industrialized West, where the majority of emissions are 
generated, but in the developing world.  Importantly  then, as Rong (2010) reiterates, it is 
critical to include the developing world in future climate negotiations.
Yet from a GHG emission production perspective, the inclusion of developing countries in 
future climate mitigation talks is important for another reason: China is currently the world’s 
largest emitter of CO2 (Lin & Sun, 2010).72  Given China’s heavy  contribution to global 
emissions, the country’s policy  approach to climate mitigation has begun to attract increasing 
academic attention (e.g. Ye et al., 2007).  Of particular interest, given China’s massive export 
economy linked to the West, is the emission dynamic associated with trade (e.g. Weber et al., 
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69 Drawing on the state of California’s plan to reduce emissions by 80% from 1990 levels by 2050, Chapman & Boston (2007) note that ambitious emission 
reduction policies do not necessarily harm the economy, and may in fact produce benefits.
70 According to Renowden (2007), globally, agriculture accounts for about, on average, 14% of emissions, so NZ is quite high in this regard.
71 NZ’s climate change policy will be discussed further in Chapter 3. 
72 China’s energy mix is currently dominated by coal-fired generation (80%). With the addition of 2 large coal power stations per week (at present), China is 
expected to have 1000 GW of new coal power by 2030 (Helm, 2008).
2008; Su et al., 2010). According to Lin & Sun (2010), China’s production-based emissions 
exceed its consumption-based emissions, which under the current climate policy and 
international trade rules, results in carbon leakage.73  
A similar area generating academic interests concerns product life cycle analysis, where the 
embedded carbon, including transportation needs, of a product  is quantified (e.g. Saunders & 
Barber, 2008). Interestingly, because of different production methods, a product that travels a 
great distance to reach its market may indeed have a lower carbon footprint than one 
produced close by.
In terms of national climate mitigation policy focus, though the emphasis varies between 
countries, national policies typically concentrate on energy (e.g. Krumdieck, 2009; Ward & 
James, 2007b; Agnolucci et al., 2009), which given, the fact that energy supply is usually 
dominated by  fossil fuel, is as Klein et  al. (2005) suggests, a logical entry point. For Pinkse & 
Kolk (2010, p. 262), “energy transition seems necessary  to lower dependence on fossil fuels.” 
In line with this conclusion, energy policies tend to focus on the national grid’s mitigative 
potential via renewable sources of energy (e.g. Sohel et al., 2009; Packer, 2009; Penniall & 
Williamson, 2009; Sovacool, 2009; Mason et al., 2010; Kelly, 2007; Barry & Chapman, 
2009).74 
In addition to energy, national climate mitigation policies generally focus on three other key 
elements: (1) Urban form and transport (e.g. Ishii et  al., 2010; Chapman, 2008), including 
consideration for long-haul air travel and ship activity (e.g. Smith & Rodger, 2009; Howitt et 
al., 2010; Higmam & Cohen, 2010; Hare et al., 2010; Milne & Grubnic, 2011); (2) 
Agriculture (e.g. del Prado et al. 2010; Beukes et al., 2010), which according to Ward & 
James (2007a), is responsible for approximately 15% of global GHG emissions - about 2/3 of 
these emissions are from developing countries; And (3), forestry (e.g. Lasocki, 2001) and 
land use change (e.g. Schwaiger & Bird, 2010), which as Ward & James (2007c), note, 
account for 18% of global GHG emissions (24% of global CO2 emissions).
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73 As Renowden (2007) notes, because European goods already have a built-in carbon price, to avoid leakage, Europe has pushed for a carbon tariff on 
goods coming from countries that do not subscribe to global emission reduction activities.
74 There is also research exploring the impacts of climate change on electricity demand (e.g. Mideksa & Kallbekken, 2010). 
Despite its central position in public discourse, and though public acceptance of the need to 
take responsibility for climate change is arguably growing, it is unsurprising that Jordan and 
Lorenzoni (2007) wonder if in fact there is a political climate for policy change. This 
sentiment resonates with Chasek (2007, p. 117) as well, who questions whether the 
international community have the “political will to tackle climate change head on?” Climate 
change policy remains rife with complexity, perhaps as Helm (2008) suggests, because of a 
disconnect between science and policy (see also Anderson & Bows, 2008; Boston & Lempp, 
2011).75  As a result, little or no progress on emission reductions have been made to date by 
governments (e.g. Helm, 2008).76  Yet key  research reports commissioned by governments 
(based on the IPCC position) argue that in order to avoid runaway climate change, and to 
stabilise atmospheric GHG concentrations, most of the developed world must cut emissions 
by 80-90% by 2050 (IPCC, 2007d; Stern, 2008b).  Ultimately, according to Boston & Lempp 
(2011), because of the transboundary nature of climate change causes and consequences, 
political commitment from individual countries to reduce GHG emissions remains untenable.
2.3.4.  Local Government
Historically  local government has not featured prominently in discussions on international 
policy, with regard to climate change, energy or otherwise. This trend began to change in the 
1990s, however, when the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development 
(OECD) published the results of its review of urban energy management (see OECD, 1995). 
Recognizing the important role of local energy management, as it  was clear cities were large 
sources of energy related GHG emissions (e.g. Romero-Lankao, 2007), the EU developed a 
funding stream for local government that helped make possible the creation of energy 
management programmes within Europe (European Commission, 2004).  This facilitated the 
emergence of local authority networks interested in sharing best practices in energy 
management and climate mitigation (e.g. Allman et al., 2004), both within Europe (i.e. the 
Climate Alliance and Energy Cities) and internationally (i.e. the Cities for Climate Protection 
[CCP]).77 
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75 Boston & Lempp (2011) explain that the barrier to international progress on climate mitigation is the result of four political asymmetries (inherent in liberal 
democracies): the voting asymmetry; the cost benefit asymmetry; the interest group asymmetry; and, the accounting asymmetry.
76  According to Verweij et al. (2006), given the complexity and opposing views on the global climate change problem, a ‘clumsy solution’ that creatively 
addresses all the opposing views, is required to create an effective policy response.
77 The availability of local government carbon management reports, which typically provide guidance on carbon quantification and mitigation, is on the rise. 
See for example; Introducing Local Authority Carbon Management (Carbon Trust, 2008); and, Carbon Neutrality Framework for Local Government (ICLEI, 
2008a).
According to Betsill & Bulkeley (2007), these networks have since increased in both the size 
and the diversity of their membership, and equally, the importance of local government in 
international climate policy discussions has also grown (e.g. Lindseth, 2004; Aall et  al., 2007; 
Parker & Rowlands, 2007). Likewise, academic attention to the role local government plays 
in climate change policy  has begun to rise (e.g. Von Seht, 2002; Coene & Menkveld, 2002; 
Bulkeley & Betsill, 2005; Davies, 2005; Bulkeley & Kern, 2006; Bulkeley & Schroeder, 
2008).78  In the United States, local government and grass-roots initiatives have tended to fill 
the void left by the national government79 when it comes to advancing the climate mitigation 
agenda (e.g. Knuth et al., 2007). This, as Lutsey & Sperling (2008) indicate, suggests that the 
US is more committed to climate mitigation than is globally perceived. That said, however, as 
Brody et al. (2010) demonstrate, the US public sector’s response to climate change, be it via 
mitigation and/ or adaptation, remains weak.
As Betsill & Bulkeley (2007) and Romero-Lankao (2007) note, though interest in the role 
local government plays in climate policy has increased, academic attention to the experience 
of cities involved in climate mitigation has tended to focus on industrialized countries (e.g. 
Demeritt & Langdon, 2004; Wall & Marzall, 2006; Byrne et al., 2007; Granberg & Elander 
2007; Brody et al., 2008; Peters et  al., 2010; Cooper & Pearce, 201180).  Given that cities in 
the global South have in fact joined programmes such as CCP, for example (e.g. Dubeux & 
Rovere, 2007), this would suggest that perhaps the research has not yet  caught up to practice 
(Betsill & Bulkeley, 2007).
In terms of areas of interest receiving academic attention, three primary areas emerge in the 
literature. The first involves motivation, exploring drivers for local government involvement 
in climate mitigation. Here, Bartlett  & Dibben (2010) highlight the importance of champions 
as feature drivers for actualizing the climate agenda. In addition, local governments are 
beginning to appreciate the business case for carbon mitigation (e.g. Kousky & Schneider, 
2003; Greenaway & Carswell, 2009). The second area of focus tends to deal with the barriers 
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78 As Ball et al. (2009b, p. 579) explain: “the literature underlines the role of local government agencies in particular as having responsibilities and decision-
making powers in traffic, public transport, economic development, housing, and urban land-use planning which have led to a degree of political support for 
climate change policies, but with authorities lacking central government political and financial support, as well as, in many cases, competence to act.”
79 As Brody et al. (2010, p. 591) explain, Obama is in the process of considering a “first ever US Federal climate change mitigation policy.”
80 Cooper & Pearce (2011) provide an interesting look at climate change performance measurements in local authority areas in England. Here, while the 
authors note that the vast majority of local area agreements include at least one climate change indicator as priority, the indicators are problematic.   
local governments experience when it comes to the incorporation of climate mitigation 
policy. Here, notwithstanding Betsill & Bulkeley’s (2007) observation that the academic 
literature tends to focus on industrialized cities, the literature suggests that political as well as 
administrative structures, or lack there of, tend to hamper the incorporation of climate 
mitigation activities, and this, though not isolated to the global South, is prevalent in the 
global South (e.g. Holgate, 2007; Kithiia & Dowling, 2010). The third area of academic focus 
concerns community  engagement, exploring how local government engage their population 
and how authorities transfer emission mitigation values to the public (e.g.Wall & Marzall, 
2006; Peters et al., 2010).
Though local government climate change policy has tended to focus on mitigation, as the 
affects of climate change become more apparent and immediate, a shift towards adaptation is 
likely to occur (e.g. Wilson, 2006; De Oliveira, 2009; Urwin & Jordan, 2008).81  Laukkonen 
et al. (2009) concur, adding that local government policy concerning climate change must 
encompass both mitigative and adaptive action if it is to effectively reduce vulnerability.82 
Moreover, given their proximity to the community,83  and often direct authority over local 
transport planning, land use change and spatial development (e.g. Coenen & Menkveld, 
2002; Lindseth, 2004; Brody et al., 2010), local authorities can certainly, as Kok et al. (2002, 
p. 46) suggest, “play an important role in realizing national climate policy targets” (see also 
Sovacool & Brown, 2009). In line with this notion, according to Lindseth (2004, p. 325), data 
from around the world suggests that local authorities have jurisdiction over “policy measures 
that deal with 30-50% of national GHG emissions.” Nonetheless, as Betsill (2001) suggests, 
in the absence of supportive policy  at the national level, it is difficult for local governments to 
make significant  contributions to climate change mitigation. Brody et al. (2010) add that 
while public sector decision-makers are in fact beginning to engage the climate change 
discourse, priority for action remains low.84
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81  As Tol (2005) indicates, to speak of climate adaptation was at one time politically incorrect as it implied defeat, but now it has become a prominent 
feature on the political agenda (see also Giddens (2009); Eriksen et al., 2011). Klein et al. (2005) explore the importance of synergies between mitigation 
and adaptation policy. For literature on adaptive capacity, see for example, Burton et al. (2002); Twomlow et al. (2008); Engle & Lemos (2010).
82  While many scholars (e.g. Horstmann 2008, Giddens 2009) express the need for a combined approach, there is a debate surrounding the potential 
conflict between climate mitigation versus adaptation (see Hamin & Gurran 2009).
83 Whitmarsh (2010) indicate that while there is an urgent need to understand and facilitate community action on climate change mitigation, recent research 
suggests that this involvement is currently limited.
84 Brody et al. (2010)’s study focuses on the USA, but results are consistent with NZ, as will be demonstrated in Chapter 8.
2.3.5.  Organizations and Carbon Management
At the organizational (public and private) level of analysis, a growing body of academic 
literature explores the balance between environmental and economic objectives (Hoffman & 
Sandelands, 2005; Hoffman & Ventresca, 1999; Milne et al., 2009b; Birchall et al., 2010).85 
The literature suggests that businesses have only just begun to actively engage in climate and 
carbon management activities (e.g. Levy and Rothenbery, 2002; Hoffman, 2007a,b; Pinkse & 
Kolk, 2009).86  Over the past decade climate change and energy related issues have 
increasingly  attracted the attention of businesses (e.g. Fischer, 2000; Kolk and Hoffmann, 
2007). And correspondingly, companies are beginning to go green, be it via creating more 
energy efficient products (e.g. Gross, 2007) or greening their fleet (e.g. Waters, 2007), and in 
the process, are attracting increasing media attention (e.g. BBC, 2004; Horovitz, 2007; Water, 
2007; Gross, 2007; Montague-Jones, 2007). While Horovitz (2007) suggests that being green 
has become a strong marketing tool, some organizations – particularly within the fossil fuel 
industry – remain skeptical of climate change, and push hard to oppose any associated 
mitigative action (e.g. Ball, 2007; van den Hove et al., 2002; Ward, 2009; Vidal, 2010).
Ultimately, according to Okereke (2007), it seems economic and competitive motivation, as 
well as ethical considerations and governmental and public pressure remain the driving forces 
behind business strategies (see also Scipioni et al., 2010). As government policies and 
regulations begin to emerge,87 organizations are argued to strategically evaluate their risk and 
opportunities in a carbon constrained economy (Dlugolecki, 2003; Busch & Hoffmann, 2007; 
Bui, 2009; Engels, 2009; Engels et al., 2008; Schultz & Williamson, 2005; Hoffman, 2006; 
Hoffman & Woody, 2008; Pinkse & Kolk, 2009; Bebbington & Barter, 2011).88 For their part, 
Schultz & Williamson (2005) have identified a five-step process for turning strategic ideas 
into actions which will allow companies to gain competitive advantage in a carbon 
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85 From the context of the individual, Whitmarsh (2009, p. 13) show that those who take action to conserve energy generally do so for reasons more aligned 
to economic savings as opposed to the environment: “surveys using energy reduction as an indicator of public response to climate change falsely assume 
that these can be equated; consequently, they will provide a distorted picture of behavioural response.” See Whitmarsh et al. (2009) for a discussion on 
carbon capabilities, where the “individual’s ability and motivation to reduce emissions within the broader institutional and social context” is explored.
86 In the United States, for example, the Environmental Protection Agency’s (EPA) Green Power Partnership works with an array of organizations across 
the country, from fortune 500 companies to colleges and universities and government organizations such as state departments and cities. Each year the 
Partnership publishes a list of the top 50 annual green power consumers. As of 5 October 2010, Intel Co. was at the top of the list with 1,433,200,000 kWh 
of green power usage, representing 51% of the company’s total power usage (GPP, 2010).
87 In June 2012 the UK Government announced regulations requiring, starting 6 April 2013, GHG emissions reporting (consistent with and the GHG 
Protocol and ISO 14064-1) by all main board companies on the London Stock Exchange. A review of the first two years will occur in 2015, with further 
decision in 2016 whether to expand requirements to all large companies (DEFRA, 2012).
88 Busch & Hoffmann (2007) identify three steps companies could take to identify carbon constraints: first, appreciate the importance of the topic; second, 
identify exposure; and, third, establish corporate management strategies. 
constrained economy.89  In addition, the literature suggests that as climate change becomes 
mainstream, stakeholder pressure may influence organization response (Gonzalez-Benito & 
Gonzalez-Benito, 2006; Sprengel & Busch, 2010). Indeed, as Solomon et al. (2011) find, 
clients and investors are beginning to view climate change as a material risk, and as result are 
requiring organizations to manage the risk accordingly.90
In the end, given current uncertainty with regard to how government policy and the 
marketplace will react to climate change, organizations are hesitant to move too quickly (e.g. 
Kolk & Pinkse, 2007; Pinkse, 2007; Pinkse & Kolk, 2010)91  and lead by example (e.g. 
Boiral, 2006; Jones & Levy, 2007; Aragon-Correa & Rubio-Lopez, 2007).  The recent global 
financial crisis92  has further exacerbated uncertainty (e.g. Kolk & Pinkse, 2009) and with 
organizations having less discretionary funding for environmental initiatives such as carbon 
offsetting, this has resulted in a decline in participation in the voluntary carbon market 
(Hamilton et al., 2010).93  According to Estrada et al. (2008), prior to the global financial 
crisis, the voluntary  carbon market had become mainstream, with, according to Lovell et al. 
(2009), market growth of 200% between 2005 and 2006. For some organizations, they 
remain reticent because of the feeling that their emissions are minor relative to organizations 
within their value chain (e.g. Hoffmann & Busch, 2008).94  Nonetheless, keen organizations 
have begun to prepare for a carbon constrained world (e.g. Jeswani et al., 2007), and as 
Pinkse & Kolk (2010) note, this prompts organizations to further push their innovative 
capacity (see also Fischer, 2000).
As an initial step, many organizations are beginning to inventory their GHG emissions (e.g. 
Kolk & Pinkse, 2004), and correspondingly GHG inventory development and 
implementation are slowly beginning to feature in the academic literature (e.g. Pham et al., 
2010; Kennedy et al., 2010; Smith & Heath. 2010). And as D’Avignon et al. (2010) indicate, 
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89 Schultz & Williamson (2005) use a cement company and a bank to illustrate their five-step process.
90  Solomon et al (2011) explore the developing discourse of private climate change reporting. The authors find that in the absence of ethical discourse, 
private climate change reporting fails to challenge the business as usual status quo.
91 As Kolk & Pinkse (2009, p. 2) suggest, “the overall policy context has been ambiguous with a range of national and international initiative, some binding, 
others voluntary, and with a multitude of actors involved.” For a discussion on how policy, in general, tends to evolve in a non-linear fashion, resulting in a 
chain of resultant policy actions, see Van Buuren et al. (2010).
92 As a consequence of the global recession, GHG emissions decreased (ISIS, 2009).
93 See Kollmuss et al. (2008) for a good comparison of carbon offset standards re. the voluntary carbon market.
94 Identifying a lack of academic attention to how personal ecological impacts are accounted for in the social accounting literature, Milne (2007) provides an 
interesting discussion on how our own individual activities contribute to climate change. See also Whitmarsh (2009). 
emission inventories are becoming an increasingly important tool for both public (e.g. 
Schulz, 2010; Zhang and Chen, 2010) and private sector organizations, particularly with 
regard to the development and implementation of emission reduction activities. After all, 
once an organization understands its carbon footprint – including its supply chain, it can 
make informed decisions on business actions (e.g. Scipioni et al., 2010).95  In a world that is 
becoming increasingly carbon-constrained, an appreciation of the organization's carbon 
footprint can help it identify both economic vulnerabilities and opportunities, and therefore 
assist in making the organization effective and profitable.96 
Policies for carbon management, and for some, the ultimate goal of achieving carbon 
neutrality (Ball et al., 2011),97  is on the rise, as is the academic literature exploring these 
trends (e.g. Gossling, 2010). Gossling (2010), for example, explores carbon neutrality in the 
context of tourism, an industry that represents 5% of global CO2 emissions. As Gossling & 
Schumacher (2010) indicate, many  tourist  destinations, in an effort to portray  an image of 
being environmentally clean and pristine, are now seeking to become carbon neutral – the 
authors explore the measures taken to achieve carbon neutrality.98 
Though some organizations are engaging in climate and carbon management activities, as 
Busch (2010) indicates, greater evidence of realised improvements is required. The literature 
further suggests that meaningful action does not always link with the rhetoric (e.g. Dale, 
2008),99  and often greenwash is the result (e.g. Pearce, 2008a,b, 2009; 2010b,c).100 
According to social environment and accounting research literature, though organizations are 
beginning to realise the value of being environmentally conscious (e.g. Lynes & Andrachuk, 
2008), this is a criticism common to organizations engaging in environmental management 
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95 For example, Herrmann & Hauschild (2009) show that shifting a company’s manufacturing offshore from a developed nation to developing nation can 
substantially increase the carbon footprint of the product, and therefore the organization.
96  A similar, but more specific, area attracting academic attention is product carbon footprinting, where the total life cycle of goods and services are 
calculated (e.g. Bolwig & Gibbon, 2009). The life cycle of goods and services includes consideration for production, processing, transportation, sale, use 
and disposal. See also McDonough & Braungart (2002) for a discussion of cradle to cradle thinking.
97  Focusing on New Zealand, Australia and the UK, Ball et al. (2011) provide an informative discussion on governments leading by example on carbon 
neutrality.
98  Carbon neutrality involves measuring emissions, reducing emissions where possible, and offsetting the remaining unavoidable emissions – an offset 
occurs when one actor invests in a project elsewhere that results in a reduction of GHG emissions that would not have occurred in the absence of the 
project (WBCSD/WRI, 2004; ISO, 2006).
99 What’s more, as indicated in the Carbon Disclosure Project’s recently released Carbon Chasm report (CDP, 2012) and highlighted by Baue (2012), it is 
the market that seems to be driving organizational emission targets, not scientific evidence. This creates a gap between good intentions and the reality of 
what is really require to mitigate climate change.
100  As Dale (2008) notes, consumers are not inclined to trust corporations – a survey of 2700 people in the USA and Britain showed that 9 out of 10 
consumers are skeptical about information they get from companies.
and corporate social responsibility (CSR) as well (e.g. Gray & Milne, 2004; Milne et al. 
2009b).101  And, there is a strong agenda for research into carbon accounting (e.g. Hopwood, 
2009; Milne & Grubnic, 2011)102  linked to the question of the efficacy of proclaimed 
organizational carbon neutral strategies, for example.103  Moreover, as Ball et al. (2009b) 
suggest, few studies have explored the relationship between reducing and offsetting 
emissions, what some in the field refer to as the manage/mitigate threshold. While offsetting 
does seem to dominate corporate carbon management strategies (e.g. Jordan and Lorenzoni, 
2007; Thornes & Randalls, 2007), it holds the potential risk, as Gössling et al. (2007) 
suggest, of either directly or indirectly, encouraging a business-as-usual mentality (e.g. 
Milne, 2007). Lohmann & Sexton (2010) are also critical of carbon offsets, reminding us that 
it is in fact not possible to prove or disprove that offsets are actually distinct from business as 
usual, or that offsets are comparable to reducing emissions at the source. Furthermore, while 
the literature on carbon offsetting (e.g. Smith & Rodger, 2009), the Kyoto Protocol’s Clean 
Development Mechanism and voluntary carbon market (e.g. Bumpus & Liverman, 2008) is 
growing, Lovell & Liverman (2010) indicate, much of it is polarized either for or against 
offsets in principle, rather than discussing offset types empirically. 
Ultimately, organizations, whether they  operate in the public or private sector, repeatedly lack 
strong leadership  for environmental initiatives. As a result, weak policy regimes and business 
as usual (e.g. Jones & Levy, 2007) tends to remain the status quo.104  This is compounded 
further by  the complexity of the climate change problem in general. And, as Brody et al. 
(2010, p. 600) note, given that “organizations are inundated with so many complex issues... 
unless the problem is readily amenable to a solution, it is difficult to act upon in the face of 
other priorities.” 
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101  For a look into corporate motivation for taking part in CSR see for example Hackson & Milne (1996), and, Bebbington et al. (2009). See also Ball & 
Bebbington (2008) for a comparison of private and public sector environmental reporting.
102  See also Milne et al. (2010) for a discussion on the ‘seesaw’ nature of GHG emission accounting associated with New Zealand’s Kyoto commitment; 
thanks to improved methods of measurement, NZ’s total emission liability are currently 4.7% lower than initially calculated in 2006 (NZ Govt., 2011b) .
103 The efficacy of offsetting, in general, has been strongly called into question (e.g. Lohmann, 2006; Smith, 2007; Spreng et al., 2007), leaving Gossling et 
al. (2007) to suggest that the efficiency and credibility of voluntary carbon offset schemes requires increased clarity and regulation. Ascui & Lovell (2011, p. 
978) suggest that while tension and contradictions continue to  surround the meaning of carbon accounting (“carbon accounting clearly means different 
things to different people”), action to mitigate climate change will be stymied (See also Bowen & Wittneben, 2011). 
104 See Coenen & Menkveld (2002), for local authority context.
2.4.  SUMMARY AND LOCATING THE RESEARCH
2.4.1.  Summary of Chapter 2
Climate change has been a source of scientific interest and academic debate for many 
decades (Weart, 2003), with initial conceptions developing as early as the mid-late 1800s 
(e.g. Fourier, 1827; Tyndall, 1875; Arrhenius, 1896) into the mid 1900s (e.g. Callendar, 
1938). Current study includes a plethora of scientific disciplines, ranging in research focus 
from atmospheric paleo-chemistry (e.g. Luthi et al. 2008), and surface temperature (e.g. Kuo 
et al. 1990; Hansen et al. 2006; Solomon et al., 2010), to sea ice (e.g. Comiso et al. 2008) and 
glacial melting (e.g. Chen et  al., 2009; Pritchard et al., 2009), to sea level rise (e.g. Vermeer 
and Rahmstorf, 2009; Willis et al., 2010), ocean currents (Vellinga et al. (2008) and ocean 
chemistry (e.g. Polovina et al. 2008; Keeling et al., 2010),  to geoengineering and climate 
change mitigation (e.g. Spreng et al. 2007) and adaptation (e.g. Jones et  al. 2009) 
technologies.   
Because climate change science is often arcane (to those outside the discipline) and moves 
extremely fast, with evidence of global climate change escalating throughout the 1980s, the 
IPCC was established (in 1988) to coordinate an international policy  response.  Using peer-
reviewed and published scientific literature, the IPCC continues to evaluate the state of the 
science of climate change, and, importantly, makes policy  recommendations based on the 
analysis of their results (Reilly  et al., 2001; Oreskes, 2004).105   According to their Fourth 
Assessment Report (IPCC, 2007d, p. 72), “most of the global warming over the past 50 years 
is very likely [IPCC emphasis] due to anthropogenic greenhouse gas increases….” This 
position is widely purported to represent the scientific consensus on anthropogenic climate 
change. To that effect the Nobel Prize in Peace (2007) was awarded jointly to the IPCC and 
Al Gore "for their efforts to build up and disseminate greater knowledge about man-made 
climate change, and to lay  the foundations for the measures that are needed to counteract 
such change" (Nobel, 2007).106  Oreskes (2004) agrees with the stance of the IPCC, and 
Doran and Zimmerman (2009, p. 23) concur, adding that “the debate on the authenticity of 
global warming and the role played by human activity is largely  nonexistent among those 
who understand the nuances and scientific basis of long-term climate processes.” Yet there 
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105 The IPCC is scheduled to release the Fifth Assessment Report (AR5) late 2013 through 2014: WGI - The Physical Science Basis, September 2013; 
WGII - Impacts, Adaptation and Vulnerability, March 2014; WGIII - Mitigation of Climate Change, April 2014; and the Synthesis Report, October 2014.
106 Websites did not have page numbers, as a result no reference to page number will be provided.
does remain a body of literature that continues to debate (e.g. Morgan & McCrystal, 2009) 
and evaluate the strength and quality  of climate change consensus (e.g. Anderegg et  al., 2010; 
Pielke, 2009).  
For those convinced by the IPCC (or a more pessimistic position – e.g. Lovelock, 2009), 
climate change is one of the most important environmental and socio-economic challenges 
facing society, particularly its poorest members.  Yet the science upon which global policy 
increasingly  and ultimately depends remains a source of confusion, as reflected most recently 
in the "climategate" incident in November 2009 (e.g. Jasanoff, 2010; Pearce, 2010a).  As a 
consequence of climategate, “a poll conducted in February 2010, found a 30% drop over 1 
year in the percentage of British adults who believe climate change is "definitely" 
real” (Jasanoff, 2010, p. 695). For the sceptical (see Montford, 2010), there is of course the 
possibility, as Oreskes (2004) points out, that  the scientific consensus may in fact be wrong. 
Despite its central position in the public discourse, and though public acceptance of the need 
to take responsibility for climate change is arguably growing globally, it is unsurprising that 
Jordan & Lorenzoni (2007) wonder if indeed there is a political climate for policy change. 
Climate change knowledge (e.g. Hulme, 2010) and climate change policy is difficult  to 
manage, be it on an international, national or local scale (e.g Underdal, 2010).107  Because of 
the complexity involved in generating a solution to climate change (e.g. Verweij et  al., 2006), 
and because of the irreversibility of its trajectory, should emissions trends continue, climate 
change is considered, as Hovi et al. (2009, p. 20) indicate, to be a “quintessential long-term 
policy problem” (see also Lazarus, 2009), requiring as Verweij et al. (2006, p. 817) suggest, a 
‘clumsy solution.’ And while climate change policy remains rife with complexity, little or no 
progress on emission reductions have been made to date by  governments (e.g. Helm, 2008); 
this in spite of key research reports commissioned by governments (based on the IPCC 
position) that argue that  in order to avoid runaway climate change and to stabilise 
atmospheric GHG concentrations, most of the developed world must cut emissions by 
80-90% by 2050 (IPCC, 2007d; Stern, 2008b).     
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107  Climate change is a complex problem for three key reasons: time lags between human action and environmental effect; problem is embedded in poorly 
understood complex systems; problem involves a global collective good (Underdal, 2010). See also Wood (2011), where the author applies game-theory to 
the climate change dilemma and the international response.
Internationally, both domestically (e.g. Chapman, 2008; Hwang, 2010; Holmes, 2010; 
Howarth & Foxall, 2010) and transnationally  (e.g. Pattberg & Stripple, 2008), carbon, or ET, 
both via voluntary  and regulated mechanisms, has become the preferred path to mitigate 
GHG emissions, and a growing body of academic literature exploring carbon markets (e.g. 
Bumpus & Liverman, 2008; Lovell & Liverman, 2010) and ET (e.g.; Lohmann & Sexton, 
2010; Engels, 2009; Braun, 2009; Clo, 2009) has emerged.  
Likewise governments from round the world are beginning to develop long-term mitigation 
strategies (Boston, 2008; Ball et al., 2011). This trend is also evident within local 
government, where the emergence of local authority  networks (i.e. CCP) interested in sharing 
best practices in energy management and climate mitigation (e.g. Allman et al., 2004) is also 
on the rise. Policies for carbon management, with the ultimate goal of achieving carbon 
neutrality (e.g. Gossling & Schumacher, 2010), represent an idealised extension of these 
methods. And, within this scope, there is an emerging body of literature that explores the role 
of offsetting (e.g. Lovell et al. 2009; Estrada et al. 2008) and its actual effectiveness at 
ultimately reducing global emissions (e.g. Gössling et al. 2007).
At the corporate level of analysis (both within the private and public sector), organizations 
have only recently begun to engage actively in climate and carbon management activities 
(e.g. Hoffman, 2007; Pinkse & Kolk, 2009). It is argued that this trend is the result  of a lack 
in strong leadership  for environmental initiatives; were business as usual (e.g. Jones & Levy, 
2007) remains the status quo. And, given the current ambiguity with regard to how 
government policy and the marketplace will react to climate change, organizations remain 
hesitant to push the agenda (e.g. Pinkse & Kolk, 2010).   This trend has been intensified by 
the recent global financial crisis, which has resulted in a decline in participation in the 
voluntary carbon market (Hamilton et al., 2010). And while some organizations are engaging 
in climate and carbon management activities, meaningful action does not  always link with the 
rhetoric (e.g. Dale, 2008; Pearce, 2010b). Offsetting tends to dominate management strategies 
(e.g. Thornes & Randalls, 2007), but the threshold at which offsetting becomes preferable 
remains a grey area (e.g. Ball et al., 2009b).
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2.4.2.  Locating the Research
Climate change is a visible and monumentally important issue affecting communities from 
round the world. By far the greater proportion of the study of climate change has explored the 
scientific base for current climate change (e.g. IPCC, 2007a; Hansen et al., 2010) on which 
global policy and ultimately organizational responses, (like carbon management and carbon 
neutrality) increasingly  and in the end depend.  More recently  there has been a growing 
academic interest in examining international and national policies to address climate change 
(e.g. Okereke et al., 2009).  Academic attention to carbon management strategies is not 
widespread but is indeed rising, exploring organizational strategies (e.g. Hoffman, 2007) and 
market-based schemes such as emissions trading and carbon offsets (e.g. Bumpus and 
Liverman, 2008; Engels, 2009).  
There is a scarcity, however, of empirical academic work that examines how organizations, 
particularly public sector organizations, make sense of the climate change discourse, and how 
they  determine strategies to manage their carbon and achieve carbon neutrality  (e.g. Ball et 
al. 2009b; Brody et al., 2010; Milne & Grubnic, 2011).108 NZ government organizations, are 
no exception, and while there is a growing body of literature that explores NZ’s place in 
global climate policy  (e.g. Chapman, 2006; Chapman & Boston, 2007), there remains a 
significant lack of academic work focusing on how NZ public sector organizations address 
climate change, and the role and efficacy of government mitigation activities (Ball & 
Grubnic, 2007; Ball et al. 2009b).109  As a result, and through critical investigation of NZ 
government public sector organizations’ cognitions, commitments and actions for carbon 
management and towards achieving carbon neutrality, this study therefore endeavours to 
narrow the gap in the literature and contribute to the scholarly discussion on climate change.
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108 As Rose and Cray (2010) note, scholarly attention to public sector (versus private sector) strategy formulation in general, is weak.
109 NZ’s climate change policy, and research associated with it, will be discussed further in Chapter 3. 
CHAPTER 3 - CONTEXT AND BACKGROUND
3.1.  INTRODUCTION
3.1.1.  New Zealand Climate Change Policy: A Quick Catch-up
NZ became a Party to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) in 1992. Relative to other Annex 1 countries Party to the Convention, NZ’s 
contribution to global greenhouse gas (GHG) emissions is low, at about 0.2%.  What is 
particularly interesting, however, is that globally NZ has the 11th highest emissions per capita, 
and is among the developed countries with the highest increase in emissions from 1990 levels 
(NZ Govt., 2009c; NZ Govt., 2011b).110 
Ratifying the Kyoto Protocol in 2002, NZ committed to reduce GHG emissions to or below 
1990 levels (NZ Govt., 2009b). In 2007, in tandem with efforts to price carbon and develop 
an emissions trading scheme (NZ Govt., 2007b), Helen Clark’s Labour-led government, 
sought to move the public sector towards carbon neutrality  (e.g. Clark, 2007c).111   In 
November 2008, John Key (National) replaced Clark as Prime Minister, and Labour’s climate 
change policies were reconsidered.112 
In line with National’s new climate change agenda, NZ has adopted a target of 50% 
emissions reduction by 2050, based on 1990 emission levels. Moreover, while calculations 
have varied in the past, NZ’s current net position during Kyoto’s first commitment period is 
expected to be a surplus of 9.6 million Kyoto Protocol Units (9.6 Mt-CO2e) (NZ Govt., 
2009a).
3.1.2.  The CNPS and the CCP-NZ Programmes
The CNPS programme was launched by Clark’s Labour government in February 2007. Led 
by the Ministry for the Environment, the initiative’s goal was to move the government’s 34 
core public service departments, representing approximately 159,000 t-CO2e for base 
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110 Milne & Grubnic (2011) note that while NZ’s annual GHG emission growth has slowly begun to demonstrate contraction, 2009 gross emission levels 
nonetheless exceeded 1990 levels by 11.5 Mt CO2e (20%).  
111  As Prime Minister Helen Clark was in position of influence. An interesting avenue for future research relates to the degree to which Clark’s ambition for 
carbon neutrality was supported by her Government. In other words, like Jean Chretien’s decision for Canada to ratify the Kyoto Protocol, which faced 
significant opposition from business, provincial governments and from within his own cabinet (Harrison & McIntosh-Sundstrom, 2010), as champion, did 
Clark force the launch of the CNPS programme? 
112 This shift in Government ended the Labour Party’s second longest period in power since its foundation in 1916 (Aimer, 2010). An interesting area for 
future research relates to why Labour lost the election, i.e. what explains the seven per cent vote share loss? Was it simply a reaction to the declining state 
of the economy and Labour’s perceived (or actual) inability to regain the fiscal competence it enjoyed in 2002 and 2005?
2006/07 (NZ Govt., 2008), towards carbon neutrality.113  Six lead-core government 
departments were chosen to become carbon neutral by  2012. While the six lead-core 
ministries were tasked with measuring and reducing their own emissions, it was the 
responsibility of the Ministry  for the Environment to investigate and organise offsetting 
projects for all six ministries.   
Though the core public sector accounts for only 2% of NZ’s total GHG emissions,114  the aim 
of the programme was to elevate NZ’s international profile as a leader on climate change and 
carbon neutrality  (NZ Govt., 2007b).  The CNPS programme was discontinued by Key’s 
National government in March 2009.
The CCP-NZ programme was the NZ arm of ICLEI’s Cities for Climate Protection (CCP) 
campaign,115  supported by the NZ Ministry for the Environment and delivered through 
ICLEI’s Oceania Secretariat.116  The CCP-NZ programme began in 2004, and during its 
operation included 34 councils (regional, district and city), representing in the order of 83% 
of NZ’s population.117  The total reported and quantifiable emission reductions from council 
activities, from base year (30 June 2004) to 30 June 2009, is conservatively  calculated to be 
more than 400,000 t-CO2e (relative to generation of over 22,000,000 t-CO2e/year) (CCP-NZ, 
2009). And though the purpose of the CCP-NZ programme was not carbon neutrality, it 
nonetheless helped councils reduce their corporate (operations) and community GHG 
emissions via awareness raising and targeted action on emission reductions (Ball et al., 
2011).118   
The CCP-NZ programme operated within the framework provided by  the International Local 
Government GHG Emissions Analysis Protocol – New Zealand Supplement.  The NZ 
Supplement applies the principles outlined in the International Protocol to the NZ context, 
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113 See Appendix, Table 3.1, for core departments and a list of abbreviations.
114 As noted previously, the core public service does not include the broader state sector (e.g. Crown entities, schools, district health boards), but instead 
refers to the 34 government agencies that were mandated to participate in the CNPS programme (NZ Govt., 2007b).
115  See Linseth (2004, p. 325) for an interesting discussion about the CCP campaign, where the author argues that CCP’s “framing of climate change 
makes it difficult to see why and how climate change should be an important concern for local communities.”
116 The International Council for Local Environmental Initiatives, today known as ICLEI - Local Governments for Sustainability (ICLEI), was founded in 1990. 
ICLEI is an international, not-for-profit association of local governments and local government organizations, with 1105 members in 66 countries (CCP-NZ, 
2009).
117 See Appendix, Table 3.2, for a list of the CCP-NZ participants.
118  Using the programme’s strategic framework, councils worked their way through five milestones. These milestones helped councils to better understand 
their emissions profile, and provided a guide to help councils ultimately achieve emission reductions.
providing guidelines to help local governments quantify their GHG emissions (ICLEI, 
2008a). Though the programme was not a mandated carbon neutral initiative, it resulted in 
awareness raising. The CCP-NZ programme was canceled in 2009.
3.1.3.  Chapter Purpose and Outline
The purpose of the Context and Background chapter is two-fold: First, to provide an 
overview of NZ’s policy  response to climate change, including a look at its reduction goals 
and emissions profile; and second, to provide an overview of the CNPS and the CCP-NZ 
programmes, the two programmes which serve as the core of the thesis research. While this 
chapter does not provide an exhaustive look at NZ climate change policy, it does aim to 
chronologically contextualise the policy environment within which the CNPS and the CCP-
NZ programmes developed and ended. In terms of the programmes background component 
of the chapter, in addition to presenting the mechanics and results of each programme, this 
chapter, albeit indirectly, provides insight into programme execution and uptake. And while 
this chapter does not seek to provide analysis of the organizations’ emission inventories and 
reduction plans,119  it does provide support material for the analytical chapters to follow (e.g. 
Chapter 8). 
This chapter is divided into five primary sections, (3.1) Introduction, (3.2) New Zealand 
Policy  Response to Climate Change, (3.3) The Carbon Neutral Public Service Programme, 
(3.4) The Communities for Climate Protection - New Zealand Programme, and (3.5) 
Summary  and Locating the Research. Building on the introduction, section 3.2 discusses 
NZ’s policy response to climate change, specifically from 1992 through to the end 2011. 
Furthermore, this section explores NZ’s emission reduction goals and projected emissions, 
and provides a general review of NZ’s GHG emissions profile. Sections 3.3 and 3.4 provide a 
more focused overview of the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programmes, including attention to 
programme approach, emission inventory data, emission reduction plans, and realised 
emission reductions. Here, the chapter speaks in general about each programme in terms of 
its total membership, then hones in on the six lead-core departments for the CNPS 
programme and the 16 study  selection councils for the CCP-NZ programme. The final 
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119 See for example, Ball et al. (2008), Mason & Ball (2008) and Ball et al. (2009a) for an analysis of CNPS programme participant emission inventories.
section, section 3.5, in addition to providing a brief summary of the previous four sections, 
locates the chapter in the overall thesis research.
3.2.  NEW ZEALAND’S POLICY RESPONSE TO CLIMATE CHANGE
3.2.1.  New Zealand’s Policy Response to Climate Change
The passing of the Environment Act 1986, the Conservation Act 1987 (both under Lange’s 
Labour-led government)120  and the Resource Management Act 1991 (Bolger’s National-led 
government), demonstrated to the world that  NZ was committed to environmental reform 
(e.g. Buhrs, 2003). During this time Government began to explore market environmentalism, 
or neoliberal policies as a means to correct previous economic problems (e.g. Peck, 2004).121 
While proponents of market environmentalism argue that this approach makes more efficient 
use of natural goods (e.g. Bakker, 2005), it is ultimately a market-driven mechanism, and as 
some scholars suggest, oversimplified in application (e.g.  Prudham, 2004; Mansfield, 2004, 
2006). As Kirk (2008) explains, market environmentalism, and free-market thinking in 
general, tends to ignore the notion that  resources are unevenly distributed within society. 
Though this suggests that some within society are more economically  capable to protect the 
environment, it also implies that others are in position to gain economically  by exploiting the 
environment.122 
While market environmentalism continues to influence policy in NZ, environmental policy  in 
general tends to develop in an ad hoc reactionary manner, leaving it especially  vulnerable to 
political change (e.g. Buhrs & Christoff, 2006). This characterisation is particularly accurate 
in the context of NZ’s response to the global climate change crisis. In this respect, as Buhrs 
(2008, p. 61) comments, NZ’s response has been based on a “narrow interpretation of what 
the challenge is: reducing GHG emissions in the most cost-effective way.” Having economics 
as the central thread in a climate mitigation strategy  tends to miss the importance of 
sustainable development and the need to address associated environmental issues and their 
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120 The Environment Act 1986 created the Ministry for the Environment; the Conservation Act 1987 created the Department of Conservation.
121  Market environmentalism, or neoliberalism, specifically in the context of climate mitigation, as believed by its proponents, will stimulate environmental 
conservatism, or the reduction in GHG emission-heavy activities, via price signals, thus incentivising environment improvement through economic gain (e.g. 
Mansfield, 2004, 2006); the market (consumerism) is viewed as the solution to the global climate change problem instead of the driver.  
122 In this view, by treating environmental goods as economic goods (and establishing property rights), and incorporating externalities, environmental goods 
will be used more efficiently. But, market environmentalism tends to view environmental destruction as a moral issue, rather than a utilitarian issue, and 
therefore as mentioned within, oversimplifies the reality of the situation.
economic and social causes (i.e. unsustainable consumption etc.), as alluded to in the 
previous chapter.
As Chapman (2006) explains, like other countries, NZ is quick to offer a plethora of 
justifications for its inaction: more information is required to make a prudent decision; 
government is faced with other pressing priorities; NZ’s impact on mitigation is small, others 
should act first (including the private sector); at present the cost is prohibitive.123 As a result, 
NZ’s response has been described as lacklustre  and inconsistent, with mitigative policy 
plagued by government indecision and policy reversals (Chapman & Boston, 2007).  
While 2008 marked the most recent shift in NZ’s climate policy, it was not the first.124  NZ 
became a Party to the United Nations Framework Convention on Climate Change 
(UNFCCC) in 1992 (Bolger’s National-led government), signed the Kyoto Protocol in 1998 
(Shipley’s National-led government), and ratified it four years later in 2002 (Clark’s Labour-
led government).125  In line with its commitment to the Protocol, in 2002 NZ launched its 
Climate Change Policy Package (e.g. DPMC, 2002), which included a carbon tax126  intended 
to create a price advantage for clean energy. In 2005, however, after significant opposition 
from the business community, this package was reviewed, with the recommendation not to 
proceed with the carbon tax (Buhrs & Christoff, 2006). Later in 2006, Cabinet approved a 
whole of government climate change work programme, which positioned action on climate 
change as a long-term effort. 
Following, in December 2007 Clark’s government introduced the Climate Change (Emissions 
Trading and Renewable Preference) Bill, which amended the 2002 Climate Change Response 
Act (Parker, 2007) and expressed government’s intention to establish an economy-wide 
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123  Chapman (2006) offers a framework for action on climate change, including: setting challenging targets with international signaling value; the need to 
learn from other countries’ experience; development of broad-based policy measures; long-term policy planning, including the avoidance of policy switches. 
124  The National Party (centre-right, formed in 1936) held government, most recently, from 1990-1999; 2008 until present. The Labour Party (centre-left, 
formed in 1916) held government, most recently, from 1999-2008. In 1999 Labour formed a coalition with the Alliance Party, in 2002 and 2005, a coalition 
with the Progressive Party. In 2008 and 2011 National formed a coalition with the ACT, United Future and Maori parties. See Miller (2010) for an in-depth 
discussion of New Zealand government and politics.
125 Buhrs & Christoff (2006) note that while the Labour-led government supported Kyoto, the National Party expressed opposition.
126 Labour had intended the carbon tax to begin in 2007 at a price of $25/t, and would apply to the whole of the economy, with the exception of agricultural 
CH4 and N2O (Hodgson, 2005).
emissions trading scheme (e.g. MFE, 2007).127  According to Clark (2007b): “The 
Government believes that an emissions trading scheme which puts a price on emissions 
creates the right incentives across the economy to use fuel and energy more efficiently.” For 
Government, the emissions trading scheme offered the most cost effective, flexible, and 
equitable means to reduce GHG emissions.128
Though the scheme was to include all sectors of the economy, including agriculture, and 
include all six GHG gases covered in the Kyoto Protocol (CO2, CH4, N2O, HFCs, PFCs and 
SF6)129, which would make it a world first (Bullock, 2009), the Green Party  felt that the 
scheme’s requirements were not onerous enough (Bullock, 2009).130  And while some 
believed Labour’s scheme was too easy  on big emitters (e.g. Bertram & Terry, 2008), others 
felt  that it placed NZ in a position of “running before the international community [could] 
even walk on climate change matters” (Bullock, 2009, p. 3).  Fear surrounded the notion that 
the scheme would place NZ at an economic disadvantage relative to its international 
competitors that did not adopt similar policies (e.g. Castalia, 2007).131  Smith (2008) 
expressed that the “bill [was] riddled with errors... that [it would] cost New Zealand 
households and businesses dearly.” Speaking after the fact, National argued that Labour’s 
emissions trading scheme would have potentially caused the loss of 50,000 jobs, and cost the 
economy in excess of $900 million by  2012 (Raea, 2009).132  Rodney Hide, from the ACT 
Party,133 concurred with Smith’s economic fears, and went on to add that climate change was 
a hoax: 
The entire climate change - global warming hypothesis is a hoax, that the 
data and the hypothesis do not hold together... Enacting this legislation will 
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127  The NZ Emissions Trading Scheme was planned to align closely with Australia’s proposed Carbon Pollution Reduction Scheme, including common 
compliance, where possible. In 2010 the Rudd government announced that it would delay the implementation of the scheme until after CP1, and 
implementation would only occur when greater efforts from other major economies presented (DCCEE, 2010). Interestingly, like the NZ Emissions Trading 
Scheme, CPRS was to include the agriculture sector (Saddler & King, 2008).
128 Government was confident in an emissions trading scheme largely because many other nations were adopting similar schemes, and modeling predicted 
minimal impact on economic growth (MFE, 2007).
129 CO2 = carbon dioxide; CH4 = methane, N2O = nitrous oxide, HFCs = hydrofluorocarbons, PFCs = perfluorocarbons and SF6 = sulphur hexafluoride.
130  As Bullock (2009, p. 10) notes, while reactions to Labour’s emission trading scheme were varied, the Green Party “expressed concern that the Bill did 
not go far enough, having traditionally preferred a carbon tax.” Because permits were allocated instead of being auctioned, Bertram & Terry (2008) 
conclude that the scheme was more a tax than an emissions trading scheme. While this is supported by the fact that Labour’s scheme did not have a 
domestic cap, it does not fit with NZ’s obligation under the Kyoto Protocol’s CP1 (e.g. Bullock, 2009).
131  In discussing emissions trading scheme-related emissions costs, Bartleet et al. (2010) emphasize the need to remain cognizant of international trade 
competitiveness, particularly with regard to emission-intensive sectors that are also export-intensive, such as the manufacturing sector.
132  The National and ACT Parties both openly criticized Labour for their haste in pushing through the Emissions Trading Scheme in last their last days in 
government (Raea, 2009; Bullock, 2009).  
133 The ACT Party has a neo-liberal ideology, based in the belief of personal freedom of choice, where Government protects freedoms but does not assume 
responsibility:http://www.act.org.nz/principles. 
cost New Zealanders dear... It will put businesses in New Zealand out of 
business. It will put farmers off their farms. And it will do all this for no 
impact on world weather, for no environmental gain, and for no conceivable 
advantage to New Zealand or to the world (Hide, 2008). 
Also in 2007, Clark  announced a raft of sustainability initiatives which included the CNPS 
programme (NZ Govt., 2007b; Clark, 2007c).134   Though the public sector accounts for only 
about 2% of NZ’s total emissions, the aim was to elevate NZ’s international profile as a 
leader on climate change and carbon neutrality  (NZ Govt., 2008); with the initiative 
conceived as “the only comprehensive central government programme with robust systems 
and methodologies to work through the challenges posed by a public service carbon 
neutrality programme…” (NZ Govt., 2008). 
In November 2008, Key (National) replaced Clark as Prime Minister, and Labour’s climate 
change policies were reconsidered. Firstly, legislation enabling the NZ Emissions Trading 
Scheme, which had been passed into law in September 2008,135  was reviewed, and 
subsequently  the legislation was modified.  Under Key’s National government the scheme 
has become NZ’s principal policy  tool for achieving GHG emission reductions.136  National 
was acutely aware of the economic concerns surrounding the scheme. To this end, when the 
Climate Change Response (Moderated Emissions Trading) Amendment Act 2009 received 
royal assent at the end of 2009, National emphasised its plan to “get the emissions trading 
scheme right and [that it] is not prepared to cut corners when kiwis’ financial security is at 
risk” (Key, 2008b).  Labour, on the other hand, contends that National’s emissions trading 
scheme is “economically  irrational, socially  inequitable, environmentally counter-productive 
and fiscally unsustainable” (Chauvel, 2009).
While National’s scheme did intend full obligation for the transport, electricity  and industrial 
sectors on 1 January 2013, and the rest of the economy by 2015, Smith has announced a 
slowing of the next stage of the emissions trading scheme:  “National’s intention is to phase 
this in three equal steps on 1 January 2013, 1 January  2014 and 1 January 2015 as 
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134  According to Greenaway & Carswell (2009), since 2003, sustainable development and climate change thinking has become progressively linked at 
national, regional and local levels.
135 The Emissions Trading Scheme was very controversial, requiring extensive amendments before passing into law in 2008.
136 As Raea (2009) notes, according to Smith, the Emissions Trading Scheme is NZ’s “most significant economic reform since economic deregulation in the 
late 1980s.” While the NZ Emissions Trading Scheme is administered by both the Ministry of Economic Development and the Ministry for Agriculture and 
Forestry, the Climate Change Response (Emissions Trading) Amendment Act is administered by the Ministry for the Environment, with the exception of 
forestry and agriculture, which is administered by the Ministry for Agriculture and Forestry (e.g. Bullock, 2009). 
recommended by the Emissions Trading Scheme Review Panel” (Smith, 2011c). And though 
the agriculture sector was due for full obligation in 2015, this is not likely to occur.137 
According to Smith (2011c), this new path assuages the economic impact on the economy, 
while continuing to push the progress needed to stimulate investment in carbon abatement, 
i.e. renewable energy, clean technologies etc.138  In terms of emissions connected with the 
agriculture sector, as part of its climate change mitigation strategy, the NZ government funds 
the Centre for Agricultural Greenhouse Gas Research, where research targets emission 
improvements associated with ruminant  methane, nitrous oxide and soil carbon from the 
pastoral and horticulture sectors (Carter, 2009).
Secondly, on 11 March 2009, Minister for Climate Change Issues and Minister for the 
Environment, Nick Smith, ended the CNPS initiative, thus  stemming efforts to move the 
public sector towards carbon neutrality.139   Before National was elected to lead the NZ 
Government it openly recognised the global importance of climate change: “The biggest 
environmental challenge of our time: global climate change…The National Party will ensure 
that New Zealand acts decisively to confront this challenge” (Key, 2007). And, National 
advocated the need to incorporate climate policy into economic growth plans: “National is 
committed to growing our economy. Confronting climate change will be a vital part of the 
policy mix for fuelling that growth” (Key, 2007). After National won the election, in a speech 
to the National Party Conference in 2008, the Prime Minister identified the need to get 
beyond the “ideological battles of the past” suggesting that “New Zealand’s future depends 
on grasping good ideas, no matter where they come from” (Key, 2008a). 
For National, however, Labour’s initiative to “lead the world on climate change and to 
become the first carbon neutral country” (Smith, 2009a) was a “feel good slogan” (Smith, 
2009b), not a good idea. Buhrs (2008, p. 61) notes that Labour’s initiatives were “largely of a 
technical and managerial nature,” and failed to address the underlying problem of emissions 
generation. In this same vein,  Smith (2009c) argued that “to make real progress on climate 
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137 The inclusion of emission from the agriculture sector in the NZ Emissions Trading Scheme may have been overly ambitious in the first place, particularly 
given that NZ is among the first to include this measure (e.g. Raea, 2009); this sector is responsible for the greatest share of NZ’s emissions, which is 
perhaps indicative of Smith’s decision to hold off on its inclusion in the Emissions Trading Scheme. While Castalia (2007) suggests that significant emission 
abatement from agriculture is not likely without a decrease in output, others argue otherwise (e.g. Clark, 2007a; Bertram & Terry, 2008; Beukes et al., 
2010). 
138  For discussions on NZ’s potential for renewable energy generation, see for example: Barry & Chapman (2009); Krumdieck (2009); Packer (2009); and, 
Penniall & Williamson (2009). 
139  When Smith ended the CNPS programme he expressed the following opinion: “The Carbon Neutral Public Service was just a feel good slogan cooked 
up by the previous Government. Its only achievement was to cost this country millions of dollars” (Smith, 2009b).
change we need to ensure that phrases like carbon neutral have integrity... The climate change 
policy the Government inherited was not credible… we have to give New Zealand’s climate 
change policy a reality check. We are not claiming New Zealand can be a world leader in 
emissions cuts or the first carbon-neutral country in the world.” For the National-led 
Government, while it wants to do its fair share in reducing emissions, it  does not want NZ to 
lead on climate change: “the new Government’s policy goal is not about being first but 
ensuring New Zealand does its fair share” (Smith, 2009a). As Chapman & Boston (2007) 
note, however, because of NZ’s relatively high emissions and income per capita, and capacity 
for energy systems improvements, the international expectation may  be that NZ “contribute 
disproportionately” to emissions mitigation efforts. That  said, in terms of leading on climate 
mitigation, as the National-led government recognises, there exists a potential economic 
advantage in being a follower on GHG emissions abatement (e.g. Boston & Lempp, 2011).  
Thirdly, the NZ Energy  Strategy of 2007 implemented under the Labour-led government and 
emphasising sustainability as a core objective (see MED, 2007a),140 was replaced in 2011 by 
a new NZ Energy Strategy in which economic growth became the key  objective (MED, 
2011). With this strategy National highlights the tie between economic performance and 
social wellbeing and energy security, emphasising the importance of fossil fuels.141 
Notwithstanding the new strategy’s mandate for exploration, exploitation and utilisation of 
fossil fuels, however, the strategy does acknowledge that environmental management is 
critical if NZ’s economy is to reach its potential (MED, 2011). 
In this vein, in 2011, Government launched the National Policy Statement for Renewable 
Electricity Generation (NPSREG), which sets out National’s agenda for renewable electricity 
generation under the Resource Management Act of 1991. As mentioned earlier, the enactment 
of such legislation was considered ground-breaking at the time, demonstrating NZ’s desire to 
show leadership  in this area (Bebbington et al., 2009). Wind is expected to play a large role in 
renewable energy development. Though wind farms represent less than 2% of net electricity 
(about 322 MW), new applications for development, representing some 3000 MW (or 30% of 
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140  This was preceded by the 2001 National Energy Efficiency and Conservation Strategy, which developed following the Energy Efficiency and 
Conservation Act 2000. This strategy focused on three key policy efforts: energy efficiency, energy conservation, and development of renewable energy 
(e.g. Kelly, 2007).
141  According to Krumdieck (2009), more than 25% of NZ’s electricity is generated by gas, but at current depletion rates this figure is expected to decline, 
leaving coal as the primary non-renewable fuel source (Kelly, 2007).
NZ’s total capacity), have been lodged (Krumdieck, 2009).142  Moreover, though the 
proportion of electricity generated by  renewable sources has decreased in recent years (Barry 
& Chapman, 2009), with the NPSREG, National has set a strategic target whereby 90 per 
cent of the country’s electricity will be generated by renewable energy sources by  2025 (NZ 
Govt., 2011a). The caveat to this goal is that supply must not be impeded (NZ Govt., 2011a). 
Interestingly, while this goal was originally  set by Clark’s Labour-led government, and 
though Key’s National-led government now endorses a 90% renewable energy target, when it 
came into power in 2009 it did not (Krumdieck, 2009).
At the local level, the Local Government Act 2002 mandates local authorities to operate in an 
environmentally  sustainable manner.  While the Act does not require local authorities to 
measure, manage or reduce the environmental effects, including the carbon footprint, of their 
activities (OAG, 2011), it does “promote the social, economic, environmental and cultural 
well being of communities in the present and for the future” (LGNZ, 2011b; see also Wilson 
& Salter, 2003).143  And with the passing of the Energy and Climate Change Amendment to 
NZ’s Resource Management Act 1991, in 2004, greater responsibility  for action on climate 
change was shifted to local authorities (Greenaway & Carswell, 2009).144  In this vein, the 
authors also note that local government recognise that planning for climate change is good 
business sense. In an effort to promote climate change mitigation, and to facilitate local 
government organizational awareness with regard to their carbon footprint, in 2004 the 
Labour-led government funded local authority membership in the CCP-NZ programme. 
Following National’s election in 2008, Smith canceled the CCP-NZ programme. As with the 
case of the CNPS programme, the National-led government believes that the activities 
undertaken as part  of the CCP-NZ programme should occur anyway, without a costly 
programme. Whether local authorities will indeed incorporate carbon measures into their 
Annual Plans and Long-term Community Council Plans is yet to be seen. 
While climate change mitigation, and the role local authorities can play remains a point of 
controversy  in NZ, the need to adapt to the changing climate is clear.  According to NIWA 
Organizational Involvement in Carbon Mitigation
54
142  Though wind does offer a renewable alternative to fossil fuel generation, because wind towers impede the ‘wild landscapes’, rural communities tend to 
oppose their development - particularly given that the electricity generated tends to feed cities (e.g. Krumdieck, 2009).  Barry & Chapman (2009) add that 
the realization of NZ’s wind generation potential is also impeded by small investor numbers.
143  Some local authorities do measure, manage and take actions to reduce their environmental impact, including actions to mitigate their carbon footprint, 
with some local authorities even taking steps to become carbon neutral. This is discussed further in the following sections.
144  While NZ local government responsibility towards adaptation to climate change is more obvious, its role with regard to climate mitigation remains less 
clear, this notwithstanding the link to central government energy policy and its connection to local government.
(2008),145  for NZ, the effects of climate change are manifested in four key trends: (1) an 
overall warming 0.9C over the last 100 years; (2) a general decline in frosts over most of the 
country; (3) a decrease of South Island glacial extent and volume, including a glacial volume 
decline of 11% over the last  30 years; and, (4) a rise in sea-level of 0.16m over the twentieth 
century.
If climate change continues unabated, NIWA (2008) expects these trends to persist, resulting 
in, for example, the following for NZ:146  Mean temperature increases of 0.9C and 2.1C by 
2040 and 2090 respectively, with the least warming occurring in the spring; increase in daily 
high temperature episodes, with substantial increase in number of days above 25C, 
particularly on the North Island; and, decrease in frosts and seasonal snow lying and snowfall 
events, with a rise in the snow line. This will result  in a continual decline in glacial volume 
and extent. Mean rainfall will increase in variation with season, with an overall trend of drier 
in the east (more frequent droughts)  and wetter in the west; increase in frequency of extreme 
rainfalls, with 1-in-100 year events expected to occur as a 1-in-50 year events by  end of 
century. Moreover, there will be an increase in risk of severe wind, with a possible increase in 
storminess, which together with a sea level rise of at least 18-59cm by 2100 (from 1990) and 
rise in storm tide elevation, will increase frequency of heavy swells in regions exposed to 
prevailing westerlies.
3.2.2.  Emissions Projections and Reduction Goal
Under a business as usual scenario for 1990 - 2050, emission projections for NZ suggest a 
significant increase in total and net emissions (NZ Govt., 2011b) (Fig. 3.2). To combat the 
increase under a business as usual scenario, NZ has adopted a target of 50% emission 
reductions based on 1990 levels by 2050.
Organizational Involvement in Carbon Mitigation
55
145 See also MFE (2008c).
146 This is based on mid-range projections from global climate models statistically downscaled to NZ, which follow the IPCC’s Fourth Assessment approach. 
The full range of projections across scenarios is 0.2-2C and 0.7-5.1C for 2040 and 2090 respectively (NIWA, 2008). See Appendix, Figure 3.1, for a visual 
depiction of these trends.
Figure 3.2:  New Zealand’s total and net GHG emissions and removals, under 
  business as usual 1990 to 2050
      NZ Govt. (2011b)
NZ Govt. (2011b) suggests that this goal is in line with targets put forward by other 
developed countries.147  In the shorter-term, NZ has committed to a “responsibility target” of 
10-20% emissions reduction below 1990 levels by  2020. NZ Govt. (2011b) notes, however, 
that the 2020 target is contingent “upon an effective global agreement, including appropriate 
commitments by developed and developing countries, and rules relating to land use and 
forestry and carbon markets that are important to NZ.148” 
When NZ joined the UNFCCC in 1992, and became a signatory  to the Kyoto Protocol, it 
agreed to restrict its emissions to 1990 levels (61,912 Gg CO2e), on average, between 
2008-2012 (Kyoto’s first commitment period, CP1). This resulted in an initial assigned 
amount for CP1 of 309,565 Gg CO2e (309.6 Mt CO2e) (e.g. NZ Govt., 2011b; Milne et al., 
2010; Milne & Grubnic, 2011).149  According to NZ Govt. (2009a), NZ’s net position during 
CP1 is expected to be a surplus of 9.6 million Kyoto Protocol Units (9.6 Mt CO2e). 
According to Milne et al. (2010), while NZ’s current projection is a 9.6 Mt CO2e surplus 
(presently valued at NZ$215 million), this could change +/- 50 Mt COe (or, over NZ$1.1 
billion).  As the authors note, though NZ may be in the positive now, because of the inherent 
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147  NZ Govt. (2011b) notes that NZ is “prepared to do [its] fair share towards reducing global greenhouse gas emissions.” According to NZ Govt. (2011b), 
like NZ, Australia has committed to reduce its emissions to 50% below 1990 levels. Many other developed countries, on the other hand, have been more 
ambitious, with for example, Canada and Japan committing to reduce emissions by 50-65% and 55-80% below 1990 levels, respectively. According to 
Bebbington & Barter (2011), the government’s of the UK and Scotland are the first (and so far, the only) governments to have passed legislation setting 
statutory emission reduction targets: 80% reduction by 2050, relative to 1990 levels.
148 See NZ Govt. (2009b) for specific details about NZ’s 2020 commitment. 
149  While the initial assessment figure is fixed for the 2008-2012 period, emissions and removals for NZ’s GHG inventory will change with scientific and 
methodological improvement. As a result of improved methodologies, NZ’s total emissions for 1990 are presently 4.7% lower than initially calculated in 
2006 (NZ Govt., 2011b). 
complexity of this kind of science, NZ’s prospects may change repeatedly (e.g. Milne & 
Grubnic, 2011; Renowden, 2007).150
3.2.3.  New Zealand’s GHG Emissions Profile: Current Emissions (1990 to 2009)151
While NZ’s contribution to global GHG emissions is relatively  low at 0.2%, it is ranked 11th 
highest in terms of emissions per capita (NZ Govt., 2011b). Moreover,  emission change 
between 1990 (59,112 Gg CO2e) and 2009 (70,563 Gg CO2e) was significant, with total 
emissions152  increasing by approximately 20% (a further 11,451 Gg CO2e, or 0.1%/ year) 
during that time (NZ Govt., 2011b).153   And, net emissions154  for the same period rose by 
over 23% (8,220 Gg CO2e), from 35,661 Gg CO2e in 1990 to 43,881 Gg CO2e in 2009 (NZ 
Govt., 2011b) (Fig. 3.3).
Figure 3.3:  New Zealand’s total and net emissions (under the Climate Change  
  Convention) from 1990 to 2009
 
          NZ Govt. (2011c)
As a proportion of GHG gas emitted, NZ’s profile has changed since 1990, when CH4 and 
CO2 contributed equally to total emissions, with approximately 25,000 Gg CO2e (or 43%) 
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150  As Milne et al. (2010, p. 27) indicate, NZ’s GHG emission measurements are in reality only acceptable estimates: “acceptable because they have been 
subject to review and audit and agreed upon, but nonetheless estimates.” The authors go on the emphasize that emissions accounting is “part science, part 
modeling, part guesswork and part negotiation.”
151  Data for this section was derived from New Zealand’s Greenhouse Gas Inventory, which is an annual report of all anthropogenic emissions and 
removals in NZ, specifically for the period of 1990 to 2009.
152 Total emissions include those from energy, industrial processes, solvent and other product use, agriculture and waste sectors. This does not include the 
LULUCF sector.
153  While the overall trend shows an increase in total emissions, between 2008 and 2009 NZ’s total GHG emissions decreased by 2,281 Gg CO2e. This, 
according to NZ Govt. (2011c) is the result of a decrease in road transport emissions (downturn of global economy) and a decrease in emissions 
associated with thermal energy generation (more hydro-electric, wind and geothermal generation). As explained in Milne & Grubnic (2011), the modest 
reduction in gross emissions are likely to rebound, given their association with climate and global economic variation as opposed to changes in policy-
induced behaviours. 
154  Net emissions include those from energy, industrial processes, solvent and other product use, agriculture and waste sectors, and emissions and 
removals from the land use and land use change and forestry (LULUCF) sector. 
each (Fig. 3.4).155   In 2009, however, CO2 dominated the country’s emission profile, with 
over 33,400 Gg CO2e, a 33.8% increase from 1990; CH4, on the other hand, provided just 
over 26,100 Gg CO2e, representing a 3.3% increase from 1990.156 
Figure 3.4:  Proportion that gases contribute to New Zealand’s total emissions   
  from1990 to 2009
     
  NZ Govt. (2011c). CO2, CH4 and N2O values exclude emissions and removals from LULUCF.
When considered as a function of sector contribution, the agriculture and energy sectors 
provided the greatest proportion of emissions in both 1990 and 2009.157  While the agriculture 
sector contributed the largest percentage of emissions in both 1990 and 2009 (51% and 46%, 
respectively),158  its share of emissions has generally been in decline since 1990. The relative 
amount of emissions from the energy sector, however, has been increasing over the same 
period, with 40% in 1990 and 44% in 2009 (NZ Govt., 2011b) (Fig. 3.6).159  The growth in 
energy related emissions, according to NZ Govt. (2011c), is the result of a 66% increase in 
transport emissions (4931 Gg CO2e) and a 72% increase in electricity generation and heat 
production emissions (2494 Gg CO2e). Notwithstanding the energy sector’s increasing 
contribution to total emissions between 1990 and 2009, between 2008 and 2009 the sector did 
experience a decrease of 2245 Gg CO2e. As noted previously, this slight aberration was the 
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155 See Appendix, Table 3.3, for data set; and Figure 3.5, for a graphic illustration of total emissions by gas in 2009.
156 This shift is the result of increased emissions from the energy sector (NZ Govt., 2011b). 
157 See Appendix, Table 3.4, for data set.
158 The agriculture sector’s dominance of NZ’s emissions profile is unique among developed countries, where the sector typically represents less than 10% 
of total emissions (NZ Govt., 2011b). While as a proportion the agriculture sector’s contribution may be in decline, by weight it continues to increase. This 
increase is largely the result of enteric fermentation emissions from dairy cattle and N2O emissions from agricultural soils (NZ Govt., 2011b). Interestingly, 
over the last two decades NZ’s energy use per capita has been increasing, also a trend that sets it apart from most of the developed world, where per 
capita energy use has been decreasing (Renowden, 2007).
159 See also Appendix, Figure 3.7, for a longitudinal graphic representation.
result of an increased contribution of hydro electric power, wind, and geothermal generation 
to the national grid, as well as a reduction in transportation related emissions (the result of a 
downturn in the economy) (e.g. Milne & Grubnic, 2011).
Figure 3.6:  Proportion that sectors contribute to New Zealand’s emissions, 1990 
  to 2009160
 
Emission removals from the LULUCF sector have increased since 1990, with net  removals 
(under the Climate Change Convention) in 2009 of -26,682 Gg CO2e, representing a 13% 
increase from 1990 (Fig. 3.8).161  According to NZ Govt. (2011c), the increase in emission 
removals is the result of new forest establishment since 1990 (post-1989 forests), and the 
growth of pre-1990 planted forests.162  While the overall trend demonstrates increased 
emission removals from the LULUCF sector, the 2008-2009 period, however, experienced a 
slight decline of 9%. This is due in part to an increase in the harvesting of pre-1990 planted 
forests and increased new planting (NZ Govt., 2011b).163 
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160 Adapted from Table ES 4.1.1, NZ Govt. (2011c). This figure does not include LULUCF.
161 See also Appendix, Figure 3.9, for a longitudinal graphic representation.
162 As per international rules, forests planted after 1990 can receive credit for their growth, but will debited upon harvest. When pre-1990 forests are cleared 
and not replanted they are also liable for debit.
163 According to NZ Govt. (2011c), new planting caused a decrease in removals because “the biomass of the previous crop is greater than the growth of the 
new crop, meaning emissions are greater than removals during 2009”.
Figure 3.8:  New Zealand’s emissions and removals by sector in 2009
  NZ Govt. (2011c). Note, emissions from the solvent and other product use sector are not represented in this 
  figure. Net removals from the LULUCF sector are as reported under the Climate Change Convention.
3.3.  THE CNPS PROGRAMME
3.3.1.  Programme Overview
Notwithstanding that the primary  goal of the CNPS programme was to launch NZ into the 
vanguard of  the international effort on climate change and carbon neutrality,164  the initiative 
also sought to demonstrate to organizations (both public and private) the practical 
methodology for achieving carbon neutrality. The government understood that in order to 
encourage businesses and households to reduce their carbon footprint, it must do the same 
and demonstrate commitment to lowering its own footprint within its operations (NZ Govt., 
2007b; Clark, 2007c).165  
The delivery  of the CNPS programme employed a staged approach to achieving carbon 
neutrality. And, it was acknowledged that the first stages of the programme would be 
iterative, learning by doing (NZ Govt., 2007b). While the six lead-core departments were 
tasked with developing plans to reach carbon neutrality  by the end of 2012 (for the period of 
2006/ 07 - 2011/ 12 financial year) by February 2008, the remaining core 28 departments 
were only required to develop emission reduction plans by the same date, and expected to be 
well on their way to achieving carbon neutrality  by 2012. In addition, the core 28 
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164  A year into the CNPS, the NZ government continued to advocate the programme’s status as an international leader on public sector carbon neutrality 
(NZ Govt., 2008). 
165 It is important to note that the CNPS initiative was developed from a sustainability perspective, rather than a policy tool for achieving NZ’s commitment 
under the Kyoto Protocol. With that said, offsets associated with the programme were intended to be Kyoto compliant: “We expect that Kyoto-compliant 
options will be preferred in the first instance because they help New Zealand meet its emission targets for the First Commitment Period under the Kyoto 
Protocol, and are more likely to align with broader climate change policy. One major criticism of non-Kyoto options is that they do not lessen our Kyoto 
liability, and therefore the government effectively pays twice to offset the emissions” (NZ Govt., 2007b).
departments were not required to design offset plans in the near term, or to offset  all 
emissions from 2006/ 07 - 2011/ 12 (NZ Govt., 2007b). While the core departments were 
mandated to go carbon neutral, the wider state sector, including Crown entities, schools and 
district health boards, for example, was only  encouraged to undertake efforts to cut 
emissions.166
The six lead-core departments include the Department for Conservation, Inland Review 
Department, Ministry for Economic Development, Ministry for the Environment, Ministry  of 
Health, and the Treasury. These ministries were chosen to lead the programme because good 
information already existed regarding their energy and transport use (emissions reductions 
efforts were built on the existing work of the Govt3 programme167  and the Energy Efficiency 
and Conservation Authority), and the fact they  were a good representative cross-section of 
core government agencies (NZ Govt., 2007b).  
The Ministry  for the Environment, serving as lead agency for the programme, was 
responsible for:
• Providing the departments with an inventory methodology;
• Managing measurement methods (including emission factors) and reporting 
formats;
• Managing independent verification of inventories;
• Providing advice on development of emission reduction plans and reduction 
targets;
• Developing an offset portfolio and establishing an administrative process 
for the management and verification of offsets.
For their part, the core departments were responsible for gathering emission data, disclosing 
these measures publicly, and identifying and implementing emission reduction activities and 
reduction plans (NZ Govt., 2007b). While the programme was largely self-reporting, based 
on annual reporting of emissions and reduction targets, the Ministry for the Environment was 
ultimately  responsible for reporting progress across all 34 core departments (NZ Govt., 
2007b).
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166  It was expected that following an assessment of the experience of the core departments, the broader state sector would also embark on a path to 
achieve carbon neutrality (NZ Govt., 2007b).
167 The Govt3 programme was a Ministry for the Environment-led initiative designed to change government agency behaviour and practices around 
sustainable procurement and energy efficiency. See: http://www.mfe.govt.nz/issues/sustainable-industry/govt3/.
Programme Funding
The budget for the CNPS programme was $10.4 million gross over three years. This  sum 
included funding for energy audits and travel plans for the 34 core departments, and the offset 
portfolio for the 2006/ 07 - 2011/ 12 emissions from the six lead-core departments (NZ Govt., 
2007b).168   The offset portfolio of the remaining 28 core departments, however, was not 
included in the $10.4 million, and government officials were in the process of determining 
whether costs should be met by respective departments’ baseline budget, or a further Budget 
bid. Likewise funding for the six lead-core departments’ offset portfolio beyond 2012 was 
also in discussion (NZ Govt., 2008). In terms of reduction measures for the 34 core 
departments, while it was expected that  financial savings would result overtime, it was 
anticipated that  departments would be required to absorbed some costs in the short to 
medium term (NZ Govt., 2007b).
Approach - Steps to Carbon Neutrality
The CNPS programme’s approach for completing the emissions inventory was consistent 
with those employed by, for example, the World Resource Institute (WRI), the World 
Business Council for Sustainable Development (WBCSD), the New Zealand Business 
Council for Sustainable Development, and the Landcare Research CarboNZero programme 
(NZ Govt., 2007b).169 The programme operated within the guidelines of the Greenhouse Gas 
Protocol for achieving carbon neutrality, with inventories compliant  to ISO specifications 
(NZ Govt., 2008; Mason & Ball, 2008).170
Under the CNPS programme, there were three key steps to achieve carbon neutrality:171  (1) 
measure emissions; (2) reduce emissions; and, (3) offset the remaining emissions. For the 
first step, agencies were required to compile an accurate inventory  that accounts for the 
greenhouse gas emissions associated with energy and electricity  use, business travel and 
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168  The $10.4 million did not include the expected savings generated from energy efficiencies. It was expected that the investment in emission reduction 
measures would be repaid overtime via reduced energy bills and a reduced need for offsets (NZ Govt., 2007b). 
169  While the reporting methodology of these organizations remain very similar, emissions associated with waste disposal tend not to be included.  The 
CNPS programme, however, in an effort to ensure credibility, did included emissions resulting from waste to landfill (NZ Govt., 2007b); with that said, 
emissions resulting from the waste sector are quite small, representing between 1-2% for the lead-core agencies between the 2006 - 2007 period (Fig. 
3.20).
170  Compliant to ISO 14064-1 (ISO, 2006). The Greenhouse Gas Protocol is an international emissions accounting framework, used by both public and 
private sector.
171 MFE (2008a) provides a good overview of how to achieve carbon neutrality.
transport (including air travel), and waste sent to landfill.172    NZ Govt. (2007b) notes that 
department inventories did not  include staff commuting or the embodied energy in buildings 
and products.173  The data, as Mason & Ball (2008) indicate, was presented in carbon dioxide 
equivalents (CO2e) and organised around three “Scope” categories, as per ISO specifications:
Scope 1 - Direct Emissions
Emissions associated with on-site production or combustion of fossil fuels, 
including purchased fuel for vehicle fleet;
Scope 2 - Indirect Emissions
Emissions associated with purchased electricity, i.e. emissions created through 
the consumption of electricity to light and power buildings; 
Scope 3 - Optional
Typically includes emissions associated with business travel (inc. air travel, 
taxis), outsourced services, and employee commuting, for example.
Step two required departments to identify, conceptualise, and, building on their experience 
with the Govt3 programme, implement  practices and programmes to reduce emissions. 
Departments were expected to reduce their emissions as much as practical, within the 
“bounds of reasonableness and cost-effectiveness” (NZ Govt., 2007b).174  Departments were 
cautioned not to undertake emission reduction efforts that would hinder their effectiveness. 
Reduction efforts focused on three areas: energy efficiency, including energy audits and staff 
awareness building; travel, including the development of travel plans, instalment of 
videoconferencing, and procurement of fuel efficient vehicles; and, waste reduction and 
recycling.175  Departments were encouraged to find “win-win’ options that resulted in both 
cost and emissions savings relative to business as usual.176  In addition, departments were 
required to set realistic emission reduction targets. Given that departments were starting from 
different base-points, the government did not believe it appropriate to set a flat-rate target 
across the departments (NZ Govt., 2007b).
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172 As Ball et al. (2009a) note, in line with international standards, see ISO (2006), departments set operational boundaries, identified emission sources and 
calculated their CO2e, and reported verified inventories. 
173  According to NZ Govt. (2007b), while CNPS did not capture staff commuting, building construction, and procurement, for the most part, this was 
achieved through the Govt3 programme and the sustainable government procurement initiative.
174 Departments were not expected to reduce their emissions to zero, as it would not have been practical with current technology (NZ Govt., 2007b).
175 The Ministry for the Environment provided departments with a guideline for these measures, but this document is not publicly available. 
176  The Ministry for the Environment was charged with developing a “cost-effective threshold” to assist department’s in determining the most appropriate 
emission reduction measure (NZ Govt., 2007b). The government recognized that “not all potential reduction measures [would] save money...” and while 
“emissions reduction [was] the main focus of the initiative... there is point at which reduction ceases to be the best option and offsetting becomes 
preferable” (NZ Govt., 2007b).
The final stage for achieving carbon neutrality involved offsetting. As noted above, since it is 
not practical - and in some cases not technologically  possible - to reduce emissions to zero, 
the remaining unavoidable emissions required offsetting. The task of investigating offset 
options for the lead-core departments was centralised, and assigned to the Ministry  for the 
Environment.177  While it was accepted that all offset projects be located in NZ, with 
preference for forestry-related projects on Department of Conservation land (NZ Govt., 
2007b), some debate did surround the offset portfolio itself. Cabinet ultimately recommended 
that the lead-core department offset portfolio include the following kyoto-compliant offsets: 
• Exotic afforestation on Crown land;
• Indigenous afforestation on Crown land through new planting; and, 
• Indigenous afforestation on Crown land by accelerated natural regeneration.
The Ministry for the Environment emphasised the need to focus on accelerated indigenous 
forest reversion on Crown land, as there was real capacity  for ecological co-benefits and 
exposure to gain public support. Moreover, this approach aligned with biodiversity goals, and 
was not limited by seed stock and seeding availability (NZ Govt., 2007c). The quality of the 
offset was an important  consideration given the programmes need to maintain credibility.178 It 
was estimated by government that emissions associated with the lead-core departments could 
be offset by the end of 2012 “through the reversion of indigenous forest on between 10,000 
and 27,000 hectares” of Department of Conservation land (NZ Govt., 2007b).179   In addition 
to the three offset options noted above, the offset portfolio for the remaining 28 core 
departments included the following:
• Permanent Forest Sink Initiative (PFSI) and Afforestation Grant Scheme (AGS);180
• Non-kyoto forest management; and,
• Other industrial projects, i.e. energy efficiency measures.
A diversified portfolio was crucial for all 34 core departments, as it allowed Government to 
minimise risk associated with any one specific activity, and particularly for the core 28 
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177 The Ministry for the Environment sought the most environmentally appropriate and cost effective offsetting options.
178  The CNPS programme was required to be accurate, transparent and auditable, in order “to demonstrate the retirement of the credits or offsets used” in 
the programme (NZ Govt., 2007c).
179 It was estimated by government that Department of Conservation had at least 50,000 hectares of land suitable and available for offset needs (NZ Govt., 
2007b).
180  It was anticipated that these two programmes would be in place by the time the remaining 28 lead departments were ready for offset projects. PFSI 
“promotes the establishment of permanent forests on previously unforested land... the forest must be direct human induced... through planting, seeding 
and/or the human-induced promotion of natural seed sources” (MAF, 2011a). AGS was a funding scheme put in place to encourage new forests, as part of 
the government’s package of climate change initiatives. No new application rounds are planned (MAF, 2011b).
departments, given their delayed timeline, it maximised opportunities for learning (NZ Govt., 
2007c).
3.3.2.  Programme Results
Emission Inventory Data for the 34 Core Departments181
All 34 core departments completed an emissions inventory for the 2006/ 07 financial year.182 
Total emissions for the 34 core departments was approximately  159,000 t-CO2e, with the six 
lead-core departments responsible for approximately 26,000 t-CO2e (16%)183  and the 
remaining 28 core departments responsible for approximately 133,000 t-CO2e (84%) (NZ 
Govt., 2008).184  Initial assessment of all 34 core department inventories reveals a range of 
emission levels or weights, from a low of  76.77 t-CO2e/y  (the Ministry of Women’s Affairs) 
to a high of 9511.24 t-CO2e/y (the Department of Conservation) (Fig. 3.10).  
Figure 3.10:  Emissions by weights (t-CO2e/y) for all 34 core departments for 
  base-year July  1, 2006 to June 30, 2007185
When viewed as function of full-time equivalent (FTE) staff, emissions range from a low of 
1.69 t-CO2e/FTE/y (the Inland Revenue Department) to a high of 9.51 t-CO2e/FTE/y 
(Archives New Zealand), with an average of 3.56 t-CO2e/FTE/y over all 34 core 
departments. In addition to Archives New Zealand,186  the Ministry of Fisheries and the 
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181 See Appendix, Table 3.5, for data set. 
182  Emission inventories and reduction plans for the 34 core departments were obtained from the respective department’s website between June and 
September 2009.
183 Det Norske Veritas verified the inventories of the lead-core six departments.
184  The six lead-core departments represent 17% of the total core departments involved in the programme, the remaining 28 core departments thus 
representing 83%. Figures released in NZ Govt. (2008) are approximations, with more accurate numbers presented in respective Department Emission 
Inventory Reports, which when tallied indicate that emissions for the six lead-core departments was 26,731.1 t-CO2e, the 28 core departments was 
126,440.59 CO2e, and the total for both groups was 153,171.68 CO2e for 2006/ 07 financial year. For accuracy, the following tables and figures use data 
directly derived from the actual department emission inventories.
185 See Appendix, Table 3.5, for data set.
186 Archives New Zealand, for example, has a high t-CO2e/FTE/y because of a low number of FTE relative to energy use (Scope 1 and Scope 2). 
Department of Corrections also presented high figures for emissions per FTE/y with  8.81 t-
CO2e and 7.93 t-CO2e, respectively (Fig. 3.11).
 
Figure 3.11:  Emissions per FTE for all 34 core departments for base-year July 1, 
  2006 to June 30, 2007187
When considered by scope for all 34 core departments, Scope 1 and Scope 3 dominate the 
emission profile, representing 37% each by proportion (57042.41 t-CO2e and 56706.44 t-
CO2e, respectively) (Fig. 3.12).  
Figure 3.12:  Emission proportions by scope for combined emissions of all 34 core 
  departments for base-year July 1, 2006 to June 30, 2007188
On an individual level, the dominant scope ranges across the 34 core departments, with the 
Department of Corrections’ emission profile dominated by Scope 1 (73%; 37980 t-CO2e), 
the Ministry of Justice’s emission profile dominated by Scope 2 (50%; 4914.9 t-CO2e), and 
the Ministry  of Foreign Affairs and Trade’s emissions profile dominated by  Scope 3 (99.7%; 
2251.86 t-CO2e). The Inland Revenue Department and the Ministry of Economic 
Development both are close behind for Scope 2 at 49.7% (4676.44 t-CO2e) and 49.3% 
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187 See Appendix, Table 3.5, for data set.
188 See Appendix, Table 3.6, for data set.
(106.95 t-CO2e), respectively. The Ministry of Health is close behind for Scope 3 at 89.7% 
(3607.79 t-CO2e) (Fig. 3.13). In terms of total emission weights, the Department of 
Corrections is the largest contributor to Scope 1 with 37980 t-CO2e, the Inland Revenue 
Department is the largest contributor to Scope 2 with 4676.44 t-CO2e, and the Department of 
Conservation is the largest contributor to Scope 3 with 4203.87 t-CO2e.
Figure 3.13:  Emission proportions by  scope for each of the 34 core departments 
  for base-year July 1, 2006 to June 30, 2007
Figure 3.14 presents department emission proportions by source (Fig. 3.14). Energy and 
transport are the primary contributors to department emissions, with waste representing only 
a fraction of the total at 1-2%, on average across the 34 core departments. The Crown Law 
Office and the Ministry of Justice stand out as exceptions to this trend with waste responsible 
for approximately 6% and 4% of their department’s total emissions, respectively. Notably, 
though not illustrated in this figure, the Department of Corrections has added a fourth 
emission source to its profile, Livestock,189  which represents approximately 41% of the 
departments’ emissions.
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189 Livestock, in the form of CH4 (21,540 t-CO2e), represents a significant proportion of the Department of Correction’s emissions, and while classed as 
Scope 1 emissions (Fig. 3.13), it is not included in Figure 3.14 because it does not fall into one of the three primary sources of emissions (Corrections, 
2007).
Figure 3.14:  Emission proportions by  source for each of the 34 core departments 
  for base-year July 1, 2006 to June 30, 2007190
Emission Inventory Data for the Six Lead-core Departments
In line with the results from the 34 core department emission inventories, analysis of the 
lead-core six department inventories reveals a range of emission levels or weights, from a 
low of  847.14 t-CO2e (the Treasury) to a high of 9511.24 t-CO2e (the Department of 
Conservation) (Fig. 3.15). The Ministry for the Environment also demonstrates a relatively 
low emission weight at 912.29 t-CO2e, and the Inland Revenue Department a relatively high 
emission weight at 9405.06 t-CO2e. As function of the proportion of the lead-core six 
department’s total emission weight, the Department of Conservation represents 36% (9511.24 
t-CO2e), the Inland Revenue Department 35% (9405.06 t-CO2e), the Ministry  of Health 15% 
(4017.73 t-CO2e), the Ministry  of Economic Development 8% (2037.63 t-CO2e), and the 
Treasury and Ministry for the Environment approximately  3% each, at 847.1428 t-CO2e and 
912.29 t-CO2e, respectively.
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190 See Appendix, Table 3.5, for data set.
Figure 3.15:  Emissions for the six lead-core departments for base-year July  1, 
  2006 to June 30, 2007191
When viewed as function of full-time equivalent (FTE) staff, emissions for the lead-core six 
departments range from a low of 1.69 t-CO2e (the Inland Revenue Department) to a high of 
5.59 t-CO2e (Department of Conservation), with an average of 2.58 t-CO2e over the six lead-
core departments (Fig. 3.16), a reduction of 0.98 t-CO2e from the FTE of the 34 core 
departments (3.56 t-CO2e). By proportion per FTE across the lead-core six departments, the 
Department of Conservation represents 30% (5.59 t-CO2e), Ministry  for the Environment 
18% (3.25 t-CO2e), Treasury 16% (2.88 t-CO2e), the Ministry  of Economic Development 
15% (2.81 t-CO2e), the Ministry  of Health 12% (2.25 t-CO2e), and the Inland Revenue 
Department 9% (1.69 t-CO2e).
Figure 3.16:  Emissions per FTE for the six lead-core departments for base-year 
  July 1,  2006 to June 30, 2007192
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191 See Appendix, Table 3.7, for data set.
192 See Appendix, Table 3.7, for data set.
When viewed by scope, Scope 3, at 56% (14980.70 t-CO2e), dominants the total emission 
profile for the six lead-core departments, with Scope 2 at  24% (6474.72 t-CO2e) and Scope 1 
at 20% (5275.66 t-CO2e) (Fig. 3.17). Within the six lead-core departments, Scope 3 remains 
the dominant scope for the Ministry of Health at 89% (3607.79 t-CO2e), the Ministry of 
Economic Development at 88% (1798.59 t-CO2e), Ministry for the Environment at 83% 
(759.79 t-CO2e), and the Treasury at 79%   (675.29 t-CO2e), while Scope 2 is the dominant 
scope for the Inland Revenue Department at 50% (4676.44 t-CO2e), and Scope 1 and Scope 
2 equally dominate the Department of Conservation’s emission profile at 45% (4303.1 t-
CO2e) and 44% (4203.8 t-CO2e), respectively. In terms of total emission weights, the 
Department of Conservation is the largest contributor to Scope 1 with 4303.1 t-CO2e and 
Scope 3 with 4203.87 t-CO2e, and consistent with results for all 34 core departments, the 
Inland Revenue Department is the largest contributor to Scope 2 with 4676.44 t-CO2e.
Figure 3.17:  Emission proportions by scope for the six lead-core  departments for 
  base-year July 1, 2006 to June 30, 2007193
A closer look at the Scope 3 contributions of the six lead-core departments, shows that of the 
total 14980.7 t-CO2e, the Department of Conservation contributes the greatest emissions at 
28% (4203.87 t-CO2e) while the Ministry for the Environment and the Treasury supply the 
fewest emissions at 5% each (759.44 t-CO2e and 675.29 t-CO2e, respectively) (Fig. 3.18).
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193 See Appendix, Table 3.8, for data set.
Figure 3.18:  Lead-core department contribution to scope 3 by proportion for 
  base-year July 1, 2006 to June 30, 2007194
The six lead-core departments organise Scope 3 emissions by  three sources, or categories: 
Energy, Transport and Waste. Figure 3.19 illustrates that  for the six lead-core departments, 
transport, with 11262.6 t-CO2e, is the dominant source of Scope 3 emissions, followed by 
energy with 3442.9 t-CO2e, then waste with 274.7 t-CO2e (Fig. 3.19). Figure 3.19 also 
shows the relative contribution of each of the six lead-core departments to the three 
categories. The Ministry of Health dominates Energy with a 35% (1214.74 t-CO2e) 
contribution, while the Department of Conservation dominates Transport with a 36% 
(4073.72 t-CO2e) contribution and the Inland Revenue Department dominates Waste with a 
55% (151.55 t-CO2e) contribution.
5%
24%
5%
12%
26%
28%
DOC
IRD
MED
MFE
MOH
Treasury
Organizational Involvement in Carbon Mitigation
71
194 See Appendix, Table 3.9, for data set.
Figure 3.19:  Lead-core department contribution to Scope 3 emission sources by 
  proportion for base-year July 1, 2006 to June 30, 2007195
Figure 3.20 presents department emission proportions by source (Fig. 3.20). Similar to the 
trend found within the 34 core departments, energy and transport are the primary contributing 
source to department  emissions, with waste representing only a fraction of the total at 1-2%, 
on average across the six lead-core departments. 
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195 See Appendix, Table 3.9, for data set. 
Figure 3.20:  Emission proportions by source for each of the six lead-core 
  departments for base-year July 1, 2006 to June 30, 2007196
Emission Reductions
The 34 core departments identified over 300 reduction projects to lower emissions below 
business as usual (NZ Govt., 2008). The initiatives ranged from the development of video 
conferencing facilities and installation of solar hot water heaters to vehicle fleet auditing and 
sustainability programmes for vehicle procurement, and recycling. It was expected that 
further reduction projects would be identified as departments completed their energy audits 
and travel plans.  In terms of emission reduction targets, as Ball et al. (2009a) indicate, 
department goals were presented in a combination of qualitative and quantitative measures.
This trend is echoed within the lead-core six department Emission Reduction Plans, where, 
for example, the Department of Conservation and the Ministry  of Economic Development 
present emission reduction targets by weight, 1837 t-CO2e (19%) and 270 t-CO2e (13%) 
respectively, by 2012, and the Ministry of Health and the Treasury present descriptive 
qualitative targets.  While all six lead-core departments provide qualitative targets (including 
language that suggests need for behaviour change i.e. awareness building) in the their 
plans,197  only 5 departments provide quantitative targets. Emission reduction targets are 
organised around three areas of focus: energy, transport and waste. Table 3.10 describes, 
generally, the key targets pledged by the six lead-core department (Table 3.10).
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196 See Appendix, Table 3.9, for data set.
197 Departments consistently advocate for energy audits, travel planning and waste/ recycling audits.
Table 3.10:  Lead-core departments’ emission reduction targets 
Department*
Emission reduction targets**
Overall Goal Energy Transport Waste
DOC
• total emission 
savings of up to 
1837 t-CO2e 
(19%)
• reduce electricity use by 
15% (150 t-CO2e)
• reduce oil use in 
generators by 50% (76 
t-CO2e)
• reduce vehicle emissions by 
approximately 33% (1300 t-CO2e)
• reduce air travel by 15% (150 t-CO2e)
• reduce helicopter use by 5% (140 t-
CO2e)
IRD • reduce energy use by 10% per FTE
• aim to reduce workplace travel distance 
by 15% (by 2010)
• work to reduce business travel, including 
a 10% reduction in air travel distance (by 
2010)
• reduce emissions from vehicle fleet by 
25%, and a 10% reduction in emissions 
from taxis and rental vehicles (by 2008)
• work to reduce 
waste to landfill
MED
• total emission 
savings of up to 
270 t-CO2e (13%)
• reduce overall energy 
use by 10%
• reduce overall number of international 
activities (flights) by 15%
• reduce overall 
waste to 15 kg or 
less per FTE/ y.
MFE
• reduce electricity 
consumption per FTE 
by 5% (2008)
• reduce emission associated with 
workplace travel by 6% (2008) • reduce total waste
MOH • reduce energy use • reduce air travel distance• reduce taxi travel distance
• reduce waste to 
landfill
Treasury
• reduce electricity used 
by personal computer 
stock by 50%
This table was constructed using data from New Zealand Ministry Emission Reduction Plans. * See Appendix, Table 3.1, for list of 
Ministry/ Department abbreviations. ** Source: Respective Ministry/ Department Emission Reduction Plan (2008)
3.4.  THE CCP-NZ PROGRAMME
3.4.1.  Programme Overview
The CCP-NZ programme began in 2004, with funding from the Ministry for the 
Environment, support from the Energy Efficiency and Conservation Authority and Local 
Government New Zealand, and operational guidance from ICLEI, through its Oceania 
Secretariat. As a voluntary initiative, local government participation in the CCP-NZ 
programme was not mandated by central government.
Building on ICLEI’s success with the CCP campaign, the goal of the CCP-NZ programme 
was to help local government councils achieve quantifiable GHG emission reductions,198 
both from within councils’ own operations (corporate) and from within its wider 
community.199  As identified by many local governments and echoed by ICLEI’s mantra, 
because of their proximity to the population, councils play a unique and pivotal role in 
demonstrating leadership on climate change mitigation (e.g. CCP-NZ, 2009).  Likewise, local 
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198  Though the goal of the CCP-NZ programme was emission reductions, some councils did seek to achieve carbon neutrality, be it aspirationally or via an 
actual path and commitment.
199  In terms of the CCP-NZ programme, ‘community’ refers to emissions associated with the residential, commercial, and industrial sectors within council’s 
land boundary. In instances were data allows, ‘community’ also includes the transportation and waste sector as well (CCP-NZ, 2009).
government is ideally situated to ease the implementation of government policy on climate 
change. 
ICLEI and the CCP campaign represent a network of international governments keen on 
environmental improvement, and specifically climate change abatement. Association with 
ICLEI’s network allowed participant councils in the CCP-NZ programme to benefit from 
sharing of best practices and the use of tried and tested methodologies. And more directly, 
programme participants benefited from workshops on capacity building for staff and senior 
management and technics for working with elected officials.200 The programme worked with 
councils to identify and execute actions to reduce GHG emissions corporately and within the 
community, for example:
• Energy management/ savings initiatives (inc. low-energy and low-carbon 
technologies); promoting renewable energy;
• Promoting sustainable transport;
• Reducing emissions from landfills; and,
• Promoting awareness
The programme targeted NZ local government.201  NZ local government is divided into two 
levels of representation, Regional Councils and Territorial Authorities (District and City 
Councils). Because these two levels of government have different responsibilities, both 
organizationally  and within the community, they ultimately  demonstrate different emission 
profiles. For example, because District and City Councils are responsible for local 
infrastructure, emissions associated with water/ sewage pumping may be elevated relative to 
Regional Councils. 
By the time the programme ended in 2009, membership was dominated by district councils, 
which represented 47% of total membership. This was followed by city, then regional 
councils which represented 35% and 15% of total membership, respectively  (Fig. 3.21). The 
programme experienced two waves of relatively high enrolment: 2004 and 2007 representing 
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200  The CCP-NZ programme included several focused workshops and forums intended to educate and build momentum, as well as facilitate networking. 
See CCP-NZ (2009) for a list of workshops, forums and events 2004 - 2009.
201  New Zealand has 11 Regional Councils, 54 District Councils, 12 City Councils, and Auckland Council, which as of November 1, 2010 amalgamated 8 
former councils. 
35% and 29% of total programme membership, respectively. At 9%, 2008 was the year with 
lowest overall enrolment, before the  programme ended in 2009.
Figure 3.21:  CCP-NZ programme participation as a proportion (by 2009)202
Initially, the programme began with 12 councils: two regional councils, six district councils, 
and four city councils. Membership  grew in 2005 to 17 councils, with the bulk of the growth 
from district councils. In 2006 membership included 21 councils. 2007 saw a spike in 
membership, with three regional councils, five district councils, and two city  councils joining 
the programme, bringing total membership to 31 councils. By the end of 2008 the 
programme’s total membership was 34 councils: six regional, 16 district, and 12 city councils 
(Fig. 3.21). 
Figure 3.22:  CCP-NZ programme membership by date joined, as a proportion of 
  council type (Regional, District, City)203
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202 See Appendix, Table 3.11, for data set.
203 See Appendix, Table 3.11, for data set.
Programme Funding
The Ministry  for the Environment was responsible for funding CCP-NZ programme 
participant membership fees.  While the exact annual cost of programme participation, 2004 
to 2009, is not available, in addition to the annual membership fees, the Ministry for the 
Environment did provide participant councils’ with a one-off payment of $4000 to employ an 
intern to assist with the completion of Milestone 1.204  Following the Ministry for the 
Environment’s withdrawal of programme funding, in an effort to prolong NZ participation in 
the programme, ICLEI provided NZ councils with a revised fee structure. The revised annual 
fee structure sets out three categories, based on council population (ICLEI, 2009):
1. Councils up to 20,000 population: $1000 
2. Councils up to 100,000 population: $2000
3. Councils above 100,000 population: $3000
Despite efforts from ICLEI, NZ councils did not  renew their membership following the 
Ministry for the Environment’s withdrawal of programme funding.
Approach - Carbon Management
The CCP-NZ programme centred around its strategic framework, a five-step  standardised and 
internationally recognised process for measuring, reporting and monitoring GHG emission 
reductions. At the core of the framework was the international CCP Greenhouse Gas 
Application (GGA) Software,205  which assisted councils develop emission inventories, 
analyse data, and ultimately  benchmark progress against other participant  councils (CCP-NZ, 
2009). 
After councils committed to becoming a CCP-NZ programme participant, they  began the five 
milestones:
Milestone 1 
Conduct a greenhouse gas emissions inventory, analysis, and forecast 
(under a business as usual scenario) for corporate and community 
emissions;206 
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204 This sum is noted in each councils’ Milestone 1 reports, see for example, ECRC (2005).
205 The GGA software was modified for use in New Zealand in 2004 (CCP-NZ, 2009).
206  The analysis must take into consideration both local and national data in order to model local community emissions. The majority of emissions from 
council operations will be a subset of the community emissions, though this will not likely present in the data (ICLEI, 2008a).
Milestone 2 
Set emissions reduction goals relative to base-year;207
Milestone 3 
Develop  a local action plan to achieve sustainable reductions in emissions - 
demonstrate council’s path to emission reductions.208
Milestone 4 
Implement the climate action plan and quantify  the benefits of policies and 
actions; and,
Milestone 5 
Monitor progress towards the reduction goal, and start the process for re-
inventory and review of the plan.
Along with the GGA, the programme also employed the New Zealand Supplement to the 
International Local Government GHG Emissions Analysis Protocol (ICLEI, 2008), which 
was written specifically to address the unique needs of local government, and “seeks to 
follow certain principles,209 drawn from the WRI/ WBCSD GHG Protocol, to ensure accurate 
accounting and reporting” (ICLEI, 2008a). The supplement provided councils with guidance 
on to how to quantify emissions from their own operations (corporate) and from the 
communities within their boundaries.210 Specifically, the New Zealand Supplement:
• Helped councils build accurate211  inventories for both council’s corporate and 
community emission sources;
• Facilitated the comparison of different communities using a standardised 
policy-relevant approach;
• Enabled quantifiable measurement toward reduction goals; and,
• Demonstrate consistency with standards adopted by the New Zealand 
Government.
In terms of the community inventory, ICLEI supplied programme participant councils with 
information based on 2001 census data for population, occupation, and vehicle registration in 
each council area. The data was sourced from the NZ Ministry of Economic Development, 
Energy Efficiency and Conservation Authority, and the MOT (CCP-NZ, 2009). 
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207 Targets should include policy set by national government.
208 The action place should include existing measures that have been in place since the base-year.
209  The principles for achieving accurate accounting and reporting under the WRI/ WBCSD GHG Protocol include: relevance, completeness, consistency, 
transparency, accuracy, and conservativeness.
210  Corporate emissions were broken down into five main sector: buildings, vehicle fleet, employee commute, water/ sewage, and waste; community 
emissions were broken down into five sector: residential, commercial, industrial, transport, and waste.
211  While the CCP-NZ programme, along with the protocols it followed, emphasize the need for accuracy and completeness, councils were reminded that 
the aim of the programme also included emission abatement actions - for some councils this meant focusing on mitigation efforts.
In addition to allowing councils to gauge the effectiveness of their emission reduction efforts, 
the five-step  framework provided councils with the opportunity to highlight achievements 
and gain buy-in for future work. Moreover, by working through the milestones, councils 
“gain[ed] an understanding of how local authority decisions can be used to reduce [GHG] 
emissions while improving quality of life in the local community” (CCP-NZ, 2009, p. 44).
While carbon neutrality  was not the focus of the CCP-NZ programme, councils’ interested in 
pursuing this effort were provided with appropriate resources. Also, in consultation with NZ 
councils, ICLEI developed the Carbon Neutrality  Framework for Local Government - New 
Zealand Version (See ICLEI, 2008b). This framework, in the absence of a global standard for 
carbon neutrality, assisted in the establishment of “an independent standard to define the 
concept and support a claim of carbon neutrality” (CCP-NZ, 2009, p. 4).
While the goal was to complete the five milestones, because the programme finished 
prematurely, this was not possible for all councils. By the time the programme ended in 2009, 
only 6% of participant councils had completed the final milestone (Fig. 3.23). Of the three 
levels of local government involved in the programme, only city  councils (2 city  councils) 
reached the final milestone. While milestone 1 was reached by all three council types, 
milestones 4 and 5 were represented by only two of the three council types, regional and city 
councils.212
Figure 3.23:  CCP-NZ programme participation as a proportion of milestone (M) 
  completion (by 2009)213
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212 Analysis of these results will occur in Chapter 8.
213 See Appendix, Table 3.12, for data set.
3.4.2.  Programme Results
Emission Inventory Data for the 34 Participant Councils
CCP-NZ programme participant councils completed an emission inventory for their 
respective base-year.214  Based on summated base-year data extracted from ICLEI’s GGA 
software, corporate emissions from the 34 participant councils totalled 146,247 t-CO2e 
(CCP-NZ, 2009).215   Emissions data are presented by sector and energy source; corporate 
sector emissions are categorised by buildings, streetlights, vehicle fleet and water/ sewage, 
while community  sector emissions are categorised by residential, commercial, industrial, and 
transport.216  While corporate waste was accounted for by some councils, since fewer than 
half of participant councils performed a waste audit, there was insufficient information 
available for inclusion in this data set.217
Of the 146,247 t-CO2e total corporate emissions, the building sector represents the largest 
share of the emissions at 42% (61,423 t-CO2e), with the water/ waste sector representing 
27% (39,468 t-CO2e), the streetlight sector representing 18% (26,324 t-CO2e) and the 
vehicle fleet  sector representing 13% (19,012 t-CO2e) (Fig. 3.24). When considered by 
energy source, electricity  is the dominant source, responsible for 65% of corporate emissions 
(95,060 t-CO2e).218   Natural gas is the second highest contributor at 12% (17,549 t-CO2e), 
then diesel and petrol each at 9% (13,162 t-CO2e each), coal at 3% (4387 t-CO2e) and LPG 
at 2% (2924 t-CO2e).
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214  By the time the CCP-NZ programme had ended in 2009, Hutt City Council had only made ‘Political Declaration’ for the programme, and thus while able 
to claim membership, did not complete the first milestone of the programme.
215 See Appendix, Table 3.13, for data set.
216 All GHG emissions are equated to carbon dioxide equivalents (CO2e) in tonnes.
217  For councils that did conduct a corporate waste audit, waste as a proportion of total emissions was less than 1 per cent (CCP-NZ, 2009). Waste 
emissions (CH4) result from the breakdown of organic matter originating from corporate activities and operations such as green waste.
218  The NZ electricity system is linked between the North and South Island by a direct-current Cook Strait cable. While South Island generation is strictly 
renewable (HEP and wind), North Island generation consists of coal and gas-fired facilities.  During the dry season, South Island generation is 
supplemented by North Island thermal generation. The NZ government decreed that all NZ grid-connected electricity should have the same emission factor 
- the average annual electricity factor. Because of weather, the average annual electricity factor varies between 0.2 t-CO2e per MWh in dry years and 0.17 
t-CO2e per MWh in wet years (CCP-NZ, 2009; MFE, 2011).
Figure 3.24:  CCP-NZ programme corporate base-year emissions profile219
Community emission data for the 34 participant councils show a total of 21,860,009 t-CO2e 
for 2001 base-year emissions.220  Of the total, the transport sector dominates the emissions 
profile at  47% (10,274,204 t-CO2e), followed by the industrial sector at 33% (7,213,802 t-
CO2e), then the residential sector at 11% (2404600 t-CO2e), and, the commercial sector at 
9% (1967400 t-CO2e) (Fig. 3.25). Because NZ waste metrics for base-year 2001 were not 
available from the Ministry for the Environment, community  waste was not included in this 
data set  (CCP-NZ, 2009). When considered by energy source, community emissions are 
dominated by petrol at  29% (6,427,811 t-CO2e). The second largest source of energy 
emissions is electricity at 26% (4,890,066 t-CO2e), followed by diesel at 17% (3,980,320 t-
CO2e), natural gas at 11% (2,144,802 t-CO2e), coal at 10% (3,082,857 t-CO2e), then light 
fuel oil, LPG and other at 4% (882,938 t-CO2e), 2% (347,798 t-CO2e), and 1% (103,417 t-
CO2e), respectively.
Figure 3.25:  CCP-NZ programme community base-year emissions profile221
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219 See Appendix, Table 3.13 and Table 3.14, for data sets.
220 As noted in CCP-NZ (2009), the proportions of emissions allocated to each sector reflect the breakdown of energy emissions by sector for New Zealand.
221 See Appendix, Table 3.15 and Table 3.16, for data sets.
Emission Inventory Data and Forecasts for the 16 Study Selection Councils
The emissions profile of the 16 study  selection councils, overall, echo the trends present 
within the total CCP-NZ programme membership.222  Because of gaps in individual council 
Milestone 1 reports (emissions inventory),223  however, it is difficult to generalise trends 
within the 16 study selection councils, or compare councils directly.224  As a result, this 
section presents data on the level of the individual council. Here, emission profiles and 
forecasts, for both corporate and community emissions, from a sample of the 16 study 
selection, is presented.225   In some instances, where data allows, council emission reduction 
goals are presented (See Appendix - Tables and Appendix - Figures, for tables and figures 
that support material presented below). 
Environment Canterbury Regional Council
Environment Canterbury  Regional Council’s base-year corporate emissions total 1227 t-
CO2e. Though Environment Canterbury  Regional Council does not include the streetlight 
sector or the water/ sewage sector in its emissions inventory, the emissions trend from base-
year (2001) to forecast-year (2010) remains one of growth, save the waste sector which 
remains even at 37 t-CO2e.226  Figure 3.36 demonstrates that from base-year to forecast-year, 
the vehicle fleet sector dominates the emissions profile, at 51% and 50% by weight 
respectively. And, while as a proportion of total emission weights, the vehicle fleet sector and 
the waste sector both decrease, and the building sector remains the same, the employee 
commute sector increases from 28% to 30% from base-year to forecast-year (Fig. 3.28). 
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222 See Appendix, Table 3.17; Table 3.18; Table 3.19; and, Table 3.20, for data sets.
223 Not all councils include the same sectors in their emissions inventory, i.e. while one council will include emissions associated with employee commute or 
streetlights, another will not.
224 See Appendix, Figure 3.26, for a generalized representation of reported community sector emissions. This figure shows an overall emissions increase of 
15% from 2001 to 2010.
225 See also Appendix, Table 3.22 and Table 3.23 and Figures 3.51 - 3.71, for additional graphs, beyond the sample discussed here.
226 See Appendix, Figure 3.27, for a graphic (bar graph) representation of this data.
Figure 3.28:  Environment Canterbury Regional Council corporate emission 
  weights for base-year (2001) and forecast-year (2010) as proportion 
  of sector227
In terms of Environment Canterbury  Regional Council’s community  emissions profile, base-
year (2001) emissions total 4,758,372 t-CO2e, while forecast-year (2010) emissions total 
5,685,804 t-CO2e, a 19% increase.228  Of these totals, the transport sector  represents the 
largest share, with 2,160,056 t-CO2e (45%) and 2,888,312 t-CO2e (51%) for the base-year 
and the forecast-year respectively (Fig. 3.30). While the transport sector, as a proportion of 
total emission weights increased from the base-year to the forecast-year, the remaining 
sectors decreased. 
Figure 3.30:  Environment Canterbury Regional Council community  emission 
  weights for base-year (2001) and forecast-year (2010) as proportion 
  of sector229
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227 Adapted from Table 3.17 and Table 3.18. See Appendix, Table 3.17 and Table 3.18, for data sets.
228  See Appendix, Figure 3.29, for a graphic (bar graph) representation of this data. The 19% increase in total emissions is attributed to the region’s 
population growth. With specific reference to the transportation sector, it is expected that as the number of households increase, so to will the number of 
cars per household. It is also projected that the population will be begin to move beyond the urban centres, resulting in a further increase in transport 
related emissions (ECRC, 2005). 
229 Adapted from Table 3.19 and Table 3.20. See Appendix, Table 3.19 and Table 3.20, for data sets.
Greater Wellington Regional Council
Greater Wellington Regional Council’s base-year (2005) corporate emissions total 6361 t-
CO2e, with the water/sewage sector representing the greatest share of emissions with 4761 t-
CO2e. This is followed by the vehicle fleet  sector with 890 t-CO2e, the building sector with 
384 t-CO2e, the employee commute sector with 247 t-CO2e, and the waste and the airline 
travel sectors with 40  t-CO2e and 39 t-CO2e, respectively. Greater Wellington Regional 
Council’s Milestone 1 report  indicates that council emissions will continue to decrease from 
the base-year through to 2050,230  when it expects total emissions to be 3774 t-CO2e, a 41% 
decrease over the base-year emissions (Fig. 3.32). 
Figure 3.32:  Greater Wellington Regional Council’s corporate GHG emission 
  reduction goal by total emissions231
Kaikoura District Council
Kaikoura District  Council’s corporate emissions for base-year (2001) total 99 t-CO2e, with 
the water/ sewage sector and the streetlight sector representing the largest weight of 
emissions with 36 t-CO2e and 34 t-CO2e, respectively. By  the forecast-year (2011), council 
projects an emissions increase of 124%  for a total of 222 t-CO2e.232  The increase in 
emissions is expected to be greatest in the water/ sewage sector and the vehicle fleet sector, 
which will rise to 101 t-CO2e and 59 t-CO2e, respectively (Fig.3.33).
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230 See Appendix, Figure 3.31, for a graphic (bar graph) representation of this data.
231 See Appendix, Table 3.21, for data set.
232 Emissions increase is attributed to growth in the municipality, resulting in growth within the Council over the forecast period (Kaikoura District Council, ?
a).
Figure 3.33:  Kaikoura District Council corporate emission weights by sector for 
  base-year (2001) and forecast-year (2011)233
In terms of total corporate emissions as a proportion of sector representation, the water/ 
sewage sector dominates for both base-year (2001) and forecast-year (2011) emissions, at 
36% and 45%, respectively. While at 34% the streetlight sector represents the second most 
abundant source of emissions for the base-year, it  declines to 19% for the forecast-year, with 
the vehicle fleet sector increasing  to represent the second most abundant source of forecast-
year emissions at 27% (Fig. 3.34).  
Figure 3.34:  Kaikoura District Council corporate emission weights for base-year 
  (2001)  and forecast-year (2011) as proportion of sector234
Kaikoura District Council’s community emissions profile demonstrates a 30% rise in total 
emissions from base-year (2001) (25,062 t-CO2e) to forecast-year (2010) (32,757 t-CO2e). 
The transport  sector represents the largest quantity  of emissions by weight for both the base-
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233 Adapted from Table 3.17 and Table 3.18. See Appendix, Table 3.17 and Table 3.18, for data sets.
234Adapted from Table 3.17 and Table 3.18. See Appendix, Table 3.17 and Table 3.18, for data sets.
year and forecast-year, with 8741 t-CO2e and 11,099 t-CO2e, respectively.235  Figure 44 
show’s that Kaikoura District Council’c community  emission profile, as a proportion of 
sector representation, is dominated by the transport sector for both the base-year and the 
forecast-year, at 35% and 34% respectively. While, as a proportion, the transport sector, as 
well as the industrial and commercial sectors all decrease from base-year to forecast-year, the 
residential sector remains constant, and the waste sector increases by 5% (Fig. 3.36).236
Figure 3.36:  Kaikoura District  Council community emission weights for base-year 
  (2001)  and forecast-year (2010) as proportion of sector237
Southland District Council
Southland District Council base-year (2005) corporate emissions total 2924 t-CO2e. Council 
projects a 2.8% increase in total corporate emissions by  the forecast-year (2010), bringing 
total corporate emissions to 3008 t-CO2e in 2010. The building sector dominates both base-
year and forecast-year emissions, with 1428 t-CO2e and 1449 t-CO2e respectively. While 
emissions associated with the streetlight and water/ sewage sectors both increase from the 
base-year to the forecast-year, the vehicle fleet sector remains even at 626 t-CO2e.238  Figure 
3.46 demonstrates that from base-year to forecast-year the building sector dominates the 
emissions profile, at 49% and 48% by weight in 2005 and 2010, respectively. While, as 
proportion of total emission weights, the streetlights and vehicle fleet sectors remains 
constant, the water/ sewage sector increases from the base-year to the forecast-year (Fig. 
3.38).
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235 See Appendix, Figure 3.35, for a graphic (bar graph) representation of this data.
236 This increase in is line with expected population growth in the district over the forecast period (Kaikoura District Council, ?b).
237 Adapted from Table 3.19 and Table 3.20. See Appendix, Table 3.19 and Table 3.20, for data sets.
238 See Appendix, Figure 3.37, for a graphic (bar graph) representation of this data.
Figure 3.38:  Southland District Council corporate emission weights for base-year 
  (2005)  and forecast-year (2010) as proportion of sector239
In terms of Southland District Council’s community  emissions profile, base-year (2001) 
emissions total 605,447 t-CO2e, while forecast-year (2010) emissions total 708,228 t-CO2e, 
a 16% increase.240  Of these totals, the industrial sector  represents the greatest share, with 
496,403 t-CO2e (82%) and 596,924 t-CO2e (84%) for the base-year and the forecast-year, 
respectively. While the industrial sector, as a proportion of total emission weights, increased 
from the base-year to the forecast-year, the residential and transport sectors both decreased by 
1%, with the commercial and waste sectors experiencing no change (Fig. 3.40).
Figure 3.40:  Southland District Council community  emission weights for 
  base-year (2001) and forecast-year (2010) as proportion of sector241
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239 Adapted from Table 3.17 and Table 3.18. See Appendix, Table 3.17 and Table 3.18, for data sets.
240  See Appendix, Figure 3.39, for a graphic (bar graph) representation of this data. The increase is attributed to population growth during the forecast 
period (SDC, 2009). Because Southland District Council’s M1 report is light on detail, it is difficult to fully assess the district’s emission profile. 
241 Adapted from Table 3.19 and Table 3.20. See Appendix, Table 3.19 and Table 3.20, for data sets.
Hamilton City Council
Hamilton City  Council’s base-year (2001) corporate emissions total 8194 t-CO2e. Council 
projects a 92% increase by the forecast-year (2010).242  This rise is dominated by the water/ 
sewage and building sectors, which will contribute an additional 2328 t-CO2e and 1962 t-
CO2e, respectively, by the forecast-year.243  As a proportion of weight, the sector contribution 
to total emissions does not change from base-year to forecast-year, with the water/ sewage 
sector representing the largest share at 31%  respectively (Fig. 3.42). 
Figure 3.42:  Hamilton City  Council corporate emission weights for base-year 
  (2001)  and forecast-year (2010) as proportion of sector244
From the base-year (2001) to the forecast-year (2010), as a result of population growth and 
sustained economic growth (Hamilton City  Council, 2006), Hamilton City Council 
community  emissions are expected to increase by 13%, from 1,144,000 t-CO2e to 1,301,000 
t-CO2e. For both the base-year and the forecast-year, the industrial sector represents the 
greatest contribution by weight, with 366,080 t-CO2e and 416,320 t-CO2e, respectively.245 
As a proportion of weight, the sector contribution to total community  emissions does not 
change from base-year to forecast-year, with the industrial sector representing the dominate 
share at 32%, respectively (Fig. 3.44). 
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242 Unfortunately, while Hamilton City Council is forthcoming with details vis-a-vis community emission increases, Hamilton City Council (2006) does not 
provide details about why it expects cooperate emissions to increase by 92%.
243 See Appendix, Figure 3.41, for a graphic (bar graph) representation of this data.
244 Adapted from Table 3.17 and Table 3.18. See Appendix, Table 3.17 and Table 3.18, for data sets.
245 See Appendix, Figure 3.43, for a graphic (bar graph) representation of this data.
Figure 3.44:  Hamilton City Council community emission weights for base-year 
  (2001) and forecast-year (2010) as proportion of sector246
In terms of Hamilton City Council’s emission reduction goal, by 2020, council hopes to 
reduce total corporate emissions to 6556 t-CO2e and total community  emissions to 1,144,000 
t-CO2e. This goal follows an emissions spike in the forecast-year when council expects total 
corporate emissions to reach 15,812 t-CO2e and total community emissions to reach 
1,301,000 (Fig. 3.45).247
Figure 3.45:  Hamilton City Council GHG emission reduction goal by total 
  emissions248
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246 Adapted from Table 3.19 and Table 3.20. See Appendix, Table 3.19 and Table 3.20, for data sets.
247 Hamilton City Council plans to reduce GHG emissions by incorporating landfill gas and wastewater methane, and increase its production and purchase 
of renewable energy (Hamilton City Council, 2006).
248 See Appendix, Table 3.22, for data set.
Waitakere City Council
Waitakere City Council’s total corporate emissions in the base-year (2002) were 6059 t-
CO2e, with the water/ sewage sector representing the largest  share by weight with 2204 t-
CO2e. Council projects a 65% increase in total corporate emissions by the forecast-year 
(2010).249  Contributing 3782 t-CO2e, the water/ sewage sector remains the primary 
contributor to total corporate emissions in the forecast-year.250  In terms of total corporate 
emissions as a proportion of sector representation, the water/ sewage sector is the dominate 
contributor for both the base-year (2002) and the forecast-year (2010) emissions, at 36% and 
38% respectively. While the building, streetlights, and the water/ sewage sectors all increase 
in terms of proportion, the vehicle fleet and the employee commute sectors both decline (Fig. 
3.47). 
Figure 3.47:  Waitakere City Council corporate emission weights for base-year 
  (2002) and forecast-year (2010) as proportion of sector251
Waitakere City Council’s community emissions profile show’s a 25% rise in total emissions 
from base-year (2001) (900,354 t-CO2e) to forecast-year (2010) (1,126,009 t-CO2e). The 
transport sector represents the largest quantity of emissions by weight for both the base-year 
and forecast-year, with 390,334 t-CO2e and 481,751 t-CO2e, respectively.252  Figure 3.57 
show’s that Waitakere City Council’s community  emission profile, as a proportion of sector 
representation, is dominated by the transport sector for both the base-year and the forecast-
year, at 43%. While the transport, residential and commercial sectors all remain the same, by 
36%
9%
11%
16%
28%
Base-year 2002
38%
6%
9%
17%
31%
Forecast-year 2010 Buildings
Streetlights
Vehicle Fleet
Employee Commute
Water/ Sewage
Organizational Involvement in Carbon Mitigation
90
249 WaiCC (2006) does not speculate as to why emissions will increase.
250 See Appendix, Figure 3.46, for a graphic (bar graph) representation of this data.
251 Adapted from Table 3.17 and Table 3.18. See Appendix, Table 3.17 and Table 3.18, for data sets.
252 See Appendix, Figure 3.48, for a graphic (bar graph) representation of this data.
proportion, from the base-year to the forecast-year, the waste sector increases by 3% and the 
industrial sector increases by 1% (Fig. 3.49).
Figure 3.49:  Waitakere City Council community  emission weights for base-year 
  (2001) and forecast-year (2010) as proportion of sector253
Following a spike during the forecast-year (2010), Figure 58 show’s that Waitakere City 
Council’s community emissions will decrease to 180,071 t-CO2e by 2051 (Fig. 3.50). 
Figure 3.50:  Waitakere City  Council community GHG emission reduction goal by  
  total emissions254
Emission Reductions
Total quantifiable emission reductions stemming from CCP-NZ programme participant 
activities from councils’ base-year through to June 30, 2009, are in excess of 400,000 t-CO2e, 
representing some 133,300 t-CO2e per year (CCP-NZ, 2009). Examples of emission 
reduction activities, as presented in CCP-NZ (2009), include:
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253 Adapted from Table 3.19 and Table 3.20. See Appendix, Table 3.19 and Table 3.20, for data sets.
254 See Appendix, Table 3.23, for data set.
Auckland Regional Council
Energy-efficient light fittings (1600) equipped with sensors for dimming/ 
turning off lights when not in use. System uses only  14.5% of the energy 
compared to old system, resulting in a savings of 391 t-CO2e/y  (savings of 
561,000 kWh/y and $128,000/y).
Hamilton City Council
Installed more efficient pumps with smart controls at Waterworld. The new 
system save approximately 50 t-CO2e/y (saving of $7000/y).
Nelson City Council
Installed metering for water consumption. Highest summer peak use has 
dropped by more than 16%, and average peak use by over 37%.
Before the programme ended, councils were also trialling several emission reduction projects, 
including solar streetlights in Kaikoura District  Council, workplace travel plans in Waitakere 
City  Council and Environment Canterbury  Regional Council, and vehicle fleet purpose 
policy and use plans in Franklin District Council and Rodney District  Council.  Pushing the 
agenda further, Christchurch City  Council, through its Burwood landfill gas converted to 
energy project, has reduced the Queen Elizabeth II Park swimming complex’s grid energy 
needs, resulting in the reduction of 40,000 t-CO2e/y  (savings of $1 million/y). This project 
has also created revenue of $3.5 million from the sale of emission credits (2008-2012). 
Wellington City Council has also pursued landfill gas conversion as a method to reduce 
emissions, and with its project at the Southern Landfill, Wellington City  Council expects to 
put 8 million kWh of electricity per year into the local grid network (savings of 1600 t-CO2e/
y from fossil-fuelled power stations). 
Whether councils continue to explore and fund emission reduction  projects is yet to be 
determined.  According to OAG (2011), by  June 30, 2010, approximately one year after the 
termination of the CCP-NZ programme, of the 77 local authorities covered in their 
analysis,255  18 councils were continuing to actively measure GHG emissions, while 5 
councils that had previously  measured emissions as part of the programme, had ceased all 
effort to do so. And, 13 councils intend to start measuring emissions, while the remaining 41 
have never, and have no plans to measure emissions in the future.256
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255  The NZ local government sector consists of 83 councils: 11 regional councils, 61 territorial authorities (11 city and 50 district councils), and six unitary 
councils (territorial authorities with regional council responsibilities) (LGNZ, 2011a).
256  These figures represent all 77 local authorities in NZ, and are thus potentially misleading when considered in the context of the CCP-NZ programme, 
which only had 34 councils in its membership.
3.5.  SUMMARY AND LOCATING THE RESEARCH
3.5.1.  Summary of Chapter 3
Though NZ trades on slogans such as ‘clean and green’257  and ‘100% pure’ it remains one of 
the highest per capita GHG emitting countries, ranked 11th in the world (MFE 2009a), and 
has a rising absolute GHG emissions profile, which increased by 22% over the period 
1990-2007 (MFE 2009b).258  NZ appears nonetheless to be on track to meet its 2008-2012 
Kyoto commitment, but this is due to carbon sequestration by forestry  plantations (NZ Govt., 
2011b; Smith 2011a), which, as acknowledged by Smith, provides only a temporary solution 
to rising emissions. 
While the National-led government does accept the importance of acting on climate change, 
unlike its predecessor (Clark’s Labour-led government), whose policy on climate change was, 
in its mind, not credible, National does not intend to lead the world: “the new Government’s 
policy goal is not about being first but ensuring New Zealand does its fair share” (Smith, 
2009a). For the National-led government, the implication of leading on climate change 
mitigation, specifically  decarburizing the economy, are potentially dwarfed by the 
insignificance of the country’s overall contribution to climate change and the accumulation of 
atmospheric GHG emissions (e.g. Macey, 2007).
With this in mind, once National took office in late 2008, the Minister for the Environment 
and Climate Change Issues (Smith) began a review of Labour’s climate change policies. 
Following, many programme were discontinued or modified significantly. For example, 
legislation enabling the NZ Emissions Trading Scheme was reviewed and modified;  A new 
NZ Energy Strategy, in which economic growth became the key objective was released 
(MED, 2011); and, the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programmes, two key programme designed to 
help the NZ public sector reduce its GHG emissions, were terminated. 
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257  International perception aside, according to Buhrs & Christoff (2006, p. 232), while 79% of New Zealanders believe they are “environmentally better off 
than people in other developed countries,” less 7% support the view that NZ is “clean and green.”
258  While 2006 saw an emissions spike of 26% over 1990 levels, subsequent years experienced a relative decline due to drought and the global financial 
crisis (Milne & Grubnic 2011).
The two programmes shared the ethos that government, both central and local, must lead by 
example in the effort to mitigate the effects of climate change.259  To this end, the NZ core 
departments identified over 300 reduction projects to lower emissions below business as 
usual (NZ Govt., 2008), with for example, the Department of Conservation having enacted 
actions to reduce emissions by 1837 t-CO2e (19%) by 2012. And, the total reported and 
quantifiable emission reductions from council activities, from base year (30 June 2004) to 30 
June 2009, is conservatively calculated to be more than 400,000 tonnes CO2e (CCP-NZ, 
2009). Beyond emission reductions, organizations involved in the CNPS and the CCP-NZ 
programmes both identified that  senior management awareness with regard to climate change 
effects and mitigative actions increased as a result of participation in the respective 
programme.260 
3.5.2.  Locating the Research
As noted previously, there is a dearth of academic work exploring how public sector 
organizations make sense of the climate change discourse (e.g. Brody et al., 2010), and how 
they  determine strategies to manage their carbon and achieve carbon neutrality  (e.g. Ball et 
al. 2009a,b).  The processes of conception, outworking and termination of the CNPS and the 
CCP-NZ programmes provide an opportunity to study the beliefs, values, commitments and 
narratives at play in organizations which were seeking to act on climate change. Moreover, 
the ending of these programmes provides an excellent opportunity to better understand how 
the NZ government values the need to manage carbon. While this chapter does not provide an 
exhaustive review of NZ’s climate change policy, or an analysis of the CNPS and the CCP-
NZ programmes (as this will come in later chapters), it  does provide a sound overview of the 
climate change policy  context within which the CNPS and the CPP-NZ programmes 
originated, as well as an informative look at the respective programme’s purpose, approach 
and results. This chapter, in addition to providing fodder for future chapters, thus provides the 
background context for the thesis research. 
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259 While CNPS programme participant departments were working towards the ultimate goal of achieving carbon neutrality, councils’ taking part in the CCP-
NZ programme were seeking only to manage their carbon footprint in an effort to reduce GHG emissions (though some councils did seek to reach carbon 
neutrality).
260 This will be discussed further in later chapters.
CHAPTER 4 -  THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK
4.1.  INTRODUCTION
4.1.1.  Introduction to Chapter 4
The role of the theoretical framework is to provide a conceptual view of how relationships 
among several factors are important to the objectives of the research (Radhakrishma et al. 
2007).261  With this in mind, termination theory has been selected as the conceptual lens 
through which the research objectives will be explored.
Termination theory  is the theoretical framework employed to rationalise or better understand 
the purposeful ending of specific government functions, programmes, policies or 
organizations (e.g. deLeon, 1978; Daniels, 1995; Sato, 2002).262  Here deLeon (1987) 
identifies four targets of termination: functions, programmes, policies and organizations. 
These targets range from services provided to the community by the government, to strategies 
aimed at solving particular problems, to actual government agencies.  Regardless of the target 
of termination, the essence of the theory and the results of it  application can be applied across 
all four. This is particularly the case for programmes as the termination of organizations or 
policies will likely trigger programme termination as well (Bardach, 1976). Further, as 
deLeon (1987) notes, programmes are the easiest to terminate because they are typically 
closest to the problem and tend to represent  the smallest  investment. Moreover, as Sato 
(2002) suggests, because programmes are closest to the problem, they are typically  the easier 
to observe, and thus more prone to critique.
Other appropriate and interesting theoretical frameworks also lend themselves to this line of 
inquiry. Institutional theory  (e.g. Bebbington et al., 2009), for example, specifically 
institutional entrepreneurship, provides insight into how actors leverage political skill to 
strategically  transform institutions and drive change (Wijen & Ansari, 2007; Levy & Scully, 
2007; Dacin et al., 2002), emphasising how actors must  break the institutional logic and 
institutionalise the practice they  are championing (Garud et  al., 2007). Given New Zealand’s 
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261  As Irvine & Deo (2006) highlight, because theory provides a filter through which qualitative data is interpreted, its use in research has been 
controversial.
262  Other definitions of termination include, for example: “the abolition of an organization with no replacement organization being established” (Peters & 
Hogwood, 1988); “the moment an organization stops all its market activities” (Woywode, 1998); the loss of the organization’s identity, based on the 
elimination of all its functions (Lewis, 2002); the abolition or absorption by a larger entity (Kuipers & Boin, 2005). 
political shift in 2008, the application of institutional entrepreneurship would allow for an 
interesting exploration of the motivations and drivers for the new Government’s (National) 
abandonment of many of the previous Government’s (Labour) climate mitigation strategies.
Similarly, socio-cultural theory explores how alternative ways of perceiving and organising 
can provide effective solutions to pressing social problems; Verweij et al. (2006) apply socio-
cultural theory to the problem of climate change, positing that the Kyoto Protocol has 
‘stagnated’. In this vein, given that carbon neutrality is no-longer an aspiration of the 
National-led Government, the application of socio-cultural theory  to this line of research 
could shed light on Government’s intended direction vis a vis climate change mitigation.
Ultimately, termination theory was selected because it allows for an exploration of the 
evolution, from inception, application, termination, through next steps, of the CNPS and the 
CCP-NZ programmes (discussed in previous chapters). For example, termination theory 
allows for exploration of the following macro-level questions:
  
Programme Inception
Why were the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programmes created?
Programme Application
How effective were the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programmes?
Programme Termination
Why were the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programmes terminated?
Next Steps
Will future iterations of the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programmes be created?
The CNPS and the CCP-NZ programmes were developed and launched under a government 
that believed climate change and carbon mitigation were critical challenges requiring a global 
response and NZ, at  the time, wanted to be at the forefront of this effort. Termination theory 
allows for a probing look into the early cognitions of programme development, and a glimpse 
into programme execution and desired outcomes.  And more specifically, termination theory 
allows for an assessment of the rationale for the termination of these key government 
programmes. Incorporating the above assessment of programme evolution, this study will 
explore the research objectives through deLeon’s model for programme termination. More 
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specifically, the termination of the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programmes will be explored to 
see if their ending aligns with deLeon’s rationales for programme termination (e.g. 
economics, inefficiency, and political ideology), and if so, is one more pronounced than the 
rest?
4.1.2.  Chapter Purpose and Outline
The research has two central objectives:  First, to determine why NZ’s newly  elected National 
government cancelled the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programmes; and, second, to determine 
whether despite the discontinuation of these two programmes, NZ government organizations 
will continue to strive for carbon emission reductions and neutrality. As for the first objective, 
this research seeks to determine whether NZ government’s cancelling of the CNPS and the 
CCP-NZ programmes aligns with deLeon’s rationales for programme termination: 
economics, inefficiency, and/or political ideology (deLeon, 1982a).  The nature of the 
research is investigative and probing. Termination theory was chosen for this study because it 
lends itself well to this approach, and because it  allows for exploration of the evolution 
CNPS and the CCP-NZ programmes. 
This chapter is divided into four primary sections, (4.1) Introduction, (4.2) State of 
Termination Theory Literature, (4.3) deLeon’s Models for Termination Resistance and 
Termination, and (4.4) Summary and Locating the Research. Following on from the 
introduction, section 4.2 provides a look at the current discourse on termination theory. 
Section 4.3 begins by exploring deLeon’s six obstacles to programme termination, then 
concludes by discussing his three rationales for programme termination. In the final section, 
section 4.4, in addition to providing a brief summary of the previous three sections, 
termination theory is discussed in the context of its application to this research, more 
specifically, how will deLeon’s model for programme termination be used in this study.
4.2.  STATE OF TERMINATION THEORY LITERATURE
Though there is debate and discussion surrounding the ending of government organizations, 
policies and programmes (Kaufman, 1976, 1985; Peters & Hogwood, 1988; Frantz, 1992; 
2002), termination has remained an understudied field since its first application by Biller in 
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1976 (Graddy & Ye, 2008).263  And while the extant literature provides little attention to 
understanding the factors influencing termination (Kirkpatrick et al. 1999), suggesting that “a 
theory  of organizational mortality is still in its infancy” (Adam et al., 2007, p. 226), it 
remains a potentially important component of the public policy process (e.g. deLeon, 1997). 
What is more, according to Frantz (2002), while agreement exists about the importance of 
termination, what the literature lacks is a clear method on how to interpret political factors 
associated with termination.
Adam et al., (2007) indicate that academic attention to termination research remains of low 
priority, particularly with regard to public sector institutions, policies and programmes, 
because it  tends to be hidden in policy  literature. And as Biller (1976, p. 134) explains: “a 
terminated policy  or organization is no longer of direct consequence to anyone’s action... it is 
no longer purported to, nor is it associated with, the production of any outcomes” and thus 
tends to avoid attention given that “to study those [programmes] that have ended is to study 
the inconsequential.” Frantz (1992) posits that the field has remained largely untested 
because of the position that programme termination is the result  of (or lack of) luck (see also 
Kaufman, 1985), and therefore is not productive for scientific inquiry.264 For Bardach (1976), 
termination remains a neglected field simply because of its infrequency of occurrence; social 
scientists thrive on generalisations, not idiosyncrasies. 
Despite its obscure location in policy literature, over the decades termination theory has been 
applied to an array of public sector organizations, policies and programmes, and while the 
literature has been dominated by US studies (e.g. Bardach, 1976; Behn, 1976; Cameron, 
1978; deLeon, 1982b; Frantz, 1992; Daniels, 1995; Kirkpatrick et al., 1999; Harris, 2001; 
Carpenter & Lewis, 2004; Graddy & Ye, 2008; Shockley, 2012),265  recent scholarship has 
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263 As Frantz (1992, p. 175) points out in her review of policy termination literature, “despite the universal recognition of termination as a vital component of 
policy studies, it remains ‘the neglected butt of the policy process’ (Behn, 1976), or more poetically stated, ‘a wrongly underattended issue’ (Biller, 1976).
264  While Kaufman (1985) argues that organizational survival is a matter of luck, and that there are no patterns in the process, Kirkpatrick (1999), on the 
other, notes that while there is indeed a paucity of theory-generating case studies from which to draw, there nevertheless exists sufficient examples to 
establish patterns among cases.
265  These studies range from research and development programmes, to the D.C. motorcycle squad (Bardach, 1976) and public training schools in 
Massachusetts (Behn, 1976; Bardach, 1976), to the California Mental Health system (Cameron, 1978), the U.S. Comprehensive Employment and Training 
Act (deLeon, 1982b), the U.S. National Hansen’s Disease Centre (Frantz, 1992, 2002), Oklahoma’s State training schools (Daniels, 1995), the U.S. Federal 
Revenue Sharing Program (Kirkpatrick et al. 1999), term limits in the Michigan legislature (Harris, 2001), through a range of US agencies (Carpenter & 
Lewis, 2004; Shockley, 2012), and hospitals in California (Graddy & Ye, 2008).
expanded to include a more global application (e.g. Dery, 1984; Sato, 2002; Botterill, 2005; 
Hsu, 2005).266  
Myth of Immortality
Early termination studies postulated that while organizational termination is expected to be 
widespread in the private sector, the opposite is true for public sector organizations, where an 
organization can persist  even beyond its raison d'être ceases to exist.267 An example of such is 
Kaufman (1976) where the author suggests that public sector organizations are immortal. As 
Peters & Hogwood (1988) point out, however, Kaufman’s study sample was biased towards 
durable organizations and because the study was limited to two points in time, failing to 
capture the period between these two points in time, the author underestimated the rate of 
actual termination. Following on, and contrary to Kaufman’s work, Lewis (2002) argues that 
public sector agencies are not immortal,268  and suggests that the myth of organizational 
immortality  is due in part to the dearth of academic debate on termination. Lewis (2002) adds 
that scholars have failed to adequately  connect with the ‘widespread’ occurrence of agency 
termination, particularly with regard to termination associated with changing ideologies.
Later, Kaufman (1985) goes on to argue that the termination or persistence of an organization 
(private or public) is a function of chance. According to Adam et al. (2007), while this line of 
debate implies that organizational termination is distributed randomly, empirical study, 
however, failed to support this hypothesis (e.g. Woywode, 1998).
In Kuipers & Boin (2005), four key variables from the literature are demonstrated to 
influence the longevity (survival) of an organization: (1) Newness - older organizations are 
more likely  to survive; (2) Size - budget/personnel is positively  correlated with survival; (3) 
Political autonomy - will increase organizational performance and public reputation; and, (4) 
Professionalism - positively correlated with survival. Their study failed, however, to prove 
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266 For example: Project Renewal in Israel (Dery, 1984), Leprosy Isolation Policy in Japan (Sato, 2002); network termination in Australia’s agriculture sector 
(Botterill, 2005), Taiwan’s nuclear programme (Hsu, 2005).
267  A bureaucracy is characterized by permanence and continuity, while a market is characterized by change; markets are designed to tolerate termination 
(Biller, 1976).
268 While the Kaufman (1976) study consisted of two points in time,1923 and 1973, the Lewis (2002) study looked at agency mortality between two points in 
time,1946 and 1997. 
that organizational characteristics do in fact influence termination or persistence (e.g. Adam 
et al., 2007).
Adam et al. (2007) agree that an organization’s age is positively related to its chance of 
survival,269  and that the general performance of an organization does affect its likelihood of 
termination; the probability of termination increases as an organization becomes less efficient 
and effective at  achieving its objectives. But while earlier studies suggest that smallness will 
increase the likelihood of organizational termination (e.g. Aldrich & Auster, 1986), more 
recent research shows a non-monotonic correlation between organizational size and hazard of 
termination (e.g. Kieser, 2002). 
Bang or Whimper
Another line of inquiry postulates that termination is “exceedingly difficult,” is rarely 
attempted, and when attempted is rarely successful (Bardach, 1976, p. 123).270   When 
termination does occur, however, it  occurs with either a bang or a whimper. In the case of the 
latter, termination is characterised by a long-term decline in resources. Termination with a 
bang, on the other hand, while similar, and more common, tends to result following a lengthy 
political struggle, followed by  a shift in power (change in administration) and a single 
authoritative decision to terminate (e.g. Sato, 2002).  
This is demonstrated in Sato (2002) where the isolation of leprosy patients continued to occur 
long after it was scientifically known to be unnecessary for the majority of cases. Isolation 
persisted as a result of bias in expert opinion (conservative scientist advocated for isolation; 
social protection), ambivalence among patients and the policy’s low priority among 
policymakers.  As the literature has shown, while a shift in ideology or scientific 
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269 According to Adam et al. (2007), once an organization reaches a certain critical age threshold, its chance of survival becomes high.
270  According to Bardach (1976), termination is rarely attempted for 5 key reasons: (1) Programmes are designed to perpetuate themselves, inc. sunk 
costs; (2) Politician shy away from termination because it is usually unsuccessful and brutal; (3) Political leaders are hesitant to admit guilt in producing a 
bad policy (also issue of sunk costs); (4) The reformer contribution to pro-termination coalition is reluctant to damage the existing programme apparatus, 
i.e. employees; and (5) Too few effective political incentives. Moreover, proponents of termination tend to fall into 3 categories: (1) Oppositionists, those that 
dislike the policy because in their view it is bad policy; (2) Economisers, those that want reduce government spending, or redirect funds elsewhere; and, (3) 
Reformers, those that believe termination is necessary for successful adoption of a substitute policy or programme. 
DeLeon’s model posits six key reasons why policy or programme termination may be particularly difficult (deLeon, 1978; Hogwood & Gunn, 1984; Frantz, 
1992): (1) Intellectual reluctance; (2) Institutional permanence; (3) Dynamic conservatism; (4) Anti-termination coalitions; (5) Legal obstacles; and, (6) High 
start-up costs. These will be discussed further in the following section.
Kirckpatrick et al. (1999) identify ‘crucial variables’ (obstacles) that affect termination: (1) Inherent characteristics, i.e. raison d'être, longevity, invisibility, 
complexity, distribution of benefits; (2) Political environment, i.e. prevailing political ideology, size and strength of coalition, powerful allies, compromise, 
speed - fast termination have a greater chance of success; and, (3) Constraints or barriers, anti-termination coalitions, dynamic conservatism, legal 
obstacles, start-up costs, fear of uncertainty.
understanding can lead to termination (e.g. Cameron, 1978; Daniels, 1994; deLeon, 1982a), 
scientific evidence on its own tends not to be a sufficient rationale for termination. In this 
case, policy termination ultimately occurred as a result of the skilful leadership of the 
terminator, who was in the end able to achieve consensus with key actors and thus abolish the 
Leprosy Isolation Policy.
In some cases, as Daniels (1995) indicates, programmes can end with both a bang and a 
whimper: while Oklahoma’s programme of public training schools ended with a bang, the 
essence or the mandate of the training schools shifted to psychiatric hospitals, and as a result 
the policy continues with a long whimper. Similarly, termination can be viewed as a ‘special 
case of the policy adoption process,’  or as a critical component in correcting a flawed policy 
(i.e. Sato, 2002). In other words, policy or programme ‘A’ must be terminated or curtailed in 
order for policy or programme ‘B’ to flourish (Bardach, 1976). This is not without its 
challenges, however, as inertia and other obstacles must first be overcome before termination 
can occur. Botterill (2005) concurs, indicating that policy termination is more likely in an 
environment that fails to demonstrate strong networks.  In their study of network termination 
in Australia’s agriculture sector, they show that established policy, characterised by weak 
networks, was terminated and replaced by  stronger policy capable of withstanding external 
shocks.
Causal Factors for Termination
Building on the existent research on termination of public organizations, Adam et al. (2007) 
identify two key causal factors that influence programme termination: (1) organizational 
stickiness (resistance); and, (2) political incentives (Table 4.1).
Table 4.1:  Typology for programme termination
Typology for Programme 
Termination
Organizational Stickiness 
(endogenous)
High Low
Political Incentives 
(exogenous)
High 1 - Reform 2 - Termination
Low 3 - Status Quo 4 - Risk
       Adam et al. (2007, p. 231)
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Adam et al. (2007)’s typology suggests that in a scenario of high stickiness and high political 
incentive for organization termination, despite the high political will to terminate, because of 
support within the organization, the whole organization will not likely be terminated, but 
instead reformed or restructured. In the case of low stickiness and high political incentive for 
organization termination, because of little organizational resistance and high political will, 
termination will likely result. In terms of a high stickiness and low political incentive for 
organization termination scenario, termination is not likely  given that their is little political 
incentive to terminate and strong organizational capacity to resist demands of termination, 
and as a result the status quo will persist. The final scenario, low stickiness and low political 
incentives for organization termination, results in a precarious status quo; instability  and risk 
of potential termination persist  because of the organization’s low capacity to resist should 
termination become a threat.
A common thread in this literature is deLeon’s model for programme termination (e.g. 
Graddy & Ye, 2008). According to deLeon (1982a), policy and programme termination is 
considered to have three rationales: Political ideology; economics (cost reduction); and, 
programmatic inefficiencies. Though sometime considered individually, “a comprehensive 
examination of most termination decisions will reveal them to have aspects of – or at least 
nominal allusions to – all three” (deLeon, 1982a, p. 7). 
Typically, economics and inefficiencies are cited openly by  government as motivating policy 
and programme termination – as deLeon (1982a, p. 8) suggests, “fiscal and operational 
responsibility is a virtual catechism in government offices; no agency wishes to be accused of 
wasting money or acting in an inefficient manner.”  In practice however, political ideology 
seems to be responsible for the majority  of government terminations (Behn, 1976; Cameron, 
1978; deLeon, 1982a, 1987; Frantz, 2002; Lewis, 2002; Adam et al. 2007) – “ideology is, of 
course, the lifeblood of politics” (deLeon, 1982a, p. 14).271 
Evaluation as a Key Component of Termination
The literature also demonstrates that evaluation is a critical component of the termination 
process (e.g. deLeon, 1982a, 1982b; Dery, 1984; Hogwood & Gunn, 1984).  Whether or not a 
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271 DeLeon’s model for programme termination will be expanded on in the following section, Section 4.3.
given programme undergoes an evaluation prior to its termination can provide insight into the 
rationale for the termination.  For example, if political ideology is the motivation for 
programme termination, an evaluation of the programme’s effectiveness may be redundant. 
Whereas, in order to deem a programme economically unsound or inefficient, some method 
of evaluation to determine such would be necessary. As deLeon (1982a, p. 22) adds, if 
government suggests that a programme was terminated on the grounds of economics or 
efficiencies, it would imply that an evaluation would be imperative to the termination 
process; “how else can one arrive at program costs or benefits lacking skilled evaluations and 
the evidential base they provide?” Moreover, the lack of evaluation prior to programme 
termination harms the transparency and credibility of government actions (deLeon, 1982a).
Sato (2002) goes further and notes that there is a lack of standard when it comes to assessing 
policies, and when standards are applied, there is a lack of understanding as to how these 
were derived. In a similar vein, Dery (1984) suggests that evaluation should be a precondition 
for termination, and posits that  the important  question is not to evaluate but what to evaluate, 
what objectives are important in making the decision to terminate. DeLeon (1982b) suggests 
a number of key consideration before the determination of termination is made:
• What are the termination objectives? Who sets them? How clear are they? 
Who has the responsibility? What are the set of accepted criteria?
• To what extent should the targeted agency be involved? How can one structure 
positive incentives for that agency (to do what?), given its projected loss in 
resources?
• How does one map or estimate the political and economic consequences of 
severe programme retrenchment? How does one perform the analysis with the 
necessary equity and evenhandedness? What or whose perspectives are used?
In practice, evaluation can help  predict and understand outcomes of programme termination. 
This according to Sato (2002, p. 42), can help identify  those that will be affected by the 
termination, and “reveal the political and ideological factors that enter into policy  termination 
decisions”. Ultimately, while the literature demonstrates that little rigorous evaluation lay 
behind programme termination, “neither the evaluation nor the termination stage makes much 
sense without the other” (deLeon, 1982a, p. 20).
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4.3.  DELEON’S MODELS FOR TERMINATION RESISTANCE & TERMINATION
DeLeon’s (1978) model for termination resistance posits that rational, deliberate termination 
may be hindered by  six obstacles: (1) Intellectual reluctance; (2) Institutional permanence; 
(3) Dynamic conservatism;  (4) Anti-termination coalitions; (5) Legal obstacles; and, (6) 
High start-up costs. As for termination, deLeon (1982a), argues that policy and programme 
terminations have three key rationales: (1) Economics (i.e. cost reductions); (2) 
Programmatic inefficiencies; and, (3) Political ideology.
Obstacles to Programme Termination
The first obstacle to programme termination, intellectual reluctance, refers to the notion that 
people, given their vested interest, tend not to like to discover that the underlying thinking 
behind a policy or programme is flawed or out of date (see also Daniels, 1995); 
Government’s are reticent to admit that they  have made a mistake (e.g. Sato, 2002). In the 
case of Japan’s Leprosy Isolation Policy, for example, as Sato (2002) describes, because 
many experts were unwilling to accept international recommendations to redirect leprosy 
policy toward outpatient service, intellectual reluctance served to obstruct the dismantling of 
a policy  that was no longer scientifically  necessary. Frantz (1992) adds that this obstacle also 
refers to the idea that government’s avoid dealing with endings, preferring beginnings, i.e. 
new and exciting actions or programmes. 
DeLeon’s second obstacle to termination relates to institutional permanence. This obstacle 
suggests that organizations and programmes are designed to endure political shifts. As Lewis 
(2002) adds, those in power will often anticipate the loss of their influence and  insulate new 
programmes against future termination should the eventuality occur. While this notion 
accepts that political ideology is an important factor in programme termination, it also 
implies that programmes are created to perpetuate a value-laden (if partisan) service (e.g. 
Sato, 2002).
DeLeon’s third obstacle to termination is dynamic conservatism, or a programme’s ability to 
change its raison d'être. In this instance, programmes that are able to evolve their objectives 
and respond to changes in their environment, are able to elude termination (e.g. Frantz, 1992; 
Daniels, 1995): “when struck with the realisation that the goals which originally  justified 
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their existence are no longer meaningful, all [programmes] alter those goals” (Frantz, 1992, 
p. 182). For example, as Kirkpatrick et al. (1999) describes, instead of becoming redundant 
once the Salk vaccine was developed, the March of Dimes shifted their attention to diseases 
other than polio.
DeLeon’s fourth obstacle refers to groups or networks of people that take action to resist the 
termination movement. As Frantz (1992) notes, these coalitions usually have a vested interest 
in the programme and tend to counter evidence contrary to their cause. This was the case in 
Frantz (1992), where despite the rationality  of the Government’s position, the US 
Government was stymied by a strong anti-termination coalition (community, patients, staff) 
for nearly  50 years before they were able to terminate the National Hansens Disease 
Centre.272
DeLeon’s fifth barrier to termination relates to legal obstacles. Legal ramifications and the 
need for due process has the effect of postponing programme termination. As Frantz (1992) 
describes, legal obstacles played a significant  role in the impediment of the National Hansens 
Disease Centre closure.
Under deLeon’s model, the last barrier to termination relates to high start-up costs. This 
obstacle has two distinct but related prongs. The first prong relates to the sunk costs of the 
programme to be terminated. In this instance, because sunk costs will be lost following 
termination, termination may be avoided or only partial termination may occur, i.e. the 
cancelling of some components of a policy or programme. Moreover, terminating a 
programme implies that Government made a mistake in launching the programme in the first 
place, and government’s avoid admitting their errors (Daniels, 1995). 
The second prong associated with this barrier relates to the high start-up cost of a 
replacement/ alternative programme (e.g. Daniels, 1995) and the political liability this may 
present: “the high costs and political liabilities incurred by proposing policy termination 
make the recommendation of policy termination extremely difficult and unlikely” (deLeon, 
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272  In a similar, but administratively different example, to stave off the termination of the US Department of Energy,  nuclear power proponents, the solar 
energy and conservation promoters formed an anti-termination coalition (deLeon, 1983).
1978). In either case, compensatory costs, which may be large depending on the obligation to 
those affected by the termination (e.g. Frantz, 1997; Graddy & Ye, 2008), can serve as an 
effective barrier to termination.
Rationales for Programme Termination
While political ideology tends to be the most  important (i.e. Hsu, 2005), the three rationales 
should not be considered in isolation of each other. Financial or budgetary constraints are 
typically highlighted for prompting programme termination or retrenchment (e.g. Levine, 
1982; Behn, 1980; Graddy & Ye, 2008).  Budget deficits, be it  actual or projected, spur policy 
makers to enact austerity measures and reduce programmes were possible (e.g. Ignatius & 
Ibrahim, 1982).
As deLeon (1982a) explains, governmental inefficiencies, in other words the government’s 
inability to deliver on objectives in an efficient and timely  manner, may also lead to 
programme termination. In this case if a programme is shown to be too expensive in its 
delivery of products and/or service, then the programme is deemed inefficient and is 
terminated. For example, in the US, Government held that there was a more effective and 
efficient method for maintaining the country’s military  deterrence in the air, and thus the 
Skybolt missile project was terminated (e.g. Enthoven & Smith, 1971). 
Political ideology, or political orientation as it relates to specific programmes, as deLeon’s 
third rationale suggests, “necessarily influences the termination decision” (deLeon, 1982a, p. 
8). Even in time of economic prosperity, political ideology will lead to the termination of 
programmes that do not align with political interest: “Critical decisions are made on the basis 
of political expediency and beliefs... they are far removed from rigorous programme 
evaluation and analytic influence” (deLeon, 1982a, p. 14).
DeLeon (1982a) notes that  government administrators tend to cite the first two rationales for 
motivating termination; even without evidence, public officials tend to reference cost 
overruns and programmatic inefficiencies as sufficient cause for programme termination. 
DeLeon maintain’s “however convenient and defensible the pleas of economy and efficiency 
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might be, in terms of policy  termination, they  are in practice much less important juxtaposed 
to the third criterion, political ideology” (deLeon, 1982a, p. 9).
As Lewis (2002, p. 91) adds, termination to improve economy or efficiency tend to have 
political overtones, “what one party views as frivolous expense or unforgivable error, another 
party  views as an indispensable component of its programme. Perceptions of success or 
failure hinge on political predispositions.” Moreover, as Graddy & Ye (2008) point out, it is 
inherently  difficult to estimate costs and efficiencies, and in any case, unless the argument 
offers a more effective method for achieving the desired goal, it is unlikely to garner much 
support.
As Graddy & Ye (2008) suggest, given that public programmes are supported by  public 
funding it is not beyond expectation that budgetary stresses can cause programme termination 
(e.g. Kirkpatrick et al., 1999). But while this implies cost savings will be incurred following 
termination, it does not address how the determination of which programmes will be 
terminated is made.  Further, according to Graddy & Ye (2008), compensatory costs may be 
large depending on the obligation to those affected by  the termination (e.g. Frantz, 1997). 
For example,  as deLeon (1982a) notes, while the termination of projected nuclear power 
stations in the Pacific Northwest led to short-term saving for the state public utilities, the 
forecasted 700-800 % increase in electricity  rates necessary to cover the bonds issued to 
purchase the reactors, make the economic argument for termination weak (see also Redburn, 
1982; Wilhelm, 1982).
In terms of programme inefficiency  leading to termination, often federal programmes are 
canceled with the belief that state or local government can deliver the programme more 
effectively and efficiently because of their proximity  to the population (deLeon, 1982a; see 
also Stanfield, 1981).
Political ideology, rather than economies and efficiencies, is argued by deLeon (1982a) to be 
the dominant cause of termination. This assertion is supported by Frantz (1997, 2002) and 
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Lewis (2002).273 It is more likely  than not, however, that a combination of these three forces 
is responsible for termination.
4.4.  SUMMARY AND LOCATING THE RESEARCH
4.4.1.   Summary of Chapter 4
Though other theoretical frameworks, i.e. institutional theory, social cultural theory, do lend 
themselves to this research, termination theory  was selected because it allows for an 
exploration of the evolution, from inception, application, termination, through next steps, of 
the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programmes.
Despite an abundance of interest in the 1970s, scholarly attention to termination theory has 
remained low over the past two decades (e.g. Adam et al., 2007). Some suggest that the 
theory’s obscure location in policy  literature has contributed to its weakening application. 
That said, however, the use of termination has grown beyond American case studies to 
include a more global application (e.g. Botterill, 2005; Hsu, 2005).
In application, termination theory broadly refers to two primary themes: obstacles to policy 
or programme termination, and rationales for policy or programme termination. DeLeon’s 
model posits six key reasons why policy  or programme termination may be particularly 
difficult (e.g. deLeon, 1978: 286; Hogwood and Gunn, 1984; Frantz, 1992): Intellectual 
reluctance; institutional permanence; dynamic conservatism; anti-termination coalitions; legal 
obstacles; and, high start-up  costs.  Additionally, Kirkpatrick et al. (1999) suggest that 
inherent characteristics, such as raison d’être, complexity and distribution of benefits and, the 
political environment, (i.e. the prevailing political ideology), also serve to resist termination. 
Bardach (1976, p. 129) adds that policy  or programme termination is rarely attempted 
because the “potential reformer contribution to the pro-termination coalition is often reluctant 
to damage the existing program apparatus, i.e. by  demoralising employees, without being 
sure that their own vision of something better will actually materialise in its stead.”  
Organizational Involvement in Carbon Mitigation
108
273  According to Frantz (2002), political decision making is more an art than a science and such policy is governed more by politics than rationality - skillful 
discourse is more powerful than being right.
As for rationales for termination, according to deLeon (1982a), policy and programme 
termination is considered to have three rationales: economics (cost reduction); programmatic 
inefficiencies; and, political ideology. Typically, economics and inefficiencies are cited 
openly  as motivating policy and programme termination. In practice however, political 
ideology seems to be responsible for the majority of government terminations (e.g. Cameron, 
1978; deLeon, 1982a, 1987; Frantz, 2002; Lewis, 2002; Adam et al. 2007). 
It is further noted that evaluation is a critical component of the termination process (e.g. 
deLeon, 1982a, 1982b; Dery, 1984; Hogwood and Gunn, 1984).  Whether or not a given 
programme undergoes an evaluation prior to its termination can provide insight into the 
rationale for the termination.  For example, if political ideology is the motivation for 
programme termination, an evaluation of the programme’s effectiveness may be redundant. 
Whereas, in order to deem a programme economically unsound or inefficient, some method 
of evaluation to determine such would be necessary. And while Dery (1984) suggests that 
evaluation should be a precondition for termination, a standard methodology for programme 
evaluation remains illusive (e.g. Sato, 2002).
4.4.2.  Locating the Research
This research seeks to contribute to termination theory  literature by applying deLeon’s 
rationales for programme termination to the contemporary  topic of climate change, 
specifically, to the termination of two key programmes designed to help the NZ Government 
reduce GHG emissions and achieve carbon neutrality: CNPS and the CCP-NZ programmes. 
This will provide insight into the robustness of deLeon’s rationales for programme 
termination, and give an appreciation for the inertia, vested interests and legitimacy of the 
respective programmes through time. 
Both the CNPS initiative and, funding for, the CCP-NZ programme were ended 
unexpectedly. By applying deLeon’s rationales for programme termination, this research aims 
to determine whether the termination of these two programmes aligns with economics, 
programmatic inefficiency or political ideology.  If indeed political ideology  was the rationale 
for ending these two programmes, where does that leave NZ’s commitment to leadership  in 
achieving carbon neutrality?  
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The practical implications of this research may thus provide insight into NZ’s new direction 
on domestic and international climate change policy: Does the ending of the CNPS and the 
CCP-NZ programmes represent the National-led Government's new agenda for climate 
change mitigation? In other words, depending on why the programmes were terminated, it 
can be determined whether the National-led Government supports the need for climate 
change mitigation via carbon management in the public sector, or simply does not support 
programmes that are seen as being Labour initiatives, regardless of their merit; termination 
without a formal evaluation of the programmes effectiveness could confirm the latter for 
example.
In addition to applying deLeon’s model for programme termination, this study will also 
employ deLeon’s model for termination resistance to assess whether obstacles hindered the 
termination of these programmes. This may shed light on the embeddedness of climate 
change thinking within the NZ public sector and provide insights for further investigation 
into organizational resolve for carbon mitigation - that is how important is Government 
support in the determination of whether an organization will pursue (potentially costly) 
carbon mitigation actions?
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CHAPTER 5 - METHODS
5.1.  INTRODUCTION
5.1.1.  Qualitative Research Methodology274
Qualitative, or inductive research emerged as a reaction to late 19th and 20th century 
positivism (Brower et al., 2000).  Unlike positivist, or quantitative research, where research 
questions are deductive, specific and measurable, and the goal is generalizability  and 
replicability, qualitative studies often address ambiguous phenomena, generate rich evidence 
from the everyday experience and focus on context (e.g. Liamputtong, 2011; Bernard & 
Ryan, 2010; Brower et al., 2000). Because of its holistic and interpretive nature, qualitative 
research has been accused of lacking rigor and failing to measure up to the “cannons of 
positivist research” (McCabe & Holmes, 2009, p. 1519). For Weber (2004, p. xi) “it is time to 
assign the rhetoric of positivism versus interpretivism to the scrap heap. It no longer serves a 
useful purpose.” And in the end, as Jootun et al. (2009, p. 42) suggest, “no single research 
method is inherently superior to any other; rather the appropriateness of the method must be 
appraised in relation to the research question.” 
A qualitative methodology was chosen for this study because of the need to extract the 
personal narratives of the managers responsible for CNPS and the CCP-NZ programmes.  As 
Liamputtong (2011) explains, while from a reliability perspective, it  is not possible to rigidly 
replicate qualitative research,275  qualitative inquiry  does, quite effectively, allow the 
researcher to explore meaning, interpretations and individual experiences. This approach was 
critical in order to better understand the dynamics influencing the termination of the CNPS 
and the CCP-NZ programmes. Accepting and understanding the limitations to qualitative 
inquiry, I have made efforts, as described throughout this chapter, to mitigate positivistic 
criticism.
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274 While methods refers to the way data is collected, methodology refers to the ‘principles underlying particular research approaches’ (Dew, 2007, p. 433). 
According to Carter & Little (2008), method is determined by methodology.
275 Qualitative researchers have developed criteria to ensure rigor, what some call ‘transactional validity,’ or ‘interpretivist criteriology’ (Liamputtong, 2011, p. 
21). 
5.1.2.  Chapter Purpose and Outline
The purpose of this chapter is to contextualise the methodological approach, and to 
demonstrate the ‘route that leads to the goal’ - the method to the research.276  Describing the 
approach lends credibility and authenticity to the research process and the study itself. This is 
particularly important in qualitative research because of the inherent potential, resulting from 
its interpretive nature, for bias and soft science (Liamputtong, 2011).
This chapter is divided into seven primary sections, (5.1) Introduction, (5.2) Reflexivity, (5.3)
Research Ethics, (5.4) Research Design, (5.5) Research Execution, (5.6) Research 
Interpretation, (5.7) Summary and Locating the Research. Building from the introduction, 
which discusses the value of qualitative inquiry, section 5.2 describes the researcher’s 
reflexive approach to the study. Section 5.3 explains the procedures taken to ensure that the 
study maintained a level of ethical standard. Section 5.4 explains the use of case studies as 
research strategy. In section 5.5 initial contact  with participants is discussed, along with the 
interview strategy and execution. Section 5.6 presents narrative analysis as the primary 
methodological approach, explains theme development and the application of Termination 
Theory. In the final section, section 5.7, in addition to providing a brief summary of the 
previous six sections, justifies the use of a qualitative approach in this research.
5.2.  REFLEXIVITY
As a method to enhance rigor and validity, reflexivity  is a “critical” component of qualitative 
research (Jootun et al., 2009). McCabe & Holmes (2009) describe reflexivity as the act of 
reflecting on one’s ability to remain unbiased while realizing and accounting for the effect of 
existing bias on the research (McCabe & Holmes, 2009).277  
A researcher’s history, beliefs and interests will affect what they choose to study, how they 
approach the study, and how they ultimately interpret  the findings (e.g. Finlay, 2002; 
Horsburgh, 2002; Wall et al., 2004; Irvine & Deo, 2006). While this bias may hold the 
potential to skew the research, Malterud (2001) contends that by identifying ones biases at 
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276 From Greek, method means ‘a route that leads to the goal’ (Liamputtong, 2011, p. x).
277  Steps to reflexive research, adapted from Ahern (1999): 1. Identify interests, beliefs and ways on knowing that you may take for granted while pursuing 
the research; 2. Identify areas of subjectivity; 3. Identify potential personality conflicts and determine how this may influence research progress; 4. Learn to 
recognize lack of neutrality; and, 5. Continuously look inward to assess how, as researcher, I am influencing the research process.
the outset  of the research, and maintaining a reflexive approach throughout the research 
process, bias can be minimized. This is the notion of bracketing, where in the context of 
reflexivity, is the effort to avoid allowing one’s assumptions to shape data collection and 
interpretation (e.g. Ahern, 1999; Weber, 2004; Bernard & Ryan, 2010).278   As Jootun et al. 
(2009) and Liamputtong  (2011, p. 25) suggest, reflexivity in fact enhances  the quality of the 
research by extending the researchers understanding of how their history and experience 
contribute to the stages of inquiry. Finlay (2002, p. 541), however, warns that reflexive 
analysis can be a difficult endeavor, as “experience is invariably  complex, ambiguous and 
ambivalent.” 
Though reflexivity is gaining acceptance in qualitative research (e.g. McCabe & Holmes, 
2009), unless its practice is made more explicit, as cautioned by Allen (2004, p. 23), “there is,
[however], a real danger that it will remain little more than a device for according studies the 
appearance of academic rigor, and its potential to enhance understanding of the research 
process and strengthen the quality of our studies will be lost.” This perspective is echoed by 
Finlay  (2002, p. 543), where the author notes that reflexivity is attacked as being “woolly, 
unscientific bias” (Finlay, 2002, p. 543).
Qualitative researchers acknowledge that it is impossible to meaningfully separate the 
researcher from the research (e.g. Hand, 2003). And, ultimately, as described by Ahern 
(1999), researchers are a part of the social world that they study, and play a key role in the co-
construction of meaning (Etherington, 2004). Reflexivity recognizes the reciprocal 
relationship  between the researcher and the research, and strives to make this interaction 
explicit. With this in mind, and as suggested by  Etherington (2004), it is important for the 
researcher to situate themselves in the research by describing their experiences and beliefs.
Situating the Researcher - A Reflexive Consideration
My academic background is eclectic in both discipline and institution. While I am currently 
pursuing a PhD in Accounting and Information Systems, with a focus on public sector 
organizational carbon management (University of Canterbury, Christchurch, New Zealand), I 
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278 According to Wall et al. (2004, p. 21), bracketing allows researchers to ‘highlight and put on hold [their] everyday assumptions.’ ... holding judgement on 
observation, and remaining open to data as it develops (Jootun et al., 2009).
began my academic journey with a Bachelor’s Degree in Geography, which focused on the 
physical environment (McMaster University, Hamilton, Canada). Following, I completed a 
Bachelor’s Degree in Environmental Studies, which focused on environmental theory  and 
planning (University  of Northern British Columbia, Prince George, Canada). Next I 
completed a Master’s Degree in Environmental Studies, which focused on Arctic climate 
change science and policy (York University, Toronto, Canada). 
My professional experience is similarly diverse, spanning both the private and public sectors, 
including a variety  of not-for-profit non-governmental organizations. Beginning with the 
private sector, I worked in a large public relations firm as an Executive Assistant. While 
studying, I worked as a Teaching Assistant in Biology, then in Geography; during this time I 
also served as President  of the Eco Conscience Association. Between my second 
undergraduate and graduate degrees, I worked as Tactician in the British Columbia Ministry 
of Forests. Following my graduate degree, I worked as a Programme Officer for the Ontario 
Ministry of the Environment (MOE). Then, I took on the role of Climate Change and Carbon 
Management Coordinator at the Toronto Region Conservation Authority (TRCA).279 While at 
the TRCA, I also consulted externally on issues relating to climate change science, adaptation 
and mitigation (e.g. with organizations such as Conservation Ontario, MOE, Greenest  City - 
Clean Air Partnership, World Green Building Council Secretariat, Asia-Pacific Network for 
Global Change Research).  This position led to a post at Ryerson University, where I continue 
to teach senior planning students about climate change science and policy.280
Having grown up in a small town on a large lake, surrounded by  forests and open fields, I 
was raised to appreciate nature for its intrinsic value. My academic training has provided me 
with the tools necessary to understand how the natural world functions, how ecosystems 
remain in balance, and importantly, how we as a society  influence this complex balance. My 
professional experience has allowed me to appreciate how difficult it is for a capitalist 
wealth-driven society, to remain in balance with the natural world. And, how despite the 
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279  In this role I developed and managed several projects, both large in scale and capital, including for example: TRCA Climate Audit and Action Plan; The 
Living City Carbon Footprint Calculator; The City of Vaughan Carbon and Energy Management and Partners for Climate Protection Project; Getting To 
Carbon Neutral: A Guide For Canadian Municipalities; Underground Thermal Energy Storage Project; TRCA Carbon Neutral Project; UHI Mitigation 
Strategy for Municipalities. 
280 I teach a similar course to business and marketing students at the University of Canterbury (Christchurch, New Zealand).
efforts of some (from within both the private and public sectors), without collective global 
agreement and action, balance with nature will remain a challenge. 
The combination of training and experience has led to my strong belief that as a society we 
will never right our imbalance with nature as long as we continue to use the same thinking 
that got us into the problem in the first place.281  Anthropogenic climate change, while 
planetary  in scale, is at its root, a symptom of our collective compulsion to live unsustainable 
lifestyles, to live beyond the natural carrying capacity of the ecosystem.282  While 
governments and corporations continue to shortsightedly place economic benefit above 
environmental health, our balance with nature will remain illusive.
It is clear from my background that I appreciate the environment, but I also understand the 
need to take from the environment. I am also acutely  aware that not  all green actions are 
indeed environmentally  positive actions. Greenwashing is an endemic problem and ultimately 
hurts environmental efforts. As an academic I find it important to view things from a critical 
perspective. As a result, I actively strive to remain objective,283  be it as a student, project 
manager, consultant, or researcher. This is particularly  important when conducting qualitative 
research, as it is impossible for the researcher to remain neutral. Because of the political 
nature of the current study, and the emotional attachments of many of the interviewees, it is 
crucial as a researcher that I remain aware of my own biases, and appreciate how this may 
influence the evolution of the research (e.g. Jootun et al., 2009).  By including this reflexive 
approach, it is my hope to present, as Horsburgh (2002) suggests, a transparent and, as 
objective as possible, interpretation of the data.  
5.3.  RESEARCH ETHICS
The nature of this topic and the specific focus of my research has the potential to be 
politically  charged and operationally sensitive.  As a result, it was important that I consider 
the ethics associated with both the line of inquiry and my interactions with interviewees (e.g. 
Myers & Newman, 2007). Liamputtong (2011) notes that while qualitative research typically 
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281  Albert Einstein once said: ‘The world will not evolve past its current state of crisis by using the same thinking that created the situation’ (source 
unknown).
282 See Lovelock (2009) for a cautionary review of humanity and Gaia theory.
283 It remains, however, as noted in Ahern (1999), humanly impossible to be totally objective.
does not cause physical harm to the participants, there are nevertheless vital issues that must 
be considered in order to maintain an ethical decorum. To this end, and in accordance with 
the University of Canterbury’s policy on field interviews with human subjects, I attained 
clearance from the university’s Human Ethics Committee for all field interview related 
components of my research.284  
In accordance with the university’s policy  on field interviews with human subjects, in the 
initial email I sent out to prospective interviewees, I provided an information brief detailing 
my objective as a researcher, the nature of the research, the expectation on the interviewee, 
and the rights of the interviewee (Appendix, Article 5.4; Article 5.5). Prospective 
interviewees were also provided with contact information for my supervisors.  
Once interviewees were selected, and before the interviews occurred, interviewees were 
required to sign a consent form (Appendix, Article 5.6). The consent form indicated that the 
research had been reviewed and approved by the University of Canterbury’s Human Ethics 
Committee. In signing the consent form, interviewees acknowledged that their participation 
was strictly voluntary, that they are free to  decline to answer any questions or withdraw from 
the study at any time without disadvantage. 
Moreover, the consent form also required participants to recognise that while the Ethics 
Committee is aware of the general areas to be explored in the interview, because of the nature 
of the semi-structured interview process, questions would evolve as the interview progressed. 
Interviewees were also informed that  once the research had been completed, all raw data 
(with the code names of the research participants only) would be held in secure storage for a 
period of five years, then destroyed. And, that while the results of the research may be 
published, the interviewee’s anonymity would be preserved.285
Similarly, before the interview began, I provided each interviewee with a signed security and 
confidentiality form (Appendix, Article 5.7). In signing this form I indicated to the 
Organizational Involvement in Carbon Mitigation
116
284  A Low Risk Ethics Application was approved by the University of Canterbury Human Ethics Committee for CS1 interviews on 31 August 2009, for CS2 
S1 interviews on 25 November 2009, and CS2 S2 interviews on 22 October 2010 (Appendix, Article 5.1; Article 5.2; Article 5.3).
285  Because of the nature of her former position as Prime Minister of New Zealand, Helen Clark agreed that it would not be possible to preserve her 
anonymity in this research.
interviewee that I would ensure that all personal information, the identity  of the interviewee, 
the contents of the digital audio recording and the raw transcript would be kept confidential. 
In addition, this form represents my agreement that the list  that matches participants’ 
identities with their research identification code will be kept secure and confidential.
5.4.  RESEARCH DESIGN: CASE STUDIES
5.4.1.  Stages of Analysis
Case study research remains a target for positivist researchers, who believe it to lack rigor 
and accuracy (Liamputtong, 2011). And even within qualitative circles, the use of few case 
studies over several case studies has the potential to draw criticism for being too shallow a 
sample.286 To this point, Siggelkow (2007, p. 20) cites the example of a fictitious talking pig, 
and argues that even “a single case can be a very  powerful example.”287  Brower et al. (2000) 
concur, adding that single case research can provide contextually rich insight. For this study, 
two case studies were chosen because together they provide an interesting account of NZ 
public sector organizations’ resolve for carbon management (e.g. Stake, 2008). This study 
involves two similar yet distinct case studies: Case Study 1: CNPS Programme (CS1), which 
focuses on the six lead-core departments involved in the CNPS programme; and Case Study 
2: CCP-NZ Programme (CS2), which focuses on 16 councils involved in the CCP-NZ 
programme.
While both case studies involve a series of semi-structured interviews (the resultant 
transcripts form the primary data of this study) with the senior managers responsible for the 
delivery of the respective programme within their organization, Stage 1 (S1), CS2 also 
includes a longitudinal component where seven of the 16 councils that participated in S1 are 
revisited for a second interview, Stage 2 (S2), following 1 years time (Table 5.1). The 
purpose of S2 is to provide another layer of richness to the data, “expos[ing] different 
perspectives of reality” (Liamputtong, 2011, p. 27).
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286 A case study, as explained in Liamputtong (2011, p191) is an intensive study of a single unit or case where attention is on the particular.
287  Adapted from Ramachandran (1998), Siggelkow (2007, p. 20) cites the following example to demonstrate the power of a single case study: ‘You cart a 
pig into my living room and tell me that it can talk. I say, “Oh really? Show me.” You snap with your fingers and the pig starts talking. I say, “Wow, you 
should write a paper about this.” You write up your case report and send it to a journal. What will the reviewers say? Will the reviewers respond with 
“Interesting, but that’s just one pig. Show me a few more and then I might believe you”? I think we would agree that that would be a silly response. A single 
case can be a very powerful example.’ 
Table 5.1:  Stages of analysis
Case Study Target
Number of 
Organizations 
Interviewed
Stage Source of Data
1: CNPS 
Programme
Ministry/ 
Department 6
Preparation Analysis and Overview of GHG Emission Inventories and Management Plans (for all years available up to 2009)
1 Semi-structured Interviews. NOTE: Each interview may have multiple interviewees, see Table 5.4.
2: CCP-NZ 
Programme
Local 
Government 
Council
16
Preparation Analysis and Overview of GHG Emission Inventories and Management Plans (for all years available up to 2009)
1 Semi-structured Interviews. NOTE: Each interview may have multiple interviewees, see Table 5.5.
Longitudinal Component - 1 year later 
7
Preparation Analysis of Annual Reports and Long Term Community Council Plans as relevant to carbon management.
2 Semi-structured Interviews. NOTE: Each interview may have multiple interviewees, see Table 5.6.
Along with the semi-structured interviews with senior managers, both case studies also 
involved semi-structured interviews with the programme architects responsible for macro 
aspects of the programmes creation and operation. Data resulting from these interviews 
serves to triangulate findings from the semi-structured interviews with senior managers and 
will emerge in Chapter 8. 
In preparation for S1 interviews, GHG emission inventories and management plans were 
reviewed.288 For CS1, this included analysis of Ministry Emission Inventory  Reports for 2007 
and GHG Emission Reduction Plans for 2008. For CS2, this included analysis of Council 
GHG Emission Analysis and Forecast Reports and Greenhouse Action Plans for 2004 - 
2009.289 
In preparation for S2 interviews, Council reports related to climate change and carbon 
management (i.e. board reports, financial and policy documents) were reviewed. In addition, 
Annual Reports (2004 to 2010), Annual Plans (2010) and Long-term Community Council 
Plans (LTCCP) (2009 to 2019)290 were analyzed using word count analysis to determine the 
occurrence of key  words related to climate change and climate change mitigation: ‘climate 
change’, ‘carbon’, ‘carbon management’, ‘carbon neutral’, ‘Communities for Climate 
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288 A summary of the analysis of these documents is presented in the Context and Background Chapter.
289  Because CCP-NZ Programme participants joined the programme at different times, and progressed through the programme at their own pace, some 
Councils may not have completed a Greenhouse Action Plan.
290 The purpose of the LTCCP is to set out activities and services that the Council intends to provide for the coming 10 year period. The plan allows for long 
term planning of responsibilities and obligations, including costs. NZ Councils are required by law to develop a LTCCP every three years. In general, the 
purpose of a Council Annual Plan is to communicate to the public Council’s intentions regarding objectives and financial obligations for the the coming year. 
The purpose of a Council Annual Report is to demonstrate to the public how Council has delivered on objectives set out in the Annual Plan and LTCCP.
Protection - New Zealand Programme’ (or ‘CCP-NZ’). The inclusion of this line of inquiry 
serves to triangulate the data, and thus enhance the validity of the study (e.g. Carpenter & 
Suto, 2008; Liamputtong, 2011).
Findings resulting from the semi-structured interviews with the senior managers, as well as 
those resulting from word count analysis of S2 Council Annual Reports, Annual Plans and 
Long-term Community Council Plans can be found in Chapters 6 and 7.
5.4.2.  Study Sample Selection Criteria
Case Study 1: CNPS Programme - Organizations
Of the 34 core NZ Ministries that were involved in the CNPS initiative, six were explored in 
S1 of this study (Appendix, Table 5.2). The six ministries chosen for this study were selected 
based on their lead role in the CNPS initiative, as discussed previously in Chapter 3, and 
because these organizations represent a good cross section of core NZ ministries in general 
(NZ Govt., 2007b). 
The remaining 28 ministries involved in the CNPS initiative were not included in this 
research for reasons of time constraint and limited access to personnel responsible for 
managing and delivering the initiative within the respective ministry. As noted in Chapter 1, 
following programme termination, many  key senior managers responsible for the delivery of 
the programme were disestablished, thus removing corporate memory  of the CNPS initiative 
and rendering interviews near impossible in many ministries.
Case Study 1: CNPS Programme - Programme Architect
The programme architect, former Prime Minister Helen Clark, was chosen for this case study 
because of her role in championing the CNPS programme. Efforts to meet with Nick Smith, 
Minister for the Environment and Climate Change Issues, were unsuccessful.291
Case Study 2: CCP-NZ Programme - Organizations
Before the CCP-NZ programme was terminated its membership included 34 councils, 
ranging from small local councils to large regional councils.  While time constraints and 
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291 As noted previously in Chapter 3, Nick Smith was the Minister responsible for terminating the CNPS programme.
restricted access to key personnel made it  impossible to include all councils involved in the 
CCP-NZ programme, 16 councils (four regional, five district and seven city) were explored 
in S1 of this study.292 
Council selection was based on several factors, including the type of council (regional, 
district or city), year of initial membership, the milestone achieved while participating in the 
program, the council’s population and location (North v. South island), and in the end, 
council’s willingness to participate in the research (Appendix, Table 5.3).  Ultimately, the 16 
councils selected for this research represent a good multi-level cross section of NZ councils.
Council Type
Of the 34 councils involved in the CCP-NZ Programme, the majority were district councils 
(47%), followed by city  councils (35%), then regional councils (18%).  While the Study 
Selection does not strictly  represent  this trend, it nonetheless demonstrates a more equal 
weighting of the three council types. Importantly, as will become clear in the proceeding text, 
city councils were given slightly greater representation in this research (44%) (Fig. 5.1).
Figure 5.1:  CCP-NZ programme membership by council type293
Year of Initial Membership
As a proportion of the year councils joined the programme, the Study Selection is quite 
similar to the Total Membership. The exception to this trend is 2008, given that all councils 
represented in the Study Selection had joined the programme by the end of 2007 (Fig. 5.2). 
35%
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292As with the CS1, because many senior managers responsible for the delivery of the CCP-NZ programme were disestablished following programme 
termination, access for interviews was limited, and became increasingly more limited as time passed.
293 See Appendix, Table 5.3, for data set. 
Figure 5.2:  CCP-NZ programme membership by year joined294
In order to capture the narrative of early adopters, the Study Selection does favour councils 
that joined the programme in 2004 (44%). In terms of the Study Selection, 2004 also 
represents the year when the greatest percentage of city councils joined the programme, and 
given that city  councils represent the largest component of the Study Selection, it was 
important to maintain this relationship in the Study Selection (Fig. 5.3).
Figure 5.3:  CCP-NZ programme membership by date joined, as a proportion of 
  council type295
Milestone Achieved
It was also important that the data represent all five milestones of the programme. Again, 
because of their enthusiasm and means, both from a personnel and financial perspective, city 
councils (Christchurch and Wellington City Councils) ultimately dominate the top two 
milestones in both the Total Membership and Study Selection, representing  67% and 100% 
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294 See Appendix, Table 5.3, for data set. 
295 See Appendix, Table 5.3, for data set.
for Milestone 4 and Milestone 5 respectively. Given that Hutt City  Council is not part of the 
Study Selection, Political Declaration is not represented in this research (Fig. 5.4).
Figure 5.4:  CCP-NZ programme membership as a proportion of milestone (M) 
  achievement296
Population and Location
Within the Study Selection, as with the Total Membership, Kaikoura District Council 
(population 3,456) and Auckland Regional Council represent (population 1,237,239) the 
smallest and greatest population. Because of the weighted representation of city  councils, the 
Study Selection includes a disproportionate number of large population centres relative to the 
Total Membership. The Study Selection does, however, represent a good cross-section of 
large-to-small councils against milestone achievement. For example, Kaikoura District 
Council, while being the smallest council by population, achieved Milestone 3 before the 
programme ended; Greater Wellington Region (population 434,034), on the other hand, while 
being one of the largest councils by population, only achieved Milestone 1 by the  time the 
programme ended. Likewise, the Study Selection captures the narrative of mid-sized city 
councils such as Hamilton City  Council (population 138,500) and Dunedin City  Council 
(population 114,891), which achieved Milestone 4 and Milestone 1, respectively, by the time 
the programme ended.
Total Membership  of the CCP-NZ Programme was heavily  weighted towards North Island 
councils (82%). While the Study Selection was dominated by North Island councils (75%), 
the proportion was not as great as it was with the Total Membership (Fig. 5.5). Because of 
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296 See Appendix, Table 5.3, for data set. * PD reefers to  political declaration.
ease of access geographically (given that Christchurch was my base), all six South Island 
programme participants were included in the Study Selection. 
Figure 5.5:  CCP-NZ programme membership by council type, as a proportion of 
  location297
The seven councils selected for S2 were chosen from among, and are considered a cross-
section of, the 16 S1 councils (Appendix, Table 5.3). As with S1, S2 council selection was 
restricted by access to key senior managers responsible for the delivery of the CCP-NZ 
programme within respective councils; as time passed from programme termination, access 
to senior managers became increasingly difficult.
While not definitive, S2 council selection also considered such factors as the council’s carbon 
dependency (corporate), its energy mix, primary industry and land use, and its commitment to 
achieving carbon neutrality.
Case Study 2: CCP-NZ Programme - Programme Architects
The programme architects chosen for this case study were selected because of their macro-
level perspective and their role in either the creation or delivery of the CCP-NZ programme 
within NZ local government.298  For example, the CCP-NZ National Programme Manager 
was selected for this study because of their role in coordinating the programme with NZ 
councils. The Manager was the key link between councils and ICLEI. The Director of ICLEI 
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297 See Appendix, Table 5.3, for data set.
298  While other individuals were involved in the CCP-NZ programme in some capacity, the three noted here were the main active figures involved in the 
programme.
Oceania,299  CEO of ICLEI, was chosen for this study because of their macro-level 
perspective with regard to programme operation.  The CCP-NZ initiative was predicated on 
the success of ICLEI’s global CCP campaign. As a result, the Director was in a position to 
compare the effectiveness of the CCP-NZ programme against other iterations of the initiative 
from around the world. The liaison with Local Government New Zealand (Senior Policy 
Analyst) was selected for this study because of their role in supporting of the programme, and 
their ability  to comment on the effectiveness of the CCP-NZ National Programme Manager 
and Director of ICLEI Oceania, in so far as it relates to the CCP-NZ programme.
It should be noted that attempts to meet with a representative from the Energy Efficiency and 
Conservation Authority  and the Ministry for the Environment were unsuccessful (this was 
exacerbated by difficulty in determining who was in the role of liaison with the CCP-NZ 
programme!). Furthermore, attempts to meet with Nick Smith, Minister for the Environment 
and Climate Change Issues were also unsuccessful.300  
5.5.  RESEARCH EXECUTION
5.5.1.  Initial Participant Contact
Initial participant recruitment for CS1 began in early  June 2009; mid August 2009 for CS2.301 
As described in section 5.2, initial recruitment was in the form of an email which included an 
information brief detailing my objective as a researcher and the nature of the research 
(Appendix, Article 5.4; Article 5.5). Because of the termination of the CNPS and the CCP-
NZ programmes, it was important to make contact with prospective interviewees quickly, as 
many were becoming disestablished in the near-term.302 
Liamputtong (2011) suggests that the purposive selection of participants for their knowledge 
and unique experience gives the research credibility. With this in mind, perspective 
interviewees were purposively targeted for two primary reasons. The first target  were 
managers responsible for the application and delivery of either the CNPS or the CCP-NZ 
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299 As noted previously in Chapter 3, ICLEI Oceania was the arm of ICLEI through which the CCP-NZ programme was operated.
300 As noted previously in Chapter 3, Nick Smith was the Minister responsible for terminating the CNPS programme.
301 Though initial contact began in mid August 2009, some perspective interviewees were not reached until February 2010.
302  Given that I began PhD studies on 01 June 2009, this required me to hit the ground running and move quickly on study design, thesis proposal 
approval, and importantly, ethics approval for interviews with human subjects. As Buchanan et al. (1988) note, researcher should adopt an opportunistic 
approach to fieldwork with organizations.
programmes in their respective organization (senior managers).303  The second target were 
those that were either involved in championing/ creating the CNPS and the CCP-NZ 
programmes, or those that were responsible for liaising between the managers and the 
champions/ creators of the programmes (programme architects).  In either case, interviewees 
sought for this research were targeted for their expertise and experience with either the CNPS 
or the CCP-NZ programmes. Myers & Newman (2007) caution that interviewing only senior 
officials may lead to elite bias. While this is likely true in many other studies, it is specifically 
the views and experience of the senior managers that I seek in this study (e.g. Carpenter & 
Suto, 2008).
While the study, in the end, included 33 interviewees, representing both case studies, 44 
prospective interviewees were initially  approached.304  With the exception of 1 prospective 
interviewee,305 while appreciating the merit of the research, others were unable to participate 
for reasons of availability  and accessibility.  Critically, the 33 interviewees that ultimately 
participated in the research, satisfied the need for cross-sectional organization representation 
(e.g. Liamputtong, 2011),306 as described previously in section 5.4.2.
5.5.2.  Interview Strategy
As an initial step in determining the interview strategy, and the qualitative research approach 
in general, I considered my role as researcher and the inevitable biases I bring to the research 
(e.g. Finlay, 2002).307  As this was discussed in section 5.2,308 I will not elaborate here, except 
to note that my earlier experience as an interviewer was not as an academic researcher but 
instead as a programme coordinator, in one instance seeking to better understand the 
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303 These senior managers often had titles that reflect the organization’s appreciation (or at least awareness) for sustainability and energy conservation, i.e. 
Sustainability Manager, Energy Policy Manager, Climate Change Response Coordinator.
304  Typical of qualitative research, the sampling process was flexible, and as a result the exact number of participants could not be determined in advance 
(e.g. Liamputtong, 2011).
305  While several attempts were made to reach Nick Smith, the Minister for the Environment and Climate Change Issues, and the minister responsible for 
terminating the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programmes, all were unsuccessful.
306  As cited in Liamputtong (2011, p.15), according to Mason (2002), the key question to ask when determining sample size is whether or not the sample 
provides enough data to effectively address the the research objectives. 
307 At the beginning of each interview I reminded the interviewee(s) that I was conducting this research in partial fulfillment of a PhD, funded through a New 
Zealand Royal Society Marsden Scholarship. At the end of the interview, as time permitted, I discussed my academic and professional background. This 
was done at the end of the interview, as opposed to the beginning, in order to avoid colouring the interviewees response to my questions. In terms of the 
overall thesis, however, my academic and professional background are both discussed at the beginning of this chapter, section 5.2, in order to identify how 
my biases may have influenced the research.  
308 As Hand (2003) notes, from a reflexive approach, it is important to identify the ‘selves’ present in the interview.
vulnerability of a quasi governmental organization to climate change,309  and in another 
instance, seeking to gather participants for a professional training and integration initiative.310 
Moreover, while this experience involved many more interviewees than the current  study, 
thus creating a level of comfort in an interview setting, preparing and strategizing in advance 
for the current study’s interviews was a critical component of the research.
Pepper & Wildy (2009) liken the semi-structured interview, when well executed, to an art. 
Similarly, at the base of all qualitative interview strategies is the need to remain calm, 
organized, and prepared.311  This latter point  is particularly critical in semi-structured 
interviews as the very nature of a semi-structured interview is to allow the conversation to 
take its course and allow the interviewee the opportunity to tell their story (e.g. Feldman et 
al., 2004; Liamputtong, 2011, p. x).312 And, in general, if the interviewer fails to remain calm 
and organized, the tone of the interview can become tense. The interviewee is likely to sense 
the interviewer’s state of mind and react accordingly, potentially creating a positive feedback 
of discomfort  which will influence the dialogue and affect the level of information the 
interviewee wishes to divulge.313  Moreover, as noted by Myers & Newman (2007), the 
interview is an artificial situation that intrudes on the interviewee. Given that this intrusion 
may influence the behavior of the interviewee, a phenomena known as the Hawthorne Effect, 
and thus the results of the interview, it is important for the interviewer to be as respectful as 
possible.
In preparation for each interview I became extensively  familiar with the organization and its 
association with the topic in question, and importantly, I became aware of the interviewees 
role within the organization. As for the former, I researched the organization’s carbon profile, 
its commitment and actions on carbon mitigation, and its respective association with the 
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309 This particular effort required me to interview 20 Business Service Area senior managers within the largest conservation authority in Canada, in order to 
determine how their respective area, and ultimately the organization as a whole, will be affected by climate change. The end result of the effort was a 
comprehensive analysis of adaptive and mitigative efforts, identification of vulnerabilities, and recommendations for priority actions.
310  This role required me to interview some 150 applicants for 30 positions. Interviews were structured and lasted approximately 60 minutes each, and 
occurred over a 7 week period. Applicants were professionals in either Planning, Engineering or Geoscience and had significant experience in their 
respective field.
311  In Myers & Newman (2007) the authors describe how the qualitative interview is like a drama, and provide guidelines that interviewers should follow in 
order to have an excellent performance.
312 As indicated in Feldman et al. (2004, p. 147-8), stories shed light on the decision making process; the narrative researcher is responsible for interpreting 
the story.
313  Likewise, a more probing or direct approach to the interview would have created a different tone, perhaps causing the interviewee to feel challenged or 
threatened, which would also have influenced the information they chose to share.
programmes at the heart of this research. This background research allowed for a better 
understanding of the organization’s vision, values, ethos and resolve with regard to climate 
change and carbon mitigation, thus fostering a more informed dialogue with the 
interviewee.314
Dialogue was further facilitated by well thought-out questions. Each interviewee was asked a 
similar set  of questions (e.g. Bernard & Ryan, 2010; Pepper & Wildy, 2009) (Appendix, 
Article 5.8; Article 5.9; Article 5.10). In order to gain insight into the evolution of the CNPS 
and the CCP-NZ programmes, interview questions reflected elements of Termination Theory. 
More specifically, the questions, while semi-structured, were designed to allow the 
interviewee the opportunity to provide a window into their experience with the respective 
organization as it relates climate mitigation (namely as it relates to the CNPS and the CCP-
NZ programmes, respectively). As cited in Myers & Newman (2006, p. 2-3), Rubin & Rubin 
(2005) suggest that the qualitative interview is like a pair of night goggles, ‘permitting us to 
see that which is not ordinarily  on view and examine that which is looked at but seldom 
seen’ (see also  Liamputtong, 2011; Soderberg, 2006).
As noted earlier, and recognizing that the interview may stress or pressure the interviewee 
(e.g. Myers & Newman, 2007), interview questions began general (broad and open-ended) 
and became more specific and probing as the interview progressed (e.g. Liamputtong, 2011). 
The purpose of this method is to create a sense of comfort with the discussion before moving 
into the potentially more difficult questions (e.g. Pepper & Wildy, 2009; Gertsen & 
Soderberg, 2011). This approach, particularly  from a qualitative perspective, also allows the 
interviewee more freedom in telling their story.315   Importantly, questions were generated 
with the understanding that the interview should remain a jointly constructed, fluid 
relationship  between the interviewer and interviewee (Hand, 2003); as Soderberg (2006) and 
Gertsen & Soderberg (2011) suggest, the interviewer is a co-author of the narrative being 
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314  Having read through many corporate documents (i.e. annual reports and plans, climate strategies etc.), I was in a better position to ask intelligent 
questions, and in certain instances appreciate the strained position of the interviewee. As mentioned earlier, many interviewees were facing imminent 
disestablishment, and this was foreshadowed in the content (or lack there of) of the texts I read in preparation for the interviews (i.e. lack of attention to 
climate change mitigation activities etc.). It was important to be aware of the interviewees role within the organization so as to ask appropriate questions, 
and moreover to ensure that they were indeed the correct interviewee for purpose of the study.
Since in the interview process, interviewees are relying on memory, it is possible that facts become blurred with memory reconstruction (e.g. Pepper & 
Wildy, 2009; Bernard & Ryan, 2010). Background reading can help to clarify this phenomena.
315 As noted earlier, the ability of the interviewee to share their experience is a key tenant of qualitative research, without their narrative the research would 
lack rich content (e.g. Liamputtong, 2011).
told.316 It should also be noted that while the interview questions were designed primarily to 
elicit  conversation, some questions, despite qualitative research convention, were conceived 
with a dichotomous response in mind (Liamputtong, 2011). 
Finally, in preparing for the interviews, it was important to be aware and consider the 
drawbacks of the semi-structured interview methodology. Recognition of the pitfalls of this 
approach allows the researcher to mitigate their occurrence, or at least  makes efforts to 
minimize the influence on the research.317 
5.5.3.  Interview Execution
All interviews for this study took place face-to-face (Bernard & Ryan, 2010). It  is important 
to note that while face-to-face interviews can be time consuming, unlike surveys which tend 
to be ‘fragmented and decontextualized,’ the narratives they elicit can provide access to rich 
personal experiences (Gertsen & Soderberg, 2011, p. 800). 
Interviews with senior managers from the lead-core agencies involved in the CNPS 
programme took place in September 2009 (Wellington, NZ), while the interview with the 
programme architect responsible for the CNPS programme occurred in April 2010 
(Manhattan, USA). Duration of the CNPS programme interviews varied from 38 minutes to 1 
hour, 47 minutes (Table 5.4).318 
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316  The interview is the result of the interviewer’s initiative, the interview begins with the interviewer’s question(s), the dialogue is influenced by the 
interviewer’s comments (Gertsen & Soderberg (2011).
317 Myers & Newman (2007) provide a descriptive account of the various ‘problems and pitfalls’ of the qualitative interview.
318 Total interview time for the CNPS programme interviews is approximately 10 hours.
Table 5.4:  CS1- interviews
Ministry/ Department Interviewee Location Date Duration
Department of Conservation Sustainability Manager Wellington, NZ Sept. 25, 2009 1h 47 min.
Inland Revenue Department Sustainability Manager Wellington, NZ Sept. 22, 2009 1h 38 min.
Ministry of Economic 
Development
(A) Procurement and Sustainability Advisor     
(B) Group Manager for Performance 
Governance and Assurance 
(C) Manager of Facilities Management
Wellington, NZ Sept. 24, 2009 60 min.
Ministry for the Environment 
(A) Manager, Carbon Markets and Emissions 
Trading Group
(B) Senior Analyst
Wellington, NZ Sept. 22, 2009 1h 07 min.
Ministry of Health (A) Senior Advisor, Procurement and Contracts (B) Project Leader, Procurement and Contracts Wellington, NZ Sept. 25, 2009 55 min.
Treasury Facilities Manager, Sustainability Manager Wellington, NZ Sept. 24, 2009 60 min.
Programme Architect
Helen Clark Former Prime Minister (Labour), programme champion
Manhattan, 
USA April 6, 2010 38 min.
Interviews with senior managers from the CCP-NZ programme member-councils took place 
throughout NZ and occurred in two stages, with the first stage, S1, occurring in January and 
February 2010, and the stage second, S2, occurring in February 2011, one year following the 
first stage of interviews. Interviews with the programme architects involved with the CCP-
NZ programme occurred in February  2010 (Wellington, NZ), July 2010 (Melbourne, 
Australia) and July 2011 (Wellington, NZ). The CCP-NZ programme interviews lasted 
between 32 minutes and 1 hour, 21 minutes (Table 5.5 and Table 5.6).319 
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319 Total interview time for the CCP-NZ Programme interviews is approximately 30 hours.
Table 5.5:  CS2 S1 - interviews
Council Interviewee Location Date Duration
Regional 
Council 
Auckland 
(A) Project Leader, Sustainability 
(B) Senior Policy Analyst, Corporate 
Sustainability Manager
Auckland, NZ Feb. 23, 2010 1h 05 min.
Environment Canterbury Energy Policy Analyst Christchurch, NZ Jan. 11, 2010 44 min.
Greater Wellington Regional Climate Response Coordinator Wellington, NZ Feb. 8, 2010 1h 21 min.
Hawke's Bay Group Manager Assets Management Napier, NZ Feb. 15, 2010 55 min.
District 
Council
Far North Senior Planner Kerikeri, NZ Feb. 26, 2010 32 min.
Kaikoura (A) District Planner (B) District Planner Kaikoura, NZ Feb. 3, 2010 52 min.
Kapiti Coast Senior Advisor, Climate Change and Energy Paraparaumu, NZ Feb. 11, 2010 56 min.
Rotorua Business Manager Rotorua, NZ Feb. 16, 2010 1h 05 min.
Southland Assistant Corporate Planner Invercargill, NZ Jan. 25, 2010 47 min.
City 
Council 
Auckland Senior Sustainability Policy Analyst Auckland, NZ Feb. 23, 2010 55 min.
Christchurch Principal Advisor, Sustainability Christchurch, NZ June 22, 2010 1h 20 min.
Dunedin Energy Manager Dunedin, NZ Jan. 27, 2010 1h 14 min.
Hamilton Energy Manager Hamilton, NZ Feb. 18, 2010 1h 4 min.
Nelson Senior Policy Planner Nelson, NZ Feb. 5, 2010 53 min.
Waitakere Energy Manager Henderson, NZ Feb. 24, 2010 45 min.
Wellington Senior Advisor Wellington, NZ Feb. 11, 2010 54 min.
Programme Architects
ICLEI
(A) CCP-NZ National Programme Manager Wellington, NZ Feb. 12, 2010 54 min
(B) CEO ICLEI, Director ICLEI Oceania Melbourne, Australia Jul. 6, 2010 1h 27min
Local Government New Zealand Senior Policy Analyst Wellington, NZ Jul. 22, 2011 56 min
Table 5.6:  CS2 S2 - interviews
Council Interviewee Location Date Duration
Regional 
Council 
Auckland Senior Policy Analyst, Corporate Sustainability Manager Auckland, NZ Feb. 28, 2011 56 min.
Greater Wellington Regional Climate Response Coordinator Wellington, NZ Feb. 22, 2011 57 min.
District 
Council 
Rotorua Business Manager Rotorua, NZ Feb. 24, 2011 54 min.
Southland Assistant Corporate Planner Invercargill, NZ Feb. 9, 2011 43 min.
City 
Council 
Dunedin Energy Manager Dunedin, NZ Feb. 8, 2011 57 min.
Nelson Senior Policy Planner Nelson, NZ Feb. 15, 2011 1h 6 min.
Wellington Senior Advisor Wellington, NZ Feb. 17, 2011 56 min.
With two exceptions, all interviews took place in either the interviewee’s office or a private 
conference room.320 In all instances, the environment was comfortable and non-threatening to 
both interviewees and researcher alike; interruptions did not occur.321  The majority  of 
interviews involved only one interviewee, but some did involve two or more interviewees.
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320 Two interviews took place in coffee houses.  While these locations were not as quiet as a private office or conference room, they nevertheless did serve 
their purpose.
321 These details are for the benefit of the reader, to provide authenticity and context - a feeling for the field setting (e.g. Brower et al., 2000).
Interviews were recorded with a digital recorder, and the subsequent transcripts were later 
returned to the interviewees for their approval.322  Participants were afforded the opportunity 
to clarify and modify their statements if they felt it necessary. It was important that the 
interviewee had the opportunity  to check and ensure that the narrative did in fact represent 
their experience. Horsburgh (2002) notes that this process may  be problematic, given that the 
researcher and interviewee have different agendas and perspectives. Given the ambiguity of 
language and resultant interpretation of questions, this process is important because it allows 
the opportunity  for clarification (Myers & Newman, 2007); while at the time the researcher 
may understand the gist  of what the interviewee is saying, following transcription, the 
meaning may  be difficult to decipher (e.g. Feldman et al., 2004). This feedback process also 
serves to increase the rigor and validity of the study (e.g. Liamputtong, 2011; Polkinghorne, 
2007). 
Though some interviewees identified areas that they would prefer remained absent, or that 
they  felt misrepresented themselves or their organization (e.g. Buchanan et al., 1988), the 
majority  of interviewees signed off on the transcript without alteration. In any event, the 
minor alterations that did occur had no significant bearing on the research, and in the end all 
transcripts were approved.
5.6.  RESEARCH METHODOLOGY AND INTERPRETATION
5.6.1.  Narrative Analysis
Narrative analysis is a subfield of discourse analysis, and has wide application in scholarly 
research, including organizational studies (e.g. Bebbington, 2009; Bailey, 2007; Boykoff et 
al., 2007; Feldman, 2004), where over the past 20 years, according to Gertsen & Soderberg 
(2011, p. 788-9), has built a strong reputation. Watson (2009, p. 427) echoes this notion, 
indicating that “narratives and stories are increasingly being seen as relevant material for 
social scientific analysis.”
As Bernard & Ryan (2010) explain, within qualitative research, there are four main 
‘traditions’ of narrative analysis: (1) Sociolinguistics, which focuses on the structure of the 
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322  Interviewees were provided with unsanitized copies of the transcript. Buchanan et al. (1988) describe the process of sanitizing the data as clearing the 
clutter before allowing the interviewees the chance to check the accuracy of the transcript. Because of time constraints, interviewees will not have the 
opportunity to see the sanitized data until it appears in the Thesis.
narratives; (2) Hermeneutics, which explores the greater meaning of narratives (3) 
Phenomenology, which employs narratives to understand a lived experience of an individual; 
and, (4) Grounded Theory, which uses narratives to better understand how things work. 
Phenomenological narrative analysis was chosen for this study  because it  allows for an 
exploration of the experience of the managers responsible the delivery and application of the 
CNPS and the CCP-NZ programmes.323  As Feldman et al. (2004, p. 148) suggest, narratives 
are particularly useful data because individuals make sense of the world through narratives; 
when an individual shares their story, they reflect an experience (see also Liamputtong, 
2011), creating meaning (Soin & Scheytt, 2006). And according to Watson (2009), unlike 
facts, narratives can speak for themselves. Through analysis of narratives, or stories, a better 
understanding of the individuals’ experience can be achieved; as Kleres (2011, p. 183) 
explains, “people have specific narrative knowledge - the knowledge of how things have 
come about...” From an organizational perspective, narratives reflect the cultural context of 
an experience, providing insight into the character of the organization itself (e.g. Soin & 
Scheytt, 2006).324  Or as Soderberg (2006, p. 397) puts it, “a narrative analysis focuses on 
interviewees” story-work and how it constitutes organizational reality. Narrative analysis is 
therefore an ideal approach to better understand the effectiveness of the CNPS and the CCP-
NZ programmes within their respective organization (e.g. Polkinghorne, 2007).
Ultimately, narratives are not fact (e.g. Soderberg, 2006). As Watson (2009, p. 448) concedes, “to 
a certain extent a story is a story  is a story, so to speak.” And as Soderberg (2006) warns, 
there is an inherent risk of interpreting narratives as fact about an organization or event. 
Another potential limitation of narrative inquiry, as Soderberg (2006) notes, relates to the 
interviewee’s need, whether conscious or subconscious, to demonstrate their authority and 
intelligence.  And, likewise, the interviewee may purposely  present themselves in such a way 
that their emotions, be it anger, frustration etc., appear “worthy of the audience’s empathy,” 
as described by Soderberg (2006, p. 401).
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323 While phenomenological analysis is the primary method of interpretation, it is difficult to separate it from hermeneutics analysis, and as a result either 
directly or indirectly, this study explores the greater meaning of the narratives well. 
324 Soin & Scheytt (2006) also suggest that narratives assist in sense making in organizations.
While these often taken for granted risks can be mitigated by treating the narratives as the 
interviewees’ retrospective interpretation or sense making, it is important to remain aware of 
the interviewees context relative to their narrative. To mitigate this risk further yet, the 
research should include multiple interviewees and/ or multiple case studies, and  extensive 
background reading about the organization (as is the case for this study). This will allow the 
researcher to triangulate the findings, and thus increase the credibility of the study  (e.g. Soin 
& Scheytt, 2006). And importantly, as cautioned by Soin & Scheytt (2006), narrative 
analysis, like all qualitative inquiry, runs the risk of being influenced by the researcher’s 
theoretical and conceptual assumptions. Though a reflexive research design can lessen this 
risk, it is critical that the researcher continuously  check their assumptions, and ensure that 
they are indeed following the data.
While narrative analysis of the senior manager interview transcripts is the primary method of 
analysis used in this study (with the transcripts being the primary data), word count analysis 
is used on CS2 S2 Council strategic reports to triangulate findings.325 As noted by  Leech & 
Onwuegbuzie (2007), the assumption associated with word count analysis is that the more 
frequent the word(s) is used, the greater the importance the word represents within the text 
(see also Bernard & Ryan, 2010). In order to increase the validity  of this assumption, the 
analysis must  also include a count of the total words in the text, so as to consider the target 
word(s) in the larger context. For the purpose of this study, I am only concerned with whether 
the key words are mentioned in the documents (yes or no), which in this case are strategic 
reports used by Council to forecast and account for progress and activities throughout the 
year. 
5.6.2.  Theme Development
Transcripts resulting from the semi-structured interviews with the senior managers were 
transcribed verbatim326  then manually  coded and studied to discover emerging themes.  In 
light of the objectives of this study, themes emerging from the data are examined to 
determine the rationale for programme termination and the resolve of government 
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325 Word count analysis was done using Adobe PDF reader’s search application.
326  The interviews were transcribed by the Centre for Evaluation & Monitoring (CEM-NZ), who provide professional and confidential transcribing services; 
CEM is located at the University of Canterbury. While there is substantial benefit in transcribing transcripts yourself (Liamputtong, 2011), for reasons of time 
constraint, I opted to have the transcripts professionally transcribed. In this case, I don’t believe that this has negatively impacted the research. 
Transcripts amounted to over 800 pages (33 interviews x average of 25 pages per transcript), every line, of text.
organizations to continue efforts for carbon mitigation.327  In addition, as Termination Theory 
is the theoretical lens through which the data is assessed, themes are explored to determine 
whether the cancelling of the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programmes aligns with deLeon’s 
rationale for programme termination, as described in Chapter 4. While theory did influence 
the development of the semi-structured interview questions, new themes did emerge from the 
data.
Given that the interviews occurred over an extended period of time, preliminary analysis of 
the interview transcripts began immediately  following transcription. This analysis also 
included review of interview and field notes. While the purpose of this assessment was purely 
exploratory, and prelude to more in-depth attention once all the interviews were complete, it 
nonetheless provided initial insight for theme development. The inclusion of interview and 
field notes in this process, as described by Ryan & Bernard (2003), also served to ensure 
continuity with the transcript data. 
Once all the transcripts had been transcribed, and before primary  data analysis occurred, CS1 
data was separated from CS2 data; likewise, with regard to CS2, S1 data was separated from 
S2 data. While the resultant data from both case studies and both stages will be reunited, at 
this point, and in order to maintain the integrity of the respective case study, each case study 
is assessed in isolation. 
Narrative analysis began with a quick reading of the transcripts (Step 1) (Table 5.7). Doing 
this for all the transcripts provided a sense of tone and context; this also allowed for 
improved recollection, which aided in the initial identification of similarities and themes 
between the transcripts. Following, each transcript was reread, slowly, so as to really 
appreciate the narrative and understand the stories held within each transcript (Feldman et al., 
2004) (Step 2). Key quotations were highlighted using different colours to represent themes 
(e.g. Ryan & Bernard, 2003).328 As noted by  Coffey & Atkinson (1996), in spite of the open-
ended nature of the semi-structured interview questions, the initial themes tend to emerge 
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327  This form of analysis is known as thematic analysis or interpretive thematic analysis, and according to Liamputtong (2011, p. 284), is the “foundational 
method for qualitative analysis” (see also Ryan & Bernard, 2003).
328 The challenge of selecting effective quotes, as Bernard & Ryan (2010, p. 260) describe, is to ‘achieve empathic understanding of the phenomenon being 
studied.’
from the interview protocol. With that said, however, Dey  (1993) notes that because of the 
open-ended nature of the semi-structured interview questions, all themes cannot be 
anticipated in advance of data analysis.
The third step involved rendering the themes within each transcript. For each transcript, this 
involved cutting, pasting and gathering highlighted quotations onto a separate page(s), 
organised by  colour-code (e.g. Ryan & Bernard, 2003; Bernard  & Ryan, 2010). Themes were 
then distilled down to those common within the respective case study and stage (e.g. Pepper 
& Wildy, 2009) (Step  4).  Ultimately, within CS1, 5 primary themes were identified; within 
CS2 S1, 7 primary themes were identified; and, within CS2 S2, 6 primary themes were 
identified. As themes were culled, sub-themes were identified.
At this point, each theme was given a colour-coded page(s), quotations from each 
organization that reflect that theme were cut and pasted onto the corresponding colour-coded 
page(s) (Step 5). This was done for each case study and stage. For example, CS1, 5 
individually colour-coded pages were created, representing the 5 primary themes identified in 
Step 4. Quotations from each of the 6 transcripts (organizations) were cut and pasted onto the 
corresponding colour-coded theme page(s).329  And finally, each case study was summarised 
(Step 6). While the findings write-up is not meant to be an exhaustive account of all the 
quotations from the transcripts, it pulls together the most appropriate quotations to articulate 
a narrative which conveys the interviewees story through the common themes identified in 
Step 4 & 5 (e.g. Pepper & Wildy, 2009; Malterud, 2001). 
Of critical importance, as noted by Pepper & Wildy (2009, p. 23), was to document the theme 
development process, so as to ensure that what is “claimed to be analysed is being analysed;” 
transparency serves to improve the validity of the researcher’s approach (Ryan & Bernard, 
2003; Feldman et al., 2004; Polkinghorne, 2007). Subsequent actions involved comparing the 
findings from CS1 to CS2, and ultimately  considering the findings in the context of 
Termination Theory.
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329 For CS2 S1, 7 individually colour-coded pages were created and quotations from each of the 16 transcripts (organizations) were cut and pasted onto the 
corresponding colour-coded theme page(s); and, for CS2 S2, 6 individually colour-coded pages were created and quotations from each of the 7 transcripts 
(organizations) were cut and pasted onto the corresponding colour-coded theme page(s).
Table 5.7:  Steps to narrative analysis
Step Description
1 Quick reading of all the transcripts (33)
2 Detailed reading and highlighting of transcripts
3 Render themes within each transcript
4 Determine common themes within each case study
5 Re-organise by theme, drawing examples from each transcript
6 Summarize findings from each case study
5.6.3.  Application of Termination Theory
Direct application of theory  was held off until after theme development occurred to avoid too 
heavy  a reliance on prior theorising, which as Charmaz (1990) argues, can limit the 
development of new ideas.  Avoiding theory, on the other hand, as  Ryan & Bernard (2003) 
caution, can result in the failure to make connections between the data and the research 
objective. This approach, along with reflexive considerations, lessened the likelihood of 
simply  finding what I was looking for in the data, instead of following the data (e.g. Ryan & 
Bernard, 2003; Coffey & Atkinson, 1996).
In this study, while application of Termination Theory occurred after theme development, it 
did play an initial role in influencing the development of the semi-structured interview 
questions, as illustrated by themes below (see Appendix, Article 5.8, Article 5.9; Article 
5.10): 
Inception: Why were the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programmes created?
• Why did departments and councils join the respective programmes?
• How did departments and councils make sense of the climate change 
discourse? 
• What were the departments and councils drivers and motivations for 
action on carbon neutrality? 
• What were departments and councils expectations and goals?
Application: How effective were the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programmes?
• How did expectations and goals compare to the actual experience?
• How economic, efficient and effective (operationally) were the 
respective 
• programmes at achieving goal?
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Termination: Why were the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programmes 
terminated?
• How were programme economics, efficiency and effectiveness 
evaluated? 
• Does government no longer believe in the need to manage carbon?
• Did termination meet resistance from programme supporters?
Next Steps: Will future iterations of the CNPS and the CCP-NZ 
programmes be created?
• What will departments and councils do next - has the ethos of these 
programmes become business as usual?
• Will departments and councils continue with or without the assistance 
and leadership of central government?
Considering the data through this lens will shed light on the rationale(s) for termination of the 
CNPS and the CCP-NZ programmes, and aid in the determination of whether the termination 
of these two programmes aligns with deLeon’s rationales for programme termination: (1)
Economics; (2) Programmatic inefficiencies; and, (3) Political ideology.
5.7.  SUMMARY AND LOCATING THE RESEARCH
5.7.1.  Summary of Chapter 5
Narrative analysis was chosen for this qualitative study because it allows the researcher to 
explore meaning and interpretations, a window into individual experiences. Analysis of this 
data, in the context of Termination Theory, in turn provides insight into the dynamics leading 
to the termination of the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programmes and ultimately  organizational 
resolve towards carbon management and carbon neutrality.
In order to address positivist criticism of qualitative research, along with continual reflexive 
considerations throughout the research process, this study maintained a level of ethical 
standard supported by the University of Canterbury’s Human Ethics Committee.
From a design perspective, this study included two distinct case studies, CS1 (CNPS 
programme); and CS2 (CCP-NZ programme). Each case study included semi-structured 
interviews with senior managers responsible for the application and delivery of the CNPS and 
the CCP-NZ programmes in their respective organization. Each case study also included 
semi-structured interviews with the programme architects that were involved in the creation 
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and macro level delivery of the respective programme. In total, 33 interviewees participated 
in the research. In order to increase the rigor and validity of the study, interview transcripts 
were returned to the interviewees for their approval.
5.7.2.  Locating the Research
As Feldman (2004, p. 167) contends, “interpretive social science is an important part of the 
scholarly repertoire... It is particularly  useful in helping us understand the processes that 
social actors engage in to make sense of their reality and to guide actions.” By exploring the 
the narratives of public sector managers involved in the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programmes, 
this research seeks to contribute to the growing body of qualitative methodological literature 
that explores organizational climate mitigation. Insights gained from this study will aid in the 
understanding of NZ public sector organizational resolve towards carbon management and 
carbon neutrality, and future NZ Government policy on climate change in general.
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CHAPTER 6 - FINDINGS I: CASE STUDIES
6.1.  INTRODUCTION
6.1.1.  Introduction to Chapter 6
The data resulting from the interviews with senior managers from organizations involved in 
the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programmes, respectively, reveal a similar experience across the 
case studies. While themes vary  slightly  between case studies, a common thread does present. 
This is in part, perhaps, a result  of the theory’s influence on interview question development. 
The similarity  is also likely because of the fact that all organizations involved in this study 
are public sector organizations and thus share a similar mandate and ethos - that is, as 
Broadbent & Guthrie (1992, p. 3) suggest, to “provide utilities and services to the community 
and which have traditionally been seen as essential to the fabric of our society.”330  While this 
will be discussed further in Chapter 8, here the themes of each case study  (and stage) are 
presented.  It  is important to note, as mentioned in Chapter 5, that the themes presented here 
are not an exhaustive representation of the themes that emerged from the transcripts, but 
instead depict the themes common to all organizations from the respective case study (and 
respective stage). Additionally, some of the themes are supported by  sub-themes, and it is 
within the sub-themes that the differences between the case studies become more clear.
Narrative analysis of CS1 (6 organizations) reveals five dominant themes: (1) Support, which 
discusses how well the programme was supported; (2) Application, which explores the 
operational efficiency of the programme; (3) Termination, which explores the ultimate cause 
of programme termination; (4) Outcome, which considers the results of the programme; and, 
(5) Moving Forward, which presents agencies’ next steps.  Table 5.4 (Chapter 5) serves as a 
reference, linking the interviewee to the lead-core agency interviewed for CS1. 
Narrative analysis of CS2 S1 (16 organizations) reveals seven dominant themes: (1) In the 
Beginning, which explores council rationale for joining the programme; (2) Support, which 
discusses leadership  and engagement; (3) Application, which explores delivery and 
operational efficiency  of the programme; (4) Termination, which presents what interviewees 
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330  Ball et al. (forthcoming) go on to explain that there is a distinct difference between public and private sector organizations, particularly when it comes to 
the responsibilities they have been asked to assume vis-a-vis sustainability (see the NZ Local Government Act 2002, for example). Additionally, it is argued 
that public sector work attracts employees that are more ethically motivated (e.g. Delfgaauw & Dur, 2008; Taylor, 2010), as opposed to the private sector 
where employees typically are driven by economic prosperity (Boyne, 2002). 
believed to be the ultimate cause of programme termination; (5) Outcome, which explores the 
effectiveness of the programme; (6) Final Thoughts, which considers  participants’ overall 
thoughts about the programme; and, (7) Moving Forward, which explores next steps. Table 
5.5 (Chapter 5) serves as a reference, linking the interviewee to the council interviewed for 
CS2 S1.
Narrative analysis of CS2 S2 (7 organizations) reveals six dominant themes: (1) In the 
Beginning, which explores the early stages the programme; (2) Support, which considers 
stakeholder engagement with programme participants; (3) Application, which explores the 
programme’s methodology (4) Outcome, which presents the results of the programme; (5) 
Final Thoughts and Membership Fee, which discusses the programme’s greatest influence on 
councils and councils’ willingness to fund the programme in the absence of the Ministry for 
the Environment’s assistance; and, (6) Moving Forward, which explores councils’ next steps. 
Table 5.6 (Chapter 5) serves as a reference, linking the interviewee to the council interviewed 
for CS2 S2.
And finally, word count analysis of Annual Reports, LTCCPs and Annual Plans for CS2 S2 
organizations demonstrates council use of five key climate change and climate change 
mitigation related words within these strategic reports.
6.1.2.  Chapter Purpose and Outline
The purpose of this chapter is to present the findings resulting from the semi-structured 
interviews for CS1, CS2 S1, and CS2 S2, as well as the findings resulting from word count 
analysis of CS2 S2 council reports. Though this is not strictly  an analytical or interpretive 
chapter (that will  follow in Chapters 7 and 8), the chapter nevertheless attempts to presents 
the findings as a descriptive and coherent narrative.
This chapter is divided into six primary sections, (6.1) Introduction, (6.2) CS1 - Themes, 
(6.3) CS2 S1 - Themes, (6.4) CS2 S2 - Themes, (6.5) CS2 S2 - Word Count Analysis Results, 
and (6.6) Summary and Locating the Research. Section 6.1 begins the chapter with a quick 
account of the dominant themes present within each case study (and within each stage). 
Sections 6.2 through 6.4 discuss the respective case study and stage in greater detail, 
Organizational Involvement in Carbon Mitigation
140
including the presentation of sub-themes. Section 5 discusses the findings resulting from 
word count analysis of CS2 S2 council Annual Reports, LTCCPs and Annual Plans. For 
clarity, sections 6.2 through 6.5 conclude with a brief summary. And, in the final section, 
section 6.6, in addition to providing an aggregated summary of the previous five sections, the 
research findings are located within the thesis.
6.2.  CS1 - THEMES
6.2.1.  Support
Senior Management Leadership
Despite the fact the CNPS programme was championed by the Prime Minister, and expected 
to have strong senior management leadership, the research suggested that the consensus 
among the lead-core agencies is that leadership  was lacking, with only  one of the six agencies 
indicating that leadership did indeed exist (Appendix, Table 6.1). 
While initially the lead-core agencies were excited, given that the mandate was “coming out 
from the Prime Minister as champion” (Table 5.4, Ministry for Economic Development C), 
and despite “chief executives in government departments [being] quite strongly directed to 
take responsibility for this stuff [(climate issues)]” (Table 5.4, Ministry for the Environment 
B), it  became apparent that at a “senior level within organizations there was a lot of lip 
service paid to it” (Table 5.4, Treasury).
Moreover, many managers, given their agency’s core business, failed to embrace the leading 
by doing nature of the programme. This was particularly  the case for the Inland Revenue 
Department: 
This is not core business or seen as core business at Inland Revenue. These 
are the people who do not see this stuff as something important, they do not 
get the understanding that actually means that you guys actually are meant 
to take action yourself to show everybody else that you can do it (Table 5.4, 
Inland Revenue Department).
In hindsight, the lead-core agencies reasoned that CNPS would have been more successful 
had it been a grass-roots initiative, as expressed by  Ministry of Health A (Table 5.4): “I think 
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one of the fundamental flaws in the Carbon Neutral Programme is [that government] started 
it from the wrong direction.  They started it from the top down.”
6.2.2.  Application
Delivery
Consistently across all six lead-core agencies, the interview data indicated that the 
programme was considered to have been poorly  delivered (Appendix, Table 6.2).  There were 
three main reasons for this conclusion: First, according to the Ministry  for the Environment, 
the programme was developed and launched in haste:
I think one of the things that is worth noting is that the Carbon Neutral 
Public Service Programme was set up really, really quickly. And it was an 
idea that was developed over a short period of time at the beginning of 2008 
in time for a Prime Minister’s speech from the throne essentially (Table 5.4, 
Ministry for the Environment B).  
Though the Ministry for the Environment conceded that the expectation was that the 
programme would evolve as the lead-core agencies moved forward with inventory 
development, other agencies characterised the programme in a less kind light, with the 
Treasury (Table 5.4) suggesting that the CNPS programme “was all sort of ‘make it up’ as 
you go along.” 
Intensified by  the quick development and launch, the second rationale for poor programme 
delivery concerned the emphasis on measurements:
The difficult thing about CNPS and one of the challenging things about it is 
that you end up getting into a measurement mindset, which means that you 
forget about what you are doing and you just look at the numbers.  And so 
you forget about the idea of actually  we are trying to do this for the greater 
good of the planet (Table 5.4, Inland Revenue Department).
The third, and perhaps most important rationale related to the Ministry for the Environment’s 
ability to deliver the programme (requested by the Prime Minister’s office):
It was something that the Prime Minister’s office requested from the 
MFE… because the MFE had the expertise – the MFE were the logical 
people (Table 5.4, Ministry for the Environment B).
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Despite their expertise, the Ministry for the Environment indicated that it was difficult to both 
deliver and participate in the programme; Ministry  for the Environment A (Table 5.4), 
confessed that “it actually would have been easier in some ways if we had not been one of the 
six pilot groups.” Ultimately, as Department of Conservation (Table 5.4) explained “CNPS 
should never have been run by MFE, MFE is a policy department.  It should have been run 
by EECA [(Energy Efficiency and Conservation Authority)]. EECA offered to run it.”331 
Given that EECA is the NZ government agency tasked with the promotion of energy 
conservation and improving energy  efficiency within NZ homes and businesses, perhaps this 
assertion is valid.
Operating Budget
Despite programme funding in the order of $10.4 million gross over three years, operating 
costs were pushed onto the lead-core agencies, as indicated by three of the six agencies 
(Appendix, Table 6.2). While “most of [the $10.4 million] got distributed at MFE’s discretion 
towards offsetting the cost  of audits – for initial audits and setups” (Table 5.4, Ministry  of 
Health B), according to Ministry for the Environment B (Table 5.4), “all of the staff resources 
were essentially out of baseline.” This caught the lead-core agencies off guard as they were 
not expecting to absorb programme costs:
Our biggest problem was that the Ministry was not prepared – there was no 
budget at all.  There was absolutely no budget for any of this (Table 5.4, 
Ministry of Health A).
The government imposed this on us with no additional resources… I had 
envisaged that [central government funding] would be spent on… helping 
to do work place travel plans – a whole range of things to actually help  us 
to you know identify cost effective ways of reducing our emissions (Table 
5.4, Department of Conservation).
Methodology (Data Requirements)
Many staff across the lead-core agencies were excited about the programme, but there was 
concern with regard to the onerous nature of validation and auditing requirements. Three of 
the six lead-core agencies suggested that data requirements and scope were inconsistent from 
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331 EECA also encourages the use of renewable energy sources in NZ.  
the onset of the programme (Appendix, Table 6.2), as is evident from Ministry  for Economic 
Development A (Table 5.4):
The Ministry  for the Environment] would change what  we were measuring 
[(i.e. whether flights were considered trans-Tasman, international or 
national)]. Stuff that they  would often think about after we had our 
contracts in place. 
Frustrating the process further, the inconsistencies exacerbated the base task of data 
gathering, particularly for multi-tenanted and non-government owned buildings.  Ministry of 
Health A (Table 5.4) echoed this sentiment and added that maintaining data quality was also a 
challenge given that “lots of data [was] missing; people had not collected stuff properly, lack 
of understanding with people collecting the data.” 
Similarly, the conversion factors provided by the Ministry for the Environment were also 
inconsistent, as explained by Treasury (Table 5.4):
I think that it got to the stage of submitting material and then getting it 
thrown back and saying, “Your conversion factors are all wrong because we 
gave you the wrong conversion factor.  Please redo it again.”
Formal Benchmarking
Across all six lead-core agencies, no formal benchmarking occurred (Appendix, Table 6.2). 
The Ministry for the Environment suggested that no other public sector organization was 
working towards achieving carbon neutrality, so there was no one to benchmark against. In 
the absence of formal benchmarking, four of the lead-core agencies took it upon themselves 
to establish benchmarks, be it from the private sector or, as in the case of the Treasury, 
interdepartmentally within the lead-core agencies. But as Treasury (Table 5.4) pointed out, 
“no international best practice or mark was ever made available to us,” so no international 
benchmark was established. Ultimately, two of the lead-core agencies did not benchmark at 
all.
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6.2.3.  Termination
Rationale
Given the political climate following the Government’s transition from Labour to National, 
the consensus among the lead-core agencies was not that of surprise with regard to the 
termination of the CNPS programme. Five of the six lead-core agencies believed that 
programme termination was politically  motivated (Appendix, Table 6.3); Ministry for the 
Environment B (Table 5.4) explained that the CNPS programme did not resonate as a priority 
for the new National-led Government. Moreover, as Department of Conservation (Table 5.4) 
indicated:
[National] knew that sustainability  had been one of Helen Clarke’s 
showcases and as she said, “Through vindictiveness they have terminated 
it.” So yes, clearly it was I think politically motivated. Clearly  [National] do 
not see climate change as a serious threat.   It is ideology.
In addition to political ideology, an economic imperative for programme termination was 
indicated as well, as suggested by Treasury (Table 5.4): “I am guessing that our gut feel was 
cost, central government did not see the value for the money.” Along this line, Ministry  of 
Health A (Table 5.4) explained that programme termination related to onerous cost associated 
with achieving carbon neutrality: 
The country does not have the money to support offsetting all the public 
sector’s carbon emissions. The big thing I guess going back to carbon 
neutral by 2012, is the fact that to offset it, it was going to cost around 
$300,000 - $400,000 a year. Treasury were very much painting a gloom and 
doom picture around 2012-2015 time economically.
According to the Climate Change Issues and Environment Minister Nick Smith, the 
initiatives involved in the CNPS should occur without requiring a costly programme: 
[The Minister’s] view was that a lot of the initiatives – you know, the good 
cost benefit initiatives that were being undertaken in the Carbon Neutral 
Public Service could easily be undertaken – should be undertaken by 
government departments anyway (Table 5.4, Ministry for the Environment 
B). 
In contrast with the Minister’s belief however, the Ministry  for the Environment were of the 
opinion that without the CNPS programme, these initiatives would not have occurred:
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I think that the key point behind that was that the Minister’s understanding 
that CNPS would happen anyway  because it  is a good idea.  That is not the 
case (Table 5.4, Ministry for the Environment A).
Ultimately, there did exist an underlying dislike of the programme prior to the shift in 
Government:
I think that the Minister [(Smith)] had been explicit in his dislike of the 
programme when he was in opposition and the communication that he did 
not believe that it  was necessary to have this programme… so it was not  a 
complete surprise (Table 5.4, Ministry for the Environment A).
Opposition to Termination
Five of the six lead-core agencies believed that the Ministry  for the Environment, in 
particular, actively opposed the decision to terminate the programme (Appendix, Table 6.3):
[The Ministry for the Environment] put some thoughts together about the 
success of the programme and then tried to get that in front of the Minister. 
My understanding is that it did not  get looked at (Table 5.4, Ministry for 
Economic Development A).
In spite of this belief, however, Ministry  for the Environment  A (Table 5.4) revealed that it is 
not the role of the Ministry for the Environment to oppose Government decisions:
It is not  our job as officials to fight …when there is a new government, they 
quickly move – they change gear to align themselves with the new 
government.  It is their job to support the government. 
Moreover, following the dismantling of the programme, there was a sense of relief among the 
lead-core agencies, particularly with regard to the compliance reporting component of the 
programme (Table 5.4, Treasury).
Interestingly, the data also suggested that the public were not as aware of the programme as 
they  could have been, “[the public] did not know before and they probably do not know 
now” (Table 5.4, Ministry  of Health B), which may have played a role in easing programme 
termination: 
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Well, one of the things that I thought that they did not do very well was to 
sell it.  So I think that there were not a lot of people out in the public who 
actually understood what we were doing. It was very hidden. There 
probably  was not a large public support  base there which is why they 
probably felt comfortable axing it (Table 5.4, Department of Conservation).
Evaluation
The interview data indicated that no formal evaluation of the programmes’ environmental 
and/ or economic effectiveness occurred prior to its termination, as suggested by five of the 
six lead-core agencies (Appendix, Table 6.3). As Department of Conservation (Table 5.4) 
indicated, the decision to terminate was too quick to allow for an adequate evaluation of the 
programme:
No – it was done so fast  - basically MFE had virtually no time.  They were 
given about a month to try to justify  its survival. We showed all the savings, 
which were quite significant for the investment.  Despite all the flaws of the 
programme, it was starting to deliver and I do not think that it would have 
mattered what we put up, a decision had been made.
6.2.4.  Outcome
Awareness
As a result of the CNPS programme, management’s level of awareness with regard to how 
carbon affects the operation of their department increased. This observation is consistent 
across all six lead-core agencies (Appendix, Table 6.4): “Created an awareness – absolutely. 
Awareness at senior level is a huge redefinition of management practices” (Table 5.4, 
Ministry for the Environment A).
In particular, as Inland Revenue Department (Table 5.4) indicated, the CNPS programme 
drove the need for information about business operations, it  fostered a need to better 
understand the relationship between information, efficiency and cost. This notion was 
reiterated by Department of Conservation (Table 5.4):
It is really that thing about that if you do not measure it, you cannot manage 
it. So that is the big change for government departments as previously we 
were not measuring this.  We did not know what it  was costing us and as a 
consequence there was no incentive to really look at it.
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Emissions and Costs
According to four of the six lead-core agencies, the programme was indeed reducing both 
emissions and costs (Appendix, Table 6.4), as acknowledged by  Ministry  of Health A (Table 
5.4): “we reduced our carbon footprint considerably, so it was a pretty  positive story.” And, 
because of the CNPS programme, Government became more proficient at identifying 
savings:
Every  single agency  that was involved in this said “I am really glad I went 
through that process – saved a lot  of money. I am much closer to my 
systems across the agency. I have identified efficiencies” (Table 5.4, 
Ministry for the Environment A).
That said, however, Treasury (Table 5.4) indicated that is was too soon to judge whether 
emission and cost savings did occur: “I think that it was too soon to tell.  And if [the 
programme] had gone for another couple of years, we might have seen something more 
concrete out of it.”
Networking
The research reveals that networking was strong and effective, with all six lead-core agencies 
agreeing about its value to the programme (Appendix, Table 6.4).  As indicated by Ministry 
for Economic Development B (Table 5.4), interdepartmental networking was pushed from the 
beginning. This was echoed by Ministry for the Environment A (Table 5.4):
We had monthly lead six agency catch-up and that  was very much a sharing 
of ideas… sharing of experiences and stuff whether it was negative or not, 
and it quite often was… people were kind of finding things hard. 
While Ministry  for the Environment B (Table 5.4) acknowledged that the programme had a 
rapid learning curve, and notwithstanding the strength and effectiveness of the information 
sharing, the data does show tension towards the Ministry for the Environment, who as 
indicated by Ministry of Health B (Table 5.4), “would basically  in a nice term, dictate what 
we had to do next.” As a result, “the lead-core agencies took it upon [themselves] to create 
meetings without MFE” (Table 5.4, Ministry of Health A).   Ministry of Health B (Table 5.4) 
added that “it is a subject with high passion content as well.  So it was always going to be 
heated.”
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In addition to interdepartmental networking, in an effort to make emissions monitoring more 
efficient and effective, some of the lead-core agencies liaised with their suppliers. And, other 
lead-core agencies liaised with local government, as indicated by Treasury (Table 5.4):
Even outside of that  six, the support that we got from people like 
Wellington Regional Council, some of the local authority people who were 
sort of on the sidelines doing their own thing at the same time - even getting 
some of that information back into the group was quite helpful too.
6.2.5.  Moving Forward
Next Steps
In the absence of a Government mandate, organizational efforts to become carbon neutral 
have ceased.  Five of the six lead-core agencies will continue to manage their carbon, 
however (Appendix, Table 6.5). As Ministry  for the Environment A (Table 5.4) indicated, “it 
is kind of business as usual to be concerned about [emissions]. We will reduce as much as 
possible.” Likewise, Treasury (Table 5.4) suggested that  actions associated with the CNPS 
programme make sound business sense, and as a result, the agency’s “reduction programmes 
are not being discontinued.” With that said however, neither the Ministry  for the Environment 
nor the Treasury  have a specific emissions reduction target; Treasury (Table 5.4) conceded 
that “the Treasury is a bit too focussed on other issues at the moment. So it has not  stopped - 
it is just lower key, I guess.”
Moreover, in spite of management support to achieve the original targets, the Ministry of 
Health, for example, must ensure that their efforts are cost neutral:
We are still striving for the same targets. So it is still full steam ahead as far 
as the Ministry is concerned and that was quite happily agreed on by 
Executive leadership  (Table 5.4, Ministry of Health B). But, now you 
cannot spend a cent  on it, it has got to be cost neutral (Table 5.4, Ministry 
of Health B).
And, the Inland Revenue Department is in full retreat:
So a lot of the stuff around really  embedding all of the reporting, it never 
really happened particularly well. Fully part of the business – it is probably 
not there… we really sort of are pulling back completely. There is no 
organizational impetus (Table 5.4, Inland Revenue Department).
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Further, and perhaps more worryingly, in the wake of the programme’s termination, as 
suggested by Ministry for the Environment A (Table 5.4), private sector interest in carbon 
neutrality collapsed:
Feedback from private sector suggests now that Government is no longer 
involved in CNPS programme, those corporates and businesses that were 
inclined to go down this path are not now doing so because Government is 
not doing it.
6.2.6.  CS1 Summary
Overall, the findings from CS1 suggest that the CNPS programme suffered from a premature 
launch, and was perhaps even delivered by the wrong Ministry.  Yet, in spite of these 
drawbacks, managers in charge of the CNPS programme at the lead-core agencies asserted 
that emissions were decreasing and cost savings were indeed becoming evident.  What’s 
more, the lead-core Ministries increased their network circle and heightened their level of 
awareness with regard to climate and carbon mitigation.  
Because of the lack of contemporary political impetus, however, the goal of carbon neutrality 
has vanished from the lead-core agencies agenda. With that said, five of the six lead-core 
agencies will maintain efforts to manage their carbon, but on average, at a scaled back pace.
As for why the initiative was dismantled, the majority of the lead-core six agencies believed 
that the decision was politically motivated. Moreover, the data suggested that a formal 
evaluation into the effectiveness of the CNPS programme did not occur. And, when asked 
whether programme stakeholders fought to block the CNPS programme’s termination, while 
many of the lead-core agencies believed that the Ministry for the Environment put up a case 
for the initiative’s merit, Ministry for the Environment A (Table5.4) flatly  explained that it is 
not their role to oppose Government decisions.
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6.3.  CS2 S1 - THEMES
6.3.1.  In the Beginning
Rationale for Joining
Of the 16 local government organizations interviewed for the purpose of this research, eight 
indicated the desire to show leadership  as their rationale for joining the CCP-NZ programme 
(Appendix, Table 6.6). Councils demonstrated a variety of reasons for wanting to show 
leadership, including the need to lead the community  by example, as expressed by 
Environment Canterbury Regional Council (Table 5.5):
We should be leading by example, it was just seen as a good thing to do, 
there was a growing awareness of needing to do something.  So I think you 
know if we are leading by example, then that  is something that the public 
will pick up on.
Councils also sought to be a part of a recognised programme, to show their forward thinking 
on climate change, “to be part of that group that is seen as ‘go ahead’ in this area” (Table 5.5, 
Nelson City Council). 
For two councils, the desire to join CCP-NZ was driven by the Mayor, be it  to address 
climate change, “a sincere thing driven by  the Mayor at the time,” as indicated by Kapiti 
Coast District Council (Table 5.5). Or as Hamilton City Council (Table 5.5) suggested, to 
improve the bottom-line: “we had a very active mayor at the time and it was a very topical 
subject, but the focus was always on money, making things cost effective.” 
Two other councils, Kaikoura District Council and Waitakere City  Council, joined the 
programme because the CCP-NZ programme aligned with their strategic direction. And, two 
other councils, Dunedin City  Council and Auckland City Council, joined the programme 
because their council appreciated the need to reduce its carbon footprint. Auckland Regional 
Council, specifically, joined the CCP-NZ programme because the programme facilitated 
political commitment, and offered a consistent  and transparent approach to climate 
mitigation:
The reason why our council did become a member of CCP, it was to get 
clear political commitment and a mandate for officers to actually  drive and 
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get more momentum behind the work – we wanted to work with a national 
consistent framework that was comparable, consistent and transparent 
(Table 5.5, Auckland Regional Council A).
On the other end of the gamut, Greater Wellington Regional Council, for example, joined the 
CCP-NZ programme because council was looking for the low-hanging fruit, easy actions:
[Council was] looking for basically something that wasn’t going to involve 
too much effort, but would allow them to do something real about you 
know a contribution to climate change response (Table 5.5, Greater 
Wellington Regional Council).
Aim (Carbon Neutral, Carbon Management)
In terms of goals, eight of the 16 councils interviewed indicated that they were seeking to 
either manage their carbon footprint or go carbon neutral (Appendix, Table 6.6). Of these 
eight, three councils admitted that carbon neutrality was not a driver for their council, as 
confirmed by Hawkes Bay  Regional Council (Table 5.5): “No real driver at this stage to 
encourage us to promote ourselves as being carbon neutral.” 
As Greater Wellington Regional Council (Table 5.5) acknowledged, carbon neutrality is a 
difficult goal to achieve, but is nonetheless “good to have it as an aspirational goal.” Indeed, 
of the five councils striving to reach carbon neutrality, Auckland Regional Council B (Table 
5.5) emphasised that council’s aim was aspirational, and added that council’s primary goal 
was “carbon reductions and maximising co-benefits.”
Far North District Council (Table 5.5) suggested that their ambition for carbon neutrality was 
a result of the community’s expectation that council should lead in this area:
Our community expect council to be a leader in relation to climate change 
and so carbon neutrality  is something that we should be seeking to pursue 
and to demonstrate to our community, to overall enhance our environmental 
performance.
Leadership to the Community
Leadership presented as a very important component to council participation in the CCP-NZ 
programme. Thirteen of the 16 councils interviewed indicated that they  were seeking to show 
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leadership to the community (Appendix, Table 6.6).332  For two of the thirteen councils 
leadership meant  to resolve in-house (corporate) emissions first, before working with the 
community, as indicated by Auckland Regional Council B (Table 5.5): “It was very  much we 
lead first – put our own house in order before we start  working with the community.” On the 
other end of the spectrum, two other councils indicated flatly that they were not aiming to 
lead: “No, [council] wasn’t aiming to be a leader” (Table 5.5, Dunedin City Council).
Was climate change thinking part of council policy before it joined the CCP-NZ 
programme?
In terms of climate change thinking, 11 of the 16 councils interviewed indicated that climate 
change thinking was part of council policy prior to council joining the CCP-NZ Programme 
(Appendix, Table 6.6). Councils indicated that the CCP-NZ programme dovetailed with 
sustainability efforts, and in the case of Christchurch City Council and Dunedin City Council, 
the programme built on energy related policy  that  was already in place, as explained by 
Christchurch City  Council (Table 5.5): “So Christchurch at the time was embarking on a 
pretty rigorous energy programme (Natural Step Framework). So it was business as usual 
rather than revolutionary change.”
For some councils, climate change mitigation was not necessarily the primary goal of earlier 
policy, instead their policies focused on savings and efficiency, as explained by Environment 
Canterbury Regional Council (Table 5.5): 
I think we don’t really  talk about it directly in terms of carbon, but  certainly 
talk about it in terms of savings – we want to reduce, we want to make our 
fleet as efficient as possible. We want to reduce our electricity usage per 
person per square metre… so it dovetailed quite nicely  I think with joining 
the programme. 
6.3.2.  Support
Senior Management Leadership (within council)
Few councils discussed senior management involvement with the CCP-NZ programme 
(Appendix, Table 6.7); of the 16 councils interviewed, five councils mentioned senior 
management leadership. While four councils indicated that strong leadership  did exist, as 
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332 However, not all councils’ that indicated they wished to show leadership to the community indicated that their rationale for joining the CCP-NZ 
programme was in fact to show leadership.
expressed by Dunedin City Council (Table 5.5) who indicated that “support structures were 
really high inside the council,” one council suggested that senior management leadership was 
in fact lacking: “There was not a lot of support in-house – trying to sell the idea to council 
was not easy” (Environment Canterbury Regional Council, Table 5.5).
Engagement with ICLEI
The majority of councils that discussed programme support  indicated that ICLEI was strong 
when it came to supporting member councils (Appendix, Table 6.7). According to two 
councils, the programme was particularly effective at information sharing and providing 
technical assistance, as confirmed by Rotorua District Council (Table 5.5):
The material was there. If we wanted the assistance, the advice, the 
direction, the facilitation or putting in touch with other people – guidelines; 
all of that was there whenever we wanted it. 
According to two other councils, however, “[ICLEI] didn’t really provide that overall sort of 
guidance and encouragement I don’t think” (Table 5.5, Hawkes Bay Regional Council). And 
as the data suggested, this became increasingly the case towards the end of the programme:
In the end [CCP] wasn’t giving the local government the support and 
information it really needed. There wasn’t a lot of interaction between local 
government and the CCP down in Wellington in the end… It kind of fell by 
the wayside and so the councils were sort of left on their own to carry on 
(Table 5.5, Waitakere City Council).
6.3.3.  Application
Programme Delivery
Of the 16 councils interviewed, only  one council suggested that the programme was well 
delivered, while five councils explicitly advocated that the programme lacked the appropriate 
focus (Appendix, Table 6.8). This was manifested in two key areas: First, as Nelson City 
Council (Table 5.5) indicated, ICLEI encouraged artificially high emission reduction targets, 
which “set [council] up to fail.” 
And, second, as Auckland Regional Council B (Table 5.5) explained, the programme was 
more interested in increasing membership than addressing the appropriateness of the 
programme itself. This was particularly  an issue for regional councils, as expressed by 
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Hawkes Bay Regional Council (Table 5.5), while ICLEI was promoting the value of the 
programme, “I didn’t really find that CCP recognised the role of the regional council.” 
A third, albeit less discussed area concerning programme focus relates to the community 
component of the programme. In this respect, while Dunedin City Council (Table 5.5) 
believed that in fact the programme had a stronger community focus, Hamilton City  Council 
(Table 5.5) suggested otherwise, and noted that the community component of the programme 
was failing, particularly towards the end of the programme: 
Where ICLEI stalled was around the community stuff… if they had more 
engagement either through local authorities or through other mechanisms 
with communities it would be a different story… the community wasn’t 
able to get engaged too well, so the value has always been questioned, 
particularly recently.
Programme Method (was the method robust enough?)
When discussing the methodology ICLEI used for the CCP-NZ programme, the majority  (10 
of 16) of councils indicated that the methodology was inefficient (Appendix, Table 6.8). 
More specifically, Dunedin City Council (Table 5.5) explained that the programme was not 
sufficiently robust for council purposes, that “the actual software and methodology [ICLEI] 
used was quite light... [the programme] wasn’t technically driven, the inventory was a bit 
simplistic.” Wellington City Council (Table 5.5) agreed noting that the functionality of the 
software was inflexible: “you weren’t able to put our own specific circumstances into 
ICLEI’s inventory  tool… it needs to be much more tailored to the council.” Waitakere City 
Council (Table 5.5) reiterated these conclusions, and highlighted that if progress is measured 
by emissions reductions, than “the [methodology] needs to be a bit more rigorous.” 
Councils were also frustrated by the programme’s inability to remain current, particularly 
with regard to global standards, as suggested by Auckland Regional Council B (Table 5.5): “I 
don’t think CCP maintained or kept  up with the maturity that grew within the sector. Some of 
the opportunities around benchmarking were not there.  It’s not ISO compliant.”
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Moreover, in terms of measurability, boundary scope was not well defined: “Goal posts must 
have shifted about three times” (Table 5.5, Greater Wellington Regional Council). For some 
councils this was further exacerbated by limited access to data, as explained by  Dunedin City 
Council (Table 5.5):
Initially the organizational thing is difficult  because all our energy  accounts 
were paper based; stored after three months off site… So there was hardly 
any history available locally.
Ultimately, concern surrounded the data itself. Three of the 16 councils interviewed indicated 
that they questioned the quality and/ or the usefulness of the data.
In spite of these criticisms (and in contradiction to the observations noted above), however, 
two councils did find that the programme had an effective methodology: “CCP could be 
tailor-made to any community” (Table 5.5, Kaikoura District Council B). And for Southland 
District Council (Table 5.5), the strength of the programme was in the framework: “Follow 
these steps and it will guide you through it… it was quite valuable in that way.” 
Benchmarking
Consistently, councils that discussed benchmarking (both domestic and/ or international), 
confessed that it was not a component of their carbon mitigation strategy (Appendix, Table 
6.8). As explained by  Wellington City Council (Table 5.5), “it became clear pretty  quickly 
through the initial analysis of the CCP programme that every  council is different. And so I 
found it quite difficult to benchmark.” In spite of the unique nature and circumstance of each 
council, Auckland Regional Council A (Table 5.5) indicated that their council did in fact 
compare progress to that of other councils.
Barriers to Achieving Next Milestone
The CCP-NZ programme ended prematurely, for some councils’ this was the sole barrier to 
achieving the next milestone (Appendix, Table 6.8). For other councils, progress was 
hindered by resource constraints. For three councils, this was the result of a change in council 
or a shift in strategic priority, as indicated by  Hawkes Bay Regional Council (Table 5.5): “So 
we haven’t put a huge amount of priority  on it.” And for three other councils, echoing an 
earlier observation, access to quality data blocked the next milestone. 
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For Wellington City Council specifically, the barrier to achieving the next milestone was the 
uncertainty surrounding the value the programme offered to council, as expressed by 
Wellington City Council (Table 5.5): 
Well, I guess the barriers were just wondering how much value it was going 
to add to us… following this process is not going to give us that much – it’s 
not actually going to deliver that much more other than a PR exercise.
6.3.4.  Termination
Rationale
Councils indicated three primary rationales for programme termination: political ideology, 
economics or cost, and programmatic ineffectiveness and design (Appendix, Table 6.9). 10 of 
the 16 councils interviewed suggested that political ideology  was the primary cause of 
programme termination. According to Southland District Council (Table 5.5), despite the 
worth of the CCP-NZ programme, the new central government did not support the initiative. 
Nelson City  Council (Table 5.5) concurred, adding that the National government saw CCP-
NZ as a “nice to do’ rather than a need to do;” Kaikoura District Council B (Table 5.5) 
explained that “[National] just didn’t see green programmes as a priority.” This sentiment is 
mirrored by Auckland Regional Council A (Table 5.5):
So [central government] made a pretty clear message really  that they didn’t 
think [climate change] was particularly a priority… they  expected the 
councils to either pick up  the funding or for the programmes to collapse and 
they were fine with that…. I think political.
Far North District Council (Table 5.5) cautioned however, “that it’s not as straight forward or 
black and white as [a shift in government].” Waitakere City Council (Table 5.5) added that 
regardless of the government in power, the expectation was that the CCP-NZ programme 
should run on its own merit, without central government financial support:
I don’t think that  it coincided with the change in government - in fact.  They 
often put funding to start programmes off, but no one expects them to keep 
on funding forever, the programmes should have their own momentum.
Along this line, four of the 16 councils indicated that programme termination was the result 
of the need to cut costs: “It’s probably more about financial savings in my mind… a cost 
saving exercise” (Table 5.5, Wellington City Council); “I mean I think that [central 
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government] felt that there was probably better bang for their bucks elsewhere” (Table 5.5, 
Hawkes Bay Regional Council).
And while Rotorua District Council (Table 5.5) conceded that a political element does exist, 
the CCP-NZ programme was ultimately dismantled for economic reasons: “There’s an 
element of political ideology, some of the elements of the National Government feeling like 
this is not core philosophy, but its more financial.”
Opposition to Termination
Of the five councils that discussed opposition to programme termination, three councils 
indicated that stakeholders were unaware of any organised opposition (Appendix, Table 6.9). 
Had they had an opportunity, Dunedin City Council (Table 5.5) explained that  council would 
have lobbied for the programme:
So there was no opportunity  [for opposition].  There was no awareness on 
our part that the funding was going to be withdrawn or the programme was 
going to fall over.  It was just bang… otherwise we would have – through 
the local government and all the CCP people would have lobbied for it 
(Table 5.5, Dunedin City Council).
In the end, though ICLEI was indeed “lobbying quite hard” (Table 5.5, Wellington City 
Council) and encouraged councils to present  the value of the CCP-NZ programme to 
Government, termination met little resistance.
Evaluation
Nine of the 16 councils interviewed believed that central government did not perform a 
formal review of the CCP-NZ programme’s effectiveness (Appendix, Table 6.9), with three 
councils adding that they were never consulted, as confirmed by Kaikoura District Council B
(Table 5.5): “I don’t think that it was [evaluated], no. No, we certainly weren’t contacted.”
While four of the 16 councils believed that a formal review may have or did occur, three of 
the four councils acknowledged that they were not involved in the review. In a similar vein, 
and equally tentative, Greater Wellington Regional Council (Table 5.5) admitted that council 
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assumed that the Ministry for the Environment had performed an evaluation and determined 
the programme to be ineffective:
Well, I think probably  MFE – they  must have done some analysis and 
decided you know its all very well saying that we’ve got 80 percent of the 
population, but what are they  doing – not enough or they are not getting 
very far?  I suspect that [Government]  just saw it as ineffective really.
6.3.5.  Outcome
Networking/ Collaboration
According to the research, networking and collaboration was consistently ranked by 
participant organizations as a co-benefit of membership in the CCP-NZ programme 
(Appendix, Table 6.10). 10 of the 16 councils interviewed indicated that  they collaborated 
with other programme member councils. As Hamilton City Council (Table 5.5) explained, 
collaboration effectively fostered new learning: 
Pulled people together who are usually individuals working on their own or 
in a very small team… you actually  get to talk and find out  what other 
people are doing and how they’re doing it.
On the other end of the spectrum, four councils indicated that  they did not network or 
collaborate with either ICLEI or the other CCP-NZ programme member councils. For the 
larger councils, it  was thought that domestic collaboration was not appropriate for their 
needs, as explained by Auckland City Council (Table 5.5):
 
The network component was useful yes. But, to be honest, the politicians 
here – being the biggest council you know, I really don’t feel that we’re that 
influenced by the other councils round New Zealand.  Really  where we are 
positioning ourselves against is your Sydney’s, your Brisbane’s, your 
Melbourne’s. So [collaboration] didn’t really seem to grab too much 
traction with our politicians.
Awareness
Seven of the 16 councils interviewed discussed awareness; all seven councils indicated that 
council awareness with regard to climate change and carbon management increased as a 
result of their participation in the CCP-NZ programme (Appendix, Table 6.10). Dunedin City 
Council (Table 5.5) explained that in the absence of the programme, council would not have 
had the same level of understanding: “You would never see it if you weren’t in the 
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programme – you would not have a clue.” Far North District Council (Table 5.5) echoed this 
belief, suggesting that “[CCP-NZ] created knowledge about opportunities that are there. It 
galvanised council’s actions in relation to the mitigation options.”
And importantly, Wellington City  Council (Table 5.5) admitted that the programme, through 
its challenges, demonstrated the critical importance of data quality, and its affect on 
management practices: 
I don’t know that councils generally  are very careful about the rigor in their 
data or how they use it or how it changes management practices and I think 
that the CCP Programme has made people a bit more aware of the 
importance of the rigour of your data and how you use it and I think that 
that message has come through quite a bit really.
And Hawkes Bay  Regional Council (Table 5.5) conceded that the programme only increased 
councils’ climate change and carbon management awareness in a narrow sense, with the 
programme serving as “tool that would assist with awareness rather than a driver of 
awareness.”
Values Embedded
One of the outcomes of the CCP-NZ programme was the embeddedness of the programme’s 
values in participant council policy. Eleven of the 16 councils interviewed agreed that the 
values of the CCP-NZ programme are now embedded in organizational management 
(Appendix, Table 6.10). As indicated by Christchurch City  Council (Table 5.5) for example, 
“when council is developing new projects it takes account of the effects of climate change. It 
has adopted a precautionary approach to future works and planning.”
This approach has been mirrored in energy management practices as well; according to 
Auckland Regional Council A (Table 5.5), the CCP-NZ programme made council energy 
management practices more current: “So I think it’s sort of brought us into the 21st century 
and quite rapidly.” And as suggested by Kapiti Coast District Council (Table 5.5), council is 
now in a position “where it is on the cusp of having energy  management considered a normal 
way of doing business... and that’s quite a step forward” council admits. 
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Wellington City Council (Table 5.5) demonstrated similar enthusiasm, indicating that the 
dismantling of the programme really  did not  impact their council because the programme’s 
values had already gained traction. For some councils, however, as expressed by Hawkes Bay 
Regional Council (Table 5.5), though values are taking root, green thinking could go further 
yet. 
On the other end of the spectrum, for two of the 16 councils interviewed, programme values 
have not become part of council policy. According to Environment Canterbury Regional 
Council (Table 5.5), this is a result  of councils’ lack of commitment with regard to climate 
change in general:
I think because really it comes back to council and their lack of 
commitment or lack of desire to do anything on climate change 
specifically… so that is probably largely why it didn’t gain a lot of traction.
Additionally, in spite of the fact that the CCP-NZ programme participant councils have the 
technical ability  to report carbon emissions, since carbon emissions reporting is not a 
mandated requirement, and given as Auckland City  Council (Table 5.5) indicated, “there is 
not a strong political rule around climate change,” councils have been lax to embed 
programme values into policy. 
Link to other Programmes
In terms of linking the CCP-NZ programme to other internal programmes or activities, 
council response was divided (Appendix, Table 6.10). While seven councils indicated that 
they  did not integrate the CCP-NZ programme with existing programmes, six councils 
suggested that the programme was connected to other programmes. Christchurch City 
Council (Table 5.5) explained that in fact it was other programmes attaching themselves to 
the CCP-NZ programme: “Yeah, it was more the other way round actually.”
6.3.6.  Final Thoughts
Impetus for Action
While discussing the outcome of council participation in the CCP-NZ programme, the overall 
consensus, as evident from 11 of the 16 councils interviewed, is that the programme did serve 
as the impetus for on-going council action on climate change and carbon management 
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(Appendix, Table 6.11). The CCP-NZ programme was the catalyst that  pushed councils to 
better understand their carbon footprint, as explained by Rotorua District Council (Table 5.5):
I think CCP got us focussed to start with and it got us thinking about it; it 
got us measuring data; it got us understanding what we’re doing and where 
the energy is used, where the emissions are and has given us some base 
statistics and some base philosophy. I think that has been helpful to take us 
forward.
For other councils, the programme was a good trigger, but then began to lose value towards 
the end; as Waitakere City Council (Table 5.5) admitted, councils no-longer needed the 
programme. This notion was mirrored by Wellington City Council (Table 5.5), who indicated 
that while the programme “was a very  good start, [it wasn’t] all encompassing enough” for 
council’s needs.
Success
In terms of whether or not the CCP-NZ programme was a success, thirteen of the 16 councils 
interviewed concluded that the programme was a success, while two of the 16 councils 
suggested that it  was a partial success, and one of the 16 councils flat-out said that  the 
programme was not a success (Appendix, Table 6.11). For a variety  of reasons, the majority 
of councils interviewed believed that, despite its problems, the CCP-NZ programme was a 
success.  According to Nelson City  Council (Table 5.5), the programme was the catalyst for 
action. Likewise, as expressed by  Auckland Regional Council B (Table 5.5), the participation 
in the CCP-NZ programme “started council on the journey; it played its part and we’ve 
grown as a result of it.” Kaikoura District Council B (Table 5.5) added that the “[CCP-NZ] 
really raised awareness at the organization level as well as the community level.” 
And importantly, as suggested by  Kapiti Coast District Council (Table 5.5), the programme 
prompted political commitment, putting climate change issues on the agenda (and attached 
critical resources as well). This is also evident in other councils. As indicated by Christchurch 
City  Council (Table 5.5), the programme facilitated a better understanding of climate change 
and carbon management issues in general:
I think it was a success in terms of getting the people to understand the 
basic principles of responding to climate change in mitigation terms 
Organizational Involvement in Carbon Mitigation
162
anyway and equipping them to do so and actually sharing information 
(Table 5.5, Christchurch City Council).
For other councils, however, the programme was not a convincing success, as suggested by 
Environment Canterbury Regional Council (Table 5.5):  “Overall, no, not as successful as it 
could have been.” And, as indicated by Greater Wellington Regional Council (Table 5.5), 
while the corporate component of the CCP-NZ programme was a success, because it failed to 
address the adaptation aspects of council’s responsibility, the community component of the 
programme was not a success. Similarly, Hawkes Bay Regional Council (Table 5.5) 
acknowledged that  benefits stemming from participation in the programme were not huge, 
and thus concluded that the programme unsuccessful.
6.3.7.  Moving Forward
Momentum
Of the 16 councils interviewed, 11 discussed whether or not the momentum generated by 
membership in the CCP-NZ programme had continued after its termination (Appendix, Table 
6.12). According to the data, nine of the 11 councils suggested that indeed the momentum had 
carried forward, as explained by Far North District Council (Table 5.5): “So there is still 
ongoing buy-in to the actions that have been identified through the previous CCP-NZ work, 
so it’s generated some momentum.” Additionally, three of the same nine councils indicated 
they  have actually stepped-up  their activity, increasing the momentum built  by the CCP-NZ 
programme.
Yet two of the 11 councils admitted that since the programme was dismantled, internal 
interest has been low, and as a result momentum has waned. For instance, Hamilton City 
Council (Table 5.5) suggested that while some core councillors are still on side, “they  are in 
the minority… this council is very conscious of what’s going on with central government.”
Next Steps (Carbon Neutral, Carbon Management)
Whether it is developing carbon management plans or implementing energy audits, 15 of the 
16 councils interviewed indicated that they  are moving forward, to some degree, with actions 
begun while participating in the CCP-NZ Programme (Appendix, Table 6.12); 12 of the 15 
councils are seeking to manage their carbon footprint. As a result of their experience with the 
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CCP-NZ Programme, Nelson City  Council has in fact developed their own emissions 
measuring programme (Table 5.5, Nelson City Council). Kaikoura District Council  will 
continue to work through their climate action plan (Kaikoura District Council A, Table 5.5). 
Far North District Council (Table 5.5) indicated that council is in the preliminary stage of 
developing a climate strategy. And, Rotorua District Council (Table 5.5) explained that it  is 
time to shift gear and focus attention on community sustainability.
While Wellington City Council (Table 5.5) revealed that council will in fact continue to work 
towards carbon neutrality, Hamilton City Council (Table 5.5) indicated that because GHG 
emissions are not a mandated measure under the Local Government Act, council has pulled 
back their carbon management efforts completely.
Reduction Target
In terms of goals, 11 of the 16 councils interviewed discussed reduction targets. While eight 
councils indicated that they have reduction targets, three councils suggested that  they do not 
have targets for future reductions (Appendix, Table 6.12).
Of the eight councils with reduction targets, two indicated that they wish to stabilise their 
emissions; Rotorua District Council (Table 5.5) for example explained that council will 
stabilise emissions at 2006 levels by 2010, with the critical goal of understanding their data in 
an effort to generate realistic emission reduction targets in the future. Four councils suggested 
that they will continue to reduce their emissions; Wellington City Council (Table 5.5) 
indicated that their goal is to reduce emissions by 30% by 2020. 
Christchurch City  Council qualified its goal by suggesting that targets are effective for 
driving policy, but tend not to ensure action:
They  are grander. 50 percent by  2050 in terms of reductions.  But in my 
mind I don’t think targets are a very good – it’s aspirational; they set a 
direction which is fine, but they don’t  set actions. Putting in a target makes 
you feel better, but it doesn’t actually do anything (Table 5.5, Christchurch 
City Council).
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Only two of the eight councils with carbon reduction targets remain committed to carbon 
neutrality, as indicated, albeit aspirationally, by Kaikoura District Council A (Table 5.5):
We said that we were going to be zero carbon by 2015. And the realisation 
was that although we may never make zero carbon that it is something that 
we should be striving for.
6.3.8.  CS2 S1 Summary
To summarise CS2 S1, while many councils already had climate policy  in place before 
joining the programme, it was their membership in the CCP-NZ programme that ultimately 
pushed policy into organizational action. Moreover, while councils indicated that  the 
programme suffered from several methodological problems, their participation in the 
programme resulted in improved networking circles and increased awareness with regard to 
climate change and carbon management. And, for a majority of councils, the momentum built 
during the programme’s operation has been maintained following its termination, with many 
councils planning to continue with carbon mitigation to some degree.
According to the majority of councils, the CCP-NZ programme was dismantled for reasons 
of either economic or political ideology. Additionally, the majority  of councils concluded that 
no formal evaluation of the programme’s effectiveness was done before its termination.
6.4.  CS2 S2 - THEMES
6.4.1.  In the Beginning
Initial Contact (Who approached who?)
Of the seven local government organizations interviewed for the purpose of this research, two 
councils indicated that they have lost the corporate memory associated with the early stages 
of the programme and are thus unaware as to which organization made the initial contact 
(Appendix, Table 6.13). And, while one council revealed that it had initially approached 
ICLEI to express its interest  in joining the CCP-NZ programme, three indicated that ICLEI 
had approached their council in the beginning, as indicated by Wellington City Council 
(Table 5.6), for example: “ICLEI definitely was more proactive in coming to councils.” 
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Timing (Rationale for joining when council did)
In terms of timing, climate change was featuring more prominently on the global agenda, and 
therefore councils were becoming keen to act. For two of the seven councils, joining the 
programme was considered the right thing to do (Appendix, Table 6.13), as explained by 
Southland District Council (Table 5.6):
It was just something that  we should be doing and the world was becoming 
more aware about climate change... this kind of stuff made sense in terms of 
protecting the environment and being more efficient - even cost savings.
And for Wellington City  Council, just as they were becoming keen to act on climate change, 
ICLEI was in the process of gathering support and meeting with prospective members:
 So it was an issue that the council was considering and it was kind of timely 
that ICLEI was also going around talking to councils about their 
programme (Table 5.6, Wellington City Council).
In terms of why councils did not join the CCP-NZ programme sooner, while Wellington City 
Council (Table 5.6) offered that  “[climate change] definitely wasn’t a priority  for the council 
until it joined the CCP Programme,” according to Nelson City  Council (Table 5.6), council 
did not join the programme earlier because it was concerned about the hidden costs it would 
incur:
 The reasons for not joining [the programme] earlier were mainly  related to 
concerns of the amount of staff time it would take and some councillors’ 
fears  about you know, you get some support  like the intern, but what 
hidden cost would evolve.
Aim (Carbon management v. Carbon neutral)
In terms of councils’ aim in joining the CCP-NZ programme, five of the seven councils 
indicated that when they  joined the programme they were seeking to manage their carbon 
(Appendix, Table 6.13). At a more root level, two councils indicated that their initial goal was 
an increased understanding of their carbon footprint, as suggested by Dunedin City Council 
(Table 5.6): “I suppose initially we just wanted to know what the picture is.”
In terms of efforts beyond carbon management, though Wellington City Council (Table 5.6)
indicated that council’s aim was to achieve carbon neutrality, this goal came later on. Greater 
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Wellington Regional Council (Table 5.6) on the other hand, explained that council had no 
interest in becoming carbon neutral:
 Carbon neutrality  was going to be a minefield… So it was quite clear to me 
that the more the science of doing inventories evolved, the more the goal 
posts  were going to shift.
Prior Policy (Climate change thinking before joining programme)
While two councils indicated that sustainability  policy did pre-exist council’s membership in 
the programme, four of the seven councils revealed that climate change thinking was not part 
of council policy  before joining the CCP-NZ programme (Appendix, Table 6.13). And for 
Nelson City Council, climate change thinking was only present in so far as it related to 
adaptation, as suggested by  Nelson City Council (Table 5.6): “Yes, in terms of you know how 
high a bridge should be, so that adaptation aspect.”
Buy-in (Within council and management)
In terms of programme buy-in from within council and management, five of the seven 
councils indicated that levels of interest were inconsistent (Appendix, Table 6.13). For three 
councils, political buy-in was weak. According to Wellington City Council (Table 5.6), 
though “there were definitely people who didn’t think climate change was an issue and didn’t 
believe in the science in climate change,” the programme did ultimately gain traction:
 So I mean it definitely wasn’t like, ‘anti the programme’, but there wasn’t 
like an enthusiastic ground swell of positive energy. But I mean there was 
definitely support and that’s why we participated. 
Likewise, for Rotorua District Council, while council did not necessarily buy-into the CCP-
NZ programme, council believed that its membership was the right thing to do: 
 No [buy-in], not at that time… I don’t think there was ever a view at  that 
point anyway to really  take it by  the throat and to you know really  buy into 
it - I think it was just playing with it... I think at the time that this was being 
promoted because of the minimal cost and just being seen to be doing the 
right thing (Table 5.6, Rotorua District Council).
 
In terms of senior management buy-in, three councils indicated that senior management 
interest in the CCP-NZ programme was weak. For Nelson City Council, while political 
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interest was split 50/50, the Chief Executive did not accept carbon management as core 
business:
 Some councillors keen - executive quite wary and some councillors quite 
wary,  so 50/50... Well, actually  our chief executive at the time… his view 
was that [CCP-NZ] wasn’t core council business (Table 5.6, Nelson City 
Council).
In terms of community buy-in, while Greater Wellington Regional Council (Table 5.6)
indicated that support for council acting on climate change was dependent on the individual 
community, Wellington City  Council (Table 5.6) suggested that community interest was quite 
pervasive: “Overwhelming support for acting on climate change.”
6.4.2.  Support
Engagement with ICLEI
While ICLEI support  within Australia was effective, two of the seven councils noted that  the 
ICLEI presence in NZ was not engaged with its council (Appendix, Table 6.14), as indicated 
by the following: 
 Oh, I don’t  think [ICLEI] were engaged at all. Well, to be honest ICLEI was 
a bit of a joke anyway.... and you know the support that they  gave was 
minimum and random and not very professional at times. I mean I think 
ICLEI in Australia was doing a wonderful job, but we really weren’t getting 
any useful information out of ICLEI New Zealand. They were under-
resourced, understaffed and they weren’t  adding a lot of value (Table 5.6, 
Auckland Regional Council).
 
That said, five of the seven councils indicated ICLEI was indeed engaged with their council. 
In the case of Wellington City  Council, however, Wellington City Council (Table 5.6) 
confessed that this may have been the result  of location, given that ICLEI’s office was located 
in Wellington.
But, while engagement did exit, Wellington City Council (Table 5.6) expressed that the 
engagement was not effective due to personality  conflicts. This was reiterated by Greater 
Wellington Regional Council (Table 5.6): “People didn’t find [the contact] easy to work with 
and so they tended to kind of keep her at arms length.”
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Engagement with Partners (The Ministry for the Environment and Local Government 
New Zealand)
In terms of partner engagement, all seven programme member councils indicated that the 
Ministry for the Environment and Local Government New Zealand were not engaged with 
councils (Appendix, Table 6.14):
 No, [the Ministry for the Environment and Local Government New 
Zealand] had no role at all; they were just not involved...Neither of them 
was involved really; I didn’t see them as being active partners (Table 5.6, 
Auckland Regional Council).
Moreover, Dunedin City Council (Table 5.6) added that there was a lack of coordination 
between the programme funder (the Ministry  for the Environment) and the programme 
provider (ICLEI):
 So I don’t think ICLEI got involved with [the Ministry for the 
Environment] to say, “Right, here’s an ICLEI MFE programme,” so they 
didn’t integrate very well like that.
Role of Intern
Only three of the seven councils discussed the role of the intern (Appendix, Table 6.14). 
While Greater Wellington Regional Council (Table 5.6) indicated that  their intern was 
effective, two of the seven councils suggested that their intern lacked the experience 
necessary  to effectively complete their job, as explained by Southland District Council (Table 
5.6): “Probably the intern’s inexperience. That’s why I would have to do a bit as well…I 
would have to go and do a lot of checking.”
According to Nelson City Council (Table 5.6), council attributed the ineffectiveness of their 
intern to the fact that the Ministry for the Environment was covering remuneration: 
 You know how when you get something done for free – if the 
Government’s paying, you’re a bit  less careful about it or even valuing the 
information that you get.
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6.4.3.  Application
Programme Methodology (was the programme robust enough?)
From a methodological perspective (i.e. GHG inventory development), only two of the seven 
councils indicated that the programme’s rigour was sufficient (Appendix, Table 6.15). That 
said, while they  believed that the methodology was sound, Southland District Council (Table 
5.6), for example, conceded that the data quality was poor. 
Four of the seven councils indicated that the programme’s approach lacked rigour.  According 
to Dunedin City Council (Table 5.6), though the programme’s methodology was strong from 
an overall concept perspective, it failed in practice. Likewise, because the inventory software 
did not mesh with council’s utility  management software, the programme was inadequate 
from an application perspective, as expressed Auckland Regional Council (Table 5.6):
 No...it was poor and how they classified things didn’t relate to how it was 
based in the utility  management software and so it  didn’t  mean anything to 
staff  on the ground... it really needed to develop and it didn’t.
In terms of community  data, as indicated by  two councils, the lack of quality and consistent 
data hindered the effectiveness of the community component of the programme as well; for 
Greater Wellington Regional Council (Table 5.6), the community  inventory just wasn’t 
sufficiently rigorous: “we just didn’t think it was robust enough to stand up to the kind of 
scrutiny we thought we might be subjected to.”
Transferability (From CCP-Australia)
Only four of the seven councils discussed transferability. In terms of how well the CCP-NZ 
programme transferred to New Zealand from its parent programme in Australia (CCP), two 
councils indicated that the programme translated well to NZ (Appendix, Table 6.15), with 
Greater Wellington Regional Council (Table 5.6) suggesting that “an inventory’s an 
inventory… Its kind of neutral across borders in a way.” Notwithstanding their belief that the 
programme did transfer well to NZ, the council conceded that the programme lacked an 
adaption component. 
Two councils concluded that in fact the programme did not transfer well to NZ, with 
Auckland Regional Council (Table 5.6) suggesting that the programme did not address the 
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community  side well enough. For Dunedin City Council, because ICLEI did not provide 
adequate resources for the NZ arm of the initiative, the CCP-NZ programme did not translate 
as well as it otherwise could have:
 
 There was a lot more support in some other areas for that programme and 
[Australia] was throwing money at it and that wasn’t going to happen here. 
I think that [CCP (Australia)] probably had more staff over there, more 
support… We had one little group  in Wellington with five people or four 
people that were running this programme in New Zealand (Table 5.6, 
Dunedin City Council).
6.4.4.  Outcome
Costs Benefit Analysis (Benefits outweigh the costs?)
From a cost  versus benefit  perspective, the majority of councils interviewed indicated that the 
programme’s benefits did outweigh the costs (Appendix, Table 6.16), with Auckland 
Regional Council (Table 5.6) calling the benefits “fantastic.” With that said, however, two of 
the six councils that held this belief qualified their response, and added that the costs were not 
actually high, as suggested by the following:
 
 I think they did (benefits outweigh the costs) initially because the costs 
were  pretty small, but the  benefits were that it started to highlight the 
issues inside  the council. So from a value proposition I’d say yes, it was 
good value (Table 5.6, Dunedin City Council).
Ultimately, Southland District Council (Table 5.6) conceded that at this stage it does not 
know whether the benefits outweighed the costs:
 I’m not sure… I’ve never sat down and looked at what we’ve achieved. 
Quite a lot of things have been done on the action plan, so whether that has 
produced savings and offset the costs of my time, I’m not sure.
Emission Reductions (were they experienced?)
While five of the seven councils indicated that they did experience emission reductions as a 
result of participation in the programme (Appendix, Table 6.16), with Auckland Regional 
Council (Table 5.6) explaining that they were meeting and going beyond their reduction 
targets, two councils indicated that it is difficult to know at this stage whether the programme 
did result in the reduction of emissions. And though Southland District Council (Table 5.6)
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indicated that they  did experience a reduction in emissions, they acknowledged that this 
claim has not been measured: “I think there would be. Of course we haven’t measured it.”
6.4.5.  Final Thoughts and Membership Fee
Programme’s Greatest Influence on Council
As for the CCP-NZ programme’s greatest influence on member councils, awareness raising 
was the common response for four of the seven councils (Appendix, Table 6.17), as explained 
by Southland District Council (Table 5.6):
 Raising awareness... Just getting us thinking about it – about reducing our 
emissions and being more energy efficient, that’s probably the greatest 
influence it had – raising the awareness about it all.
Along a similar vein, three of the seven councils indicated that the programme’s greatest 
influence was that it served to catalyse council action on climate mitigation, as expressed by 
the following:
 We probably  wouldn’t have got started as quickly  as we have and have 
progressed as quickly subsequent to being a member.  So I think that  that 
was the primary catalyst for all that we’re doing now around sustainability 
and climate change (Table 5.6, Rotorua District Council).
 Definitely  – yeah, there was nothing in any  council policy or strategy that 
mentioned responding to climate change either through adaptation or 
reducing emissions, so by joining CCP that was our first policy decision on 
responding to climate change... Just giving us a blueprint  to start with 
(Table 5.6, Wellington City Council).
Summing up council’s experience with the programme
Thinking back on their experience with the CCP-NZ programme, four of the seven councils 
indicated that their overall experience with the programme was positive; for Rotorua District 
Council, like others, the programme was the impetus for action on climate change (Appendix, 
Table 6.17):
 Positive… it was the primary  catalyst to doing something positive around 
having sustainability actions and objectives in the organization, so it was 
something that you could hang your hat on… So if we didn’t have that, I 
think we would probably have been a couple of years behind where we are 
now (Table 5.6, Rotorua District Council).
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Nelson City  Council (Table 5.6) concluded that while their overall experience with the 
programme was positive, council believed that the programme had run its course. Southland 
District Council (Table 5.6), on the other hand, while also confirming that their experience 
with the programme was positive, suggested that because of its premature ending, it did not 
have the opportunity to prove itself:
 Summing up - it was a very  good experience... I just think the incoming 
Government had different priorities and so they ultimately  really pulled the 
pin because I think the programme was working well… more and more and 
more people were joining. So it didn’t really get a chance to prove itself.
And while two councils indicated that their overall experience with the programme was 
mixed, with Auckland Regional Council (Table 5.6) explaining that  “it was a victim of its 
own success really, it became unwieldy and slow... it didn’t evolve and they didn’t invest  the 
money  and time into it,” Dunedin City Council (Table 5.6) flatly indicated that their overall 
experience with the programme was disappointing:  “Disappointing… there wasn’t a lot of 
value coming in for the money. I felt like we were just isolated away a little bit from the 
programme itself.” Later, qualifying their conclusion, Dunedin City  Council (Table 5.6) 
acknowledged that the marketing side of the programme was sound, with “[ICLEI] waving 
the flag and getting Government support,” but the implementation component failed to 
deliver: “It just didn’t get the movement inside the organization.” 
Had the Ministry for the Environment not Paid the Initial Membership Fee, Would 
Council have Joined the Programme?
In terms of whether councils would have joined the CCP-NZ programme in the absence of 
initial Ministry for the Environment funding, three of the seven councils indicated that they 
would have joined (Appendix, Table 6.17), with Auckland Regional Council (Table 5.6) 
expressing that “the funding was not an issue. It didn’t really make any difference.”
And though two of the seven councils suggested that they would not have joined the 
programme without the Ministry for the Environment’s funding, Rotorua District  Council 
(Table 5.6) indicated that they do not know whether they  would have joined the CCP-NZ 
programme in the absence of funding, expressing that there likely would not have been 
sufficient support within council:
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 I don’t know… I would say there would be at least some doubt as to 
 whether we would have. I doubt whether there would have been enough 
 support within the organization.
If the Programme had Continued, Would Council have Paid the Membership Fee?
As for whether council would have paid the on-going membership fee following the Ministry 
for the Environment’s egress from the programme, four of the seven councils indicated they 
would not have paid the membership fee (Appendix, Table 6.17). Three of the seven councils, 
on the other hand, indicated that they would have paid the membership fee, as indicated by 
Auckland Regional Council (Table 5.6):
So really my council was willing to support ICLEI and to give the money 
just really because we wanted to keep that data available and keep  that 
website going.
6.4.6.  Moving Forward
Has Council Joined Another Programme?
In terms of whether councils have joined another programme in the absence of the CCP-NZ 
programme, three of the four councils that discussed this matter indicated that they have in 
fact joined another programme (Appendix, Table 6.18).
For Dunedin City  Council, while it indicated that  the new programme it has joined is “much 
more prescriptive than CCP” (Table 5.6, Dunedin City  Council), it acknowledged, however, 
that the programme does not offer the critical networking component present  in the CCP-NZ 
programme.
Four of the seven councils suggested that they  have not joined another programme, with 
Nelson City Council (Table 5.6) noting that cost  was a concern: “No… they’re too 
expensive.”
Carbon Management Linked into Reporting?
In terms of whether carbon management has been linked into council’s existing reporting 
mechanism (i.e. the Annual Report  or the Long-term Community Council Plan), three of the 
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seven councils indicated that at  this stage no link exists (Appendix, Table 6.18), though 
Dunedin City Council (Table 5.6) suggested “that’s coming down the line.” 
And, though Nelson City Council (Table 5.6) indicated that the link does exist, it is informal 
at this stage: “I don’t know how closely aligned it is with financial policy  in a formal sense. 
Its still more of an informal link I think – it’s not a big driver.”
Next Steps (carbon neutral, carbon management)
Five of the seven councils indicated that their next steps will involve either managing or 
reducing their carbon (Appendix, Table 6.18). In terms of carbon neutrality, Greater 
Wellington Regional Council (Table 5.6) expressed definitive opposition: “It is manage or 
reduce. Not going carbon neutral – definitely not.” For Wellington City Council, however, 
though they conceded that they are in no rush, council does have a carbon neutral vision:
 We do have a carbon neutral vision... I mean there’s not any  urgency to 
become carbon neutral because we still need to focus on the reduction side 
of things so much (Table 5.6, Wellington City Council).
And though Rotorua District Council has shifted away from carbon management, council has 
adopted a sustainability policy. Auckland Regional Council’s position is complicated by the 
recent mega city amalgamation, which has left council unaware of their next move with 
regard to climate change and carbon mitigation: “I don’t know what we’re doing at  the 
moment” (Table 5.6, Auckland Regional Council).
Reduction Target
While three of the seven councils indicated that their current target involves emission 
reductions and stabilisation (Appendix, Table 6.18), with Wellington City Council (Table 5.6) 
revealing, for example, that:
 For both corporate and community we are looking to stabilise our emissions 
at 2010 levels. The corporate emission reductions goal [is] to reduce 
emissions by  40 percent by 2020 and for the community 30 percent by 
2020.
Another three councils suggested that they do not have a target at this time; though council 
does not have an emissions reduction target, Rotorua District Council (Table 5.6) indicated 
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that council’s path forward does involve sustainability thinking: “It’s not about meeting a 
particular carbon reduction target, its all about sustainability.” 
6.4.7.  CS2 S2 Summary
In summary of CS2 S2 analysis, in the beginning, ICLEI courted councils to join the 
programme. Given that  climate was starting to feature more prominently  as a council priority, 
councils began to join the programme. According to the majority  of councils, while 
engagement with ICLEI was good, partner (the Ministry  for the Environment and Local 
Government New Zealand) engagement was not. Furthermore, the interns sponsored by the 
Ministry for the Environment to assist  with inventory development were on average 
ineffective in their role.
While the majority of councils were split on whether the programme transferred well from 
the parent programme in Australia, the majority view was that the programme’s approach was 
not sufficiently rigorous enough in the NZ context. That said, councils experienced emission 
reductions and stated that the overall experience was positive. Moving forward, the majority 
of councils will aim to either reduce or stabilise their carbon emissions.
6.5.  CS2 S2 - WORD COUNT RESULTS
6.5.1.  Annual Reports
‘Climate Change’
The number of councils that referred to ‘climate change’ in their Annual Reports increased 
from 28% (2 of 7) of councils in the first year of CCP-NZ programme membership to 86% (6 
of 7) of councils in 2007/ 2008 (Fig. 6.1). This trend however, decreases to 57% (4 of 7) of 
councils in 2008/ 2009. While the trend does increase to 71% (5 of 7) of councils for 2009/ 
2010, given the lack of data for Auckland Regional Council, it  is not possible to judge the 
extent of the increase.
‘Carbon’
The number of councils that referred to ‘carbon’ in their Annual Reports increased from 43% 
(3 of 7) of councils in the first year of programme membership to 57% (4 of 7) of councils in 
2007/ 2008. Though this trend continues to rise in 2008/ 2009, with 86% (6 of 7) of councils 
making reference to ‘carbon,’ only 71% (5 of 7) of councils referred to ‘carbon’ in their 
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Annual Report 2009/ 2010. And again, given the lack of data for Auckland Regional Council, 
it is not possible to judge the extent of the increase. 
In addition, and of important note, not all reference to ‘carbon’ related to climate change or 
climate change mitigation. In year 1 of council membership in the CCP-NZ programme, for 
example, reference to ‘carbon’ related to ‘carbon’ monoxide and activated ‘carbon’ bio 
filter.333 In council Annual Reports for 2007/ 2008, with the exception of one council (Nelson 
City  Council), all reference to ‘carbon’ did relate to climate change or climate change 
mitigation.334  In council Annual Reports for 2008/ 2009, all reference to ‘carbon’ related to 
climate change or climate change mitigation.335  And in council Annual Reports for 2009/ 
2010, while Nelson City Council’s four references to ‘carbon’ are split between activated 
‘carbon’ filter (1x) and carbon emissions (3x), all reference made by  the other councils 
related entirely to climate change or climate change mitigation.336
‘Carbon Management’ and ‘Carbon Neutral’
With the exception of 2007/ 2008, where ‘carbon neutral’ is present in 14% (1 of 7) of 
council Annual Report, the words ‘carbon management’ and ‘carbon neutral’ are not 
mentioned in the Annual Reports of any of the seven councils’ first year of programme 
membership through 2009/ 2010.  Because the data set is incomplete for Annual Report 2009/ 
2010, it is difficult to assess the significance of this trend.
‘Communities for Climate Protection - New Zealand Programme’
The number of councils that referred to ‘Communities for Climate Protection - New Zealand 
programme’ (or ‘CCP-NZ’) in their Annual Report  increased from 28% (2 of 7) of councils in 
the first year of programme membership to 43% (3 of 7) of councils in 2007/ 2008. This 
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333 Annual Report first year of programme membership (‘carbon’): Auckland Regional Council - carbon monoxide; Nelson City Council - activated carbon bio 
filter; Wellington City Council - carbon monoxide (5x).
334  Annual Report 2007/ 2008 (‘carbon’): Auckland Regional Council - CarbonNow, Carbon Future, carbon accounting, carbon responsibility, carbon 
footprint; Wellington RC - carbon footprint; Nelson City Council - activated carbon bio filter; Wellington City Council - carbon emissions, carbon sinks, 
carbon dioxide (4x), carbon neutral (4x), carbon credit.
335  Annual Report 2008/ 2009 (‘carbon’): Auckland Regional Council - CarbonNow, Carbon Future, carbon accounting, carbon responsibility; Wellington 
Regional Council - carbon reduction, carbon forests, carbon footprint; Rotorua District Council - carbon emissions; Southland District Council - carbon 
emissions, carbon credits; Nelson City Council - carbon reduction; Wellington City Council - carbon emissions (3x), carbon credits (7x), carbon absorption 
(2x), carbon neutrality (2x), carbon dioxide.
336 Annual Report 2008/ 2009 (‘carbon’): Rotorua District Council -carbon emissions; Southland District Council - carbon emissions, carbon credit; Dunedin 
City Council - carbon footprint, carbon credit (2x), carbon sequestration (2x); Nelson City Council - carbon filter, carbon emissions (3x); Wellington City 
Council - carbon footprint, carbon economy, carbon absorption, carbon credit (4x), carbon monoxide (2x).
trend however, decreases to zero councils in 2008/ 2009 and 2009/ 2010. Given the lack of 
data for Auckland Regional Council, it is not possible to judge the full extent of the decrease.
Figure 6.1: Presence of word(s) in councils’ Annual Report during the respective 
  first year of programme membership through 2009/ 2010337
6.5.2.  LTCCP 2009 to 2019 and Annual Plan 2010/ 2011
‘Climate Change’
While all seven councils referred to ‘climate change’ in their Long Term Community Council 
Plan 2009 to 2019, only 71% (5 of 7) of councils mentioned ‘climate change’ in their Annual 
Plan 2010/ 2011 (Fig. 6.2).
‘Carbon’
While all seven councils referred to ‘carbon’ in their LTCCP 2009 to 2019, only 57% (4 of 7) 
of councils mentioned ‘carbon’ in their Annual Plan 2010/ 2011. In terms of the LTCCP 2009 
to 2019, while the vast  majority  of references to ‘carbon’ related to climate change or climate 
change mitigation, one council (Nelson City Council) used ‘carbon’ in the context of 
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337 See Appendix, Table 6.19 - Table 6.22, for data sets. CC = ‘climate change’; C = ‘carbon’; CM = ‘carbon management’; CN = ‘carbon neutral’; and, CCP-
NZ = ‘CCP-NZ’ and/ or ‘Communities for Climate Protection - New Zealand programme’. 
‘carbon’ dating.338  Likewise, in terms of the Annual Report 2010/ 2011, not all reference to 
‘carbon’ was directly related to climate change or climate change mitigation, with one council 
(Nelson City Council) using ‘carbon’ in the context of ‘carbon’ monoxide.339
‘Carbon Management’ and ‘Carbon Neutral’
Zero councils made reference to ‘carbon management’ in their LTCCP 2009 to 2019, and 
only 43% (3 of 7) of councils mentioned ‘carbon neutral’ in their LTCCP 2009 to 2019. In 
terms of the Annual Plan 2010/ 2011, neither ‘carbon management’ nor ‘carbon neutral’ was 
mentioned by any council.
‘Communities for Climate Protection - New Zealand Programme’
While 71% (5 of 7) of councils referred to ‘Communities for Climate Protection - New 
Zealand Programme’ (or ‘CCP-NZ’) in their LTCCP 2009 to 2019, zero councils made 
reference to ‘Communities for Climate Protection - New Zealand Programme’ (or ‘CCP-NZ’) 
in their Annual Plan 2010/ 2011.
Figure 6.2: Presence of word(s) in councils’ Long Term Community Council Plan 
  2009 to 2019 and Annual Plan 2010 to 2011340
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338  LTCCP 2009 to 2019 (‘carbon’): Auckland Regional Council - carbon neutral, carbon mitigation, low carbon region, carbon price (2x); Wellington 
Regional Council - carbon footprint (2x), carbon neutral, carbon reduction (4x), carbon dioxide, carbon tax; Rotorua District Council - carbon credits (7x), 
waste carbon (re. energy) (9x), carbon footprint (2x); Southland District Council - carbon dioxide, carbon footprint, carbon credits, carbon emissions (2x), 
carbon price (2x), carbon liability; Dunedin City Council - carbon footprint; Nelson City Council - carbon reduction (3x), carbon credits, carbon dating, 
carbon trading; Wellington City Council - carbon emissions (4x), carbon neutrality (2x), carbon lifestyle, carbon sink, carbon monoxide (3x), carbon credits.
339  Annual Plan 2010/ 2011 (‘carbon’): Wellington RC - carbon footprint, carbon reduction; Southland District Council -  carbon emissions; Dunedin City 
Council - carbon credits; Nelson City Council - carbon monoxide.
340  See Appendix, Table 6.23 and Table 6.24, for data sets. CC = ‘climate change’; C = ‘carbon’; CM = ‘carbon management’; CN = ‘carbon neutral’; and, 
CCP-NZ = ‘CCP-NZ’ and/ or ‘Communities for Climate Protection - New Zealand programme’.
6.5.3.  CS2 S2 Word Count Results Summary
In terms of CS2 S2 word count analysis, the presence of key climate change and climate 
change mitigation words varied across and between the different strategic reports. For 
example, ‘climate change’ appeared in 28% to 86% of the seven councils’ Annual Reports 
between councils’ first  year of programme membership and 2009/ 2010. And though ‘climate 
change’ was mentioned in all seven council LTCCPs, ‘climate change’ was only referenced in 
71% of council Annual Plans 2010/ 2011.
As for ‘carbon,’ it  appeared in 43% to 86% of the seven councils’ Annual Reports between 
councils’ first year of programme membership  and 2009/ 2010. And again, while ‘carbon’ 
was mentioned in all seven council LTCCPs, ‘carbon’ was only referenced in 57% of council 
Annual Plans 2010/ 2011. In addition, with respect to ‘carbon,’ while the majority  of 
instances did indeed relate to climate change or climate mitigation, a number of references 
did not. For instance, ‘carbon’ was also mentioned in the context of geologic dating and 
filtration (activated carbon). Interestingly, ‘carbon management’ was not mentioned in the 
Annual Reports, LTCCPs or Annual Plans of any of the seven councils.  ‘Carbon neutral’ 
appeared in zero to 14% of the seven councils’ Annual Reports between councils’ first year of 
programme membership and 2009/ 2010. And while ‘carbon neutral’ was mentioned in 43% 
of the seven councils’ LTCCPs, ‘carbon neutral’ was not referred to in any of the councils’ 
Annual Plans 2010/ 2011.
Similarly, ‘Communities for Climate Protection - New Zealand Programme’ (or ‘CCP-NZ’) 
appeared in zero to 28% of the seven councils’ Annual Reports between councils’ first year of 
programme membership  and 2009/ 2010. And while ‘Communities for Climate Protection - 
New Zealand programme’ (or ‘CCP-NZ’) was mentioned in 71% of the seven councils’ 
LTCCPs, ‘Communities for Climate Protection - New Zealand programme’ (or ‘CCP-NZ’) 
was not mentioned  in any of the councils’ Annual Plans 2010/ 2011.341
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341 Given that the purpose of the LTCCP is to document council’s vision for the next 10 years, it is a good barometer of local government’s commitment to 
climate change and climate change mitigation. Further research into the remaining 27 CCP-NZ member councils LTCCPs would therefore be instrumental 
in sharping the precision of this analysis. CCP-NZ (2009), for example, indicates that by 2009 20 of the 34 (59%) participant councils specifically mentioned 
CCP-NZ, up from eight councils (47%) in the 2006 to 2016 LTCCPs when only 17 councils were participating in the programme. This represents a 12% 
increase in reference to the CCP-NZ programme.
6.6.  SUMMARY AND LOCATING THE RESEARCH
6.6.1.  Summary of Chapter 6
Overall, the findings from both case studies suggest that in spite of drawbacks,  senior 
managers in charge of the respective programme, consistently asserted that emissions were 
decreasing and cost savings were indeed becoming evident. What’s more, the organizations 
increased their network circle and heightened their level of awareness with regard to climate 
and carbon mitigation.  
With that said, however, while five of the six lead-core agencies involved in the CNPS 
programme will maintain efforts to manage their carbon, as a result of the lack of political 
motivation, the goal of carbon neutrality has vanished. Likewise, the majority of CCP-NZ 
programme member councils will aim to either reduce or stabilise, to varying degrees, their 
carbon emissions.
As for why the initiatives were dismantled, the majority of organizations in CS1 and CS2 
believed that their respective programme was terminated for reasons of political ideology. 
Additionally, the consensus among the organizations was that no formal evaluation of the 
CNPS or the CCP-NZ programmes’ effectiveness was done prior termination.
In terms of CS2 S2 word count analysis, the presence of key climate change and climate 
change mitigation words varied across and between the different strategic reports. 
Interestingly, ‘carbon management’ was not mentioned in the Annual Reports, LTCCPs or 
Annual Plans of any  of the seven councils. And while ‘Communities for Climate Protection - 
New Zealand programme’ (or ‘CCP-NZ’) was mentioned in 71% of the seven councils’ 
LTCCPs 2009 to 2019, reference to the initiative appeared in only zero to 28% of the seven 
councils’ Annual Reports between councils’ first year of programme membership and 2009/ 
2010, and was not mentioned  in any of the councils’ Annual Plans 2010/ 2011.
6.6.2.  Locating the Research
There is a paucity  of academic work exploring how public sector organizations determine 
strategies to manage their carbon and achieve carbon neutrality. Review of themes emerging 
from case study transcripts provides insight into the functional effectiveness of the CNPS and 
the CCP-NZ programmes, two key initiatives designed to help NZ public sector organizations 
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mitigate their carbon footprint. In line with the objectives of this research, analysis of themes 
sheds light on Government’s rationale for the termination of these two efforts, and public 
sector organizational resolve for carbon management and neutrality in the absence of 
Government leadership and support.  
This will be explored further in the two chapters that follow: In Chapter 7, were deLeon’s 
model of programme termination is applied to the data in order to determine whether the 
dismantling of the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programmes aligns with economics, programmatic 
inefficiency, or political ideology. Then, in Chapter 8, were the research findings are further 
analysed in order to better understand Government’s new direction on climate change and 
carbon management.
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CHAPTER 7 - FINDINGS II: APPLICATION OF THEORY  
7.1.  INTRODUCTION
7.1.1.  Introduction to Chapter 7
As discussed in Chapter 4, the role of the theoretical framework is to provide a conceptual 
view of how relationships among several factors are important to the objectives of the 
research (Radhakrishma et al. 2007). In this chapter, data resulting from the semi-structured 
interviews with the senior managers from NZ ministries and local government councils is 
interpreted through deLeon’s model of programme termination in order to determine whether 
the dismantling of the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programmes aligns with economics, 
programmatic inefficiency, and/ or political ideology.
This chapter focuses on the themes relevant to deLeon’s (1982a) rationales for programme 
termination, namely  those that concern programme delivery, application and termination.342  It 
is important to note that while the previous chapter was organised by case study, here, in 
order to assess the appropriateness deLeon’s model, results from CS1, CS2 S1 and CS2 S2 
are aggregated together.
7.1.2.  Chapter Purpose and Outline
The aim of this chapter is two-fold: First, to interpret the findings resulting from the semi-
structured interviews from CS1, CS2 S1, and CS2 S2 (see Chapter 6) through the study’s 
theoretical lens, deLeon’s Termination Theory; and second, to determine whether the 
dismantling of the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programmes aligns with deLeon’s (1982a) 
rationales for programme termination. 
This chapter is divided into three primary sections, (7.1) Introduction, (7.2) Rationales for 
Programme Termination; and, (7.3) Summary and Locating the Research. Section 7.1 begins 
with a quick introduction to the chapter, including a description of the chapter’s purpose. 
Section 7.2 discusses the research findings in the context of deLeon’s (1982a) Termination 
Theory. And, in the final section, in addition to providing a brief summary of the chapter, 
section 7.3 locates the chapter within the thesis.
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342  Chapter 8 will discuss all the findings resulting from the research: including the themes from CS1, CS2 S1 and CS2 S2, data resulting from the semi-
structured interviews with the programme architects; CS2 S2 Word Count Results; and, other sources that have provided insight into this research, i.e. 
department/ council websites and media releases. 
7.2.  RATIONALES FOR PROGRAMME TERMINATION
7.2.1.  Economics
DeLeon’s first  rationale for programme termination concerns financial constraints or 
budgetary cutbacks. As noted in Chapter 4, economics is quickly referred to as the stimulus 
for public sector programme termination (i.e. Levine, 1982; Behn, 1980; Graddy & Ye, 
2008). This trend is exacerbated during times of economic pressure, with austerity measures, 
at the very least,  justifying programme retrenchment (i.e. Ignatius & Ibrahim, 1982; Adams 
et al., 2007). However, results from CS1 indicated that only 17% (1 of 6) of the organizations 
interviewed believed that the CNPS programme was terminated for economic reasons (Fig.
7.1).343  Results from CS2 S1, while slightly higher, likewise remain relatively low with 25% 
(4 of 16) of the organizations believing that the CCP-NZ programme was terminated for 
purely economic reasons.344
Figure 7.1:  Rationales for programme termination345
In terms of the CNPS programme, according to Treasury  (Table 5.4), “central government did 
not see the value for the money.” And as Ministry  of Health B (Table 5.4) explained, “the big 
thing I guess going back to carbon neutral by 2012, is the fact that to offset it, it  was going to 
cost around $300,000 - $400,000 a year.”
Wellington City  Council (Table 5.5) presented a similar argument for the termination of the 
CCP-NZ programme,  indicating that “it’s probably more about financial savings… a cost 
saving exercise.” And Hawkes Bay Regional Council (Table 5.5) added that “[central 
government] felt  that there was probably better bang for their bucks elsewhere.” More to the 
17%
67%17%
CS1
6%
63%
6%
25%
CS2 S1 Economic
Programmatic Inefficiency      
Political
Economic/ Political
Organizational Involvement in Carbon Mitigation
184
343 17% (1 of 6) of CS1 organizations believed that the programme was terminated for both economic and political reasons.
344 6% (1 of 16) of CS2 S1 organizations believed that the programme was terminated for both economic and political reasons.
345 See Appendix, Table 6.3 and Table 6.9, for data sets.
point, according to Waitakere City  Council (Table 5.5), the expectation was that once the 
programme gained momentum, councils’ would absorb programme costs themselves. 
Conversely, ministry’s were not expecting to absorb costs associated with the CNPS 
programme. As Ministry of Health A (Table 5.4) explained, “our biggest problem was that the 
Ministry was not prepared – there was no budget at all.” The programme had a start-up cost 
of $10.4 million gross over three years, which according to Ministry  of Health B (Table 5.4) 
“[was] distributed at MFE’s discretion towards offsetting the cost of audits – for initial audits 
and setups.” As for efforts moving forward, including emission reduction plans, “all of the 
staff resources were essentially out of baseline” (Table 5.4, Ministry for the Environment B).
As for councils’ willingness to pay  programme membership fees in the absence of 
Government funding, while 43% (3 of 7) of CS2 S2 council’s indicated that they  would have 
paid the membership  fee had the CCP-NZ programme continued, a majority of 57% (4 of 7) 
indicated that they would not have paid the membership fee (Fig. 7.2): “So no, they  wouldn’t 
have – no.   I think if they had seen better value for the money [council] certainly  would 
have” (Table 5.6, Greater Wellington Regional Council).
Figure 7.2:  CS2 S2 council willingness to pay  membership fee in absence of 
  Government funding  and assertion that benefits outweighed the 
  costs346
Interestingly, however, while deLeon (1982a) cautions that it  is difficult to assess the benefits 
versus the costs of public sector programmes, 86% (6 of 7) CS2 S2 councils indicated that the 
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346 See Appendix, Table 6.16 and Table 6.17, for data sets.
benefits associated with membership in the CCP-NZ programme did indeed outweigh the 
costs.347  Yet this finding may not be a surprise given that as Greater Wellington Regional 
Council (Table 5.6) confessed, “Oh yeah, because the costs were not high.”
Notwithstanding that some organizations’ believed that programme termination was purely  an 
economic decision, their views remain the minority. If as described by  Kirkpatrick et al. 
(1999), a programme is created during times of economic surplus, it should not  be a surprise 
that the same programme, if shown to be an economic liability, is scaled-back or terminated 
during times of economic difficulty. After all, as Adam et al. (2007) indicate, the greater the 
pressure for austerity  measures, the greater the role that economics will play in programme 
termination.
However, given that the primary cost associated with the CNPS programme was expended up 
front, and that operating costs were shunted onto the organizations themselves, it is not likely 
that the programme was terminated solely for economic reasons, despite the economic 
downturn. Similarly, as the data have demonstrated, ongoing costs for the CCP-NZ 
programme membership  were not high. And, while in the minority, some organizations 
indicated that they  would have paid the programme membership themselves, thus alleviating 
Government of the expense.
Exploring the extent to which terminations occurring during President’s Reagan’s tenure were 
influenced by economic rationalisation, deLeon (1982a) finds that economics was rarely 
responsible for programme termination. Likewise, in the case of the CNPS and the CCP-NZ 
programmes, while economics may have influenced programme termination, given the 
evidence from the data (and therefore as judged by those implementing the respective 
programme), economics (deLeon’s first rationale) was not likely the cause for programme 
termination.
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347 1 of the 7 CS2 S2 councils confessed that it was too soon to know whether to benefits did outweigh the costs.
7.2.2.  Programmatic Inefficiencies 
DeLeon’s second rationale for programme termination relates to programmatic inefficiencies. 
As highlighted in Chapter 4, a department or agency’s inability to deliver on objectives in an 
efficient and effective manner may result in programme termination (deLeon, 1982a).
Evidence from the data suggested that both the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programmes suffered 
from serious inefficiencies. With regard to the CS1 lead-core agencies (CNPS programme), 
given the programme’s prominence with the Prime Minister, early traction was anticipated. 
Ultimately, however, despite senior level lip service: “I guess at a senior level with inside the 
organizations there was a bit of lip  service paid to it – well, a lot of lip  service paid to 
it” (Table 5.4, Treasury),“strong collaborative leadership seemed to be fairly  lacking” (Table 
5.4, Ministry  of Health B); 67% (4 of 6) of ministries indicated that senior management 
leadership was  not strong (Fig. 7.3). As the Inland Revenue Department (Table 5.4) 
explained, for example, many within the ministry simply did not see climate mitigation as 
core business.
Figure 7.3:  Senior management leadership  within the programmes and CS2 S2 
  stakeholder engagement348
The experience within the CS2 S1 councils (CCP-NZ programme), on the other hand, was 
the polar opposite.  While not all CS2 S1 councils interviewed discussed senior management 
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348  See Appendix, Table 6.1, Table 6.7 and Table 6.14, for data sets. *These organizations did not discuss senior management leadership or stakeholder 
engagement.
leadership, of the five  (5 of 16) that did,  only  one  council identified that senior management 
leadership was lacking. Interestingly, however, 100% (7 of 7) of CS2 S2 councils revealed 
that neither the Ministry for the Environment nor Local Government New Zealand (key 
programme partners, as discussed in Chapter 3) were engaged with the programme.
With the above in mind, it is not surprising then, to find that 100% (6 of 6) of CS1 
organizations indicated that the CNPS programme was not efficient in its delivery (Fig. 7.4). 
Though the Ministry  for the Environment (Table 5.4) offered a quick launch as the reason for 
poor delivery: “We had to go out with whatever we had,” Treasury (Table 5.4) conceded that 
“it  was all sort of ‘make it  up’ as you go along.” Moreover, as Department of Conservation 
(Table 5.4) indicated, “CNPS should never have been run by  MFE.” For their part, the 
Ministry for the Environment did acknowledge that it  was difficult to both lead and be a part 
of the lead-core group at the same time. While programme delivery was not discussed by all 
CS2 S1 councils, of the 8 councils that did discuss delivery, 7 councils indicated that the 
CCP-NZ programme was not efficiently delivered. Greater Wellington Regional Council 
(Table 5.4) explained that the programme’s inefficiency was  the result  of “a combination of 
the CCP strategy for New Zealand was not the right strategy and the central government 
hobbling them from the beginning.”
Figure 7.4:  Efficiency of programme delivery and methodology349
As for the CNPS programme’s methodology, of the 3 department’s that discussed the 
programme’s effectiveness, 3 indicated that the methodology  was not efficient or effective. In 
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349 See Appendix, Table 6.2 and Table 6.8, for data sets. *These organizations did not discuss the effectiveness of programme delivery or methodology.
terms of the CS2 S1, of the 13 councils that discussed effectiveness, 10 indicated that the 
programme’s methodology  was not efficient or effective.350  Specifically, as Dunedin City 
Council (Table 5.5) noted, “so it wasn’t technically driven… I think that the inventory was a 
bit simplistic.”351  What’s more, while Kaikoura District Council B (Table 5.5) believed that 
the programme’s strength was in its ability to be “tailor-made to any  community,” Wellington 
City  Council (Table 5.5) argued that the “[the inventory  tool] wasn’t  very flexible.” And, 
according to Waitakere City  Council (Table 5.5), the programme failed to remain current:“I 
don’t think CCP maintained or kept up with the maturity that grew within the sector.”
The research also demonstrated that programme data requirements were a challenge for both 
CS1 and CS2 organizations: CS1 organizations indicated that their efforts to create a sound 
emissions inventory were frustrated by  changing scope and inconsistent data requirements, 
while some CS2  S1 organizations indicated that they had difficulty gaining access to the 
necessary  data: “One of the tricky parts was going back to a certain pre-determined date 
because we signed on in 2004, but I think the baseline was supposed to be – was it 
200[1]” (Table 5.5, Christchurch City Council). Additionally, as indicated by  Auckland City 
Council (Table 5.5), “data quality was definitely an issue.”
Interestingly, although not definitive, two of the four councils that discussed whether the 
CCP-NZ programme transferred well from the parent  programme (CCP) in Australia 
indicated that the programme did not effectively transfer from Australia. While Auckland 
Regional Council (Table 5.6) cited the CCP-NZ programme’s lack of a community focus as 
the reason why it did not effectively transfer to NZ, Dunedin District Council (Table 5.6) 
suggested that the programme simply wasn’t as well supported or financed in NZ: 
“[Australia] was throwing money at it and that wasn’t going to happen here.”
Another attribute that made both programmes inefficient was the lack of formal 
benchmarking in their carbon mitigation strategy. In the case of CS1, 100% (6 of 6) of the 
lead-core agencies identified that they did not include a formal benchmark in their 
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350  For councils that were visited in both stages of CS2, the results are consistent, i.e. in CS2 S1 and S2, Auckland Regional Council, Greater Wellington 
Regional Council, Dunedin City Council and Wellington City Council all indicated that the programme’s methodology was NOT effective; and, in both stages 
Southland District Council indicated that the method was sound (Appendix, Table 6. 8, Table 6.15).
351 With with respect to programme effectiveness, Dunedin City Council (Table 5.6), in CS2 S2, reiterates this point: “No… Probably from an overall concept 
point of view, but not from an implementation or a reporting point of view.”
management plan (Fig. 7.5). According to Ministry for the Environment B (Table 5.4), 
because no other public sector organization was working towards achieving carbon neutrality, 
there was no one to benchmark against. While only seven of the 16 councils interviewed as 
part of CS2 S1 discussed formal benchmarking, six of those seven (38% of the total) 
indicated that they did not include a formal benchmark in their emission reduction plan. For 
Wellington City  Council (Table 5.5), they  offered that  because “every  council is different… 
[they] found it quite difficult to benchmark.”352 
Figure 7.5:  Occurrence of formal benchmarking353
Despite a plethora of inefficiencies, the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programme members 
identified considerable benefits. Chiefly  among the benefits was a reduction in GHG 
emissions, with 67% (4 of 6) of CS1 organizations and 71% (5 of 7) of CS2 S2 organizations 
indicating that they did experience emissions reductions: “Yeah, it was huge - it was hugely 
successful.  I mean we were having targets of 20 percent and we were you know meeting 
those targets” (Table 5.6, Auckland Regional Council) (Fig. 7.6). Cautiously, one of the six 
CS1 organizations conceded that “it was too soon to tell.  And if it had gone for another 
couple of years, we might have seen something more concrete out of it” (Table 5.4, 
Treasury). Likewise for two of the seven CS2 S2 councils, as suggested by  Wellington City 
Council (Table 5.6): “At this stage it’s too early to tell if CCP had any [emission reductions].”
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352 As noted in Chapter 6, some of the lead-core agencies did benchmark against each other lead-core agencies, but not in a formal fashion (Department of 
Conservation, Table 5.4.
353 See Appendix, Table 6.2 and Table 6.8, for data sets. *These organizations did not discuss formal benchmarking.
Figure 7.6:  Occurrence of emission reductions354
Apart from emissions reductions, the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programme member 
organizations both indicated that because of their participation in the respective programme, 
they  experienced improved inter-departmental networking and raised awareness with regard 
to climate change and carbon mitigation.  As for networking, 100% (6 of 6) of CS1 
organizations identified that collaboration was effective, and as suggested by Ministry for 
Economic Development B (Table 5.4) “[collaboration] was driven right form the start” (Fig. 
7.7). In terms of CS2 S1 organizations, 10 of 16 organizations indicated that the networking 
component of the programme was effective, as explained by Hamilton City Council (Table 
5.5): “It pulled people together… you actually get to talk and find out  what other people are 
doing and how they’re doing it.”355  
Figure 7.7:  Occurrence of networking and awareness-raising356
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354 See Appendix, Table 6.4 and Table 6.16, for data sets. *These organizations did not discuss whether emission reductions occurred.
355 With that said, however, domestic collaboration was not a priority for the bigger councils, who as indicated by Christchurch City Council (Table 5.5) were 
“learning more from overseas than from within New Zealand.”
356 See Appendix, Table 6.4 and Table 6.10, for data sets. *These organizations did not discuss networking or awareness.
Similarly, awareness-raising was consistently identified by organizations as being an effective 
component of the respective programmes. As with Networking, 100% (6 of 6) of CS1 
organizations identified that the CNPS programme effectively increased management’s 
awareness with regard to how carbon affects the operation of their department: “It is really 
that thing about that if you do not measure it, you cannot manage it” (Table 5.4, Department 
of Conservation). While only 44% (7 of 16) of CS2 S1 councils discussed the programme’s 
effectiveness with regard to awareness raising, all seven councils consistently  identified it as 
a co-benefit to participation in the programme, with Far North District Council (Table 5.5) 
explaining that “[CCP-NZ] created knowledge about opportunities that are there… it 
galvanised council’s actions in relation to the mitigation options.”
Ultimately, regardless of the programme’s inefficiencies, of the 11 CS2 S2 councils that 
discussed whether participation in the CCP-NZ programme was their council’s impetus for 
action on climate mitigation, all indicated that in fact it  was, with for example, Rotorua 
District Council (Table 5.5) explaining that “[the programme] has been helpful to take us 
forward,” and Hawkes Bay Regional Council (Table 5.5) suggesting that “[CCP-NZ] has 
been a driver… and a way of progressing our assessment of our own carbon or emission 
footprint” (Fig. 7.8). 
Figure 7.8:  CS2 S1 council determination of whether the CCP-NZ programme was 
  council’s impetus for action on climate change; whether the 
  programme’s  values have become embedded; and, whether the 
  programme was a success?357
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357  See Appendix, Table 6.10 and Table 6.11, for data sets. *These organizations did not discuss whether the programme was their council’s impetus for 
action on carbon management, nor whether the programme’s values have become embedded within the organization.
And to the programme’s credit, as indicated by at least 63% of CS2 S1 councils, the values of 
the CCP-NZ programme have become embedded in organizational management: “[CCP-NZ] 
made the way that we manage our energy in this organization more efficient” (Table 5.5, 
Auckland Regional Council A). Moreover, the programmes’s values, as described by Kapiti 
Coast District Council (Table 5.5), are becoming business as usual: “we’re sort  of on the cusp 
of having energy  management considered a normal way of doing business here and that’s 
quite a step forward.” 
In the end, 81% (13 of 16) of councils interviewed for CS2 S1 concluded that the CCP-NZ 
programme was a success.358  As Kapiti Coast District Council (Table 5.5) indicated, this was 
particularly the case: “In terms of getting climate change issues on the agenda of councils it 
was excellent.” As Christchurch City Council (Table 5.5) added “[the programme] was a 
success in terms of getting the people to understand the basic principles of responding to 
climate change in mitigation terms.” And, as Wellington City Council (Table 5.5) conceded, 
“I think without it, we would have struggled to put a lot more resources into developing 
something and probably not as good as what they were able to provide us.”
As the literature suggests, government programmes are at risk of termination if it is shown 
that the desired objectives can be achieved via a more efficient and effective approach (e.g. 
Enthoven & Smith, 1971). And, as deLeon (1982a) explains, in some instances Federal 
programmes are dismantled with the belief that state or local government can deliver the 
programme more efficiently. In the case of the CNPS programme, the new National-led 
Government believed that the initiatives involved in the programme should occur without 
requiring a Government-funded programme. Despite Government’s belief, however, as 
identified by  Ministry  for the Environment A (Table 5.4), these initiatives would not have 
occurred: “I think that the key  point behind that  was that the Minister’s understanding that 
[good cost-benefit initiatives associated with] CNPS would happen anyway because it’s a 
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358 While not the same theme, when CS2 S1 ‘Success’ is compared to CS2 S2 ‘Summing up Council’s Experience with the Programme,’ the data becomes 
inconsistent. In CS2 S1 Auckland Regional Council, Rotorua District Council, Southland District Council, Dunedin City Council, Nelson City Council and 
Wellington City Council all indicated that the CCP-NZ programme was, YES, a success, and Greater Wellington Regional Council indicated, YES/NO. In 
‘Summing up Council’s Experience with the Programme’, and in line with CS2 S1, SC2 S2 data indicated that Rotorua District Council, Southland District 
Council, Nelson City Council and Wellington City Council all believed that council’s overall experience with the programme was POSITIVE, and Greater 
Wellington Regional Council believed that it was MIXED. Inconsistent with CS2 S1, in CS2 S2, Auckland Regional Council indicated that their experience 
with the programme was MIXED and Dunedin City Council indicated that it was DISAPPOINTING.
good idea.  That is not  the case.” In fact, now that the programme has been dismantled, 100% 
of CS1 organizations have abandoned the objective of becoming carbon neutral.359
As Botterill (2005) highlights, the lack of efficient and effective support networks can lead to 
programme termination. This aligns with the data, which show that despite a strong inter-
organizational network circle, the CNPS programme suffered from a lack of senior 
management leadership, and the CCP-NZ programme lacked engagement with programmes’ 
partners (the Ministry for the Environment and Local Government New Zealand).
Because programmes are the operational manifestation of policies, they  tend to attract 
attention more easily (Sato, 2002), and thus if found to be lacking in efficiency or 
effectiveness are at greater risk of termination. As the data demonstrated, both the CNPS and 
the CCP-NZ programmes suffered from serious inefficiencies. Despite the assertion of 
emission reductions and the realisation of significant co-benefits, the inefficiencies associated 
with the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programmes suggest that programme termination does align 
with deLeon’s second rationale for programme termination (programmatic inefficiencies). 
For CS2 S1, this conclusion is supported by Greater Wellington Regional Council (Table 
5.5), indicating that “I suspect  that [Government]  just saw [the programme] as ineffective 
really.”
7.2.3.  Political Ideology
DeLeon’s third rationale for programme termination concerns political ideology. As 
highlighted in Chapter 4, for reasons of political expediency, programmes that do not 
resonate ideologically with the party  in power, are terminated (e.g. Adam et al., 2007; Lewis, 
2002; Kirkpatrick et al., 1999). 
Given the political shift from a Labour to a National government immediately prior to the 
termination of the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programmes,360  it is not surprising that the 
majority  of organizations interviewed believed that political ideology was a motivating factor 
for the termination of their respective programmes; 67% (4 of 6) of CS1 organizations and 
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359  While five of the six ministries are going to continue to manage their carbon, the Inland Revenue Department is in full retreat: “we really sort of are 
pulling back completely… There is no organizational impetus” (Table 5.4, Inland Revenue Department).
360 The ideological differences between these two parties and the significance of the shift are explored further in Chapter 8.
63% (10 of 16) of CS2 S1 organizations believed that ideology was the reason for 
programme termination (Fig. 7.1).361 
In terms of CS1, Ministry for the Environment B (Table 5.4) identified that  the new National 
Government did not see carbon neutrality as a priority. Department of Conservation (Table 
5.4) went further, adding that “clearly  [National] do not see climate change as a serious 
threat.” Moreover, Ministry  for the Environment A (Table 5.4) conceded that “the Minister 
[for the Environment and Climate Change Issues (Nick Smith)] had been explicit in his 
dislike of the programme when he was in opposition.” In a similar fashion, with regard to 
CS2 S1, Kaikoura District Council B (Table 5.5) concluded that “[National] just didn’t see 
green programmes as a priority,” with Nelson City Council (Table 5.5) suggesting that 
Government saw the CCP-NZ programme as a “‘nice to do’ rather than a ‘need to do.’”
Sato (2002) notes that a shift in ideology or scientific theory can motivate termination. While, 
as the data suggests, the National Government did not see carbon mitigation as a priority for 
New Zealand, global scientific consensus with regard to climate change and carbon 
mitigation supports the ethos of programmes like the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programmes.
What’s more, the majority of organizations interviewed for CS1 (50%, 3 of 6) and CS2 S1
(56%, 9 of 16) believed that, prior to programme termination, Government did not perform a 
formal evaluation into the respective  programmes’ effectiveness (Fig. 7.9).362  In terms of the 
CCP-NZ programme, the host council (Wellington City Council) wasn’t even consulted: “I 
don’t think that we were asked from the central government whether it was effective” (Table 
5.5, Wellington City Council). And as indicated by Department of Conservation (Table 5.4), 
though the dismantling of the CNPS programme was too quick to allow for a formal 
evaluation, it was clear that a decision had been made: “I do not think that  it would have 
mattered what we put up, a decision had been made.” 
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361 16% (1 of 6) of CS1 organizations and 6% (1 of 16) of CS2 S2 organizations reasoned that their respective programme was terminated for both political 
and economics reasons.
362  33% (2 of 6) of CS1 and 6% (1 of 16) of CS2 S1 organizations were not sure; 17% (1 of 6) of CS1 and 13% (2 of 16) of CS2 S1 organizations did not 
discuss whether Government had performed a formal evaluation of the respective programme’s effectiveness prior to termination.
Figure 7.9:  Occurrence of a formal programme evaluation363
In the end, while Dery  (1984) argues that the common trouble with programme evaluation is 
the lack of standards by which to assess programme effectiveness, in the case of the CNPS 
and the the CCP-NZ programmes, no formal evaluation occurred.   And though deLeon’s 
(1982a) observation that ideology is the chief rationale for programme termination explains 
the absence of a formal evaluation, the determination of a programme’s effectiveness is 
ultimately  a function of political disposition (e.g. Adam et al., 2007). Given the evidence 
from the data, the termination of the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programmes does align with 
deLeon’s third rationale for programme termination, political ideology.
 
7.3.  Summary and Locating the Research
7.3.1.  Summary of Chapter 7
According to deLeon (1982a), programme termination is considered to have three rationales: 
economics (cost reduction); programmatic inefficiencies; and, political ideology. After 
applying deLeon’s model to the results from the semi-structured interviews for CS1, CS2 S1 
and CS2 S2, it is clear that the termination of the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programmes was 
influenced by all three of deLeon’s rationales for programme termination. 
With the onset of the global recession, and the resultant pressure for Government austerity 
measures, some organizations (CNPS, 17%; CCP-NZ, 25%) believed that programme 
termination was purely an economic decision. Interestingly  however, while programmatic 
inefficiencies were clearly evident and detrimental to both programmes, as is made clear from 
the narratives, few organizations (CNPS, 0%; CCP-NZ, 6%) identified this as the cause for 
programme termination. Instead, and given the recent political shift in Government 
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363 See Appendix, Table 6.3 and Table 6.9, for data sets. *These organizations did not discuss whether an evaluation occurred.
leadership, not surprisingly, the majority  of organizations (CNPS, 67%; CCP-NZ, 65%) 
argued that programme termination was the result of political ideology. This notion is 
supported by the lack of evidence for the occurrence of a formal evaluation into the 
effectiveness of the two programmes, which suggests that the decision to terminate was 
politically motivated as opposed to assessment-driven.  
Typically, as the literature suggests (e.g. Cameron, 1978; deLeon, 1982a, 1987; Frantz, 2002; 
Lewis, 2002; Adam et al. 2007), while economics and inefficiencies are cited openly  as 
motivating programme termination, in practice, political ideology  tends to be responsible for 
the majority of government terminations. While this trend rings true in this research, as the 
data demonstrates, elements of all three of deLeon’s rationales for programme termination 
were present in the dismantling of the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programmes. 
7.3.2.  Locating the Research
As the previous chapters have identified, there is a paucity of scholarly  work exploring how 
public sector organizations determine strategies to manage their carbon and achieve carbon 
neutrality. While analysis of the themes emerging from the case studies provides an 
appreciation for the study organizations’ overall experience with the CNPS and the CCP-NZ 
programmes (see Chapter 6), considering these themes through the lens of deLeon’s 
Termination Theory provides insight into the rationale for programme termination.
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CHAPTER 8 - DISCUSSION
8.1.  INTRODUCTION
8.1.1.  Introduction to Chapter 8
A qualitative methodology was chosen for this study because of the need to extract the 
personal narratives of the managers responsible for CNPS and the CCP-NZ programmes. 
Qualitative inquiry is however, inherently  difficult to replicate (Liamputtong, 2011), and thus 
tends to attract positivist  criticism. Nonetheless, this approach effectively  allows the 
researcher to explore meaning, interpretations and individual experiences, all of which are 
critical in order to better understand the dynamics influencing the termination of the CNPS 
and the CCP-NZ programmes. 
The narratives, including insights into meaning, interpretations and individual experiences 
with the respective initiatives will be discussed here. Additionally, as this research is 
interested in understanding not only why the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programmes were 
dismantled, but also what programme participant organizations intend do next, the 
organizational structure of this chapter serves to highlight and extract the data in a manner 
that emphasizes programme evolution: In the beginning, delivery and application, 
termination, outcome and moving forward.
While Chapter 6 presented the findings from the interviews with the respective senior 
managers responsible for the delivery of the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programmes, and 
Chapter 7 considered these findings through the theoretical lens of termination theory, this 
chapter draws on all the research findings and secondary  materials. In addition to the findings 
from Chapter 6, this includes findings from interviews with the programme architects, word 
count analysis of CS2 S2 organization Annual Reports, Annual Plans, and LTCCPs, and other 
support material such as ministry and council emission inventories and reduction plans, and 
Government press documents. 
8.1.2.  Chapter Purpose and Outline
The aim of this chapter is to analytically discuss the various themes that emerged from the 
research, namely the findings presented in Chapters 6 and 7. While direct attention to how the 
Organizational Involvement in Carbon Mitigation
198
research findings address the research objectives will be discussed in the following chapter, 
elements are nevertheless presented in this chapter as well, particularly  with respect to the 
evolution of the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programmes.  
This chapter is divided into six primary sections, (8.1) Introduction, (8.2) In the Beginning; 
(8.3)  Delivery and Application; (8.4) Termination; (8.5) Outcome and Moving Forward; and, 
(8.6) Summary and Locating the Research. Section 8.1 provides a quick introduction to the 
chapter, including a description of the chapter’s purpose. Section 8.2 begins with a broad 
discussion of the Labour-led Government’s ambition for sustainability and climate 
mitigation, then focuses on the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programmes, exploring programme 
aim and, with respect to latter programme, ICLEI’s recruitment strategy. Section 8.3 
discusses the overall delivery and application of the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programmes, 
highlighting some of the key programatic pitfalls experienced by participant organizations. 
Section 8.4 discusses the rationales for, and obstacles against, the termination of the CNPS 
and the CCP-NZ programmes. Section 8.5 explores the success of the CNPS and the CCP-
NZ programmes, including a discussion on the embeddedness of programme values, and 
concludes with a brief consideration of NZ’s path forward on carbon mitigation. The final 
section, section 8.6, provides a brief summary  of the chapter and locates the chapter with the 
thesis.
8.2.  IN THE BEGINNING
8.2.1.  Labour’s Ambition
The CNPS and the CCP-NZ programmes grew out of the Labour-led Government’s desire to 
make “sustainability central to New Zealand’s unique national identity” (Clark, 2006). This 
came at a time when sustainability  and climate change were featuring predominantly  on 
international agendas (e.g. Pinkse & Kolk, 2009; Bailey, 2007; Boston, 2008), and Labour 
wanted to be bold in this area: “we could aim to be carbon neutral” (Clark, 2006).  Labour 
believed that carbon neutrality was “the way the world [would] move” and thus wanted to 
seize the “opportunity to be at the forefront” (Clark, 2007c) of this global effort.
While NZ’s contribution to global GHG emissions is low (0.2%), it has the 11th highest 
emissions per capita (NZ Govt., 2009c). What’s more, NZ is among the developed nations 
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with the greatest net emissions increase (23%) since 1990 (NZ Govt., 2009b) (Fig. 3.3). NZ’s 
increase in emissions is largely the result of two sectors, agricultural and energy, which 
dominate NZ’s unique emissions profile. The contribution of agriculture and energy  are 
unique for two key reasons. First, over the last two decades NZ’s energy use per capita has 
been increasing, where per capita energy use for most of the developed world has been 
decreasing (Renowden, 2007). Second, agriculture represents approximately  50% of NZ’s 
total national emissions profile, as compared to the developed-world average of 10% (NZ 
Govt., 2009b).
Notwithstanding the fact that this trend does seem to be in decline, given that agriculture 
represented 51% of NZ’s total emissions in 1990 and 46% in 2009 (NZ Govt., 2011c) (Fig. 
3.6), by  weight, it continues to rise, largely the result  of enteric fermentation CO2 emissions 
from dairy cattle and N2O emissions from agricultural soils (NZ Govt., 2011b).  This trend 
places NZ in a paradox: while 95% of all agricultural production is exported, with the sector 
accounting for 54% of total exports in 2005 (MFAT, 2010), Labour did not want to damage 
NZ’s international reputation or be seen as doing too little about emissions:
New Zealand is serious about climate change. We’ve got a problem – the 
world needs our food, but as we produce our food we create greenhouse 
gases, that’s a problem we’ve got to try and solve… if New Zealand gets a 
reputation for being a dirty producer, a greenhouse gas polluter – a country 
that doesn’t care, you’re going to see it  as a pariah... We don’t want people 
boycotting New Zealand (Table 5.4, Clark).
To this end, and reiterating that “NZ did the right thing in ratifying the Kyoto Protocol, and 
resolving to be part of the solution, not part of the problem” (Clark, 2006), the Prime Minister 
announced a raft of sustainability initiatives, including an economy-wide emissions trading 
scheme, designed to make sustainability  central to NZ’s unique national identity  (Clark, 
2006). Principally, Labour believed that the world was moving towards carbon neutrality 
(Clark, 2007c), and wanted NZ “to be in the vanguard of making it happen” (Table 5.4, 
Clark). As a first step, Labour wanted to put Government’s house in order: “If we are going to 
tell Kiwis that our country can be carbon neutral, let’s use Government Departments in a 
leadership role, and show that it can be done” (Table 5.4, Clark).
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Nevertheless, Labour’s ambition was challenged by the opposition, who believed it 
unnecessary  and economically dangerous to get ahead of other countries that may have a 
greater mitigative impact or more to lose (e.g. Chapman, 2006). As the literature suggests, the 
economic and social cost may be outweighed by the insignificance of the country’s overall 
contribution to atmospheric GHG emission accumulation (e.g. Macey, 2007). For the Prime 
Minister, however, “…Everything about having a carbon neutral public service made sense, it 
saved money; so it wasn’t only  good for the environment, it was good for the bottom line of 
the Government’s budget” (Table 5.4, Clark).
8.2.2.  The Aim of the CNPS and the CCP-NZ Programmes
The CNPS programme was a Government mandated initiative.  While the programme’s intent 
was to achieve carbon neutrality  within the core public sector, its aim was ultimately to 
demonstrate NZ’s leadership on climate change and carbon neutrality (NZ Govt., 2007b). 
Additionally, Government wanted to demonstrate to organizations (both public and private) a 
practical methodology for achieving carbon neutrality. 
The CCP-NZ programme, on the other hand, was neither mandated by Government nor a 
carbon neutrality  initiative. Instead, in joining the CCP-NZ programme, local government 
councils sought to achieve quantifiable GHG emission reductions (corporate and within the 
community) and, similar to the core departments, demonstrate leadership to the community 
on climate change mitigation (CCP-NZ, 2009).364  As ICELIb (Table 5.5) explains, the 
programme’s framework provided councils with a method to reduce emissions: “So I guess 
the core value of a programme like CCP is that it allows local governments to take a very 
complex set of issues and simplify them into a straight forward step process.” And 
importantly, as ICLEI A (Table 5.5) notes: “This helps you lay the ground for policies that are 
going to be harder for the public to accept in the future because it will give them examples of 
what they can do.  It will give them confidence that they can do something.”
Interestingly, while the CCP-NZ programme was not  a carbon neutrality initiative, some 
councils did endeavor to achieve carbon neutrality; of the 8 councils that discussed their goal 
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364 Incidentally, while the findings suggested that councils were disappointed with the programme’s lack of an adaptation component, ICLEI never indicated 
that adaptation was indeed a part of the programme’s aim. Moreover, while local government responsibility for adaptation is more obvious, with the passing 
of the Energy and Climate Change Amendment to NZ’s Resource Management Act in 2004, increased responsibility for mitigation was passed to local 
authorities (Greenaway & Carswell, 2009). Exactly how these responsibilities are manifested, however, remains unclear.
in joining the programme, five expressed a desire to achieve carbon neutrality (Appendix, 
Table 6.6). Here the data conflicts slightly. While CS2 S1 findings suggested that Wellington 
City  Council was in fact aiming for carbon neutrality  (Appendix, Table 6.6), findings from 
CS2 S2 revealed that  Wellington City Council did not initially have carbon neutrality as their 
aim, though it did come later (Appendix, Table 6.13). ICLEI B (Table 5.5) concurred with the 
former findings, and added that Wellington City Council’s goal was pure hubris and naiveté:
Wellington wanted to become the world’s first carbon neutral city.  Then 
realised that they had miscounted and it  was going to cost them a lot  – 
F*#@% naïve… Wellington is a good example, where they just over-
reached and they were doing it in New Zealand a bit.  It’s a real Kiwi thing.
 
Not surprisingly the National Government felt the same about Labour’s vision of NZ having 
the world’s first carbon neutral public service. ICLEI B (Table 5.5)’s criticism is not driven 
by ideology, however: “The world’s first is bullshit – it  should be about where are we now; 
how we can be better?”
As for demonstrating leadership to the community, of the 14 councils that discussed the role 
of leadership  in joining the programme, while one council indicated that leadership was not a 
driver, 13 indicated that they were striving to demonstrate leadership to the community 
(Appendix, Table 6.6). Wellington City  Council (Table 5.5), for example, explained that: “We 
wanted to show the community that we were taking the issue seriously  and we wanted to help 
the community with programmes that  also facilitated them to take action whether its residents 
or businesses.” 
8.2.3.  Timing and Recruitment
In terms of timing, Government launched the CNPS programme in 2007 as part of a larger 
sustainability initiative. As for the CCP-NZ programme, the data shows that councils were in 
the process of exploring climate mitigation at  about the same time that ICLEI was gathering 
support and meeting with prospective programme members:
 [Climate change] definitely wasn’t a priority for the council until it  joined 
the CCP Programme... So it was an issue that the council was considering 
and it was kind of timely that ICLEI was also going around talking to 
councils about their programme (Table 5.6, Wellington City Council).
According to ICLEI B (Table 5.5), councils were quite keen to join the programme:
Organizational Involvement in Carbon Mitigation
202
So when I went over to New Zealand and talked about what we were setting 
up here in Australia, New Zealanders [were] very interested ... We then 
started recruiting councils and we recruited them very quickly  and to MFE 
that was seen as the market speaking… So the fast recruitment and we 
pushed it really hard was kind of proof that the market was saying, “yes, we 
want CCP.” 
And as ICLEI B (Table 5.5) indicated, “[the programme] very quickly  got momentum.”365 
The first year of the programme saw the greatest uptake in membership, with 35% of the total 
membership joining in 2004 (Fig. 3.21); 44% of the 16 study selection councils joined in 
2004 (Fig. 5.2; Fig. 5.3). Interestingly, and perhaps linked to Labour’s launch of CNPS 
programme (though this was never mentioned in the interviews), 2007 saw the next largest 
wave of membership, with 29% of total membership and 25% of the study selection. 
Also of note, the bulk of councils that joined in 2004 (and in 2007) were District Councils. 
Had time (and access to key personnel) permitted, it would have been interesting to explore 
deeper into ICLEI’s recruitment strategy, particularly  given that, as Local Government New 
Zealand (Table 5.5) indicated, “[the recruitment strategy] was very weighted towards those 
authorities with larger populations.” This would imply that city councils were the primary 
target, and begs the question, of those councils approached by  ICLEI, how many ultimately 
joined the CCP-NZ programme. 
Perhaps not surprisingly, the findings suggested that ICLEI sought to sign-up as many 
councils as possible.366  What’s interesting about ICLEI’s strategy, however, is that 
performance objectives were centred around the number of councils participating in the 
programme as opposed  to their progression through the five-milestone framework (Table 
5.5, ICLEI A)367. While this suggests that ICLEI’s ambition was public relations related 
(quantity over quality), which in fact was the belief held by Local Government New 
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365  ICLEI B (Table 5.5) notes that the larger councils in particular were very keen to act on climate mitigation, they were just unsure what to do - CCP 
provided the framework for action.
366  ICLEI B conceded that the programme was not likely to grow any further, given the percentage of NZ’s population (83%) already represented by 
programme member councils: “you know with that percentage of population and that number of councils you’re not going to get many more” (ICLEI B, Table 
5.5).
367 Incidentally, only 6% of participant councils completed the final milestone by the time the programme ended in 2009 (Fig. 3.23).
Zealand,368 it  is supported by the fact that 45% of participant councils did not move beyond 
the first milestone.369
With that said, the lack of progression beyond the first  milestone may  be less about ICLEI’s 
shortsighted performance objectives and more about councils’ laggardness. After all, 
Government funded the interns who’s sole task was to develop the inventory  necessary to 
achieve M1. As such, once the funding was gone, councils may have lost the drive to 
continue at their own expense, given the abundance of pressing priorities. Alternatively, the 
lack of forward movement may have been the result of the programme simply ending 
prematurely, as is suggested by the fact that 38% of councils joined the programme between 
2007 and 2008 - it would take at least one year to achieve M1 after all. 
8.2.4.  Climate Change Policy Prior to Programme Participation
Though not labeled a climate change policy, before mandated to join the CNPS programme, 
Government agencies were involved in the Govt3 programme, which aimed to gather data 
related to energy and transport use. CCP-NZ, on the other hand, as indicated by Local 
Government New Zealand (Table 5.5), “would have been something that was driven from 
outside of New Zealand,” implying that  perhaps climate change thinking was not high on NZ 
councils’ agenda. Yet of the 11 SC2 S1 councils that discussed whether climate change 
thinking was part of council policy  prior to joining the CCP-NZ programme, all indicated that 
indeed it was (Appendix, Table 6.6). 
Granted, for some councils, climate change mitigation was not necessarily  the primary goal 
of their policies. Instead, as indicated by Environment Canterbury Regional Council (Table 
5.5): “I think we don’t really talk about it directly  in terms of carbon, but certainly  talk about 
it in terms of savings.” And ICLEI must have been aware of this disposition, given that as 
Local Government New Zealand (Table 5.5) indicated, “[the programme] was promoted as a 
cost saving sort of thing” as opposed to strictly GHG emission mitigation. While local 
governments are beginning to appreciate the business case for carbon management (Kousky 
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368 Local Government New Zealand (Table 5.5) suggested that “[the programme] was a bit too public relations orientated.”
369  While the programme’s goal was to help local government councils quantify their GHG emissions (M1), it was also to build off M1 and achieve 
quantifiable GHG emission reductions.
& Schneider, 2003; Greenaway & Carswell, 2009), actions must compete with other 
responsibilities shunted from the Government: 
Councils have had decades of increasing responsibilities to take up without 
funding to follow, so they themselves have found it extremely difficult to 
undertake new programmes that aren’t  legislatively – that aren’t required 
(Table 5.5, ICLEI A).
What’s more, four of the same councils that were interviewed as part of CS2 S2, one year 
later, indicated that council policy did not include climate change thinking prior to joining the 
programme (Appendix, Table 6.13). And of those that indicated that climate change thinking 
was present before they joined the programme, all suggested that it was in the form of either 
sustainability  or energy management and adaptation. This suggests that councils’ 
interpretation of climate change policy  varies across local government and is thus highly 
subjective.
To get an idea of whether climate change thinking was part of council policy prior to joining 
the CCP-NZ programme, this research included a look at local government Annual Reports 
for CS2 S2 organizations. The findings from word count analysis suggested that ‘climate 
change’ was mentioned in only 28% (2 of 7) of Annual Reports in councils’ first year of 
membership in the programme, with no mention of ‘carbon management’ or ‘carbon 
neutrality’ in the same respective first year (Fig. 6.1).370  And, ‘Communities for Climate 
Protection - New Zealand programme’ (or ‘CCP-NZ’) was also only mentioned in 28% (2 of 
7) of Annual Reports in councils’ first year of membership in the programme. This suggests 
that council policy  prior to joining the programme was weak with regard to climate change in 
general and carbon mitigation specifically. Moreover, as ICLEI B (Table 5.5) revealed, while 
Local Government New Zealand eventually  came on board and supported the CCP-NZ 
programme, initially, “they were a bit of a blocker... So Local Government New Zealand 
firstly  had some councillors of course who were sceptical. Secondly, didn’t understand the 
need for a programme.” Because the interviewee representing Local Government New 
Zealand was not  on staff when the CCP-NZ programme began, they were not able to speak to 
ICLEI B’s claim. Given the evidence from CS2 S2 word count analysis, it would appear that 
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370 Because Annual Reports for some CS2 S2 councils were not available for the years prior to joining the CCP-NZ programme, I was not able to generate 
a trend for the period prior to councils’ first year of membership.
Local Government New Zealand was not promoting the need to incorporate climate change 
thinking into council policy.
8.3.  DELIVERY AND APPLICATION
8.3.1.  Delivery of the CNPS and the CCP-NZ Programmes
In Labour’s haste to launch the CNPS programme, critical building blocks were overlooked 
and as a result the programme met challenges along the way.  The findings suggested that the 
programme was poorly delivered. Whether defending the programme, or simply explaining 
circumstances, Ministry  for the Environment B (Table 5.4) indicated that the programme was 
an ‘idea that was developed over a short period of time at the beginning of 2008 in time for a 
Prime Minister’s speech from the throne.” And while the expectation was that the programme 
would develop and mature over time (e.g. NZ Govt., 2007b), the Inland Revenue Department 
(Table 5.4) acknowledged that “it was sort of make it up as you go along.” 
Perhaps the greatest  challenge was the failure of the programme to effectively connect with 
senior management: “strong collaborative leadership seemed to be fairly  lacking” (Table 5.4, 
Ministry of Health B). Senior management play  a critical role in the design and execution of 
new initiatives.  Had senior management been more effectively engaged in the CNPS 
programme, those charged (lead-core agencies’ managers) with the delivery and application 
of the programme would have met fewer obstacles.371
On the other hand, perhaps the CNPS programme would have enjoyed greater success had it 
not been delivered by  the Ministry for the Environment. For all their bravado and confidence 
in their ability  to deliver the programme,“because the Ministry for the Environment had the 
expertise – the Ministry for the Environment were the logical people” (Table 5.4, Ministry for 
the Environment B), the Prime Minister later conceded that “the Ministry  for the 
Environment hasn’t been a strong ministry” (Table 5.4, Clark). This sentiment was supported 
openly  by at least one lead-core department, who suggested that the programme would have 
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371  As noted in previous chapters, many within the Inland Revenue Department, for example, did not accept climate mitigation as core business, and 
therefore did not approach the CNPS programme with enthusiasm (Table 5.4, Inland Revenue Department).
been better placed with the Energy Efficiency and Conservation Authority  (who did in fact 
offer to run the programme) (Table 5.4, Department of Conservation).372
In spite of the obstacles, the CNPS programme did enjoy  considerable leadership from the 
Prime Minister.  Because of the Prime Minister’s keen interest in the programme, private 
sector organizations affiliated with the lead-core agencies were beginning to fall in line with 
the goal of carbon neutrality, thus supporting the notion that the Government was showing 
leadership. Unfortunately..., 
Feedback from private sector suggests now that Government is no longer 
involved in CNPS programme, those “corporates and businesses that were 
inclined to go down this path are not now doing so because Government is 
not doing it” (Table 5.4, Ministry for the Environment A).
While further research into the accuracy of this assertion would be necessary in order to make 
any definitive judgements, it remains quite telling anecdotally.
As for the CCP-NZ programme, while senior management leadership does not appear to have 
been a problem (Fig. 7.3), the programme did lack a clear champion,373  which as the 
literature suggests, can hinder the actualisation of a climate control agenda (e.g. Bartlett & 
Dibben, 2010). Moreover, notwithstanding funding to support an intern and pay programme 
membership fees, Government support for the initiative was also lacking:
And we know on climate change activities they’re not supported in New 
Zealand to the same extent that  they are in Australia – I know that.  I mean 
in terms of what’s happening in local authorities there’s just nothing – we 
just get this huge vacuum of support (Table 5.5, Local Government New 
Zealand).
This is further substantiated by  the interview findings, which indicated that 100% (7 of 7) of 
CS2 S2 organizations believed that the Ministry for the Environment was not engaged when 
it came to council involvement with the CCP-NZ programme (Fig. 7.3).374
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372  The notion that the CNPS programme was poorly delivered is substantiated by Fig. 7.4, which indicates that 100% of the lead-core departments 
believed that the programme was poorly delivered.
373 According to Local Government New Zealand (Table 5.5), “There are very few local authorities who have a nominated climate change policy person.”
374 This was likewise the case for Local Government New Zealand (Fig. 7.3). As the findings suggested, the majority of councils interviewed for CS2 S1 that 
discussed the efficiency of programme delivery, concluded that the programme was not delivered in an efficient manner (Fig. 7.4).
Communication between Local Government New Zealand and the Ministry  for the 
Environment was also unproductive, particularly with regard to climate initiatives such as the 
CCP-NZ programme: “What we tried to do at the time was initiate a conversation with [the 
Ministry for the Environment] about setting up a... brokerage for a lot of information and 
ideas and best practice and stuff like that... you know we may as well just  gone away and 
buried ourselves somewhere.  We just can’t get central government to engage” (Table 5.5, 
Local Government New Zealand). This was likewise the case between Government and 
ICLEI as well: “So I don’t think ICLEI got involved with [the Ministry  for the Environment] 
to say, ‘Right, here’s an ICLEI/ MFE programme,’ so they didn’t integrate very  well like 
that” (Table 5.6, Dunedin City Council).
Unlike their experience with the Ministry for the Environment, the majority  of councils did 
enjoy  engagement with ICLEI (Fig.7.3). With that said, however, ICLEI’s administrative arm 
in NZ quickly began to deteriorate soon after the programme began, leaving councils without 
support and decreasing value in their membership:375 
Oh, I don’t  think [ICLEI] were engaged at all. Well, to be honest ICLEI was 
a bit of a joke anyway.... and you know the support that they  gave was 
minimum and random and not very professional at times. I mean I think 
ICLEI in Australia was doing a wonderful job, but we really weren’t getting 
any useful information out of ICLEI New Zealand. They were under-
resourced, understaffed and they weren’t  adding a lot of value (Table 5.6, 
Auckland Regional Council).
Specifically, the problem surrounded the National Programme Manager (ICLEI A). ICLEI A, 
while politically adept, lacked the resolve and leadership necessary  to lead the programme: 
“Well, it’s a leadership problem and even that’s a little bit you know, it’s really  a single 
person... and I think that  [ICLEI B] knew that there were issues as well” (Table 5.5, Local 
Government New Zealand).376  In fact  ICLEI B was quite aware of the problem, as conceded 
later in our discussion: “I guess [ICLEI A] wasn’t technically strong.”
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375  Perhaps another angle of inquiry could explore the spatial dimension to ICLEI NZ’s level of engagement. The findings suggested that perhaps ICLEI’s 
point person based in Wellington was in more frequent contact with councils that were near to Wellington, i.e. Rotorua District Council, Nelson City Council, 
Greater Wellington Regional Council and Wellington City Council for example (Appendix, Table 6.14).
376  This claim is supported by the interview findings as well, where it is noted that “people didn’t find [the contact] easy to work with” (Table 5.6, Greater 
Wellington Regional Council)... “there were definitely some personality conflicts” (Table 5.6, Wellington City Council).
What is also telling is that while Local Government New Zealand (Table 5.5) revealed that 
when it came to discussions with ICLEI A “there was a distinct unwillingness to listen,” as it 
was ICLEI B’s failure to communicate with the consultants charged with selecting the 
National Programme Manager that led to ICLEI A being hired in the first place; The 
consultant was prepared to advise against ICLEI A, believing that they  were unsuitable for 
the position. But  ICLEI B had already offered ICLEI A the post. Reflecting, ICLEI B (Table 
5.5) explains: “You know too bad, we’ve followed a process here and f*#@% up basically.” 
The reality is, however, that ICLEI B did not follow the process, otherwise they would not 
have hired ICLEI A in advance of the consultants recommendation. This is further evidence 
of an endemic breakdown in the CCP-NZ programme’s administrative architecture. 
8.3.2.  Application of the CNPS and the CCP-NZ Programmes
In application, both the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programmes suffered from a number of 
methodological problems. For the CNPS programme, principal among these challenges was 
the Ministry for the Environment’s inability  to remain consistent. In spite of Government’s 
assertion that  the programme was “the only comprehensive central government programme 
with robust systems and methodologies to work through the challenges posed by a public 
service carbon neutrality  programme” (NZ Govt., 2008), the Ministry for the Environment 
would “change their mind about what they wanted measured” (Table 5.4, Ministry  for 
Economic Development A), or indicate that they provided the wrong conversion factors, so 
calculations would have to be done again (e.g Table 5.4, Treasury). While this would be more 
frustrating than limiting, departments were also challenged by data availability and the lack 
of experience (and guidance from the Ministry for the Environment) to gather data correctly. 
Given the Government’s need for ISO compliance,377  it would be interesting to further 
explore the core agencies inventories, specifically with regard to completeness, consistency 
and accuracy, the key tenants of the Greenhouse Gas Protocol, and to assess the efficacy of 
the programme beyond the narratives. 
The CCP-NZ programme suffered a similar experience, particularly with regard to data 
quality, but also with respect to the programme’s approach. Referencing the fact that the CCP 
initiative failed to materialise in Europe, and suggesting that ICLEI International lacks 
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377 Compliant to ISO 14064-1 (ISO, 2006).
technical substance, ICLEI B (Table 5.5) asserts that the Australian programme was of high 
standard. As for the NZ extension of the programme, which was intended as a replica of the 
Australian parent programme, implementation was weak: “So CCP-NZ being designed by us 
had the same approach technically. I don’t think the implementation was anywhere near as 
strong as here [(Australia)]” (Table 5.5, ICLEI B). And even though ICLEI B (Table 5.5) 
conceded that the National Programme Manager was largely  responsible for the programme’s 
decline, the programme’s inventory tool was “quite light” (Table 5.5, Dunedin City Council) 
and moreover failed to remain current: “the tool that we used was becoming obsolete.  It 
wasn’t refined enough and in actual fact, it had reached the end of its life” (Table 5.5, ICLEI 
A).
Recognising the deficiencies of the programme, ICLEI developed a protocol document that 
was intended to address NZ councils’ unique needs and improve the functionality  of the 
inventory tool (the CCP GGA Software).378  Unfortunately, as ICLEI A (Table 5.5) explained, 
the protocol was inconsistent with the original tool’s methodology. While it remains unclear 
why the inconsistency was not addressed prior to the protocol’s delivery, ICLEI was in the 
process of correcting the problems when the programme was cancelled: “with the CCP 
programme being pulled that stopped too” (Table 5.5, ICLEI A).
Another failure of both programmes was the lack of formal benchmarking (Fig. 7.5).  While 
the GGA software was intended to facilitate comparison and benchmarking within the CCP-
NZ programme and between the larger pool of CCP participants (e.g. CCP-NZ, 2009), the 
majority  of councils indicated that benchmarking was not practical, so they  simply  did not 
include it in their carbon mitigation effort. This is likely a failing of the councils as opposed 
to the programme itself however, given that the software at the heart of the programme did 
indeed allow for comparison. With that said, though the programme endeavoured to follow 
“certain principles” (ICLEI, 2008a) from the WRI/ WBCSD GHG Protocol, councils 
indicated that they had difficulty gathering consistent data (garbage in garbage out), thus 
rendering cross-council comparison difficult. 
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378 As discussed in Chapter 3, the New Zealand Supplement to the International Local Government GHG Emissions Analysis Protocol was intended to help 
councils build accurate inventories and facilitate comparison between communities. Again, GGA refers to the Greenhouse Gas Application software.
As for the CNPS programme, the lack of formal benchmarking appears to have been a more 
endemic problem, with Ministry  for the Environment B (Table 5.4) explaining that  “nobody 
else was doing it,” implying that there was in fact no public sector organization to benchmark 
against. However, it  is not clear how Government came to this conclusion, given that  at the 
same time that the Ministry for the Environment was conceptualising the CNPS programme, 
the provincial government of British Columbia (BC), Canada, had already  introduced 
legislation requiring all public sector organizations to become carbon neutral (this effort was 
further bolstered by a $75 million commitment in 2008) (BC MOE, 2011).379
8.4.  TERMINATION
8.4.1.  Rationales for Programme Termination
Chapter 7 applied deLeon’s model for programme termination to the findings from CS1 and 
CS2. While the data suggested that the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programmes were both 
dismantled for reasons of political ideology, it was clear from the narratives that 
programmatic inefficiencies were endemic, and thus possibly played a role in termination. 
Yet the new National-led Government cited conventional neoliberal economic ideology as the 
rationale for ending the initiatives. Unfortunately, due to limited access to finance 
information, it was not  possible to critically  assess the cost/benefit relationship of the 
programmes beyond insights gained from the participants.380 
Economics
With that said, as for the CNPS programme, as expressed in Birchall et al. (2012), it is 
possible to glean potential costs from existing data, including lead-core agency emission 
reduction projections as published in their emissions reduction plans (e.g. DOC, 2007; IRD, 
2008; MED, 2008; MFE, 2008; MOH, 2008; Treasury, 2008). A further complication, 
however, concerns the fact that only two of the six lead-core agencies employed a consistent 
metric for anticipated emissions reductions; for the period 2008-2012, the Department of 
Conservation anticipated emission reductions were 19% (1837t-CO2e), and 13% (270t-
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379  BC’s carbon neutral legislation, which was introduced in 2007, requires all public sector organizations to measure, reduce and offset GHG emissions 
from buildings, vehicle fleet and paper use. According to BC MOE (2011), BC’s public sector is now officially the first province or state to achieve carbon 
neutrality in North America.
380 While time was a limiting factor in this respect, a deeper exploration of programme costs, both expected and actual (via Government freedom of 
information access), would be an interesting avenue for further research.
CO2e) for the Ministry of Economic Development.381  For the Department of Conservation, 
this translates into a projected financial savings of NZ$4.3 million (DOC, 2007; Mason & 
Ball, 2008). While savings were anticipated by  the Ministry  of Economic Development and 
the other agencies (Table 3.10), given that estimated costs, including offsetting for the 
2008-2012 period were NZ$10.4 million (NZ Govt., 2007b), it is not likely that savings from 
the lead-core agencies would exceed the initial programme expense. Moreover, as 
highlighted in Birchall et al. (2012), because the quick and easy  (“low-hanging-fruit”) 
emission reductions will have been made during the trial period, post-2012 reductions would 
be minimal. 
It is worth repeating that while the NZ$10.4 million gross over three years included energy 
audits and travel plans for all 34 core agencies, it only included the offset portfolio for the 
2006/07 to 2011/12 emissions from the six lead-agencies (NZ Govt., 2007b). Given that the 
lead-core six agencies, by weight, represented only 16% of the 159,000 t-CO2e for the total 
34 core public service departments (NZ Govt., 2008), Government’s post-2012 offset liability 
was potentially quite large, depending on departments’ offset  requirement. Exacerbating the 
problem further, the Department of Conservation had identified only  50,000 hectares of land 
suitable and available for offset needs (NZ Govt., 2007b). If offsetting requirements for the 
six lead-core agencies necessitated between 10,000 and 27,000 hectares, post-2012 needs 
most certainly would have exceeded the Department of Conservation’s capabilities, thus 
requiring what would likely have proven a more expensive option. 
However, these projections are only one side of a multi-faceted paradigm shift towards 
carbon mitigation. And while the National-led Government was adamant that  the CNPS 
programme served only to cost Government money, the Labour-led Government believed 
that: “everything about having a carbon neutral public service made sense, it  saved money; so 
it wasn’t only good for the environment, it was good for the bottom line of the Government’s 
budget” (Table 5.4, Clark).
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381  Given that the CNPS programme was intended to demonstrate leadership on carbon neutrality, a best case scenario offset threshold of 19% (for the 
Department of Conservation) seems a little weak, suggesting that perhaps the bar Government planned to set was one of “business-a-little-less-than-
usual” (e.g. Ball et al 2009a) rather than a paradigm shift in climate mitigation.
Moreover, on a global scale, as expressed in Stern (2006), benefits of near-term action 
overwhelmingly  outweigh the economic costs of inaction.382 And as alluded to earlier in this 
chapter, the Labour-led Government understood the long-term nature of this investment and 
was correspondingly keen to demonstrate leadership in this area.
Ultimately, the CNPS programme was not promoted as a short-term cost saving exercise. 
Instead, Labour recognised that “without commitment to greater sustainability…, we risk not 
only damaging our environment, but also exposing our economy to significant risk” (Clark, 
2007c). As discussed perviously, having economics as the central thread in a climate 
mitigation strategy, be it for carbon management or neutrality, tends to miss the significance 
of sustainable development383 and the need to address associated environmental issues and 
their economic causes. This highlights another important consideration, the value of carbon 
offsetting, particularly in terms of the manage-mitigate threshold (e.g. Ball et al., 2009b), and 
certainly with regard to efficacy associated with carbon neutral strategies in general (e.g. 
Lohmann, 2006; Smith, 2007; Spreng et al. 2007; Hopwood, 2009; Milne & Grubnic, 2011). 
Compared to the CNPS programme, Government’s financial obligation for the CCP-NZ 
programme was relatively minor, with participant councils receiving funding to cover annual 
membership and NZ$4000 to cover the cost of the intern (who’s role as noted previously was 
to assist with the completion of Milestone 1). Unlike the CNPS programme, the CCP-NZ 
programme was not a Government mandated carbon neutral programme and as a result 
Government was not responsible for council offset requirements.
While annual membership  fees were not disclosed, if we liberally  calculate the possible 
obligation for the period between 2004 and 2009 at the maximum rate of NZ$3000 per 
council per year, based on the revised fee structure, as discussed in Chapter 3,  for 6 years 
and 34 councils, the total is NZ$612,000. Given that not all councils were members of the 
CCP-NZ programme 2004-2009 (some started earlier while others started later), and not all 
councils had a population greater than 100,000, this figure is a crude approximation. 
Additionally, since this is based on the revised fee structure, it may have been a greater sum 
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382 As noted previously, ambitious emission reduction policies do not necessarily harm the economy (Chapman & Boston, 2007)
383  It should also be noted that NZ does not in fact have a defined sustainable development strategy, despite the implied importance of sustainable 
development to the country’s identity (e.g. Buhrs, 2008).
for the noted term. As for the cost of the intern for each council, at NZ$4000 per council, 
Government expended approximately  $136,000 to assist with the completion of Milestone 
1.384  Total expenditure for the CCP-NZ programme is thus liberally estimated to be 
approximately NZ$748,000 for the period 2004-2009. Moving forward, using the revised fee 
structure, Government’s obligation would have been approximately NZ$102,000 per year, 
plus an additional NZ$4000 for an intern and NZ$3000 per year for every  additional council 
that joined the programme. Again, this is based on the highest possible membership fee 
category, and thus would likely be a lesser sum.
Programmatic Inefficiencies
With the expressed aim of the CNPS programme being global leadership and long-term 
economic resilience in a carbon constrained world, and the minimal cost associated with the 
CCP-NZ programme, economics does not scan as the primary driver for programme 
termination. Had the National-led Government rationalised the termination of these 
programmes by suggesting that they were inefficient at achieving their aim, they would have 
had a more compelling case.  As demonstrated by  the narratives from CS1 and CS2,  both the 
CNPS and the CCP-NZ programmes suffered from a range of programmatic inefficiencies. 
And while programmatic inefficiencies were not cited by  the senior managers as being the 
rationale for programme termination, it  is clear, while admittedly speculative, that had the 
programmes continued (beyond 2009) without modification, these inefficiencies would have 
likely diminished the programmes’ ability to achieve their respective goal. 
Yet during the operation of the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programmes, results were realised. As 
the findings suggest, in addition to cost and emission reductions, organizations experienced 
an increase in senior management awareness with regard to operational carbon mitigation and 
importantly, broadened their network base for sharing of best practices in the area of energy 
management and sustainability. 
Whether the Government was aware of the programmes’ inefficiencies and successes when 
the decision to terminate was made, remains unclear. What is clear, however, is that a formal 
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384  This figure, while noted in each Councils’ Milestone 1 report, remains approximate as ICLEI could not disclose the actual sum. Also, because Hutt City 
Council had only made ‘Political Declaration,’ it is not clear whether council had begun the inventory; had council not begun the inventory, they likely would 
not have received the $4000 from the Ministry for the Environment, and thus Government would have expended approximately $132,000 instead of 
$136,000 to assist with the completion of Milestone 1.
evaluation into the effectiveness of the two programmes did not in fact occur prior to their 
termination, as is evident from the senior managers narratives (Fig. 7.9), and in the case of 
the CCP-NZ programme, confirmed by Local Government New Zealand (Table 5.5), and 
ICLEI B (Table 5.5) who adds that “Governments very rarely want to be told the truth.” Had 
a formal evaluation occurred, the new National-led Government would have discovered that 
in spite of a plethora of pitfalls, both the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programmes had merit and 
were indeed achieving their goals.
Interestingly, National’s failure to demonstrate, or even identify in this instance, the 
inefficiencies of the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programmes detracts from their assertion that the 
programmes were too expensive.  As deLeon (1982a) explains, if Government suggests that a 
programme was terminated on the grounds of economics or efficiencies, it  would imply that 
an evaluation would be imperative to the determination of this rationale; “how else can one 
arrive at program costs or benefits lacking skilled evaluations and the evidential base they 
provide?” (deLeon, 1982a, p. 22). If an informal assessment of the CNPS and the CCP-NZ 
programmes did occur, what criteria  was used in the decision to terminate? What role did the 
targeted agency play, and how involved were the stakeholders? While this research cannot 
speak to the criteria used to assess the effectiveness of these programmes, the findings 
certainly demonstrate that the organizations and stakeholders involved in the CNPS and the 
CCP-NZ programmes played no role whatsoever in the formal determination of the 
respective initiatives’ effectiveness. 
Political Ideology
If, however, political ideology is the motivation for termination, an evaluation of programme 
effectiveness may be redundant. As explained by  deLeon (1982a, p. 14): “Critical decisions 
are made on the basis of political expediency and beliefs... they are far removed from 
rigorous programme evaluation and analytic influence.” With this in mind, along with the 
timing of programme termination relative to the shift  in Government, and with the evidence 
from the research which demonstrates that 67% of CS1 and 63% of CS2 interviewees 
believed that programme termination was politically  motivated (Fig. 7.1), it is convincingly 
clear that political ideology was the dominant rationale for the termination of the CNPS and 
the CCP-NZ programmes. 
Organizational Involvement in Carbon Mitigation
215
As Moloney (2010) contends, ideology plays a critical role in crafting meaning and identity, 
and determining political behaviour. Since its inception in 1916 (Aimer, 2010), when its goals 
were driven by the industrial labour movement, humanitarian issues and strong anti capitalist/ 
state controlled economic socialist ideology,385  Labour has transformed into an “ideological 
coalition of liberals and socialists,” a social democratic centre-left party known as the “third 
way.” Combining traditional humanitarian concerns with free market reforms, contemporary 
Labour ideology rejects the notion that the economy should be “kept largely subordinate to 
government” (Giddens 1998, p. 99, in Aimer, 2010), while remaining committed to key social 
issues such as environmental sustainability and climate change mitigation. 
It is here where Labour, centre-left, and National, centre right, diverge. National’s economic 
policy reflects individual freedom, and private enterprise in the economy, a support base that 
is largely farmers, industrialists, merchants and the upper-middle classes (James, 2010). For 
Key’s National-led Government, action on sustainability and climate change mitigation 
seems to be contingent on cost neutrality, or at the very least low cost/ low commitment (this 
will be discussed further towards the end of this chapter). Clark’s Labour-led Government, on 
the other hand, understood that early investment in sustainability and climate change 
mitigation is not only economically prudent (e.g. Stern, 2006, 2008b), it  is necessary for NZ 
to remain globally competitive in a carbon constrained economy. 
While National continues to assert that “tackling climate change is the Government’s number 
one environmental priority” (Smith, 2009b), it  identifies that “it is unrealistic to continue to 
pretend we are, or can be, world leaders in reducing emissions” (Smith, 2009b). And to 
emphasise the lack of value in the CNPS programme, Smith (2009a) denounced it  as “just a 
feel good slogan.”
In Clark’s (Table 5.4) view, “tackling climate change is not a major priority for the NZ 
Government now… they will put any growth ahead of the environment.” And while Smith 
(2009b) acknowledges that  “it was the policy of the previous Government for NZ to lead the 
world on climate change,” in reference to the CNPS programme, Clark (Table 5.4) reiterates 
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385 Labour never really fulfilled this objective though, as it alienated voters (e.g. Miller, 2010).
that “[National’s] canning it  would have absolutely nothing to do with whether it was 
succeeding or not. Canning it would be simply pure politics.” This sentiment was echoed by 
Local Government New Zealand (Table 5.5) and reinforced by ICLEI A (Table 5.5) who 
indicated that:
Anything that was to do with sustainability  – that word – anything that had 
the word ‘sustainability’ attached to it seemed to rouse the ire of some 
politicians… There was a political ideology which was about rejection of 
programmes of the past Government.
In the end, the findings suggested that while the National-led Government is not prepared to 
fund public sector climate control efforts, it does believe that the good cost-benefit initiatives 
should occur anyway, without costly programmes such as CNPS and CCP-NZ. Ministry for 
the Environment A (Table 5.4) explained, however, that this is not the case: “…I think that 
the key  point behind that was that the Minister’s (Smith) understanding that CNPS would 
happen anyway because it a good idea.  That is not the case.” Indeed, as will be discussed 
later in this chapter, the lead-core departments have ended their goal of carbon neutrality and 
scaled back efforts to manage carbon in general.
As for the actions associated with the CCP-NZ programme, as ICLEI A (Table 5.5) indicated:
The big cry and the clear message [from Government] was… that now is 
the time for local government to take responsibility for [CCP-NZ] – in other 
words to pay for it; ‘they should be doing it  anyway and they should be 
paying for it.’  
With the ideological shift  towards strong neoliberal market environmentalism, Government 
support for initiatives like the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programmes has declined. The 
National-led Government’s expectation is that public sector organizations should endeavour 
to explore climate mitigation on a cost analysis basis, without support from Government.386 
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386  Ultimately, the CCP-NZ programme was a capacity building initiative; once councils gained momentum, they really should be able to move forward on 
their own: “the interesting thing about a capacity building programme is that eventually you make yourself redundant... the whole point is that [councils] start 
to drive their own dynamic” (ICLEI B, Table 5.5).
It is unclear whether councils were aware that the Ministry for the Environment expected them to take on programme funding once the programme gained 
momentum within council: “That [CCP] was always set up on the basis that it would become self sustainable and that local authorities would buy into it to 
the point where [councils] would fund it.  Now whether the councils were given that piece of information when they signed up or not is a different matter and 
I suspect they [were not]” (Local Government New Zealand, Table 5.5).
As indicated previously, Government’s desire to demonstrate leadership on climate mitigation 
ended when National took office.
8.4.2.  Obstacles to Programme Termination
As discussed in Chapter 4, deLeon posits six obstacles to programme termination. While 
deLeon’s obstacles are usually explored when a programme continues to persist beyond its 
purpose or value, it  is nonetheless instructive to consider the presence of the obstacles when a 
programme has been dismantled. For example, did deLeon’s obstacles exist, and if so in what 
capacity? While the obstacles were obviously insufficient to hinder programme termination, 
were they in fact a barrier, if only a temporary one? 
Intellectual Reluctance
DeLeon’s first obstacle concerns intellectual reluctance, where those involved avoid the truth 
of their error - Government’s tend not to like admitting that they made a mistake in 
promoting (and funding) an ineffective or poorly conceived programme (e.g Daniels, 1995). 
Notwithstanding the inefficiencies associated with these programmes, had the CNPS and the 
CCP-NZ programmes been dismantled by a succeeding Labour led-Government, then 
perhaps this barrier would have been sufficient to block termination. However, in the case of 
a shift  in Government party leadership, intellectual reluctance is not a barrier, but instead can 
be used by the new Government to demonstrate the previous Government’s failings.
Furthermore, in the case of the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programmes, following their 
termination the  National-led Government diverted attention towards its new climate change 
agenda, namely the re-conceived emissions trading scheme. As Bardach (1976) indicated, 
programme A must  be terminated in order for programme B to flourish. While Labour 
embraced both global leadership on carbon neutrality and an all-sector (and all-emission) 
emissions trading scheme, because of National’s resistance to Labour initiatives, particularly 
those that placed short-term costs on Government, it  abandoned the CNPS and the CCP-NZ 
programmes full-stop. As a result of its international obligation to the Kyoto Protocol, 
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Government was not in a position to terminate the emissions trading scheme, so instead 
National revised the scheme’s approach and delayed sector compliance.387 
Institutional Permanence
DeLeon’s second obstacle, institutional permanence, speaks to the notion that programmes 
are designed to endure political shifts, with those that are obscure or old, and well entrenched 
being particularly good at avoiding termination. Though early scholarship on termination 
theory  argues that public sector programmes (and or organizations) are virtually immortal 
(e.g. Kaufman, 1976), more recent research suggests otherwise (e.g. Lewis, 2002). And while 
it has been demonstrated that a programme’s age is positively correlated to its chance of 
survival, Sato (2002) explains that when termination does occur, it occurs with either a bang 
or a whimper. In the case of the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programmes, given the paradigm 
shift in political ideology following the 2008 election, the programmes’ relative newness, and 
having been the flagship initiative of the previous Prime Minister, termination was swift.  
Dynamic Conservatism
As for deLeon’s third obstacle, dynamic conservatism, it is believed that if a programme is 
able to evolve its reason d'être, it can avoid termination. The ending of the CNPS and the 
CCP-NZ programmes was swift, and though National suggested that the good cost-benefit 
initiative should carry on, without Government support efforts were significantly scaled back. 
As will be discussed in Chapter 9, instead of outright termination, National could have 
evolved the programmes into Government mandated and supported carbon management 
strategies.388  This would remove the offset requirement and allow Government to benefit 
from the investment already incurred.
Anti-termination Coalitions
Anti-termination coalitions are cited as deLeon’s fourth obstacle to programme termination. 
As discussed in Chapter 4, organised groups or networks, typically those with a vested 
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387 Interestingly, while NZ asserts that it will stand by its existing Kyoto Protocol commitment, it will not sign on to the second commitment period. Instead, 
along with countries like the United States, Canada, Japan, China, India, Brazil and Russia, NZ will make a non-binding pledge under the UN Convention 
Framework to commence January 2013. NZ has not as yet set a formal target for the 2013-2020 period (NZ Govt., 2012b).
388  Had this occurred, political ideology would not likely have been the dominant rationale for programme termination, as judged by CS1 and CS2 
interviewees.
Perhaps as an alternative to carbon neutrality, the National-led Government could have adopted a measure-manage approach, with the option of achieving 
CEMARS (Certified Emissions Measurement And Reduction Scheme) certification. In this vein, organizations would measure and manage their GHG 
emissions, with third party verification leading to certification. See CaroNZero for further details:http://www.carbonzero.co.nz/cemars/.
interest in the programme’s continuation, will take action to resist  termination (e.g Frantz, 
1992). As the research demonstrated, though organizations participating in the CNPS and the 
CCP-NZ programmes were well networked, organised resistance to termination did not exist. 
In fact, in the case of the CNPS programme, while five of the six lead-core agencies believed 
that the Ministry  for the Environment was working to oppose programme termination, 
Ministry for the Environment A (Table 5.4) indicated: “it  is not our job as officials to fight…
when there is a new government, they quickly  move – [the ministry] change gear to align 
themselves with the new government.  It is their job to support the government.” In the end, 
as Adam et al. (2007)’s typology suggests (Table 4.1), when low stickiness (lack of 
resistance) is correlated with high political incentive (shift in government), programme 
termination is more often than not the outcome.  
Legal Barriers and High Start-up Costs
DeLeon’s final two obstacles to programme termination relate to legal barriers and high start-
up costs. In terms of the former, while legal discussions were beyond the scope of this 
research, neither the former Prime Minister of NZ nor the CEO of ICLEI, mentioned any 
legal ramifications associated with the termination of their respective programme. As for high 
start-up  costs, because the new National-led Government was not interested in proceeding 
with Labour’s ambition to lead the world on carbon neutrality, believing that Labour’s efforts 
were costly to Government, termination of Labour’s programmes was seen as a cost saving 
exercise instead of costing Government further. The lack of an evaluation of the 
programmes’ effectiveness is further evidence that the National-led Government was not 
interested in assessing the value of the programmes, financial or otherwise. National’s 
ideological desire to distance itself from Labour initiatives thus further supports the notion 
that regardless of funds spent, sunk costs were not a barrier to programme termination.
8.5.  OUTCOME AND MOVING FORWARD
8.5.1.  Programme Success
To judge the success of the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programmes it is important to consider 
the programmes’ failings and accomplishments in equal measure.  And moreover, to remain 
cognisant of the fact that the programmes were dismantled before they  were able to achieve 
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their stated goal, carbon neutrality and quantifiable emission reductions, respectively. As the 
programmes’ failings have already been discussed, this section will address accomplishments.
In line with the Labour-led Government’s desire to be at the forefront of the global effort on 
climate change mitigation, the aim of the CNPS programme was to elevate NZ’s international 
profile as a leader on climate change and carbon neutrality  (NZ Govt., 2007b). While the new 
National-led Government dismantled the programme before the lead-core agencies were able 
to achieve carbon neutrality, the programme was indeed demonstrating leadership. Though it 
is difficult to determine the programme’s influence on an international scale, domestically, 
the CNPS programme was in fact demonstrating leadership:
Feedback from private sector suggests now that Government is no longer 
involved in CNPS programme, those “corporates and businesses that were 
inclined to go down this path are not now doing so because Government is 
not doing it” (Table 5.4, Ministry for the Environment A).
In addition to leadership, and in spite of Nick Smith’s assertion that the “only achievement” 
of the CNPS programme was “…to cost this country millions of dollars” (Smith, 2009a), the 
34 core departments identified over 300 actions to lower GHG emissions below business as 
usual (NZ Govt., 2008), with further reductions expected once departments completed their 
energy audits and travel plans. And, in the process of developing their emissions inventory 
and management plan, senior management awareness and learning around organizational 
carbon management, and climate mitigation in general, increased substantially (Fig. 7.7). 
Participation in the programme also significantly increased inter-ministry/ department 
networking, which fostered further awareness raising and helped to maintain the 
programme’s ethos beyond its operation (albeit to a lesser extent than during programme 
operation). 
In a similar vein, council participation in the CCP-NZ programme increased both senior 
management awareness around organizational carbon management and broadened inter-
council networking and collaboration on GHG emission reduction related objectives (Fig. 
7.7). By  the time the CCP-NZ programme ended, these actions ultimately resulted in total 
quantifiable emission reductions, stemming from participant activities from councils’ base-
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year through to June 30, 2009, in excess of 400,000 t-CO2e, or about 133,300 t-CO2e/y 
(CCP-NZ, 2009). Admittedly, ICLEI notes that “there remains significant potential for more 
emissions reductions from the local government sector;” with total quantifiable council 
emissions hovering around 22,000,000 t-CO2e/y, a reduction in the order of 133,333 t-CO2e/
y (or 0.6%) does not seem satisfactory (e.g. CCP-NZ, 2009, p. 10).389
Although many  councils involved in the programme considered their experience a success 
(Fig. 7.8), ICLEI B was less certain. Strictly  speaking, while the programme’s goal was to 
help  local government councils quantify their GHG emissions, it  was also to build off M1 
and achieve quantifiable GHG emission reductions. Despite quantifiable reductions in excess 
of 400,000 t-CO2e (CCP-NZ, 2009), ICLEI B (Table 5.5) conceded that it was too soon to 
know whether real emissions reductions were actually made: “Was it a success?  My key 
success criteria would be did it reduce CO2 emissions and I am yet to see that evidence. 
[CCP-NZ] perhaps was not there long enough to do that or to be able to account for it.” 
While it may have been too early  to see significant emission reductions, evidence from CS2 
S2 demonstrates that the majority  of councils believed that reductions did occur (Fig. 7.6). As 
for the co-benefits of participation in the programme, ICLEI B (Table 5.5) does acknowledge 
their value, but maintains that without actual reductions in CO2, “I can’t see how you can 
claim [the programme] as a success.”
In the end, whether the programmes were a success is less important, given their untimely 
termination, than what can be learned from the experience and improved on in the future. 
Though next steps will be discussed later in this chapter, for the purposes of this section, it is 
worthwhile repeating that a formal evaluation into the effectiveness of the CNPS and the 
CCP-NZ programmes did not occur.  As a result, it  may be difficult to learn from the 
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389  Because ICLEI aggregates corporate and community emissions when it presents emission reductions in CCP-NZ (2009), it is difficult to gauge the 
impact of councils’ in-house (corporate) reduction efforts. While greater detail may be gleaned from individual council emission reports, since not all 
councils joined the programme at the same time, progressed through the 5 milestone framework at the same rate, or provided complete data, and since not 
all councils are included in this study, it is difficult to effectively assess the data on this scale. Accepting this limitation, and to better assess the value of 
initiatives like the CCP-NZ programme, in the future, it would be interesting to explore each participant councils’ emissions and emissions reductions in 
isolation. As for the 16 councils included in this study, from individual base-year through individual forecast-year, total corporate emissions increased by 
about 9.3% overall, 86,339 t-CO2e to 94,451 t-CO2e (Table 3.18) (note that his does not include Auckland Regional Council, Kapiti Coast District Council 
or Dunedin City Council), and total community emissions increased by about 15% overall, 16,589,592 t-CO2e to 19,093,482 t-CO2e (Table 3.20) (note that 
his does not include Auckland Regional Council, Greater Wellington Regional Council, Hawkes Bay Regional Council, Kapiti Coast District Council or 
Dunedin City Council). As noted in Chapter 3, councils typically attribute GHG emission increases to population growth.
experience and improve the next iteration of the programmes. But that may be beside the 
point since leadership on climate mitigation remains a partisan concern in NZ.390 
8.5.2.  Embeddedness of Programme Values
Another possible indicator of programme success, while not a strictly quantitative measure, 
relates to whether the programmes’ ethos endured programme termination; was the 
programmes’ momentum sufficient to embed its values into the organization’s business as 
usual? In terms of lead-core CNPS programme participants, without a direct mandate from 
central government, carbon neutrality  is no longer a target which would therefore suggest that 
the ethos of the programme did not become embedded in organizational management. With 
that said, however, some organizations indicated that they will continue to manage and effort 
to reduce their carbon, albeit at a scaled back pace, with the caveat of cost neutrality, and in 
some instances, with the absence of a formal reduction target. 
For the Inland Revenue Department, on the other hand, the programme’s values have not 
endured, as is evident by the department’s complete reversal on carbon mitigation activities. 
This is perhaps not  a surprise given that the Inland Revenue Department’s GHG emissions 
represent 35% of the total lead-core organizations for the base year (Fig. 3.15). What is more, 
a significant proportion of Inland Revenue Department’s emissions are derived from energy 
(Fig. 3.20), which is a function of the national grid’s energy  mix, and thus beyond the 
department’s control. And while the department did identify  a 10% energy reduction per FTE 
target as part of its CNPS programme reduction plan, the majority  of its reduction targets 
were focused on transport (Table 3.10).
The experience within the CCP-NZ programme councils is similar, with council carbon 
management activities likewise continuing in a scaled-back manner.391  Having that said, the 
data suggested that  the majority  of councils that discussed the programme’s momentum 
indicated that  the momentum has carried forward, with three councils identifying that the 
momentum has in fact grown: “I think the momentum is there and I think it’s built even 
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390  This point reinforces the notion that the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programmes were terminated for reasons of political ideology, instead of merit or lack 
there of.
391  15 of the 16 SC2 S1 councils indicated that they were planning to continue, to some degree, the emission reductions efforts begun during their 
participation in the CCP-NZ programme. 
further…We’ve become more inspirational”(Table 5.5, Auckland Regional Council B). 
What’s more, the consensus among CS2 S1 councils is that the programme’s values have 
become embedded within organizational management (Fig. 7.8). And while this is 
particularly the case with respect to energy management and sustainable development, as 
Christchurch City Council (Table 5.5) explained, it is also exemplified by council’s belief in 
exercising a precautionary approach to future climate change affects in general: 
So the council’s policy talks about acknowledging that climate changes are 
happening. It’s adopted a precautionary approach to future works and 
planning. When the council’s developing new projects it takes account of 
the effects of climate change.
In spite of councils’ beliefs, ICLEI A (Table 5.5) suggested that councils have lost the 
programme’s momentum. Local Government New Zealand (Table 5.5), however, indicated 
otherwise, explaining that “councils are still looking for something, and they  still come back 
asking for you know, ‘what are we going to do now we don’t have CCP?’”
Interestingly, evidence from CS2 S2 word count analysis does not directly corroborate the 
data resulting from interviews with the senior managers. For example, while the use of the 
words ‘climate change’ and ‘carbon,’ respectively, in council Annual Reports did increase to 
five of seven councils for 2009 - 2010 (Fig. 6.1), ‘carbon management’ continued to remain 
absent from councils’ first year of programme membership  through 2009 - 2010. Reference to 
‘Communities for Climate Protection - New Zealand’ (or ‘CCP-NZ’) similarly  was not 
present in the latter years of programme membership.392  Additionally, zero councils made 
reference to ‘carbon management’ in their LTCCP 2009 - 2019 or Annual Plan 2010 - 2011 
(Fig. 6.2). If the values of the CCP-NZ programme had become embedded within councils’ 
organizational management structure, would words such as ‘carbon management’ and 
reference to CCP-NZ, perhaps in a transitionary fashion, be mentioned in council Annual 
Reports and Plans?
Perhaps not. Review of council Annual Reports, Annual Plans and LTCCPs occurred 
approximately one year after SC2 S1 interviews, and just before SC2 S2 interviews. And, it 
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392 Yet ‘Communities for Climate Protection - New Zealand’ (or ‘CCP-NZ’) was present in 71% of council LTCCP 2009-2019 (Fig. 6.2).
was interviewees from the SC2 S1 interviews that indicated programme values had in fact 
become embedded within council’s organizational management. As noted in Chapter 5, many 
senior managers responsible for the delivery of the CCP-NZ programme were disestablished 
shortly following the programme’s termination. While this limited the study sample for SC2 
S1, the trend continued for SC2 S2, with many  senior managers that were present for SC2 S1 
interviews becoming disestablished before SC2 S2 interviews could occur. Ultimately, within 
the CCP-NZ programme councils, and specifically within SC2 councils, in many councils 
senior managers associated with carbon mitigation had become redundant. This observation 
is further supported by ICLEI B (Table 5.4), who suggested that within NZ in general, as a 
result of huge staff turnover, there is no corporate memory within Government agencies. As 
for the CCP-NZ programme specifically, ICLEI B (Table 5.5) explained that:
Government programmes won’t learn anything from what we did – won’t 
learn anything.  They’ll just sail on in blissfully  unaware, probably  because 
anyone you talk to now has no knowledge of what we did anyway and 
certainly no knowledge of the underpinning values to it.
Because of significant organizational disestablishment, both within the CNPS and the CCP-
NZ programme agencies, it is difficult to accept that the ethos of these two programmes has 
carried forward within the respective agencies.393
8.5.3.  NZ’s Path Forward on Carbon Mitigation
Before National was elected to lead Government, it identified the importance of confronting 
climate change394  as part  of its economic growth strategy: “National is committed to growing 
our economy. Confronting climate change will be a vital part of the policy  mix for fueling 
that growth” (Key, 2007). In addition, National recognized the potential liability of inaction, 
particularly with respect to NZ’s famous brand image:
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393 Alternatively, the disestablishment of the senior managers, while in line with the termination of the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programmes, may have more 
to do with Government efforts to reduce the size of the public service in general. See for example SSC (2012) which indicates that public service staffing 
decreased from approximately 45,297 in 2008 to 43,595 in 2011, with manager and policy analyst positions decreasing by 85 and 800 FTE, respectively, 
between the same period. See also NZ Govt. (2012a) for public service FTE reduction projections for 2012.
A study into the actual rate of disestablishment among senior managers responsible for the delivery of the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programmes, within their 
respective agency, could further improve the validity of this statement.
Had Government allowed the programmes to run their course, organizations could have experienced significant learning around process (inventory 
building) and application (emissions reductions). Instead, as the data have demonstrated, memory loss will most certainly occur.
394  National recognized the importance of climate change, and advocated the need to act decisively: “The biggest environmental challenge of our time: 
global climate change…The National Party will ensure that New Zealand acts decisively to confront this challenge” (Key 2007, p. 4).
In the decades ahead, peoples’ perceptions around climate change will 
affect the brand image of New Zealand and its exports. New Zealand must 
take credible steps to reduce greenhouse gas emissions or risk becoming a 
trading pariah (Key, 2007).
While brand image is important for trade, it is critical for NZ’s tourism identity which is 
largely centered on the idea that NZ is ‘clean and green’ and ‘100% Pure’ (e.g. MFE, 
2009a).395  But in a recent interview with the BBC, Prime Minter Key provided a lackluster 
defence of NZ’s clean and green image (Murray, 2011). For Pearce (2009), NZ’s branding 
rings hollow when viewed through its Kyoto commitment as well,396  particularly given the 
23% rise in net emissions since 1990 (NZ Govt., 2009b).397  Whether in response to the 
declining validity  of its green branding, or as Tourism NZ (2011) claims, to “highlight the 
many individual experiences on offer,” NZ has shifted the ‘100% Pure’ branding to ‘100% 
Pure You’ (see also Caims, 2011).398  And while National maintains that  “the question is no 
longer whether New Zealand should act  on climate change – the question is how we best 
act...” (Key, 2007). Also, NZ remains the only country  among the OECD countries that does 
not require by law independent state of the environment reports. Though the Minister for the 
Environment concedes the need to change this oversight (Smith, 2011b), it does beg the 
question, how ‘clean and green’ is NZ?399
Moreover, while Smith (2009b) affirms that “dealing with climate change effects must be part 
of existing planning for Government...”, and that “it  is now business as usual,” public sector 
organizations continue to identify a lack of Government support and leadership for climate 
mitigation. What’s more, a study conducted by NZ’s Office of the Auditor-General 
demonstrates that emissions quantification is in fact not business as usual for at least 53% of 
the 77 local authorities covered by  their study400  (OAG, 2011). This trend is common on 
global scale as well, with the literature suggesting that while public sector decision-makers 
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395  As noted previously, many tourist destinations are adopting an environmental ethos and branding themselves as carbon neutral (e.g. Gossling & 
Schumacher, 2010). According to True & Gao (2010, p. 43), NZ’s brand, on an annual basis, is worth “NZ$530 million to the tourism sector and NZ$938 
million to the economy as a whole.”
396 Given that NZ recently downgraded its Kyoto commitment to a non-binding target for the second commitment period, 2013 to 2020 (NZ Govt., 2012b), 
perhaps Pearce (2009)’s sentiment is accurate.
397 See also Milne et al. (2010) and Milne & Grubnic (2011) for a discussion on NZ’s Kyoto liability. 
398 Pearce (2009) notes that NZ tourism could decrease by 68% if its ‘clean and green’ image were to prove false.
399 Incidentally, the National-led Government recently scrapped the five-yearly State of the Environment Report, a decision the public was made aware of 
by the Green Party, not National directly. While Government claims the five-yearly report will be replaced by interim regular report cards, critics argue that 
essential indicators have been removed from the report: http://www.nzherald.co.nz/health/news/article.cfm?c_id=204&objectid=10843742.
400 As OAG (2011) identified, while these authorities are not currently measuring their GHG emissions, they do not have plans to measure in future either.
are indeed beginning to engage the climate change discourse, priority  for action remains low 
(e.g. Brody et al., 2010); and in the absence of supportive policy from Government, it 
remains difficult  for public organizations to make significant contributions to climate change 
mitigation (e.g. Betsill, 2001). 
As for Labour’s ambition to lead the world on carbon neutrality, highlighting the gap between 
Labour’s “lofty goal” and NZ’s track record in this area, Smith (2009b) identifies that this too 
could in effect harm NZ’s international reputation. Smith (2009b) goes on to suggest that NZ 
should instead undertake effort to do its fair share, adding that..:
The climate change policy the Government inherited was not credible. We 
have to give New Zealand’s climate change policy a reality check. We are 
not claiming New Zealand can be a world leader in emissions cuts or the 
first carbon-neutral country in the world.
Given the CNPS programme participants heavy reliance on offsets to achieve carbon 
neutrality, it does seem fair to question the integrity of the programme’s ethos for 
sustainability. But with that said, the programme was charting new territory. Further, because 
the programme ended prematurely, it  is difficult to project how organizational emission 
reduction efforts would have evolved beyond the first commitment period.
Ultimately, with the non-fossil fuel proportion of NZ’s energy mix in consistent  decline, and 
the doubling of coal-fired power generation on the horizon (e.g. Kelly, 2007),401  Smith 
(2009b) acknowledges that “it is just unrealistic to continue to pretend we are, or can be, 
world leaders in reducing emissions.”  Yet Government’s new energy strategy does aim to 
generate 90% of NZ’s energy by renewable sources by 2025 (NZ Govt., 2011a). And while 
the literature suggests (e.g. Sohel et al., 2009; Packer, 2009; Penniall & Williamson, 2009; 
Sovacool, 2009; Mason et al., 2010) that national energy policies do tend to focus on the 
grid’s mitigative potential via renewable sources of energy, the caveat in NZ is that supply 
must not  be impeded (NZ Govt., 2011a). Moreover as highlighted in Birchall et al. (2012), 
while Labour’s energy  strategy emphasised sustainability as a key objective, National’s 
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401  NZ’s new energy strategy highlights the tie between economic performance and social wellbeing and energy security, emphasizing the importance of 
fossil fuels (MED, 2011). Notwithstanding the new strategy’s mandate for exploration, exploitation and utilization of fossil fuels, however, the strategy does 
acknowledge that environmental management is critical if NZ’s economy is to reach its potential (MED, 2011).
strategy remains focused on exploration, exploitation and utilisation of fossil fuels, with 
economic growth as the core outcome. 
In terms of a national emissions reduction target, Government has adopted the target  of 50% 
reduction in CO2e, as compared to 1990 levels, by 2050, with a “responsibility target” of 
10-20% emissions reduction below 1990 levels by 2020.402  And though Government’s new 
target may seem low from an international perspective,403 its legitimacy is further hobbled by 
the fact  that the target is contingent “upon an effective global agreement” (NZ Govt., 2011b), 
which in coming years may in fact prove elusive given the resistance of critical emitters such 
as China and the USA. Along this line, Government recently  announced that instead of 
signing onto the second commitment period of the Kyoto Protocol, beginning 1 January 
2013, NZ will make a voluntary pledge under the Convention Framework (NZ Govt., 
2012b).404  Though Government justified the decision by explaining that a pledge under the 
Convention Framework will align “its climate change efforts with developed and developing 
countries which collectively  are responsible for 85% of global emissions” (NZ Govt., 
2012b),405  it nonetheless demonstrates National’s lack of commitment to climate change 
mitigation. Again, this is not surprising, particularly  when considered in the context of the 
uncertainty surrounding net estimates of NZ’s liability under the Protocol’s first  commitment 
period, estimates which Milne et al. (2010) describe as a “seesaw” because of their 
variability.406 
As for Government’s revised emissions trading scheme, though promoted as “strik[ing] a 
better balance between NZ’s environmental responsibilities and economic 
opportunities” (Key, 2010),  is likewise an example of National’s weak resolve for climate 
change mitigation. This is evident from Government’s slowing of the next stage of the 
scheme, and the delayed entry of the agriculture sector, which was due for full obligation in 
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402 See NZ Govt. (2009b) for specific details about NZ’s 2020 commitment. 
403  The UK for example, through the UK Climate Change Act, has a legally binding target of 80% GHG emission reductions below 1990 by 2050 (DECC, 
2012).
404 Ironically, NZ’s announcement to shift to a voluntary pledge took place on the same day that the Australian Government committed to the Protocol’s 
second phase.
405 The 85% includes, for example, the United States, Japan, China, India, Canada, Brazil and Russia.
406 Milne & Grubnic (2011) explain that because NZ “seems set to pin its hopes on forestry offsets,” the surplus/ liability (using the most optimistic and 
pessimistic estimates from forestry) amounts to a range of (+) NZ$851 million to (-) NZ$137, a NZ$1 billion variation.
2015 (Smith, 2011b).407  On the other hand, as noted in Chapter 3, the inclusion of emissions 
from the agriculture sector in the NZ Emissions Trading Scheme may  have been overly 
ambitious in the first place, given that NZ is among the first countries to include this measure 
(e.g. Raea, 2009), and particularly given that this sector is responsible for the greatest share 
of NZ’s emissions. Ultimately, as the literature suggests (e.g. Clo, 2009; Lohmann & Sexton, 
2010), because of over-allocation of allowances (typically  to the biggest polluters), schemes 
such as NZ’s emissions trading scheme tend to result in market saturation. This, in the end, 
renders such schemes economically and environmentally trivial and ineffective (e.g. Milne & 
Grubnic, 2011). 
Perhaps then, National’s laggard approach to emissions trading is a moot point. But since 
over the last two decades NZ’s energy use per capita has been increasing408  while in most of 
the developed world per capita energy  use has been decreasing (Renowden, 2007), and 
notwithstanding the fact that because of NZ’s unique emissions profile “reducing carbon 
pollution is more difficult  [for NZ] than most developed countries” (Smith 2009b), NZ may 
have to reassess what it means by ‘fair share’ of the global burden.  
In November 2012 Prime Minister Key  publicly acknowledged that the previous Government 
“may have had a stronger emphasis” on climate change,409  and reiterated that “we never 
wanted to be a world leader in climate change we've always wanted to be what  is 
affectionately  called a fast follower.”410  And while Government concedes that  the 
environment does matter, “[Government] wants to make sure that [it is] not prioritising that 
over everything else,” with Key assuring that he believes “[Government has] got  that balance 
about right.”411  As for NZ’s withdrawal from the second phase of the Kyoto Protocol, Green 
Party MP Kennedy Graham describes the decision as  “NZ wilfully  turn[ing] its back on the 
rest of the world... we have turned our back on our moral and political obligations” (Graham, 
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407 A recent (October 2012) article published by ONE News criticizes amendments to the scheme, particularly the “two-for-one” deal which essentially 
requires high emitters to pay for only half their total emissions, emphasizing the concern that Government’s goal with the scheme is not climate change 
mitigation but economic growth. The article quotes Labour MP David Cunliffe: "We have the bizarre and frankly disgusting picture of a Government so 
craven to its traditional agricultural and big business backers that it's selling out the future of my children and your children and because they are confused 
about science that puts a 95 per cent-plus confidence on this change:"  http://tvnz.co.nz/politics-news/bill-halting-ets-expansion-sparks-heated-
debate-5163588.
408 This is further exacerbated by the energy sector’s transportation related emissions, which increased by 66% between 1990 and 2009 (NZ Govt., 2011c).
409 See 3 News, 12 November 2012: http://www.3news.co.nz/Key-defends-no-to-Kyoto-Protocol/tabid/1607/articleID/276309/Default.aspx.
410 See ONE News, 12 November 2012: http://tvnz.co.nz/politics-news/john-key-defends-kyoto-decision-5209727.
411 See 3 News, 12 November 2012: http://www.3news.co.nz/Key-defends-no-to-Kyoto-Protocol/tabid/1607/articleID/276309/Default.aspx.
2012). Ultimately, in placing national economic growth over its international commitment to 
mitigate climate change, the National-led has further demonstrated its ideological shift away 
from the previous Government’s desire to lead by example in this important area.
8.6.  SUMMARY AND LOCATING THE RESEARCH
8.6.1.  Summary of Discussion Chapter
The CNPS and the CCP-NZ programmes grew out of the Labour-led Government’s desire to 
make sustainability a cornerstone of NZ’s national identity. This came at a time when 
sustainability and climate change were featuring prominently on international agendas, and 
Labour wanted to be bold in this area. In particular, Labour wanted to be at the forefront of 
the global effort on carbon neutrality  (Clark, 2007cc). In 2008 the NZ government changed 
from a Labour to a National Government, and this resulted in a shift in Government’s carbon 
neutrality strategy, including the termination of the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programmes.  
Under the National-led Government, NZ is no longer aiming to lead on climate change. Not 
surprisingly, the findings suggest a strong political element associated with programme 
termination, yet it is evident that programmatic inefficiencies were rampant. Nevertheless, 
narratives from public sector senior managers involved in the CNPS and the CCP-NZ 
programmes suggested that the initiatives delivered both emission reductions and cost 
savings, as well as significant learning around climate change and carbon management, and 
fostered a broadened network circle.
In the end, given the new Government’s lack of leadership on carbon management and 
neutrality, notwithstanding the desire of some organizations to continue with programme 
objectives, NZ organisational resolve towards these goals has weakened. 
8.6.2.  Locating the Research
As has been demonstrated throughout this study, there is a dearth of empirical academic work 
that examines how public sector organizations make sense of the climate change discourse, 
and how they determine strategies to manage their carbon and achieve carbon neutrality (e.g. 
Ball et al. 2009b; Brody et al., 2010; Milne & Grubnic, 2011). 
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The processes of conception, outworking and termination of the CNPS and the CCP-NZ 
programmes provided an opportunity to study the beliefs, values, commitments and 
narratives at play in NZ organizations which were seeking to act on climate change. 
Additionally, the ending of these initiatives provides an excellent opportunity to understand 
how the new NZ government values the need to manage carbon, providing insight into public 
sector organizational resolve towards carbon management, and Government’s new direction 
on domestic and international climate change policy in general. 
Through critical investigation of NZ government public sector organizations’ cognitions, 
commitments and actions for carbon mitigation (in some instances carbon neutrality), and the 
application of policy  theory (termination theory), this study endeavours to narrow the gap in 
the literature and contribute to the scholarly discussion on climate change.
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CHAPTER 9 - CONCLUSIONS
9.1.  INTRODUCTION
9.1.1.  Introduction to Chapter 9
The CNPS and the CCP-NZ programmes grew out of the Labour-led Government’s desire to 
make sustainability a pillar of NZ’s national identity. This came at  a time when sustainability 
and climate change were featuring prominently on international agendas, and Labour wanted 
to be a force in this area.
While National openly recognised climate change as the greatest environmental challenge of 
our time (before and after winning the 2008 election), and advocated the need to incorporate 
climate policy into economic growth plans, it did not support Labour’s ambition for 
leadership on carbon mitigation. Arguing that actions associated with the CNPS and the CCP-
NZ programmes should occur without costly initiatives, the newly elected National-led 
Government quickly dismantled the CNPS programme and halted funding, ultimately ending 
the CCP-NZ programme.
9.1.2.  Chapter Purpose and Outline
Building on the analytical discussion of the previous chapter, the aim of Chapter 9 is to 
provide a succinct assessment of the research findings as they relate to the study’s objectives, 
and then to discuss the implications of these findings in the broader context of theory and 
practice. Additionally, while avenues for future research have been identified throughout the 
thesis, this chapter provides a short summary of interesting themes for further exploration.
Chapter 9 is divided into five sections, (9.1) Introduction; (9.2) Primary Research Findings; 
(9.3) Implications of Research Findings; (9.4) Future Research Directions; and, (9.5) 
Conclusion. Section 9.1 provides an introduction to the chapter. Sections 9.2 and 9.3 explore 
the study’s research findings, first  as the findings relate to the study’s two objectives, and 
then in the context of the findings’ theoretical and practical implications. Section 9.4 
proposes several themes for future research. And, section 9.5, the chapters’ final section, 
provides an ultimate conclusion to the chapter and the thesis.
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9.2.  PRIMARY RESEARCH FINDINGS
9.2.1.  Research Objective 1
Determine why NZ’s newly elected National-led Government cancelled the 
Carbon Neutral Public Service programme and halted funding, therefore 
ending the Communities for Climate Protection programme.
Using deLeon’s model for programme termination to explore the dismantling of the CNPS 
and the CCP-NZ programmes, this study finds that though economic constraints and 
programmatic inefficiencies may have played a role, political ideology was the primary 
rationale for programme termination.
NZ’s newly elected National-led Government indicated that the CNPS and the CCP-NZ 
programmes were terminated for reasons of conventional neoliberal economic ideology; 
despite the sunk costs, immediate termination of the programmes was considered a sound 
method to stem further expense. Unfortunately, due to limited access to financial information, 
it was not possible to critically assess the cost/benefit relationship of the programmes beyond 
insights gained from the participants.
As for programmatic inefficiencies, the narratives indicated that programmatic challenges 
were endemic. The initiatives nevertheless enjoyed some success, with senior managers from 
both programmes indicating that emission reductions and cost savings were experienced, 
along with several non-financial benefits such as increased awareness around climate change 
and carbon mitigation, and improved network circles.
Ultimately, given the preponderance of evidence from the data, the CNPS and the CCP-NZ 
programmes were both dismantled for reasons of political ideology. Sustainability  and the 
desire to demonstrate leadership on carbon mitigation was a cornerstone of Clark’s Labour-
led Government. Key’s National-led Government expressed a need to get beyond unrealistic 
aspirations and to give NZ’s climate agenda a reality  check, citing the gap between Labour’s 
ambition to lead the world on carbon neutrality and NZ’s increasing contribution to global 
GHG emissions as justification for the shift in policy.
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9.2.2.  Research Objective 2
Determine whether despite the discontinuation of these two programmes, 
NZ government organizations will continue to strive for carbon emission 
reductions and carbon neutrality.
With the ideological shift  towards strong neoliberal market environmentalism, Government 
support for initiatives like the CNPS and the CCP-NZ programmes has declined. And though 
the National-led Government does believe that the good cost benefit initiatives associated 
with these programmes should continue, central Government emphasises that the actions 
should occur without requiring Government assistance.  
The data demonstrate, however, a clear need for Government leadership and support in this 
area. Since the termination of the CNPS programme efforts to achieve carbon neutrality have 
ceased, with resolve towards carbon management in decline. The experience within the CCP-
NZ programme organizations is similar, with plans for carbon neutrality  recast as aspirational 
and carbon management as non-target orientated-measures, but not necessarily emission 
reduction-driven.
Overall, notwithstanding the desire of some organizations to continue with programme 
objectives, NZ public sector organisational resolve towards these goals has weakened. On the 
national level, Government’s new climate change policy focuses on a revised emissions 
trading scheme and a national emission reduction target of 50% reduction in CO2e, as 
compared to 1990 levels, by 2050, including an aspiration to achieve 90% of NZ’s energy  by 
renewable sources by  2025 (NZ Govt., 2011a). However, with its recent announcement to 
move away  from the Kyoto Protocol’s second commitment, Government is unclear how 
national emission targets will evolve in the near-term (NZ Govt., 2012b).
9.3.  IMPLICATIONS OF RESEARCH FINDINGS
9.3.1.  Theoretical Implications of Findings
Programme termination has remained an understudied field since its first application by 
Biller in 1976 (Graddy & Ye, 2008), yet it remains a potentially important component of the 
public policy process (e.g. deLeon, 1997). This research contributes to policy theory  literature 
by applying deLeon’s rationales for programme termination to the ending of the CNPS and 
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the CCP-NZ programmes. The theoretical implications of the study’s findings support the 
notion that “what one party views as frivolous expense or unforgivable error, another party 
views as indispensable...” (Lewis, 2002, p. 91). 
This research demonstrates that the application of deLeon’s rationales for programme 
termination is appropriate for the contemporary field of public sector organizational carbon 
mitigation. DeLeon’s approach has proven sufficiently  robust  to tease out the nuances of 
vested interest (programme architects) and experience (senior managers). 
Though deLeon’s theory for programme termination is useful on its own, the inclusion of 
deLeon’s obstacles to programme termination provides more depth to the analysis and can 
help in the final development of a conclusion.
While other theories were considered for this research, termination theory was ultimately 
selected because it  allows for an exploration of the evolution of the CNPS and the CCP-NZ 
programmes, from inception through termination. Given the dual objectives of the research, 
and the subjects involved in the case studies, deLeon’s theory for programme termination has 
proven the correct choice in theoretical framework for this study.
With that said, expanding deLeon’s rationales for programme termination, to include 
programme value, for example, could increase the model’s level of complexity and render the 
analysis more rigorous. Likewise, the inclusion of subcategories could tease-out some of the 
nuances that make a specific rationale for termination more obvious and/ or appropriate.
9.3.2.  Practical Implications of Findings
Climate change presents society with an unprecedented challenge, which is made more 
difficult by  the wicked nature of the challenge and sheer complexity of policy solutions. 
While governments from around the world have recently instituted public sector carbon 
management initiatives designed to mitigate against climate change, NZ has terminated two 
programmes intended to help NZ public sector organizations reduce their carbon liability. 
Through empirical case-based narratives, this research goes beyond existing academic 
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research to provide a critical analysis of how the NZ Government perceives, rationalizes and 
acts on climate change and carbon mitigation. 
The practical implication of these findings surround the notion that if a programme is aligned 
with Labour’s ethos, the National-led Government will likely terminate the programme 
regardless of the potential value for climate mitigation.  This idea is supported by the findings 
which indicated that Government did not perform a formal evaluation of the effectiveness of 
either the CNPS or the CCP-NZ programmes, yet deemed both to be economically unsound: 
for example, in order to deem a programme economically  unsound or inefficient, some 
method of evaluation to determine such would be necessary, whereas, if political ideology is 
the motivation for termination, an evaluation of the programme’s effectiveness may be 
redundant.
The findings also shed light on the decision dynamics of senior managers faced with 
balancing near-term economic with long-term environmental challenges while operating 
within a diminished budget  and increasing responsibility. A further implication of these 
findings concerns NZ government organizations’ resolve for carbon emission reductions and 
carbon neutrality.  This study  demonstrates that while a strong business case can be made for 
reducing organizational carbon emissions, NZ government organizations do indeed require 
Government financial support in order to pursue such actions. Or, given that the CNPS or the 
CCP-NZ programmes were the impetus for organizational action on climate change, 
Government support is needed at least to cultivate interest in such initiatives, whether 
through a mandated or voluntary effort.
From a technical perspective, given that ICLEI is in the process of scoping an EU expansion 
of its CCP initiative, findings from this study may  serve an instructional function. 
Specifically, demonstration of lessons learned from the CCP-NZ programme experience may 
assuage local government buy-in and thus facilitate programme uptake throughout the EU.412  
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412 While ISO compliance  was not a requirement for the CCP and the CCP-NZ programmes, perhaps the EU’s iteration of the programme would gain 
credibility if indeed it was compliant. Moreover, the CCP-NZ experience can shed light on the appropriateness of ICLEI’s 5 milestone framework: is it 
applicable in different countries, or even within the same country but in different regions? If the framework is too malleable, does it lose comparative, 
quantitative and functional value? 
9.4.  FUTURE RESEARCH DIRECTIONS
Through the course of this PhD study many further interesting questions have become 
evident, some of which are not quite central to the objectives of the research.  While a 
selection of these questions are addressed in the footnotes throughout the text, others will 
remain the fodder for future research. The following section identifies a selection of themes 
for future inquiry.
Adaptation versus Mitigation
An interesting area for future research concerns the prevalence of adaptation versus 
mitigation in local government planning and policy. While local authorities have traditionally 
focused their environmental change policy on adaptive capacity (i.e. watershed management, 
coastal erosion, and infrastructure), central governments are beginning to shift  responsibility 
for climate change mitigation onto local authorities (i.e. carbon management and emission 
reductions) (Greenaway & Carswell, 2009). This presents an opportunity to explore the 
decision dynamics local authorities face when confronted with competing priorities whilst 
operating within a limited budget. 
Carbon Mitigation Strategies
Another area for further research concerns whether the rhetoric surrounding carbon 
management strategies matches realised emission reductions. While Busch (2010)  and others 
have explored this dynamic in the private sector, there remains a dearth of attention to public 
sector organizations. This study does go some way to address this gap, yet the efficacy of 
carbon accounting, particularly with regard to public sector carbon neutral strategies, remains 
an area in need of further academic attention (e.g. Hopwood, 2009; Milne & Grubnic, 2011). 
Building off this study, the gap in the literature could be further narrowed through research 
into the completeness, consistency and accuracy of the inventories developed for the CNPS 
programme participant organizations. Given that  interviewees identified data availability as a 
key methodological frustration, this could provide an assessment of the programme’s efficacy 
beyond the narratives.
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Carbon Offset - Manage - Mitigate Threshold
As identified by Ball et al. (2009b), and reiterated in this study, an important  area for further 
research is the manage-mitigate threshold associated with public sector organizational carbon 
offsetting. In this sense, what are the drivers that  determine when it is beneficial to offset as 
opposed to reducing emissions further, and what criteria is employed for this decision? In the 
case of the CNPS programme, the offset threshold for the two most ambitious departments 
was 13% for the Ministry of Economic Development and 19% for the Department of 
Conservation. Why are these two thresholds so low? What does this imply about 
Government’s initial intention for leadership? Was the Labour-led Government seeking to 
demonstrate “business-a-little-less-than-usual” (e.g. Ball et al 2009a), or a paradigm shift in 
climate mitigation?
Influence on the Private Sector
This study identified that private sector interest in organizational carbon neutrality 
deteriorated when the CNPS programme collapsed. Thus an interesting area for future 
research relates to private sector involvement with organizations participating in the CNPS 
programme. Specifically, what was the nature of the relationship, were the private sector 
organizations also seeking to achieve carbon neutrality? If, as the narratives imply, private 
sector organizations ended their pursuit of carbon neutrality when the CNPS programme 
ended, what does this imply about private sector organizational resolve for carbon 
mitigation? 
The CNPS Programme’s Adherence to the GHG Protocol’s Principles
Organizations involved in the CNPS programme prepared and developed their emissions 
inventory report in accordance with ISO 14064-1, with verification provided by Det Norske 
Veritas. Each of the 34 inventories achieved a positive assurance: “A positive assurance 
report has been given over the assertions and quantifications included in this report” (MFEd, 
2008). The GHG Protocol has five key principles: (1) Relevance; (2) Completeness; (3) 
Consistency; (4) Accuracy; and, (5) Transparency. Given the plethora of programmatic 
difficulties, it would be interesting to explore how closely the organizations adhered to the 
principles of the Protocol, and by  extension, what variables or criteria were employed by Det 
Norske Veritas’ to determine assurance.
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Strength of ICLEI’s CCP Programme
While this study  has identified weaknesses in the NZ arm of ICLEI’s CCP initiative, were 
these weaknesses endemic to NZ or are they  present within the CCP programme in general? 
ICLEI is in the process of expanding its emission reduction framework into Europe.413  An 
analysis of the CCP parent programme’s design and methodology could be instructional and 
shed light on the potential drawbacks of the programme and its ability  to disseminate beyond 
Australia.
9.5.  CONCLUSION
While economics and inefficiencies are cited openly as motivating programme termination, in 
practice political ideology tends to be responsible for the majority  of government 
terminations (e.g. Cameron, 1978; deLeon, 1982a, 1987; Frantz, 2002; Lewis, 2002; Adam et 
al. 2007). Though this is true in this research as well, elements of all three of deLeon’s 
rationales for programme termination were present in the dismantling of the CNPS and the 
CCP-NZ programmes.
Both programmes demonstrated emission reductions and cost savings prior to termination. 
And, while non-financial benefits of the programmes remain to be fully assessed, participants 
identified a number of co-benefits associated with participation in the programmes. 
Ultimately, some government organizations will continue to include climate change and 
carbon mitigation in their management strategies (albeit to a lesser degree than during 
programme operation), others however, have pulled back completely. This suggests that 
without a direct mandate and financial support from Government, some government 
organizations will not incorporate climate change thinking into business as usual.
As an alternative to programme termination, by allowing the CNPS and the CCP-NZ 
programmes to formally evolve into Government-mandated (and financially  supported) 
carbon management strategies, Government could have redefined its carbon agenda without 
significant corporate memory loss and nullified the need for offsetting (and particularly the 
high degree of reliance upon it). In this respect, transition to carbon management would have 
allowed Government to better capitalise on costs already incurred, the investment in learning 
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413 It would also be useful to consider the effectiveness of the Partners for Climate Protection (PCP) programme, the Canadian arm of the CCP programme.
around carbon accounting, and the leadership demonstrated both nationally and 
internationally.  Importantly, this approach would have demonstrated to NZ that the National-
led Government is openminded, resourceful and able to recognise the value of programmes 
that were intended to improve NZ government organizations’ carbon footprint, not simply 
serve partisan ideology.414
If Government were to introduce another iteration of either the CNPS or CCP-NZ 
programmes, in addition to focusing on carbon management rather than carbon neutrality, 
the initiative would have to be bipartisan in order to survive subsequent political shifts. In 
order to achieve universal support the programme must demonstrate that energy and financial 
savings will be achieved, as well as reductions in GHG emissions. 
To improve the efficiency and effectiveness of programme delivery and application, the 
scheme would have to enjoy executive support within the prescribed agencies. This can be 
achieved by including executive and senior management in the scoping and execution phases 
of programme development. Programme efficiency  and effectiveness can also be improved 
by ensuring adequate time for internal capacity-building around climate change discourse and 
the practical component of carbon accounting and management. And, in terms of design, the 
programme should include benchmarks that facilitate comparison within the NZ public sector 
as well as internationally; milestones that allow progression to be measured should also be 
included. Administratively, the programme should be run by EECA, given the organization’s 
mandate for energy conservation and energy efficiency. Since it is not realistic to expect all 
government agencies to create a specific management position for climate change or 
sustainability, each agency  should nominate a representative (perhaps under an energy 
manager) who will work closely with the lead agency. 
From a financial perspective, the programme should initially be funded by central 
Government (i.e. for audits associated with emission inventory development). Moving 
forward, Government should provide seed funding for the internal programme representative, 
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414 Data resulting from the semi-structured interviews suggested that the new National-led government is not interested in supporting public organization 
carbon management or carbon neutral initiatives. However, as alluded to previously, it was indicated that good cost-benefit initiatives should occur without a 
costly Government-run programme (e.g. Table 5.4, Ministry for the Environment A). Given National’s current climate change agenda (namely a weakened 
emissions trading scheme), it is not likely that Government will further explore public agency carbon mitigation.
or for the creation of a management position, depending on the size of the agency. To make 
clear Government’s expectations, central Government must be transparent and forthcoming 
with regard to the programme’s funding structure.
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APPENDIX - TABLES
Table 3.1:  List of CNPS programme participants and their associated 
  abbreviations
Department Abbreviation
Archives New Zealand Archives
Department of Corrections Corrections
Crown Law Office Crown Law
New Zealand Customs Service Customs
Department of Building and Housing DBH
Department of Conservation DOC
Department of Internal Affairs DOIA
Department of Labour DOL
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet DPMC
Education Review Office ERO
Government Communications Security Bureau GCSB
Inland Revenue Department IRD
Land Information New Zealand LINZ
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry MAF
Ministry for Culture and Heritage MCH
Ministry of Economic Development MED
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade MFAT
Ministry for the Environment MFE
Ministry of Fisheries MFISH
Ministry of Defence MOD
Ministry of Education MOE
Ministry of Health MOH
Ministry of Justice MOJ
Ministry of Research, Science, and Technology MORST
Ministry of Transport MOT
Ministry of Pacific Island Affairs MPIA
Ministry of Social Development MSD
Ministry of Women's Affairs MWA
National Library of New Zealand NLNZ
New Zealand Food Safety Authority NZFSA
State Services Commission SSC
Statistics New Zealand STATSNZ
Te Puni Kokiri TPK
Treasury, The Treasury
Lead-core departments (6)
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Table 3.2:  List of CCP-NZ programme participants and their associated 
  abbreviations
Local Government Abbreviation Year Joined CCP-NZ* Milestone Reached*
Regional 
Council
Auckland ARC 2006 4
Environment Canterbury ECRC 2004 2
Environment Waikato EWRC 2007 1
Greater Wellington GWRC 2007 1
Hawkes Bay HBRC 2007 1
Taranaki TRC 2004 2
District 
Council
Carterton CDC 2004 3
Far North FNDC 2007 1
Franklin FDC 2007 3
Kaikoura KDC 2004 3
Kaipara KaiDC 2007 1
Kapiti Coast KCDC 2004 3
Masterton MDC 2004 3
New Plymouth NPDC 2007 2
Papakura PDC 2006 1
Rodney RodDC 2004 1
Rotorua RDC 2005 3
Southland SDC 2005 3
South Waikato SWDC 2004 3
South Wairarapa SWaiDC 2005 3
Waipa WDC 2007 1
Western Bay of Plenty WBPDC 2008 1
City 
Council
Auckland ACC 2005 1
Christchurch CCC 2004 5
Dunedin DCC 2006 1
Hamilton HCC 2004 4
Hutt HuttCC 2008 Political Declaration
Manukau MCC 2006 1
Nelson NCC 2007 3
North Shore NSCC 2005 1
Palmerston North PNCC 2008 1
Porirua PCC 2007 1
Waitakere WaiCC 2004 4
Wellington WCC 2004 5
* Data sourced from Communities for Climate Protection – New Zealand 2 Actions Profile 2009
Study Selection (16 councils)
Table 3.3:  New Zealand’s total (gross) emissions by gas in 1990 to 2009
  Source: NZ Govt. (2011c). Note: CO2, CH4 and N2O values exclude emissions and removals from LULUCF. 
  The % change for hydrofluorocarbons is not applicable (NA) as production of hydrofluorocarbons in 1990 
  was not occurring (NO). Columns may not total due to rounding.
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Table 3.4:  New Zealand’s emissions and removals by sector in 1990 to 2009
  Source: NZ Govt. (2011c). Note: LULUCF includes CO2 removals and emissions of CO2, CH4 and N2O. 
  Net removals from the LULUCF sector are as reported under the Climate Change Convention. Columns may 
  not total due to rounding.
Table 3.5:  CNPS core department emissions profile for base-year July 1, 2006 to 
  June 30, 2007
Department*
GHG 
emissions 
weights for 
base-year 
July 1, 2006 
- June 30, 
2007        
(t-CO2e/y)**
GHG emissions weights by scope         
(t-CO2e/y)**
GHG emissions by source  
(%)***
FTE**
GHG 
emissions 
per FTE     
(t-CO2e/y)**Scope 1 Scope 2 Scope 3 Energy Transport Waste
Archives 1041.40525 402.77793 507.3598218 131.2675 90.5 7.5 2 109.5 9.51055021
Corrections^^^ 51903 37980 8246 5677 44 12 3 6541 7.93502523
Crown Law 491.85403 0 188.01117 303.84286 56 38 6 172.6 2.84967572
Customs 3851.63377 666.29637 524.7078033 2660.62959118 24 75 1 1178 3.26963817
DBH 666.41 53.28 179.61 433.52 30 68 2 383 1.73997389
DOC 9511.24 4303.1 1004.27 4203.87 14 85 1 1700 5.59484706
DOIA 2832.7 768.24 897.67 1166.79 38 61 1 1300 2.179
DOL^^ 6329.16 639.26 1996.78 3693.12 34 65 1 1926 3.28616822
DPMC 439.868223 158.31291 145.6500687 135.90524329 71 27 2 125 3.51894578
ERO 791.54 236.21 133.27 422.06 25 73 2 280 2.82692857
GCSB^^ 1407.71319 114.75838 495.0979887 797.85681422 51 48 1 307 4.58538497
IRD 9405.06 793.25 4676.44 3935.37 65 33 2 5552 1.69399496
LINZ 2073.48248 18.422053 418.2604299 1636.8 37 62 1 540 3.83978238
MAF 2857.32 677.94 968.9 1210.48 38 60 2 1139 2.5086216
MCH 206.939146 0 102.162115 104.7770311 54 44.5 1.5 89 2.32515894
MED 2037.63 132.09 106.95 1798.59 39 60 1 723 2.81829876
MFAT^^ 2258 6.14 0 2251.86 10 88.5 1.5 712 3.17134831
MFE 912.29 4.96 147.54 759.79 18 81 1 280 3.25817857
MFISH 3922 491 415 3,016 7 92 1 445 8.81348315
MOD^ 288.58699 0 58.71699 229.870 30 67 3 60 4.80978317
MOE 6544.82294 1575.2136 1058.3634801 3911.2458157 32 66 2 2547 2.56962031
MOH 4017.73 42.26 367.68 3607.79 39 59 2 1778 2.25969066
MOJ 9732.7 732.4 4914.9 4085.4 64 32 4 2849 3.41618112
MORST 208.341734 0 41.1272517 167.2144818 19 80 1 71 2.93439061
MOT 292.363214 0 83.9385948 208.4246187 32 67 1 175 1.67064693
MPIA 261.760889 72.562575 36.35286512 152.8454484 29 70 1 44 5.949111109
MSD 20308.6837 5338.8053 9233.5784 5736.30 59 39 2 9308 2.18185257
MWA 76.7743112 0 15.1541043 61.620206901 22 75 3 35.5 2.16265665
NLNZ^ 1933.5941 667.00488 916.8436974 349.7455303 84 16 0 401 4.82193043
NZFSA 1660.23 350.61 184.49 1125.13 12 87 1 450 3.6894
SSC 541.401399 3.1998828 163.8955304 374.30598587 47 51 2 216 2.50648796
STATSNZ 2071.63037 145.65151 679.2199482 1246.758905 43 56 1 1000 2.07163037
TPK 1446.67428 668.67255 343.0293864 434.97233951 26 73 1 232 6.23566499
Treasury 847.1428 0 171.8470 675.2958 51 48 1 294 2.8814381
TOTAL 153171.683 57042.418 39422.816646 56706.448172 42963 3.56523308
This table was constructed using data from New Zealand Ministry Emission Inventory Reports and Reduction Plans. * See Appendix for 
list of Ministry/ Department abbreviations. ** Source: Respective Ministry/ Department Emission Inventory Report (2008). *** Source: 
Respective Ministry/ Department Reduction Plan (2008); Data for GCSB, NLNZ and NZFSA was extrapolated from the respective 
Ministry’s Emission Inventory Report. ^ According to MOD, Scope 1 emission data is not available; according to NLNZ, data for waste is 
not available. ^^ Offshore building information is not included in this data-set, likewise offshore FTE are not included in this data-set. 
DOL has an additional 224 staff employed as locally engaged staff offshore; GCSB has an additional 12 staff stationed overseas; MFAT 
has an additional 611 staff stationed overseas. ^^^ Corrections, in addition to Energy, Transport, and Waste has a fourth category for 
GHG emissions by source (%), Livestock, which accounts for 41%.
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Table 3.6:  CNPS core department emission weights by  scope for base-year July 
  1, 2006  to June 30, 2007
Department*
GHG emissions 
weights for base-
year July 1, 2006 - 
June 30, 2007     
(t-CO2e/y)**
GHG emissions weights by scope (t-CO2e/y)**
Scope 1 Scope 2 Scope 3
Weights    
(t-CO2e/y) %
Weights    
(t-CO2e/y) %
Weights     
(t-CO2e/y) %
Archives 1141.4052478 402.777926 38.676387 507.359822 48.718769 131.2675 12.6048433381
Corrections^^^ 52003 37980 73.174961 8246 15.887328 5677 10.9377107296
Crown Law 591.85403 0 0 188.01117 38.224993 303.84286 61.7750067027
Customs 3951.633768253 666.296374 17.299058 524.707803 13.622993 2660.629591 69.0779485088
DBH 766.41 53.28 7.9950781 179.61 26.951876 433.52 65.0530454225
DOC 9611.24 4303.1 45.242261 1004.27 10.55877 4203.87 44.198968799
DOIA 2932.7 768.24 27.120415 897.67 31.689554 1166.79 41.1900307127
DOL^^ 6429.16 639.26 10.100234 1996.78 31.548894 3693.12 58.3508712057
DPMC 539.86822299 158.312911 35.990986 145.650069 33.112205 135.9052433 30.8968086774
ERO 891.54 236.21 29.841827 133.27 16.836799 422.06 53.321373525
GCSB^^ 1507.71318582 114.758383 8.1521139 495.097989 35.170374 797.8568142 56.6775123127
IRD 9505.06 793.25 8.4342896 4676.44 49.722596 3935.37 41.8431142385
LINZ 2173.48248257 18.4220527 0.8884595 418.26043 20.171882 1636.8 78.9396589438
MAF 2957.32 677.94 23.726429 968.9 33.909398 1210.48 42.3641734212
MCH 306.9391461 0 0 102.162115 49.368192 104.7770311 50.6318079854
MED 2137.63 132.09 6.4825312 106.95 5.2487449 1798.59 88.2687239587
MFAT^^ 2358 6.14 0.2719221 0 0 2251.86 99.7280779451
MFE 1012.29 4.96 0.5436868 147.54 16.172489 759.79 83.2838242226
MFISH 4022 491 12.519123 415 10.581336 3,016 76.8995410505
MOD^ 388.58699 0 0 58.71699 20.346375 229.870 79.6536254112
MOE 6644.8229368 1575.21364 24.068086 1058.36348 16.171002 3911.245816 59.7609110815
MOH 4117.73 42.26 1.0518377 367.68 9.1514363 3607.79 89.796726012
MOJ 9832.7 732.4 7.5251472 4914.9 50.498834 4085.4 41.9760189875
MORST 308.3417335 0 0 41.1272517 19.740285 167.2144818 80.2597151281
MOT 392.3632135 0 0 83.9385948 28.710382 208.4246187 71.2896182132
MPIA 361.76088881 72.5625753 27.720939 36.3528651 13.887814 152.8454484 58.3912474835
MSD 20408.6837 5338.8053 26.288288 9233.5784 45.466159 5736.30 28.2455529109
MWA 176.774311201 0 0 15.1541043 19.738509 61.6202069 80.261491034
NLNZ^ 2033.5941043 667.004877 34.495599 916.843697 47.416554 349.7455303 18.0878463335
NZFSA 1760.23 350.61 21.118158 184.49 11.112316 1125.13 67.7695259091
SSC 641.40139907 3.1998828 0.591037 163.89553 30.272462 374.3059859 69.1365014041
STATSNZ 2171.630368164 145.651515 7.0307675 679.219948 32.786734 1246.758905 60.1824980054
TPK 1546.674278071 668.672552 46.221362 343.029386 23.711584 434.9723395 30.0670542155
Treasury 947.1428 0 0 171.8470 20.285482 675.2958 79.7145180246
TOTAL 156571.68280695 57042.418 37.240838 39422.8166 25.737666 56706.44817 37.0214958358
This table was constructed using data from New Zealand Ministry Emission Inventory Reports and Reduction Plans. * See 
Appendix for list of Ministry/ Department abbreviations. ** Source: Respective Ministry/ Department Emission Inventory 
Report (2008). *** Source: Respective Ministry/ Department Reduction Plan (2008); Data for GCSB, NLNZ and NZFSA was 
extrapolated from the respective Ministry’s Emission Inventory Report. ^ According to MOD, Scope 1 emission data is not 
available; according to NLNZ, data for waste is not available. ^^ Offshore building information is not included in this data-
set, likewise offshore FTE are not included in this data-set. DOL has an additional 224 staff employed as locally engaged 
staff offshore; GCSB has an additional 12 staff stationed overseas; MFAT has an additional 611 staff stationed overseas.
^^^ Corrections, in addition to Energy, Transport, and Waste has a fourth category for GHG emissions by source (%), 
Livestock, which accounts for 41%.
Table 3.7:  CNPS lead-core department emissions profile for base-year July  1, 
  2006 to June 30, 2007
Department*
GHG 
emissions 
weights for 
base-year 
July 1, 2006 - 
June 30, 
2007         
(t-CO2e/y)**
GHG emissions weights by 
scope (t-CO2e/y)**
GHG emissions by source     
(%)***
FTE**
GHG 
emissions 
per FTE    
(t-CO2e/y)
**Scope 1 Scope 2 Scope 3 Energy Transport Waste
DOC 9511.24 4303.1 1004.27 4203.87 14 85 1 1700 5.59484706
IRD 9405.06 793.25 4676.44 3935.37 65 33 2 5552 1.69399496
MED 2037.63 132.09 106.95 1798.59 39 60 1 723 2.81829876
MFE 912.29 4.96 147.54 759.79 18 81 1 280 3.25817857
MOH 4017.73 42.26 367.68 3607.79 39 59 2 1778 2.25969066
Treasury 847.1428 0 171.8470 675.2958 51 48 1 294 2.8814381
TOTAL 26731.0928 5275.66 6474.727 14980.706 10327 2.58846643
This table was constructed using data from New Zealand Ministry Emission Inventory Reports and Reduction Plans. * See 
Appendix for list of Ministry/ Department abbreviations. ** Source: Respective Ministry/ Department Emission Inventory Report 
(2008). *** Source: Respective Ministry/ Department Reduction Plan (2008)
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Table 3.8:  CNPS lead-core department emission weights by scope for base-year 
  July 1, 2006 to June 30, 2007
Department*
GHG 
emissions 
weights for 
base-year 
July 1, 2006 - 
June 30, 2007  
(t-CO2e/y)**
GHG emission weights by scope (t-CO2e/y)**
Scope 1 Scope 2 Scope 3
Weights       
(t-CO2e/y) %
Weights      
(t-CO2e/y) %
Weights      (t-
CO2e/y) %
DOC 9567.0410312 4303.1 45.24226 1004.27 10.5587705 4203.87 44.1989688
IRD 9463.2168858 793.25 8.43429 4676.44 49.7225961 3935.37 41.84311424
MED 2049.361276 132.09 6.482531 106.95 5.24874487 1798.59 88.26872396
MFE 929.00617578 4.96 0.543687 147.54 16.172489 759.79 83.28382422
MOH 4027.933274 42.26 1.051838 367.68 9.15143626 3607.79 89.79672601
Treasury 867.42828198 0 0 171.8470 20.285482 675.2958 79.71451802
TOTAL 26903.986925 5275.66 19.73604 6474.727 24.2217071 14980.7058 56.0422498
This table was constructed using data from New Zealand Ministry Emission Inventory Reports and Reduction Plans. * See 
Appendix for list of Ministry/ Department abbreviations. ** Source: Respective Ministry/ Department Emission Inventory 
Report (2008). *** Source: Respective Ministry/ Department Reduction Plan (2008)
Table 3.9:  CNPS lead-core department Scope 3 emission inclusion for base-year 
  July 1, 2006 to June 30, 2007
Scope 3 Emissions Type
Department*
DOC IRD MED MFE MOH Treasury
Energy**
Transmission and distribution line loss for all 
purchased electricity 94.6 502.60 59.80 13.90 125.36 26.4518
Energy consumed by outsource providers 658.30
All purchased electricity for lighting, utilities/ appliance 
power in leased space in buildings where joint tenant 413.36 962.89 108.9183
All base electricity supplied by the landlord for 
common area lighting, lifts and air conditioning in 
buildings where is a joint tenant
114.41
Natural gas for base heating in owned and/ or leased 
buildings where joint tenant 106.76 126.49 129.1420
Sub-total 94.6 1160.9 694.33 13.9 1214.74 264.5121
Transport**
Air travel 1129 2451.86 1,036.15 719.53 2184.23 396.3792
Helicopter use 2806
Business travel in rental car/ taxis 138.72 171.05 51.84 22.86 143.64 11.3447
Sub-total 4073.72 2622.91 1,087.99 742.39 2327.87 407.7239
Waste** Waste to landfill 35.55 151.55 16.27 3.15 65.18 3.0598
Sub-total 35.55 151.55 16.27 3.15 65.18 3.0598
Total Scope 3 Emissions (t-CO2e) 4203.87 3935.36 1798.59 759.44 3607.79 675.2958
This table was constructed using data from New Zealand Ministry Emission Inventory Reports and Reduction Plans. * See Appendix for list 
of Ministry/ Department abbreviations. ** Source: Respective Ministry/ Department Emission Inventory Report (2008)
Table 3.11:  CCP-NZ programme membership by date joined
Year Joined Regional Council District Council City Council TOTAL
2004 2 6 4 12
2005 3 2 5
2006 1 1 2 4
2007 3 5 2 10
2008 1 2 3
TOTAL 6 16 12 34
Data was extrapolated from Communities for Climate Protection – New Zealand Actions Profile 2009
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Table 3.12:  CCP-NZ programme participation as a proportion of milestone 
  completion (by 2009)
Council Milestone 1 Milestone 2 Milestone 3 Milestone 4 Milestone 5
Political 
Declaration TOTAL
Regional 3 2 0 1 0 0 6
District 6 1 9 0 0 0 16
City 6 0 1 2 2 1 12
TOTAL 15 3 10 3 2 1 34
Data was extrapolated from Communities for Climate Protection – New Zealand Actions Profile 2009
Table 3.13:  CCP-NZ programme corporate base-year emissions by sector
Sector % GHG Emissions (t-CO2e/y)
Buildings 42 61423.74
Streetlights 18 26324.46
Vehicle Fleet 13 19012.11
Water/ Sewage 27 39486.69
TOTAL 146247
Data was extrapolated from Table 2 & Graph 3, Communities for Climate Protection – New Zealand Actions 
Profile 2009
Table 3.14:  CCP-NZ programme corporate base-year emissions by energy source
Source % GHG Emissions (t-CO2e/y)
Electricity 65 95060.55
Natural Gas 12 17549.64
Diesel 9 13162.23
Petrol 9 13162.23
Coal 3 4387.41
LPG 2 2924.94
TOTAL 146247
Data was extrapolated from Table 2, Communities for Climate Protection – New Zealand Actions Profile 
2009
Table 3.15:  CCP-NZ programme community base-year emissions by sector
Sector % GHG Emissions (t-CO2e/y)
Residential 11 2404600.99
Commercial 9 1967400.81
Industrial 33 7213802.97
Transport 47 10274204.23
TOTAL 21860009
Data was extrapolated from Table 3 & Graph 5, Communities for Climate Protection – New Zealand 
Actions Profile 2009. NOTE: This data excludes waste and agriculture.
Table 3.16:  CCP-NZ programme community base-year emissions by energy source
Source % GHG Emissions (t-CO2e/y)
Electricity 26 4,890,066
Natural Gas 11 2,144,802
Diesel 17 3,980,320
Petrol 29 6,427,811
Coal 10 3,082,857
LPG 2 347,798
Light Fuel Oil 4 882,938
Other 1 103,417
TOTAL 100 21,860,009
Data was extrapolated from Table 3, Communities for Climate Protection – New Zealand Actions Profile 
2009
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Table 3.17:  CCP-NZ programme study selection corporate emissions profile
Local Government
Corporate emissions profile**
Year 
Joined 
CCP-
NZ*
Milestone 
Reached*
Base
-year
Total 
Emissions 
(t-CO2e/y)
GHG emissions by Sector (t-CO2e/y)** 
Buildings Streetlights Vehicle Fleet
Employee 
Commute
Water/ 
Sewage Waste
Regional 
Council
Auckland^ 2006 4 0
Environment 
Canterbury 2004
2 
(corporate) 2001 1227 220 624 346 37
Greater 
Wellington*^ 2007 1 2005 6,361 384 929 247 4,761 40
Hawkes Bay 2007 1 2006 886 140 609 137
District 
Council
Far North 2007 1 2006 1960 216 337 449 958
Kaikoura 2004 3 2001 99 12 34 13 36 4
Kapiti 
Coast^^ 2004 3 0
Rotorua 2005 3 (corporate) 2001 4462 989 20 1039 2414
Southland 2005 3 (corporate) 2005 2924 1428 77 626 793
City 
Council
Auckland 2005 1 2004 10,444 6,039 3,164 751 490
Christchurch 2004 5 2001 30069 10524 9021 902 601 9021
Dunedin^^ 2006 1 0
Hamilton^^^ 2004 4 2001 8194 2110 1563 895 2504 1122
Nelson 2007 3 2004 1077 338 368 135 236
Waitakere 2004 4 2002 6059 1679 958 650 568 2204
Wellington 2004 5 2003 12,577 7,323 1,464 3,127 663
TOTAL 86,339 31402 17006 10749 2252 23,727 1203
* Data sourced from Communities for Climate Protection – New Zealand 2 Actions Profile 2009. ** Data has been extrapolated from 
respective Council CCP-NZ Milestone 1 Reports, unless otherwise noted. *** Projections for forecast-year are based on a ‘business-as-
usual’ scenario. ^ Data for Auckland Region Council (Carbon Now and Carbon Futures reports) does not conform to the template 
provided by ICLEI, and as a result does not fit within this table. See Appendix for a graphic representation of Auckland Regional 
Council’s emissions profile. ^^ Data for this  Council is not available. ^^^ Data for Hamilton City Council was extrapolated from Figure 1 
of the Hamilton City Council’s Communities for Climate Protection Programme Local Action Plan (2006). *^ Date for Greater Wellington 
Regional Council was extrapolated from the Climate Change Mitigation Corporate Action Plan (2008)
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Table 3.18:  CCP-NZ programme study selection corporate emissions forecast
Local Government
Corporate emissions forecast**
Base-year 
Total 
Emissions 
(t-CO2e/y)
Forecast
-year
Total 
Emissions 
(t-CO2e/y)
***
GHG emissions by Sector (t-CO2e/y)*** % 
Change 
from 
Base-
year
GOAL*Build-
ings
Street-
lights
Vehicle 
Fleet
Empl-
oyee 
Com-
mute
Water/ 
Sewage Waste
Regional 
Council
Auckland^ 0 0 20% by 2019
Environment 
Canterbury 1227 2010 1585 280 794 474 37 29.1769
Greater 
Wellington*^ 6361 0 -100
41% below 
2006
levels by 
2050.
Hawkes Bay 886 2012 1007 161 695 151 13.6569
District 
Council
Far North 1960 2011 2414 231 384 449 1350 23.1633
Kaikoura 99 2011 222 16 42 59 101 4 124.242
100% 
below 
2001
levels by 
2020.
Kapiti 
Coast^^ 0 0
15% below 
2001
levels by 
2010.
Rotorua 4462 2010 4607 1041 20 1039 2507 3.24966
Stabilize at 
or below 
2006
levels by 
2010
Southland 2924 2010 3008 1449 83 626 850 2.87278
Stabilize at 
2005 level 
by
2015; 
reduce by 
20%  by 
2025.
City 
Council
Auckland 10444 2010 10,898 6,625 2,750 901 622 4.34699
Christchurch 30069 2010 30393 9324 9923 950 589 9607 1.07752
69% below 
1994 by
2011.
Dunedin^^ 0 0
Hamilton^^^ 8194 2010 15812 4072 3016 1727 4832 2165 92.9705
20% below 
2001
levels by 
2020.
Nelson 1077 2010 1460 378 409 134 539 35.5617
Stabilize at 
2004 level 
by 2012: 
reduce 
40% below 
2004 level
by 2020.
Waitakere 6059 2010 10045 3096 1696 867 604 3782 65.7864
50% below 
2001
level by 
2021.
Wellington 12577 2010 13,000 7,619 1,599 3,096 686 3.36328
Stabilize at 
2003 level 
by
2010, and 
reduce by 
40% by 
2020
and 80% 
by 2050
TOTAL 86339 94451 34292 19922 11337 2289 24405 2206 9.39552
* Data sourced from Communities for Climate Protection – New Zealand 2 Actions Profile 2009. ** Data has been extrapolated from 
respective Council CCP-NZ Milestone 1 Reports, unless otherwise noted. *** Projections for forecast-year are based on a ‘business-as-
usual’ scenario. ^ Data for Auckland Region Council (Carbon Now and Carbon Futures reports) does not conform to the template provided 
by ICLEI, and as a result does not fit within this table. See Appendix for a graphic representation of Auckland Regional Council’s emissions 
profile. ^^ Data for this  Council is not available. ^^^ Data for Hamilton City Council was extrapolated from Figure 1 of the Hamilton City 
Council’s Communities for Climate Protection Programme Local Action Plan (2006). *^ Date for Greater Wellington Regional Council was 
extrapolated from the Climate Change Mitigation Corporate Action Plan (2008)
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Table 3.19:  CCP-NZ programme study selection community emissions profile
Local Government
Community emissions profile**
Base-
year
Total 
Emissions 
(t-CO2e/y)
GHG emissions by Sector (t-CO2e/y)
Residential Commercial Industrial Transport Waste
Regional 
Council
Auckland^ 0
Environment 
Canterbury 2001 4758372 370756 314536 1289689 2160056 623335
Greater 
Wellington*^ 0
Hawkes Bay 0
District 
Council
Far North 2006 375,640
Kaikoura 2001 25062 2600 3555 7493 8741 2673
Kapiti Coast^^ 0
Rotorua 2001 580503 49937 48267 174811 185830 121658
Southland 2001 605,447 22,655 12,578 496,403 68,216 5,595
City Council
Auckland 2001 3432608 299945 424593 1099021 1422003 187046
Christchurch 2001 3,288,277 505,808 391,598 1,019,994 886,572 484,305
Dunedin^^ 0
Hamilton^^^ 2001 1144000 183040 137280 366080 331760 125840
Nelson 2001 400535 30845 34315 163584 107766 64025
Waitakere 2001 900354 118709 56810 150432 390334 184069
Wellington 2001 1,078,794 122,285 214,806 191,809 345,811 204,083
TOTAL 16,589,592 1706580 1638338 4959316 5907089 2002629
* Data sourced from Communities for Climate Protection – New Zealand 2 Actions Profile 2009. ** Data has been 
extrapolated from respective Council CCP-NZ Milestone 1 Reports, unless otherwise noted. *** Projections for forecast-
year are based on a ‘business-as-usual’ scenario. ^ Data for Auckland Region Council (Carbon Now and Carbon Futures 
reports) does not conform to the template provided by ICLEI, and as a result does not fit within this table. See Appendix 
for a graphic representation of Auckland Regional Council’s emissions profile. ^^ Data for this  Council is not available.
^^^ Data for Hamilton City Council was extrapolated from Figure 1 of the Hamilton City Council’s Communities for Climate 
Protection Programme Local Action Plan (2006). *^ Date for Greater Wellington Regional Council was extrapolated from 
the Climate Change Mitigation Corporate Action Plan (2008)
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Table 3.20:  CCP-NZ programme study selection community emissions forecast
Local Government
Community emissions forecast**
Base-year 
Total 
Emissions 
(t-CO2e/y)
Forecast-
year
Forecast-
year Total 
Emissions 
(t-CO2e/y)
***
GHG emissions by Sector (t-CO2e/y) % 
Change 
from 
Base-
year
GOAL*Resident-
ial
Commer-
cial
Indust-
rial
Trans-
port Waste
Regional 
Council
Auckland^ 0 0
Environment 
Canterbury 4758372 2010 5685804 340526 349322 1446505 2888312 661139 19.4905
Greater 
Wellington*^ 0 0
Hawkes Bay 0 0
District 
Council
Far North 375640 2011 392,103 4.38265
Kaikoura 25062 2010 32757 3377 3979 8956 11099 5346 30.7039
60% 
below 
2001
levels by 
2015.
Kapiti 
Coast^^ 0 0
Stabilize 
at 2001 
levels
by 2010.
Rotorua 580503 2010 660626 48735 53722 203240 228892 126037 13.8023
Southland 605447 2010 708,228 24,504 14,654 594,924 68,216 5,930 16.9761
City 
Council
Auckland 3432608 2010 4070676 345700 499173 1277511 1708210 240082 18.5884
Christchurch 3288277 2010 3,490,668 476,099 433,881 1,143,442 1,013,672 423,574 6.15493
16% per 
person
below 
2008 by 
2018.
Dunedin^^ 0 0
Hamilton^^^ 1144000 2010 1301000 208160 156120 416320 377290 143110 13.7238
Stabilize 
at 2001 
level
by 2020.
Nelson 400535 2010 413010 31893 37057 156679 131519 55862 3.11458
Stabilize 
at 2001 
level
by 2012: 
reduce 
40% 
below 
2001
level by 
2020.
Waitakere 900354 2010 1126009 146555 63848 178531 481751 255324 25.0629
80% per 
capita
below 
2001 
level by 
2051.
Wellington 1078794 2010 1,212,601 119,022 238,042 214,088 437,366 204,083 12.4034
Stabilize 
at 2001 
levels
by 2010; 
reduce 
by 30% 
by 2020;
80% by 
2050
TOTAL 16589592 19,093,482 1744571 1849798 5640196 7346327 2120487 15.0931
* Data sourced from Communities for Climate Protection – New Zealand 2 Actions Profile 2009. ** Data has been extrapolated from 
respective Council CCP-NZ Milestone 1 Reports, unless otherwise noted. *** Projections for forecast-year are based on a ‘business-as-
usual’ scenario. ^ Data for Auckland Region Council (Carbon Now and Carbon Futures reports) does not conform to the template provided by 
ICLEI, and as a result does not fit within this table. See Appendix for a graphic representation of Auckland Regional Council’s emissions 
profile. ^^ Data for this  Council is not available. ^^^ Data for Hamilton City Council was extrapolated from Figure 1 of the Hamilton City 
Council’s Communities for Climate Protection Programme Local Action Plan (2006). *^ Date for Greater Wellington Regional Council was 
extrapolated from the Climate Change Mitigation Corporate Action Plan (2008)
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Table 3.21: Greater Wellington Regional Council corporate GHG emissions 
  forecast 2005 to 2050
Greater 
Wellington 
Regional 
Council
Year
% 
Decrease 
(average 
across 
sectors)^
Total 
Emissions 
(t-CO2e/y)
Emissions Source by Weight(t-CO2e)
Buildings Vehicle Fleet
Airline 
Travel
Employee 
Commute
Water/ 
Sewage Waste
2005 Base-year 6,361 384 890 39 247 4,761 40
2012 18 5216 308 623 37 173 4047 28
2020 28 4578 269 534 35 149 3571 20
2050 41 3774 192 356 24 99 3095 8
Data was extrapolated from Greater Wellington Regional Council’s Climate Change Mitigation Corporate Action Plan 
(2008). ^ For specific reduction goals by corporate sector, see Section 2.4 of Greater Wellington Regional Council’s 
Climate Change Mitigation Corporate Action Plan (2008)
Table 3.22: Hamilton City Council GHG emission reduction goal by total 
  emissions
Hamilton City Council
Total Emissions (t-CO2e/y)
Base-year 2001 Forecast-year 2010 Goal-year 2020
Corporate 8194 15812 6556
Community 1144000 1301000 1144000
Data was extrapolated from Hamilton City Council’s CCP Local Action Plan (2006)
Table 3.23: Waitakere City  Council community GHG emission reduction goal by  
  total emissions
Waitakere City 
Council
Total Emissions (t-CO2e/y)
Base-year 
2001
Forecast-year 
2010 Goal-year 2051
Community 900354 1126009 180071
Data was extrapolated from Waitakere City Council’s CCP Local Action Plan
Table 3.24: Wellington City Council GHG emission reduction goal by total 
  emissions
Wellington City 
Council
Total Emissions (t-CO2e/y)
Base-year 2001/ 
2003*
Forecast-year 
2010 Goal-year 2050
Corporate 12577 13000 2516
Community 1078794 1212601 215759
Data was extrapolated from Wellington City Council’s Greenhouse Gas Emission 
Analysis and Forecast and the Wellington City Council Climate Change Action Plan 
(2007). * Community Base-year was 2001, while the Corporate Base-year was 2003.
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Table 5.2:  CS1 - ministry selection criteria 
Department S1
Archives New Zealand
Department of Corrections
Crown Law Office
New Zealand Customs Service
Department of Building and Housing
Department of Conservation
Department of Internal Affairs
Department of Labour
Department of the Prime Minister and Cabinet
Education Review Office
Government Communications Security Bureau
Inland Revenue Department
Land Information New Zealand
Ministry of Agriculture and Forestry
Ministry for Culture and Heritage
Ministry of Economic Development
Ministry of Foreign Affairs and Trade
Ministry for the Environment
Ministry of Fisheries
Ministry of Defence
Ministry of Education
Ministry of Health
Ministry of Justice
Ministry of Research, Science, and Technology
Ministry of Transport
Ministry of Pacific Island Affairs
Ministry of Social Development
Ministry of Women's Affairs
National Library of New Zealand
New Zealand Food Safety Authority
State Services Commission
Statistics New Zealand
Te Puni Kokiri
Treasury, The
Data was extrapolated from NZ Govt. (2007)
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Table 5.3:  CS2 - council selection criteria
Local Government
Stage Year 
Joined
Milestone 
Reached Population
Geography 
(North/South 
Island)1 2
Regional 
Council
Auckland 2006 4 1,237,239 North
Environment Canterbury 2004 2 508,102 South
Environment Waikato 2007 1 365,292 North
Greater Wellington 2007 1 434,034 North
Hawkes Bay 2007 1 142,710 North
Taranaki 2004 2 100,263 North
District 
Council
Carterton 2004 3 6,870 North
Far North 2007 1 55,845 North
Franklin 2007 3 55,506 North
Kaikoura 2004 3 3,456 South
Kaipara 2007 1 17,127 North
Kapiti Coast 2004 3 44,640 North
Masterton 2004 3 22,623 North
New Plymouth 2007 2 72,000 North
Papakura 2006 1 48,783 North
Rodney 2004 1 89,601 North
Rotorua 2005 3 62,526 North
Southland 2005 3 27,440 South
South Waikato 2004 3 21,291 North
South Wairarapa 2005 3 8,532 North
Waipa 2007 1 41,148 North
Western Bay of Plenty 2008 1 42,075 North
City 
Council
Auckland 2005 1 382,540 North
Christchurch 2004 5 369,000 South
Dunedin 2006 1 114,891 South
Hamilton 2004 4 138,500 North
Hutt 2008 Political Declaration 95,421 North
Manukau 2006 1 310,335 North
Nelson 2007 3 41,679 South
North Shore 2005 1 200,091 North
Palmerston North 2008 1 80,000 North
Porirua 2007 1 48,546 North
Waitakere 2004 4 175,299 North
Wellington 2004 5 172,971 North
Data was extrapolated from CCP-NZ (2009)
Table 6.1:  CS1 - support
SUB-THEME
MINISTRY
OVERALL
DOC IRD MED MFE MOH TREASURY
Senior 
Management 
Leadership
No No Yes, with CEOs No
No, but lots of lip 
service!
Lack of senior 
management 
leadership
Data is derived from semi-structured interviews with managers from respective ministry. See Table 5.4 for further details. 
Table 6.2:  CS1 - application
SUB-THEMES
MINISTRY
OVERALL
DOC IRD MED MFE MOH TREASURY
Programme 
Delivery       
(was it 
effective?)
No; Should not 
have been run 
by the MFE
No; 
Programme 
lost in the 
numbers
No; MFE's 
credibility in 
question
No; Quick 
start-up; tight 
timeline
No; Too fast; 
not prepared; 
poorly 
managed by 
MFE
No; The MFE 
made it up as 
they went along
Delivery was too fast; 
Ministries were 
unprepared; the MFE 
was ineffective
Operating 
Budget 
No additional 
resources
High profile 
programme, no 
resources
No budget Cost was pushed to the Ministries
Methodology 
(Data 
Requirements)
Inconsistent 
requirements
Scope 
changed 
constantly
Misunderstandin
g with regard to 
requirements
Data requirements 
were inconsistent
Formal 
Benchmarking 
No formal 
benchmarking; 
but DOC did 
benchmark 
against the 
other lead-core 
agencies.
No formal 
benchmarking;  
but IRD did 
benchmark 
internationally
None
No formal 
benchmarking; 
benchmarked 
against private 
sector 
None
No formal 
benchmarking; 
Treasury 
benchmarked 
against other 
lead-core 
agencies
No formal 
benchmarking
Data is derived from semi-structured interviews with managers from respective ministry. See Table 5.4 for further details. 
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Table 6.3:  CS1 - termination
SUB-
THEMES
MINISTRY
OVERALL
DOC IRD MED MFE MOH TREASURY
Rationale Political Political Political Political Political and Economic Economic
Political ideology 
is the common 
rationale
Opposition 
to 
Termination
MFE, but they 
had no time! 
CNPS was 
hidden from 
community
MFE MFE
"Not our job as 
officials to 
fight"
MFE and 
DOC
IRD, MFE and 
DOC
Decision to 
terminate faced 
little opposition
Evaluation No evaluation Not clear Not clear No evaluation No evaluation
Ministries were 
not involved in 
the 
determination of 
the programme's 
effectiveness
Data is derived from semi-structured interviews with managers from respective ministry. See Table 5.4 for further details. 
Table 6.4:  CS1 - outcome
SUB-
THEMES
MINISTRY
OVERALL
DOC IRD MED MFE MOH TREASURY
Awareness Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Management's 
awareness 
increased
Emissions 
and Cost 
Reductions
Yes Yes Yes Yes Too soon to tell
Emissions 
reductions and 
cost savings did 
occur
Networking Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Networking was effective
Data is derived from semi-structured interviews with managers from respective ministry. See Table 5.4 for further details. 
Table 6.5:  CS1 - moving forward
SUB-
THEME
MINISTRY
OVERALL
DOC IRD MED MFE MOH TREASURY
Next Steps Carbon management 
No carbon 
management
Carbon 
management 
(efficiency 
and cost 
savings)
Carbon 
management 
(no goal for 
carbon 
reductions)
Carbon 
management 
(cost neutral)
Reduction 
programmes will 
continue (but 
scaled back)
Continue with 
initiatives, albeit 
scaled back; No 
goal for carbon 
neutrality
Data is derived from semi-structured interviews with managers from respective ministry. See Table 5.4 for further details. 
Table 6.6:  CS2 S1 - in the beginning
SUB-
THEMES
REGIONAL COUNCIL DISTRICT COUNCIL CITY COUNCIL
OVERALL
Auckland
Environment 
Canterbury
Greater 
Wellington
Hawke's 
Bay Far North Kaikoura
Kapiti 
Coast Rotorua
South-
land Auckland
Christ-
church Dunedin Hamilton Nelson Waitakere Wellington
Rationale 
for Joining 
Gain 
political 
mandate
Show 
leadership
Easy 
contribution 
to climate 
change 
response
Show 
leadership
Show 
Leadership
Aligned 
with 
strategic 
direction
Personal 
wish of 
Mayor
Show 
leadershi
p
Show 
leadership
Show 
leadership
Reduce city 
and 
operation 
carbon 
footprint
Politically 
driven
Show 
leadership
Aligned 
with 
strategic 
direction
Show 
leadership
Show 
leadership
Aim 
(Carbon 
Manageme
nt/ Neutral)
Neutral Management Management Neutral Neutral
Managem
ent Neutral Neutral
Managem
ent
Leadership 
to 
Community
Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes
Climate 
Change 
Policy pre-
CCP-NZ
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Yes - 
energy Yes Yes Yes
Data is derived from semi-structured interviews with managers from respective ministry. See Table 5.5 for further details. 
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Table 6.7:  CS2 S1 - support
SUB-
THEMES
REGIONAL COUNCIL DISTRICT COUNCIL CITY COUNCIL
OVERALL
Auckland Environment 
Canterbury
Greater 
Wellington
Hawke's 
Bay
Far 
North
Kaikoura Kapiti 
Coast
Rotorua Southland Auckland Christchurch Dunedin Hamilton Nelson Waitakere Wellington
Senior 
Management 
Leadership 
(Within 
Council)
Not a lot Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Engagement 
with ICLEI
Yes No Yes Yes Yes Not in the 
end
Yes
Data is derived from semi-structured interviews with managers from respective ministry. See Table 5.5 for further details. 
Table 6.8:  CS2 S1 - application
SUB-
THEMES
REGIONAL COUNCIL DISTRICT COUNCIL CITY COUNCIL
OVERALL
Auckland
Environment 
Canterbury
Greater 
Wellington
Hawke's 
Bay
Far 
North Kaikoura
Kapiti 
Coast Rotorua Southland Auckland
Christ-
church Dunedin Hamilton Nelson Waitakere Wellington
Programme 
Delivery   
(was it 
effective?)
No; 
Focused 
on getting 
as many 
councils 
on board 
as 
possible
No; Didn't 
provide for 
adaptation
No; 
Strategy not 
right for 
New 
Zealand
No; Didn't 
recognize 
role of 
regional 
council
Yes; Well 
put 
together
No; Too 
focused on 
community 
component
No; Stalled 
on 
community 
side
No; 
Programm
e did not 
evolve 
with the 
times
Not 
effective
Programme 
Methodology 
(robust 
enough?)
No; 
Difficult 
getting 
data from 
suppliers
No
No; 
Boundari
es not 
well 
defined
Yes; Tailor-
made to 
any 
community
Yes; 
Valuable 
framework
No; Data 
quality 
was an 
issue of 
concern
No; 
Boundaries 
not well 
defined
No; Access 
to data was 
an issue
No; 
Concern 
with regard 
to efficacy
No; 
Difficulties 
with emission 
calculations
No; Lack 
of rigour
No; Lacked 
scope; 
inventory 
tool not 
flexible
Not robust 
enough; 
Data 
quality a 
concern
Formal 
Benchmarking Yes No No No No No No No
Barrier to 
Achieving 
next Milestone
Programm
e ended
Time and 
resource 
constraints
Resource 
constraints
Low 
priority
Action 
Plan focus 
changed
Programm
e ended
Change in 
council; 
quality of 
data
All 
milestones 
complete
Measurability  
of community
Access to 
data
Uncertain 
of value
Time 
restriction
Data is derived from semi-structured interviews with managers from respective ministry. See Table 5.5 for further details. 
Table 6.9:  CS2 S1 - termination
SUB-
THEMES
REGIONAL COUNCIL DISTRICT COUNCIL CITY COUNCIL
OVERALL
Auckland Environment 
Canterbury
Greater 
Wellington
Hawke's 
Bay
Far North Kaikoura Kapiti 
Coast
Rotorua Southland Auckland Christchurch Dunedin Hamilton Nelson Waitakere Wellington
Rationale Political Political
Programme 
ineffective; 
NOT 
political
Economic Economic Political Political
Political/
Economic Political Political Political Political Political Political Economic Economic
Political/ 
Economic
Opposition 
to 
Termination
No No
Encourage
d by ICLEI 
to write 
letter of 
support
No Yes No
Evaluation
Yes, but 
not 
involved
Yes, but not 
involved
Yes No
Yes, but 
not 
involved
No No No No No No Not sure No No No
Data is derived from semi-structured interviews with managers from respective ministry. See Table 5.5 for further details. 
Table 6.10:  CS2 S1 - outcome
SUB-
THEMES
REGIONAL COUNCIL DISTRICT COUNCIL CITY COUNCIL
OVERALL
Auckland
Environment 
Canterbury
Greater 
Wellington
Hawke's 
Bay
Far 
North Kaikoura
Kapiti 
Coast Rotorua Southland Auckland Christchurch Dunedin Hamilton Nelson Waitakere Wellington
Networking/ 
Collaboration
Yes Yes No No Yes No Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Awareness Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Values 
Embedded Yes No Yes & No Yes Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Link to other 
Programmes
Yes Not really No Yes Yes No No Yes Yes No No No Yes Split: Yes/ No
Data is derived from semi-structured interviews with managers from respective ministry. See Table 5.5 for further details. 
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Table 6.11:  CS2 S1 - final thoughts
SUB-
THEMES
REGIONAL COUNCIL DISTRICT COUNCIL CITY COUNCIL
OVERALL
Auckland
Environment 
Canterbury
Greater 
Wellington
Hawke's 
Bay
Far 
North Kaikoura
Kapiti 
Coast Rotorua Southland Auckland Christchurch Dunedin Hamilton Nelson Waitakere Wellington
Impetus for 
Action
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Success Yes Yes/ no Yes/ no No Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Data is derived from semi-structured interviews with managers from respective ministry. See Table 5.5 for further details. 
Table 6.12:  CS2 S1 - moving forward
SUB-
THEMES
REGIONAL COUNCIL DISTRICT COUNCIL CITY COUNCIL
OVERALL
Auckland Environment 
Canterbury
Greater 
Wellington
Hawke's 
Bay
Far 
North
Kaikoura Kapiti 
Coast
Rotorua South-
land
Auckland Christ-
church
Dunedin Hamilton Nelson Waitakere Wellington
Momentum
Built even 
further Slowed Yes Yes Yes Yes
Built even 
further Yes Slowed
Built even 
further Yes Yes
Next Steps 
(Carbon 
Management
/ Neutral)
Carbon Now 
Programme
Manage 
carbon
Low-carbon 
fleet
Energy 
audit
Develop 
Action 
Plan
Implement 
Action 
Plan
Develop 
Emission 
Reduction 
Plan
Continue 
with 
CCP-NZ 
objectives
Manage 
carbon
Energy 
management
Manage 
carbon
Develop a 
sustainable 
framework
No 
mandate 
for action, 
no steer
Next Step 
Programme
Continue 
with 
Action 
Plan
Work 
towards 
carbon 
neutrality 
(goal: 
2012/12)
Carbon 
management
Reduction 
Target Reduce Reduce
Carbon 
zero by 
2015
Stabilize 
at 2006 
levels by 
2010
Stabilize No goals
50% 
reduction 
by 2050
No goals No goals
Create 
position 
statement
Reduce 
emissions 
by 30% by 
2030
Reduce, 
Stabilize, No 
goal
Data is derived from semi-structured interviews with managers from respective ministry. See Table 5.5 for further details. 
Table 6.13:  CS2 S2 - in the beginning
SUB-THEMES
REGIONAL COUNCIL DISTRICT COUNCIL CITY COUNCIL
OVERALL
Auckland Greater Wellington Rotorua Southland Dunedin Nelson Wellington
Initial Contact   
(who 
approached 
who?)
Don’t Know
ICLEI 
approached 
council
Don’t Know
Council 
approached 
ICLEI
ICLEI 
approached 
council
ICLEI 
approached 
council
ICLEI 
approached 
council
Timing         
(Rationale for 
joining when it 
did)
New political 
buy-in
Keen to do 
something
Right thing to 
do
Right thing to 
do
Fears of 
hidden costs 
dissipated
Increased 
priority for 
responding 
to climate 
change
Climate 
change 
featured more 
prominently as 
a priority
Aim           
(Carbon 
management/ 
neutral)
Manage Manage Manage Manage
Manage... 
carbon 
neutral 
came later
Manage 
carbon
Prior Policy     
(Climate 
change thinking 
before joining 
programme)
Yes - 
sustainability
Yes - 
sustainability No No No
Yes-
adaptation No Split Yes/ No
Buy-in         
(Within council 
and 
management)
Mixed No Not consistent Mixed Mixed Mixed
Buy-in within 
council and 
management 
was 
inconsistent
Data is derived from semi-structured interviews with managers from respective ministry. See Table 5.6 for further details. 
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Table 6.14:  CS2 S2 - support
SUB-THEMES
REGIONAL COUNCIL DISTRICT COUNCIL CITY COUNCIL
OVERALL
Auckland Greater Wellington Rotorua Southland Dunedin Nelson Wellington
Engagement 
with ICLEI      
(Were they 
engaged?)
No Yes Yes Yes No Yes Yes Majority YES
Engagement 
with Partners 
(Were MFE and 
LGNZ 
engaged?)
No No No No No No No Consistent NO
Role of Intern   
(Was the intern 
effective?)
Yes No No
Majority 
believed that 
the intern was 
ineffective
Data is derived from semi-structured interviews with managers from respective ministry. See Table 5.6 for further details. 
Table 6.15:  CS2 S2 - application
SUB-THEMES
REGIONAL COUNCIL DISTRICT COUNCIL CITY COUNCIL
OVERALL
Auckland Greater Wellington Rotorua Southland Dunedin Nelson Wellington
Programme 
Methodology    
(Was the 
programme 
robust enough)
No No Yes Yes No No Not robust enough
Transferability   
(Did the 
programme 
transfer well 
from CCP-
Australia?)
No Yes Yes No Split Yes/ No
Data is derived from semi-structured interviews with managers from respective ministry. See Table 5.6 for further details. 
Table 6.16: CS2 S2 - outcome
SUB-THEMES
REGIONAL COUNCIL DISTRICT COUNCIL CITY COUNCIL
OVERALL
Auckland Greater Wellington Rotorua Southland Dunedin Nelson Wellington
Cost Benefit 
Analysis       
(Did the 
benefits 
outweigh the 
costs?)
Yes Yes Yes Not sure Yes Yes Yes Benefits outweigh costs
Emission 
Reductions     
(Were 
reductions 
experienced?)
Yes Not sure Yes Yes Yes Yes Not sure
Reduction in 
emissions 
occurred
Data is derived from semi-structured interviews with managers from respective ministry. See Table 5.6 for further details. 
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Table 6.17:  CS2 S2 - final thoughts and membership fee
SUB-THEMES
REGIONAL COUNCIL DISTRICT COUNCIL CITY COUNCIL
OVERALL
Auckland Greater Wellington Rotorua Southland Dunedin Nelson Wellington
Programme’s 
Greatest 
Influence on 
Council
Gaining 
political buy-
in; awareness
Awareness 
raising
Catalyst for 
action
Awareness 
raising
Awareness 
raising
Catalyst for 
action
Catalyst for 
action
Raise 
awareness; 
Catalyst for 
action
Summing up 
Council’s 
Experience with 
Programme
Mixed 
experience Fine; 6.5/10 Positive Positive
Disappointin
g Positive Positive
Positive 
experience
Had the MFE 
not Paid the 
Initial 
Membership 
Fee, would 
Council have 
Joined the 
Programme?
Yes No Don’t Know Yes No Yes Split Yes/ No
If the 
Programme had 
Continued, 
would Council 
have Paid the 
Membership 
Fee?
Yes No Yes Yes No No No Split Yes/ No
Data is derived from semi-structured interviews with managers from respective ministry. See Table 5.6 for further details. 
Table 6.18:  CS2 S2 - moving forward
SUB-THEMES
REGIONAL COUNCIL DISTRICT COUNCIL CITY COUNCIL
OVERALL
Auckland Greater Wellington Rotorua Southland Dunedin Nelson Wellington
Has Council 
Joined another 
Programme?
Yes No Yes No Yes No No Split Yes/ No
Carbon 
Management 
Linked into 
Reporting?
No No No Informally No
Next Steps      
(Carbon Neutral/ 
Management/ 
other)
Don’t know Manage/ reduce
Sustainabilit
y policy Manage Reduce Manage Manage
Manage and/
or reduce 
emissions
Reduction Target
Yes - 
corporate: 
41% by 2040
No target No target No target
Stabilize by 
2012 based 
on 2004; 
reduce by 
40% by 
2020
Stabilize 
based on 
2010 levels; 
corporate 
reduce by 
40% by 2020, 
community by 
30% by 2020
Reduce and/
or stabilize
Data is derived from semi-structured interviews with managers from respective ministry. See Table 5.6 for further details. 
Table 6.19:  Presence of word(s) in council Annual Report during the first year of 
  programme membership
Council Year Joined CCP-NZ
Climate 
Change Carbon
Carbon 
Management
Carbon 
Neutral CCP-NZ
Regional Auckland 2006 Yes - 3 times Yes - 1 times No No Yes - 2 timesWellington 2007 Yes - 4 times No No No Yes - 2 times
District Rotorua 2005 No No No No NoSouthland 2005 No No No No No
City 
Dunedin 2006 No No No No No
Nelson 2007 No Yes - 1 time No No No
Wellington* 2004 No Yes- 5 times No No No
TOTAL
Yes 2 3 0 0 2
No 5 4 7 7 5
TOTAL 7 7 7 7 7
Data was extrapolated from the respective council’s Annual Report for the year council joined the CCP-NZ Programme. * Data 
comes from the Executive Summary for the 2004/05 Annual Report.
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Table 6.20:  Presence of word(s) in council Annual Report (2007/ 2008)
Council Climate Change Carbon
Carbon 
Management Carbon Neutral CCP-NZ
Regional Auckland Yes - 8 times Yes - 5 times No No Yes - 2 timesWellington Yes - 2 times Yes - 1 time No No No
District Rotorua Yes - 2 times No No No Yes - 2 timesSouthland No No No No No
City 
Dunedin Yes - 1 time No No No No
Nelson Yes - 4 times Yes - 1 time No No No
Wellington Yes - 20 times Yes - 11 times No Yes - 4 timesYes Yes - 1 time
TOTAL
Yes 6 4 0 1 3
No 1 3 7 6 4
TOTAL 7 7 7 7 7
Data was extrapolated from the respective council’s Annual Report 2007/ 2008.
Table 6.21:  Presence of word(s) in council Annual Report (2008/ 2009)
Council Climate Change Carbon
Carbon 
Management Carbon Neutral CCP-NZ
Regional Auckland Yes - 6 times Yes - 4 times No No NoWellington Yes - 1 time Yes - 3 times No No No
District Rotorua Yes - 2 times Yes - 1 time No No NoSouthland No Yes - 2 times No No No
City 
Dunedin No No No No No
Nelson No Yes - 1 time No No No
Wellington Yes - 9 times Yes - 15 times No No No
TOTAL
Yes 4 6 0 0 0
No 3 1 7 7 7
TOTAL 7 7 7 7 7
Data was extrapolated from the respective council’s Annual Report 2008/ 2009.
Table 6.22:  Presence of word(s) in council Annual Report (2009/ 2010)
Council Climate Change Carbon
Carbon 
Management Carbon Neutral CCP-NZ
Regional Auckland
Data Not 
Available
Data Not 
Available
Data Not 
Available 
Data Not 
Available
Data Not 
Available
Wellington Yes - 1 time No No No No
District Rotorua Yes - 2 times Yes - 1 time No No NoSouthland No Yes - 2 times No No No
City 
Dunedin Yes - 1 time Yes - 5 times No No No
Nelson Yes - 3 times Yes - 4 times No No No
Wellington Yes - 9 times Yes - 9 times No No No
TOTAL
Yes 5 5 0 0 0
No 1 1 6 6 6
Data Not 
Available 1 1 1 1 1
TOTAL 7 7 7 7 7
Data was extrapolated from the respective council’s Annual Report 2009/ 2010.
Table 6.23:  Presence of word(s) in council Long Term Community Council Plan 
  (2009 to 2019)
Council Climate Change Carbon
Carbon 
Management Carbon Neutral CCP-NZ
Regional Auckland Yes - 20 times Yes - 5 times No Yes - 1 time Yes - 1 timeWellington Yes - 30 time Yes - 9 times No Yes - 1 time Yes - 1 time
District Rotorua Yes - 15 times Yes - 18 times No No Yes - 2 timesSouthland Yes - 16 times Yes - 8 times No No Yes - 3 times
City 
Dunedin Yes - 25 times Yes - 1 time No No No
Nelson Yes - 8 times Yes - 6 times No No Yes - 2 times
Wellington Yes - 9 times Yes - 12 times No Yes - 2 times No
TOTAL
Yes 7 7 0 3 5
No 0 0 7 4 2
TOTAL 7 7 7 7 7
Data was extrapolated from the respective council’s Long Term Community Council Plan 2009 to 2019.
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Table 6.24:  Presence of word(s) in council Annual Plan (2010)
Council Climate Change Carbon
Carbon 
Management Carbon Neutral CCP-NZ
Regional Auckland Yes - 7 times No No No NoWellington Yes -1 time Yes - 2 times No No No
District Rotorua No No No No NoSouthland No Yes - 1 time No No No
City 
Dunedin Yes - 5 times Yes - 1 time No No No
Nelson Yes - 4 times Yes -1 time No No No
Wellington Yes - 2 times No No No No
TOTAL
Yes 5 4 0 0 0
No 2 3 7 7 7
TOTAL 7 7 7 7 7
Data was extrapolated from the respective council’s Annual Plan 2010.
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APPENDIX - FIGURES
Figure 3.1:  Projected changes in annual mean temperature relative to 1990
  NIWA (2008). This figure represents the average over 12 climate models for A1B emissions scenario.
  
Figure 3.5:  New Zealand’s total emissions by gas in 2009
  NZ Govt. (2011c). CO2, CH4 and N2O values exclude emissions and removals from LULUCF.
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Figure 3.7:  Absolute change in New Zealand’s total emissions by  sector from 1990 
  to 2009
  NZ Govt. (2011c). Total emissions exclude emissions and removals from the LULUCF sector.
Figure 3.9:  Absolute change from 1990 in New Zealand’s net  removals/ 
  emissions from the LULUCF sector from 1990 to 2009 (UNFCCC 
  reporting)
  NZ Govt. (2011c)
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Figure 3.26:  CCP-NZ study  selection council community emission weights for 
  base-year (2001) and forecast-year (2010) as proportion of sector415
Figure 3.27:  Environment Canterbury Regional Council corporate emission 
  weights by sector for base-year (2001) and forecast-year (2010)416
Figure 3.29:  Environment Canterbury Regional Council community emission   
  weights by sector for base-year (2001) and forecast-year (2010)417
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415 Adapted from Table 3.19 and Table 3.20. See Appendix, Table 3.19 and Table 3.20, for data sets.
416 Adapted from Table 3.17 and Table 3.18. See Appendix, Table 3.17 and Table 3.18, for data sets.
417 Adapted from Table 3.19 and Table 3.20. See Appendix, Table 3.19 and Table 3.20, for data sets.
Figure 3.31:  Greater Wellington Regional Council’s corporate GHG emission  
  reduction goal by sector, as a proportion of forecast year418
Figure 3.35:  Kaikoura District Council community emission weights by  sector for 
  base-year (2001) and forecast-year (2010)419
Figure 3.37:  Southland District  Council corporate emission weights by sector for 
  base-year (2005) and forecast-year (2010)420
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418 Adapted from Table 3.21. See Appendix, Table 3.21 for data set.
419 Adapted from Table 3.19 and Table 3.20. See Appendix, Table 3.19 and Table 3.20, for data sets.
420 Adapted from Table 3.17 and Table 3.18. See Appendix, Table 3.19 and Table 3.20, for data sets.
Figure 3.39:  Southland District Council community emission weights by  sector for 
  base-year (2001) and forecast-year (2010)421
Figure 3.41:  Hamilton City Council corporate emission weights by sector for   
  base-year (2001) and forecast-year (2010)422
Figure 3.43:  Hamilton City Council community emission weights by sector for   
  base-year (2001) and forecast-year (2010)423
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421 Adapted from Table 3.19 and Table 3.20. See Appendix, Table 3.19 and Table 3.20, for data sets.
422 Adapted from Table 3.17 and Table 3.18. See Appendix, Table 3.17 and Table 3.18, for data sets.
423 Adapted from Table 3.19 and Table 3.20. See Appendix, Table 3.19 and Table 3.20, for data sets.
Figure 3.46:  Waitakere City Council corporate emission weights by sector for  
  base-year (2002) and forecast-year (2010)424
Figure 3.48:  Waitakere City Council community emission weights by sector for  
  base-year (2001) and forecast-year (2010)425
Figure 3.51:  Hawkes Bay Regional Council corporate emission weights by sector 
  for base-year (2006) and forecast-year (2012)426
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424 Adapted from Table 3.17 and Table 3.18. See Appendix, Table 3.17 and Table 3.18, for data sets.
425 Adapted from Table 3.19 and Table 3.20. See Appendix, Table 3.19 and Table 3.20, for data sets.
426 Adapted from Table 3.17 and Table 3.18. See Appendix, Table 3.17 and Table 3.18, for data sets.
Figure 3.52:  Far North District Council corporate emission weights by sector for 
  base-year (2006) and forecast-year (2011)427
Figure 3.53:  Rotorua District Council corporate emission weights by sector for 
  base-year (2001) and forecast-year (2010)428
Figure 3.54:  Rotorua District Council corporate emission weights for base-year 
  (2001) and forecast-year (2010) as proportion of sector429
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427 Adapted from Table 3.17 and Table 3.18. See Appendix, Table 3.17 and Table 3.18, for data sets.
428 Adapted from Table 3.17 and Table 3.18. See Appendix, Table 3.17 and Table 3.18, for data sets.
429 Adapted from Table 3.17 and Table 3.18. See Appendix, Table 3.17 and Table 3.18, for data sets.
Figure 3.55:  Rotorua District Council community emission weights by  sector for 
  base-year (2001) and forecast-year (2010)430
Figure 3.56:  Rotorua District Council community emission weights for base-year 
  (2001)  and forecast-year (2010) as proportion of sector431
Figure 3.57:  Auckland City Council corporate emission weights by  sector for 
  base-year (2004) and forecast-year (2010)432
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430 Adapted from Table 3.19 and Table 3.20. See Appendix, Table 3.19 and Table 3.20, for data sets.
431 Adapted from Table 3.19 and Table 3.20. See Appendix, Table 3.19 and Table 3.20, for data sets.
432 Adapted from Table 3.17 and Table 3.18. See Appendix, Table 3.17 and Table 3.18, for data sets.
Figure 3.58:  Auckland City Council corporate emission weights for base-year   (2004) and 
forecast-year (2010) as proportion of sector433
Figure 3.59:  Auckland City  Council community emission weights by sector for 
  base-year (2001) and forecast-year (2010)434
Figure 3.60:  Auckland City  Council community emission weights for base-year 
  (2001) and forecast-year (2010) as proportion of sector435
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433 Adapted from Table 3.17 and Table 3.18. See Appendix, Table 3.17 and Table 3.18, for data sets.
434 Adapted from Table 3.19 and Table 3.20. See Appendix, Table 3.19 and Table 3.20, for data sets.
435 Adapted from Table 3.19 and Table 3.20. See Appendix, Table 3.19 and Table 3.20, for data sets.
Figure 3.61:  Christchurch City Council corporate emission weights by sector for 
  base-year (2001) and forecast-year (2010)436
Figure 3.62:  Christchurch City Council community emission weights by sector for 
  base-year (2001) and forecast-year (2010)437
Figure 3.63:  Nelson City  Council corporate emission weights by sector for 
  base-year (2004) and forecast-year (2010)438
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436 Adapted from Table 3.17 and Table 3.18. See Appendix, Table 3.17 and Table 3.18, for data sets.
437 Adapted from Table 3.19 and Table 3.20. See Appendix, Table 3.19 and Table 3.20, for data sets.
438 Adapted from Table 3.17 and Table 3.18. See Appendix, Table 3.17 and Table 3.18, for data sets.
Figure 3.64:  Nelson City Council corporate emission weights for base-year (2004) 
  and forecast-year (2010) as proportion of sector439
Figure 3.65:  Nelson City Council community  emission weights by sector for 
  base-year (2001) and forecast-year (2010)440
Figure 3.66:  Nelson City  Council community emission weights for base-year 
  (2001) and forecast-year (2010) as proportion of sector441
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439 Adapted from Table 3.17 and Table 3.18. See Appendix, Table 3.17 and Table 3.18, for data sets.
440 Adapted from Table 3.19 and Table 3.20. See Appendix, Table 3.19 and Table 3.20, for data sets.
441 Adapted from Table 3.19 and Table 3.20. See Appendix, Table 3.19 and Table 3.20, for data sets.
Figure 3.67:  Wellington City Council corporate emission weights by sector for   
  base-year (2003) and forecast-year (2010)442
Figure 3.68:  Wellington City Council corporate emission weights for base-year 
  (2003) and forecast-year (2010) as proportion of sector443
Figure 3.69:  Wellington City Council community  emission weights by sector for 
  base-year (2001) and forecast-year (2010)444
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442 Adapted from Table 3.17 and Table 3.18. See Appendix, Table 3.17 and Table 3.18, for data sets.
443 Adapted from Table 3.17 and Table 3.18. See Appendix, Table 3.17 and Table 3.18, for data sets.
444 Adapted from Table 3.19 and Table 3.20. See Appendix, Table 3.19 and Table 3.20, for data sets.
Figure 3.70:  Wellington City Council community  emission weights for base-year 
  (2001)  and forecast-year (2010) as proportion of sector445
Figure 3.71:  Wellington City Council GHG emission reduction goal by total 
  emissions446
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445 Adapted from Table 3.19 and Table 3.20. See Appendix, Table 3.19 and Table 3.20, for data sets.
446 See Appendix, Table 3.24, for data set.
APPENDIX - ARTICLES
Article 5.1:  Human Ethics Committee approval (CS1)
Ref:  HEC 2009/115 
31 August 2009
Jeff Birchall
Department of Accounting & Information Systems
UNIVERSITY OF CANTERBURY
Dear Jeff 
The Human Ethics Committee advises that your research proposal “Organisational 
involvement in climate control: The outcomes and lessons learned from the now dismantled 
Carbon Neutral Public Sector initiative” has been considered and approved.  
Please note that this approval is subject to the incorporation of the amendments you have 
provided in your email of 20 August 2009.
Best wishes for your project.
Yours sincerely
Dr Michael Grimshaw
Chair, Human Ethics Committee
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Article 5.2:  Human Ethics Committee approval (CS2 S1)
Ref:  HEC 2009/167 
25 November 2009 
Jeff Birchall
Department of Accounting & Information Systems
UNIVERSITY OF CANTERBURY
Dear Jeff 
The Human Ethics Committee advises that your research proposal “Organizational 
Involvement in Climate Control: The Outcomes and Lessons Learned from the now 
Dismantled Communities for Climate Protection (CCP) – NZ Programme” has been 
considered and approved.  
Please note that this approval is subject to the incorporation of the amendments you have 
provided in your email of 21 November 2009.
Best wishes for your project.
Yours sincerely
Dr Michael Grimshaw
Chair, Human Ethics Committee
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Article 5.3:  Human Ethics Committee approval (CS2 S2)
Ref:  HEC 2010/144 
22 October 2010
Jeff Birchall
Department of Accounting & Information Systems
UNIVERSITY OF CANTERBURY
Dear Jeff 
The Human Ethics Committee advises that your research proposal “Organisational 
involvement in climate control: carbon management/neutrality work (if any) continued within 
New Zealand councils since the discontinuation of the Communities for Climate Protection – 
New Zealand Programme” has been considered and approved.  
Please note that this approval is subject to the incorporation of the amendments you have 
provided in your email of 15 October 2010.  Further, in point 10 of the consent form, please 
remove the words “Educational Research” as it should read University of Canterbury Human 
Ethics Committee.
Best wishes for your project.
Yours sincerely
Dr Michael Grimshaw
Chair, Human Ethics Committee
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Article 5.4:  Invitation to participate
College of Business and Economics
S. Jeff Birchall, PhD Candidate, Marsden Researcher
Department of Accounting and Information Systems
Tel: +64 3 364 2987 ext. 8277, Fax: + 64 3 364 2727
Email: jeffrey.birchall@canterbury.ac.nz 
ORGANIZATIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN CLIMATE CONTROL:  
THE OUTCOMES AND LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE NOW DISMANTLED COMMUNITIES FOR 
CLIMATE PROTECTION – NZ PROGRAMME447
To Whom It May Concern:
My name is Jeff Birchall, I am a PhD candidate working as part of a collaborative research team here 
at the University of Canterbury.
I am writing to request your participation in research into the Communities for Climate Protection 
(CCP) – NZ programme.
I realize that the CCP-NZ programme has been discontinued, but the initiative is still a focus of a 
Royal Society of New Zealand Marsden funded, three-year research programme on Carbon 
Neutrality: Fact or Fiction. At this stage I am redirecting the research towards understanding the 
lessons from the CCP-NZ for organizational involvement in climate control.   
The project is being carried out towards partial  completion of a Thesis, as a requirement for a PhD in 
Accounting and Information Systems by myself, under the supervision of Professor Amanda Ball  and 
Professor Markus Milne, who can be contacted at amanda.ball@canterbury.ac.nz, Phone: 
64-3-364-2614; and markus.milne@canterbury.ac.nz, Phone: 64 3 364 2624. They will be pleased to 
discuss any concerns you may have about participation in the project. The project has been reviewed 
and approved by the University of Canterbury Human Ethics Committee.
I understand that you are likely to be very busy in your position; however I would very much 
appreciate the opportunity of interviewing you or your colleagues in order to understand the lessons 
and outcomes of CCP-NZ, and what (if any) work is likely to continue within the Council.
Thank you for your time.
Kind regards,
S. Jeff Birchall
PhD Candidate, Marsden Researcher
College of Business and Economics
Department of Accounting and Information Systems
University of Canterbury
Private Bag 4800
Christchurch 8140, New Zealand
jeffrey.birchall@canterbury.ac.nz
364 2987x8277
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447  While this represents the initial email to the CCP-NZ programme participants, the email to the CNPS programme participants was the same, save 
reference to the respective programme.
Article 5.5:  Research information brief
College of Business and Economics
S. Jeff Birchall, PhD Candidate, Marsden Researcher
Department of Accounting and Information Systems
Tel: +64 3 364 2987 ext. 8277, Fax: + 64 3 364 2727
Email: jeffrey.birchall@canterbury.ac.nz 
ORGANIZATIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN CLIMATE CONTROL:  THE OUTCOMES AND LESSONS 
LEARNED FROM THE NOW DISMANTLED COMMUNITIES FOR CLIMATE PROTECTION – NZ 
PROGRAMME448
INFORMATION
You are invited to participate as a subject in the research project: 
‘Organizational involvement in climate control:  The outcomes and lessons learned from the now 
dismantled Communities for Climate Protection (CCP) – NZ programme.’
This research is being conducted by Jeff Birchall, for partial completion of a PhD Thesis in the 
department of Accounting and Information Systems at the University of Canterbury.   The project has 
been reviewed and approved by the University of Canterbury Human Ethics Committee.
The overall  objective of the research is to systematically and critically investigate New Zealand public 
sector organizations’ claims and actions around climate change. 
The research explores how the New Zealand public  sector makes sense of climate change discourse; 
their drivers and motivations for and ultimate actions on climate change; their accounts and 
accountabilities for action on climate change; and ultimately their willingness and ability to reorient 
commitment, identify and behaviour toward fundamental transformation of the New Zealand economy.
The research will focus on New Zealand councils involved in the Communities for Climate Protection 
(CCP) – NZ programme.
The research will  involve semi-structured interviews with the relevant environmental  personnel  of 
participant public sector organizations (for example environmental, carbon, emissions, sustainability, 
or facilities managers). 
The semi-structured interviews will be designed to allow a free flow of conversation, driven by the 
participants’ opinion of New Zealand’s climate change situation, its relationship with their organisation, 
and their role in climate change policy and mitigation.  
Questions will  be guided to identify their perspectives, and opinions on the motivations, drivers and 
barriers to their organisation adopting climate change strategies.  While the structure of the interviews 
will  be prompted by a number of guided questions, the aim is to facilitate a conversation that allows 
the participants to describe their organisation's position on climate change.
This research is being conducted as part of a Royal Society Marsden funded research project at the 
University of Canterbury, investigating New Zealand organizations’ claims of ‘carbon-neutrality.’  The 
finalised results of this initial  PhD research project (by way of thesis and publications) may be used to 
inform subsequent publications from the wider Marsden project.  However, no confidential information 
obtained during this PhD research process will  be available to be used by the Marsden research 
team.  The tape recorded interviews will be transcribed in writing with the name of the participant 
remaining confidential.  Raw data transcripts will not be available to anyone other than myself and my 
project supervisors, and neither will  the researcher (or supervisors) discuss the content of these 
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448  While this represents the information brief sent to the CCP-NZ programme participants, the information brief sent to the CNPS programme participants 
was the same, save reference to the respective programme.
transcripts with anyone beyond the anonymised and disguised extracts that are made available 
through the PhD thesis and other published works arising from it.
All  participants will be provided information regarding the study and the research will only commence 
under voluntary informed consent, and when the rights of privacy and rights to withdrawal  are agreed. 
To remove any risks of misrepresentation, the participant and any other interested member of the 
organisation will be sent the interview transcript if they wish.  If the organisation finds any reason not 
to agree with the researcher’s work, the organisation is free to withdraw from the study or recommend 
revision of the drafted work.  The final copy of the PhD thesis will  be publicly available at the 
University of Canterbury and on the university’s website.  
The project is being carried out towards partial  completion of a Thesis, as a requirement for a PhD in 
Accounting and Information Systems by Jeff Birchall, under the supervision of Professor Amanda Ball 
and Professor Markus Milne, who can be contacted at [amanda.ball@canterbury.ac.nz, Phone: 
64-3-364-2614; and markus.milne@canterbury.ac.nz, Phone: +64 3 364 2624. They will  be pleased to 
discuss any concerns you may have about participation in the project. 
Thank you for your consideration.  
Kind regards,
S. Jeff Birchall
PhD Candidate, Marsden Researcher
College of Business and Economics
Department of Accounting and Information Systems
University of Canterbury
Private Bag 4800
Christchurch 8140, New Zealand
jeffrey.birchall@canterbury.ac.nz
364 2987x8277
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Article 5.6:  Participant consent form
College of Business and Economics
S. Jeff Birchall, PhD Candidate, Marsden Researcher
Department of Accounting and Information Systems
Tel: +64 3 364 2987 ext. 8277, Fax: + 64 3 364 2727
Email: jeffrey.birchall@canterbury.ac.nz 
ORGANIZATIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN CLIMATE CONTROL:  THE OUTCOMES AND LESSONS 
LEARNED FROM THE NOW DISMANTLED COMMUNITIES FOR CLIMATE PROTECTION – NZ 
PROGRAMME449
CONSENT FORM FOR PARTICIPANTS
I have read the Information Sheet concerning this project and understand what it is about. All my 
questions have been answered to my satisfaction. I understand that I am free to request further 
information at any stage.
I know that:
1. My participation in the project is entirely voluntary;
2. I am free to withdraw from the project at any time without disadvantage;
3. At the end of the research any raw data (with the code names of the research participants only) 
on which the results of the research or related publications depend, as required by the 
University’s research policy, will be retained in secure storage for five years, after which it will be 
destroyed. Once data matching has occurred, the list matching the participants name with the 
research code name will be destroyed by the researcher or project supervisors; 
4. I may decline to answer any questions if I so wish, without any disadvantage to myself of any 
kind;
5. The precise nature of the questions to be asked in the interview have not been determined in 
advance, but will depend on the way in which the interview develops. Consequently, although the 
Ethics Committee is aware of the general areas to be explored in the interview, the Committee has 
not been able to review the precise questions to be used;
6. If the line of questioning develops in such a way that I feel hesitant or uncomfortable, I may 
decline to answer any particular question(s) and I may withdraw from the interview, without any 
disadvantage to myself of any kind; 
7. I may withdraw from the process at any time without any disadvantage to myself of any kind. If 
I terminate the research process before its conclusion, or am unable to continue, then the tape 
and transcript, will be destroyed at my request;
8. No remuneration is offered for my participation in this project;
9. The results of the research may be published but my anonymity will be preserved.
I agree to take part in this project.
……………………………………..
(Printed name of participant)
……………………………………..  ……………………
(Signature of participant)     (Date)
This project has been reviewed and approved by the Ethics Committee of the University of 
Canterbury.
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449  While this represents the consent form provided to the CCP-NZ programme participants, the consent form provided to the CNPS programme 
participants was the same, save reference to the respective programme.
Article 5.7:  Researcher security and confidentiality form
College of Business and Economics
S. Jeff Birchall, PhD Candidate, Marsden Researcher
Department of Accounting and Information Systems
Tel: +64 3 364 2987 ext. 8277, Fax: + 64 3 364 2727
Email: jeffrey.birchall@canterbury.ac.nz 
ORGANIZATIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN CLIMATE CONTROL:  THE OUTCOMES AND LESSONS 
LEARNED FROM THE NOW DISMANTLED COMMUNITIES FOR CLIMATE PROTECTION – NZ 
PROGRAMME450
AGREEMENT OF SECURITY AND CONFIDENTIALITY BY RESEARCHER
I agree to keep all personal information confidential and secure;
I agree to keep the list that matches participants’ identities with their research identification code 
confidential and secure in a locked cabinet in the department administrator's cabinet;
I agree to destroy the list that matches participants’ identities with their research identification code 
once data matching has occurred; 
I agree to keep the identity of interviewees, and the contents of the tapes and transcripts confidential; 
and,
I agree to destroy the tapes once they have been transcribed.
…………………………………………………
(Printed name of the researcher)
…………………………………………………  ………………………......................
(Signature of researcher)      (Date)
NOTE: The project has been reviewed and approved by the University of Canterbury Human Ethics 
Committee.
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450  While this represents the researchers’ agreement of security and confidentiality for the interviews with participants from the CCP-NZ programme, the 
same form was used for participants of the CNPS programme, save reference to the respective programme.
Article 5.8:  Semi-structured interview questions (CS1)
College of Business and Economics
S. Jeff Birchall, PhD Candidate, Marsden Researcher
Department of Accounting and Information Systems
Private Bag 4800, Christchurch 8140, New Zealand
Tel: +64 3 364 2987 ext. 8277, Fax: + 64 3 364 2727
Email: jeffrey.birchall@canterbury.ac.nz
ORGANIZATIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN CLIMATE CONTROL:
THE OUTCOMES AND LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE NOW DISMANTLED COMMUNITIES 
FOR CLIMATE PROTECTION - NZ PROGRAMME
SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
NOTE: The project has been reviewed and approved by the University of Canterbury 
Human Ethics Committee.
Please state your name, title, and describe your role in the CCP-NZ programme…
(identity will be coded prior to interview transcription; participants will be identified 
strictly by their Ministry/Department/Council)
1. Discuss the value, in general, to a public  sector organization participating in the CCP-NZ 
programme.
2. Ultimately, why did your council become a member of the CCP-NZ programme?
3. What does carbon management and carbon neutrality mean for your council?
a. Was/is your council striving for carbon neutrality?
4. In joining the CCP-NZ programme, was your council  aiming to be a leader, and if so, how was this 
role benchmarked against other public sector organizations (national/ international)?
Application
1. Discuss the resources you were provided to complete the programme’s milestones.
a. How was it decided who would manage the inventory and action plan? 
b. To what extent did staff get involved? 
c. What kind of climate change awareness programs were available to staff?
d. How was the CCP-NZ programme received by staff? Was there an opportunity for 
staff feedback?
2. What milestone did your council reach before the programme was cancelled?
3. What were the barriers to achieving the next milestone?
4. How did you determine your council’s action plan?
a. How did anomalies in your inventory play into the action plan? 
5. In working through your inventory and action plan, how were you supported by inter-council 
sharing of best practices?
a. Did you have any joint/inter-council emissions reduction programs? Activities? 
Competitions?
b. Did you liaise with private organizations?
6. How was the CCP-NZ programme linked to other environmental (air quality, watersheds)/ 
ecological (habitat, diversification)/ sustainable development (land-use change) initiatives?
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Termination Process
1. Why was the CCP-NZ programme dismantled? 
a. How was this received by your staff/council?
2. How was the effectiveness of the CCP-NZ programme evaluated before it was terminated?  
a. Were stakeholders consulted?
3. Discuss your thoughts as to whether or not the CCP-NZ programme had strong collaborative 
leadership?
Outcomes
1. What have been the co-benefits of participating in the CCP-NZ programme?
2. How did completing the emissions inventory and action plan redefine management practices?
a. How has the CCP-NZ programme affected cost? Has your department built a carbon cost 
into its operating budget?
3. How will you measure the performance of your council’s emission reduction activities?
a. How will you determine the success of a given initiative?
4. Was the CCP-NZ programme a success?
Moving Forward
1. How has the momentum for the underlying values of the CCP-NZ programme changed in your 
council since the programme was cancelled?
2. How will you seek to reduce your emissions in the future? 
a. What have you learned about how your core business impacts the environment?
b. How has staff behaviour changed?
c. What lessons have been learned from the CCP-NZ programme itself, i.e. in terms of 
methodology and organization? 
3. How will the status of your current emission reduction activities be affected by the dismantling of 
the CCP-NZ programme?
a. Will  your emission reduction activities also be discontinued? If so, how will  you decide 
which activities to discontinue?
4. What is your department’s long-term goal with regards to emissions reductions?
5. What do you see as the next iteration of the CCP-NZ programme, and will your council take part? 
Opinion/Thoughts
1. Discuss your thoughts on carbon offsets as a means to achieve carbon neutrality. 
a. Was carbon offsetting a component of your council’s action plan? 
b. What kind of signal does a weighted ratio of offset to mitigation activities give the public, 
industry? … business a little less than usual?
c. In your option, are councils doing all they can to maximise their emission reductions via 
mitigation activities?
2. What is the responsibility of NZ public  sector with regards to reducing national and global 
emissions?
a. Does the responsibility for curbing public  sector emissions lie outside the scope of public 
administration?  Why?
3. With regards to public  sector awareness and action against climate change, discuss your 
thoughts on whether or not a paradigm shift has occurred.
4. What sort of public  communication has your council had with regards to its emission reductions 
activities?
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a. How do you think the public will perceive your council’s, and the government’s new 
direction?
5. Discuss your thought on whether or not the transition to a low carbon society/economy depends 
more on an effective decision making mechanism or the willingness and acceptance of the public 
for change?
6. What does New Zealand have to do in order “to be truly sustainable – across the four pillars of 
the economy, the society, the environment, and nationhood” (Clark, 2007c)? 
7. Discuss what you think our role is within the environment? 
a. Are we too late to reverse climate change? 
b. Should we focus our efforts on adapting to a new climate or mitigating against the 
change?
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Article 5.9:   Semi-structured interview questions (CS2 S1)
College of Business and Economics
S. Jeff Birchall, PhD Candidate, Marsden Researcher
Department of Accounting and Information Systems
Private Bag 4800, Christchurch 8140, New Zealand
Tel: +64 3 364 2987 ext. 8277, Fax: + 64 3 364 2727
Email: jeffrey.birchall@canterbury.ac.nz
ORGANIZATIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN CLIMATE CONTROL:
THE OUTCOMES AND LESSONS LEARNED FROM THE NOW 
DISMANTLED COMMUNITIES FOR CLIMATE 
PROTECTION – NZ PROGRAMME
SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
NOTE: The project has been reviewed and approved by the University of Canterbury 
Human Ethics Committee.
Please state your name, title, and describe your role in the CCP-NZ programme…
(identity will be coded prior to interview transcription; participants will be identified strictly 
by their Ministry/Department)
1. Discuss the value, in general, to a public sector organization participating in the CCP-NZ 
programme.
2. Ultimately, why did your council become a member of the CCP-NZ programme?
3. What does carbon management and carbon neutrality mean for your council?
a. Was/is your council striving for carbon neutrality?
4. In joining the CCP-NZ programme, was your council aiming to be a leader, and if so, 
how was this role benchmarked against other public sector organizations (national/ 
international)?
Application
1. Discuss the resources you were provided to complete the programme’s milestones.
a. How was it decided who would manage the inventory and action plan? 
b. To what extent did staff get involved? 
c. What kind of climate change awareness programs were available to staff?
d. How was the CCP-NZ programme received by staff? Was there an opportunity 
for staff feedback?
2. What milestone did your council reach before the programme was cancelled?
3. What were the barriers to achieving the next milestone?
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4. How did you determine your council’s action plan?
a. How did anomalies in your inventory play into the action plan? 
5. In working through your inventory and action plan, how were you supported by inter-
council sharing of best practices?
a. Did you have any joint/inter-council emissions reduction programs? 
Activities? Competitions?
b. Did you liaise with private organizations?
6. How was the CCP-NZ programme linked to other environmental (air quality, 
watersheds)/ ecological (habitat, diversification)/ sustainable development (land-use 
change) initiatives?
Termination Process
1. Why was the CCP-NZ programme dismantled? 
a. How was this received by your staff/council?
2. How was the effectiveness of the CCP-NZ programme evaluated before it was 
terminated?  
a. Were stakeholders consulted?
3. Discuss your thoughts as to whether or not the CCP-NZ programme had strong 
collaborative leadership?
Outcomes
1. What have been the co-benefits of participating in the CCP-NZ programme?
2. How did completing the emissions inventory and action plan redefine management 
practices?
a. How has the CCP-NZ programme affected cost? Has your department built a 
carbon cost into its operating budget?
3. How will you measure the performance of your council’s emission reduction activities?
a. How will you determine the success of a given initiative?
4. Was the CCP-NZ programme a success?
Moving Forward
1. How has the momentum for the underlying values of the CCP-NZ programme changed in 
your council since the programme was cancelled?
2. How will you seek to reduce your emissions in the future? 
a. What have you learned about how your core business impacts the 
environment?
b. How has staff behaviour changed?
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c. What lessons have been learned from the CCP-NZ programme itself, i.e. in 
terms of methodology and organization? 
3. How will the status of your current emission reduction activities be affected by the 
dismantling of the CCP-NZ programme?
a. Will your emission reduction activities also be discontinued? If so, how will 
you decide which activities to discontinue?
4. What is your department’s long-term goal with regards to emissions reductions?
5. What do you see as the next iteration of the CCP-NZ programme, and will your council 
take part? 
Opinion/Thoughts
1. Discuss your thoughts on carbon offsets as a means to achieve carbon neutrality. 
a. Was carbon offsetting a component of your council’s action plan? 
b. What kind of signal does a weighted ratio of offset to mitigation activities give the 
public, industry? … business a little less than usual?
c. In your option, are councils doing all they can to maximise their emission 
reductions via mitigation activities?
2. What is the responsibility of NZ public sector with regards to reducing national and 
global emissions?
a. Does the responsibility for curbing public sector emissions lie outside the scope of 
public administration?  Why?
3. With regards to public sector awareness and action against climate change, discuss your 
thoughts on whether or not a paradigm shift has occurred.
4. What sort of public communication has your council had with regards to its emission 
reductions activities?
a. How do you think the public will perceive your council’s, and the government’s 
new direction?
5. Discuss your thought on whether or not the transition to a low carbon society/economy 
depends more on an effective decision making mechanism or the willingness and 
acceptance of the public for change?
6. What does New Zealand have to do in order “to be truly sustainable – across the four 
pillars of the economy, the society, the environment, and nationhood” (Clark, 2007c)? 
7. Discuss what you think our role is within the environment? 
a. Are we too late to reverse climate change? 
b. Should we focus our efforts on adapting to a new climate or mitigating against the 
change?
Organizational Involvement in Carbon Mitigation
342
Article 5.10:   Semi-structured interview questions (CS2 S2)
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Department of Accounting and Information Systems
Private Bag 4800, Christchurch 8140, New Zealand
Tel: +64 3 364 2987 ext. 8277, Fax: + 64 3 364 2727
Email: jeffrey.birchall@canterbury.ac.nz 
ORGANIZATIONAL INVOLVEMENT IN CLIMATE CONTROL:  
CARBON MANAGEMENT/ NEUTRALITY WORK (IF ANY) CONTINUED WITHIN NEW ZEALAND 
COUNCILS SINCE THE DISCONTINUATION OF THE CCP – NZ PROGRAMME
SEMI-STRUCTURED INTERVIEW QUESTIONS
The project has been reviewed and approved by the University of Canterbury Human Ethics 
Committee.
Please state your name, title, and describe your role in the CCP-NZ programme… (identity will  be 
coded prior to interview transcription; participants will  be identified strictly by their Ministry/ 
Department)
General
1. What made your council decide to join CCP-NZ when it did?? Why not sooner?
a. Did your council go to ICLEI or did ICLEI approach your council to join?
b. Was there a particular individual within your council  that championed the 
programme?
2. With regard to climate change and carbon management would you say that, within your council, 
buy-in exist at all levels? 
 Politicians
 Executive management
 Management 
 General staff
 Community
3. Did your council have strong senior management support for CCP-NZ?
a. Does that support matter?
4. Was climate change thinking part of council policy before it joined the CCP-NZ programme?
5. How does carbon management factor into your council’s Annual Report? LTCCP?
a. How does carbon management link with existing financial or energy policy?
6. When your council joined the CCP-NZ programme, was it aiming to manage its carbon or go 
carbon neutral?
Costs and Emissions
1. Would your council have joined the programme if the MFE had NOT provided the initial funding?
2. For your council, have the benefits resulting from the programme out-weighted the costs?
3. What have been some of the major costs associated with your councils’ participation in the 
programme?
4. Had the programme continued, would your council have paid the membership fee?
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5. Did your council experience emission reductions as a result of activities stemming from its 
membership in CCP-NZ?
a. How did/do you measure this?
CCP-NZ Methodology
1. What lessons have been learned from the CCP-NZ programme itself, i.e. in terms of 
methodology?
2. Do you think that the programme’s methodology was sufficiently rigorous?
3. Was the CCP-NZ programme effective for your council? 
a. Did the programme’s framework apply to your council? – CCP-Aus.
4. How engaged was ICLIE throughout your council’s CCP-NZ experience?
5. In terms of programme delivery, what role did MFE’s play? LGNZ?  ICLEI?
Moving Forward
1. Is your council currently seeking to:
a. Manage its carbon emissions?
b. Reduce its carbon emissions?
c. Go carbon neutral?
2. What is your council’s current carbon emission reduction target?
a.How does this differ from when your council was part of CCP-NZ?
3. Since the dismantling of the CCP-NZ programme, has your council  joined another carbon 
management programme? 
a. Which one? 
b. What is the cost? 
c. What does it involve?
Opinion/ Thought
1. What was the greatest influence CCP-NZ had on your council?
2. How would you sum up your councils’ experience with the CCP-NZ programme?
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